In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: E.C. and A.C. v. Indiana Department of Child Services and Child Advocates, Inc. (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                              FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                     Nov 30 2017, 8:34 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                       CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                        Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                                   and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Daniel G. Foote                                          Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    Attorney General of Indiana
    Katherine A. Cornelius
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Termination of the Parent-                        November 30, 2017
    Child Relationship of:                                   Court of Appeals Case No.
    49A05-1706-JT-1375
    E.C. and A.C.,
    Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Court Juvenile Division
    v.                                               The Honorable Marilyn A.
    Moores, Judge
    The Indiana Department of                                The Honorable Larry Bradley,
    Child Services and Child                                 Magistrate
    Advocates, Inc.,                                         Trial Court Cause No.
    49D09-1601-JT-68
    Appellee-Petitioner
    Altice, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1706-JT-1375 | November 30, 2017        Page 1 of 14
    Case Summary
    [1]   A.C. (Father) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his
    son E.C., who is now three years old. Although Father is a stranger to E.C.,
    having been incarcerated all but a couple months of the child’s life, Father urges
    that his release from prison is imminent and that he should be granted
    additional time to work toward reunification. Accordingly, he contends that
    the trial court’s termination order is clearly erroneous.
    [2]   We affirm.
    Facts & Procedural History
    [3]   E.C. was born on October 29, 2014, having been exposed to opioids due to
    Mother’s drug use during the pregnancy. After a five-day stay in the NICU, he
    came home to live with Mother and Father. Father, at the time, was serving
    time in community corrections on home detention as the result of a 2014
    conviction for Class C felony burglary.1
    [4]   On or about December 14, 2014, Father battered Mother in E.C.’s presence,
    resulting in Father’s arrest that same night. On January 20, 2015, Father pled
    guilty to Class A misdemeanor domestic battery in exchange for time served
    and 289 days suspended to probation. Father was ordered to complete a 26-
    1
    Father has a history of criminal convictions, arrests, and probation/parole violations dating back a number
    of years. Since just 2012, he has been convicted of disorderly conduct, battery, receiving stolen property,
    burglary, and domestic battery.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1706-JT-1375 | November 30, 2017         Page 2 of 14
    week domestic violence counseling program while on probation and to have no
    contact with Mother, among others. Additionally, as a result of this new
    offense, Father’s placement in community corrections was revoked in the
    burglary case and he was ordered to serve the remainder of his four-year
    sentence in the Department of Correction (DOC).
    [5]   In the meantime, Mother left E.C. in the care of another individual on January
    7, 2015, and did not return. This individual contacted the Indiana Department
    of Child Services (DCS) two days later due to Mother’s apparent abandonment
    of E.C. The DCS took two-month-old E.C. into custody and filed a petition
    alleging E.C. to be a Child in Need of Services (CHINS). After the detention
    hearing in January 2015, Erma Watson, the Family Case Manager (FCM)
    assigned to E.C.’s case, visited Father in jail. FCM Watson provided Father
    with a summons and rights form, an incarcerated parent letter, her contact
    information, and other information about the CHINS proceedings. Father was
    also informed that the DCS would accept collect calls from him. Further,
    counsel was appointed to represent Father at the continued initial hearing in
    February 2015. Thereafter, E.C. was adjudicated a CHINS. At the
    dispositional hearing on June 17, 2015, services for Father were not ordered
    due to his incarceration. Father was directed to contact the DCS within
    seventy-two hours of being released.
    [6]   At the permanency hearing on January 6, 2016, the DCS requested that the
    permanency plan change from reunification to adoption due to Mother’s
    nonparticipation with services and Father’s continued incarceration. Father
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1706-JT-1375 | November 30, 2017   Page 3 of 14
    objected – indicating that “he was going to engage in services during his
    incarceration” – and requested parenting time. Exhibits Vol. III at 6. The trial
    court denied Father’s request for parenting time. Noting that “[n]either parent
    has addressed the issues of domestic violence or instability that led to the filing
    of this action”, the court found that changing the plan to adoption was in E.C.’s
    best interests. Id. Accordingly, on January 21, 2016, the DCS filed a petition to
    terminate the parent-child relationship between Father and E.C.2
    [7]   During the pendency of the termination proceedings, Father was released from
    the DOC on July 14, 2016. He left one voicemail message for FCM Watson
    following his release but then never returned any of her calls. Father spoke
    with E.C.’s Guardian ad Litem (GAL) once and was informed of two
    upcoming hearings: July 20 in the CHINS case and July 29 in the termination
    case. Father did not appear for either hearing. Thereafter, Father was returned
    to the DOC on August 9, 2016, due to a parole violation.
