Reynoldo Martin-Godinez v. State of Florida , 225 So. 3d 926 ( 2017 )


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  •                                         IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA
    REYNOLDO                MARTIN-         NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
    GODINEZ,                                FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
    Appellant,
    CASE NO. 1D16-1860
    v.
    STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Appellee.
    _____________________________/
    Opinion filed August 15, 2017.
    An appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
    Linda F. McCallum, Judge.
    Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Barbara J. Busharis, Assistant Public Defender,
    Tallahassee, for Appellant.
    Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Robert Quentin Humphrey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
    ROBERTS, J.
    In this appeal, the appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his pre-trial
    motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement at a time when he had not
    been provided with an appropriate interpreter. We find no error in the trial court’s
    denial of the motion to suppress and affirm.
    The appellant is a native of Guatemala and primarily speaks a dialect of the
    Mayan language, Mayan Mam, along with some Spanish. The State filed sexual
    battery and lewd and lascivious molestation charges against the twenty-two-year-old
    appellant, claiming he molested his niece who was between eight and nine years old
    at the time. After he was identified as a suspect, the appellant was detained and
    interviewed by a Spanish-speaking detective. At the outset of the interview, the
    appellant told the detective that he only spoke a little English, but he did speak
    Spanish. The detective asked the appellant several questions in Spanish about his
    background and reviewed his constitutional rights. The appellant was sufficiently
    able to answer the questions and voiced an understanding of his rights. The appellant
    signed a Miranda1 wavier form and was able to read the first line aloud to the
    detective. After affirmatively waiving his rights, the appellant agreed to speak with
    the detective and provided several incriminating statements.
    The appellant later moved to suppress the statements, arguing that they were
    obtained in violation of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to
    counsel because he did not understand his Miranda rights and the interview, which
    were conducted in Spanish instead of Mayan Mam. The appellant argued that his
    1
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966).
    2
    limited education further impeded his ability to understand his legal rights. The State
    responded that the appellant never conveyed that he could not understand Spanish,
    never asked for a Mayan Mam interpreter, and had agreed to talk with the detective
    after affirmatively waiving his Miranda rights. The trial court denied the motion to
    suppress upon the “totality of the circumstances,” which included its review of the
    DVD and transcript of the interview and consideration of the testimony and
    argument at the suppression hearing.2 It found the appellant understood Spanish
    enough to freely and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights with a full understanding
    of what he was doing and he had agreed to speak with the detective.
    On appeal, the appellant argues that it was error to deny the motion to suppress
    where the totality of the circumstances, including his language barrier, lack of
    education, relatively short time in the United States, and lack of exposure to the
    judicial system, supported a conclusion that he did not knowingly, intelligently, or
    2
    The court also considered the observations of a previous judge who had presided
    over an earlier hearing on child hearsay evidence, which the appellant does not
    challenge on appeal. The previous judge had denied the appellant’s request to delay
    the proceedings in order to find a Mayan Mam interpreter. The previous judge
    personally observed that the appellant had a sufficient command of Spanish such
    that continuing the proceedings with a Spanish interpreter would not jeopardize his
    constitutional rights. While declining to delay the proceedings, defense counsel was
    allowed to continue to search for a Mayan Mam interpreter. One was eventually
    located and was present from the appellant’s suppression hearing throughout the
    remainder of trial.
    3
    voluntarily waive his right to counsel or his privilege against self-incrimination. We
    disagree.
    A ruling on a motion to suppress comes to the appellate court with a
    presumption of correctness. Spivey v. State, 
    45 So. 3d 51
    , 54 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010)
    (citing Connor v. State, 
    803 So. 2d 598
    , 605 (Fla. 2001)). This Court applies a mixed
    standard of review, giving deference to the factual findings that are supported by
    competent, substantial evidence, but reviewing the determination of constitutional
    rights de novo. 
    Id.
    The State carried the burden to prove the appellant waived his Miranda rights
    by a preponderance of the evidence. Balthazar v. State, 
    549 So. 2d 661
    , 662 (Fla.
    1989). In order to waive Miranda rights, the waiver must be made “voluntarily,
    knowingly and intelligently.” Murdock v. State, 
    115 So. 3d 1050
    , 1055 (Fla. 4th
    DCA 2013) (citations omitted). The burden of proving voluntariness is “heavier”
    when a defendant claims a language barrier, but the standard of proof remains the
    same. Balthazar, 
    549 So. 2d at 662
    . The appellant does not claim that his waiver
    was the product of intimidation, coercion, or deception. Therefore, the totality of
    the circumstances must show that his waiver was made with a full awareness of the
    rights he was abandoning and the consequences of the abandonment. Murdock, 
    115 So. 3d at
    1055 (citing Louis v. State, 
    855 So. 2d 253
    , 255 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).
    4
    The trial judge’s finding that the appellant understood Spanish well enough to
    freely and voluntarily waive his Miranda rights with a full understanding of what he
    was doing is supported by competent, substantial evidence. The appellant was able
    to sufficiently answer the detective’s background questions in Spanish, and he
    acknowledged he understood the rights he was waiving. The appellant argues that
    the trial judge failed to consider factors beyond his language barrier; however, her
    ruling was made upon consideration of the “totality of the circumstances.” While
    the appellant did state he only had a second-grade education, there was no indication
    that he had anything but average intelligence. His answers to the detective’s
    questions indicated he had a sufficient understanding of the judicial system. For
    example, when asked if he knew what a lawyer was, the appellant stated it was
    someone to advocate for him. After the appellant affirmatively waived his rights,
    the interview continued in Spanish wherein the appellant provided a detailed account
    of his actions against his niece. Accordingly, the trial judge appropriately denied
    the motion to suppress, allowing for the admission of the appellant’s incriminating
    statements.
    AFFIRMED.
    LEWIS and WINSOR, JJ., CONCUR.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-1860

Citation Numbers: 225 So. 3d 926

Filed Date: 8/27/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023