    [8]   The trial court heard evidence in the termination case on March 27, 2017.
    Father argued that because his expected released date, April 28, 2017, was
    approaching he should be given additional time to remedy the conditions
    resulting in E.C.’s removal. Father noted that he completed a literacy program
    and obtained his high school equivalency diploma while incarcerated.
    2
    The petition was also filed with respect to Mother, and her parental rights were terminated by default on
    June 20, 2016. Mother is not a participant in this appeal.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1706-JT-1375 | November 30, 2017         Page 4 of 14
    Additionally, Father testified that he planned to live and work with his brother
    upon release.
    [9]    The DCS, on the other hand, presented evidence that Father was a stranger to
    E.C., having had absolutely no contact with the child since infancy.3 Father
    had also made no attempt while incarcerated to address his issues with
    domestic violence or to improve his parenting skills. He did not remain in
    contact with the FCM during the more than two years of the CHINS or TPR
    proceedings and did not attend the two hearings that took place while he was
    briefly out of prison. The DCS also established Father’s significant history of
    arrests, convictions, and violations of probation or parole, which took place
    both before and after E.C.’s birth. Both the FCM and the GAL testified that
    termination of Father’s rights and adoption by the foster parents were in E.C.’s
    best interests.
    [10]   On June 8, 2017, the trial court issued its order terminating the parent-child
    relationship between Father and E.C. Father appeals, asserting that there was
    insufficient evidence to terminate his parental rights to E.C. Additional facts
    will be provided below as needed.
    Standard of Review
    3
    As a result of his conviction for domestic violence, a criminal no-contact order is in effect between Father
    and E.C. (as well as others) and is to remain in effect through Father’s probation.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1706-JT-1375 | November 30, 2017           Page 5 of 14
    [11]   On review of the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence
    or judge the credibility of witnesses. K.E. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    39 N.E.3d 641
    , 646 (Ind. 2015). Rather, we consider only the evidence and
    reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment. 
    Id.
     Where the trial court
    entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, as in this case, we apply a two-
    tiered standard of review. 
    Id.
     We first determine whether the evidence
    supports the findings and then determine whether the findings support the
    judgment. 
    Id.
     The judgment will be set aside only if it is clearly erroneous. 
    Id.
    Discussion & Decision
    [12]   We recognize that the traditional right of parents to “establish a home and raise
    their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
    Constitution.” In re M.B., 
    666 N.E.2d 73
    , 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied.
    Although parental rights are of constitutional dimension, the law provides for
    the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet
    their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 
    892 N.E.2d 144
    , 149 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2008). In addition, a court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those
    of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. In
    re K.S., 
    750 N.E.2d 832
    , 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The purpose of terminating
    parental rights is not to punish the parents, but to protect their children. 
    Id.
    [13]   Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur in Indiana, the
    DCS is required to allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence, among
    other things:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1706-JT-1375 | November 30, 2017   Page 6 of 14
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
    that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
    placement outside the home of the parents will not be
    remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
    of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
    being of the child.
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a child in need of services[.]
    
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4
    (b)(2)(B). The DCS must also prove by clear and
    convincing evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child and that
    there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child. I.C. § 31-35-
    2-4(b)(2)(C), (D).
    [14]   Father first challenges the trial court’s determinations that subsections
    (b)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) were met. We note that the DCS was required to establish
    only one of the three requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) by clear and
    convincing evidence. See K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 646. Therefore, we focus our
    inquiry on the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B)(i) – that is, whether there
    was sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable probability that the conditions
    resulting in the E.C.’s removal or continued placement outside Father’s care
    will not be remedied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1706-JT-1375 | November 30, 2017   Page 7 of 14
    [15]   In making such a determination, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness to
    care for his or her child at the time of the termination hearing, taking into
    consideration evidence of changed conditions. In re J.T., 
    742 N.E.2d 509
    , 512
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. “Changed conditions are balanced against
    habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial
    probability of future neglect.” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 647. In this regard, courts
    may consider evidence of a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol
    abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate
    housing and employment. Id.
    [16]   Within two months of E.C.’s birth, Father battered Mother and was
    incarcerated. Thus, Father was unavailable to care for E.C. upon Mother’s
    subsequent abandonment of their infant. This resulted in E.C. being placed in
    nonrelative foster care, where he has thrived.
    [17]   Since Father’s battery of Mother in December 2014, he has been incarcerated
    except for a very brief period in the summer of 2016. Although he completed a
    literacy course and earned his high school equivalency diploma, Father has
    made no effort to improve his parenting skills or address issues related to
    domestic violence through programs offered at the prison. Nor has he
    established any sort of bond with E.C. or maintained contact with the DCS
    throughout this case.
    [18]   At the termination hearing in March 2017, Father did not dispute these facts.
    He simply argued that because he was scheduled to be released on April 28,
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1706-JT-1375 | November 30, 2017   Page 8 of 14
    2017,4 he should be given additional time to pursue reunification with E.C. and
    engage in services through the DCS. On appeal, Father argues that Indiana law
    requires that additional time be given whenever a parent’s release from
    incarceration is imminent. Father overstates the law in this regard. See K.E., 39
    N.E.3d at 648 (“the potential release date is only one consideration of many
    that may be relevant in a given case”).
    [19]   In Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cty. Office of Family & Children, 
    841 N.E.2d 615
     (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2006), this court held that the incarcerated father was entitled to a
    continuance of the termination hearing and that the evidence was insufficient to
    support the termination order. Because he was to be released from prison six
    weeks after the scheduled hearing, the father sought a continuance in order to
    have an opportunity to participate in services and demonstrate his fitness as a
    parent. In reversing the trial court, we observed that the children had been
    placed with their grandmother for nearly three years and that granting the father
    more time would have “little immediate effect upon the children.” 
    Id. at 619
    .
    We also recognized that the father had “participated in numerous services and
    programs [in prison], which would be helpful to him in reaching his goal of
    reunification with his children.” 
    Id.
     In addition to advancing his education, he
    had “participated in nearly 1,100 hours of individual and group services,
    including services in encounters, anger management and impulse control,
    4
    Although Father’s release date at the time of the hearing was in April 2017, we observe that according to
    the DOC website he has yet to be released and his earliest release date currently is May 11, 2018.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1706-JT-1375 | November 30, 2017          Page 9 of 14
    parenting skills, domestic violence, self-esteem, self-help, and substance abuse.”
    
    Id. at 622
    . With his release imminent, the father had secured employment and
    housing and had been accepted at the University of Evansville. During his
    incarceration, Father had also maintained a relationship with his children.
    Given the positive strides made toward turning his life around, we concluded
    that the evidence was insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the
    conditions resulting in the children’s removal would not be remedied.
    [20]   Although this case and Rowlett have similarities, their differences are
    considerable. Father made no effort during his significant period of
    incarceration to improve his parenting skills or to address the cause of his
    current placement – domestic violence. He has absolutely no bond with E.C.
    and has not worked toward reunification while in prison. Further evidence of
    Father’s apparent lack of commitment to change is his behavior while out on
    parole in July and August 2016. During that brief period, he knowingly failed
    to attend two hearings and made no real effort to engage with the DCS. He
    then found himself back in prison following a parole violation. In his own
    words, Father has been “locked up since 2013…[p]retty much, off and on.”
    Transcript at 133. Father acknowledged at the termination hearing that he also
    had a six-year-old daughter whom he has not seen while incarcerated and for
    whom he does not pay child support. He emphasized that his daughter was
    “blessed” to have a good mother who has custody of her. Id. at 128. E.C., on
    the other hand, was abandoned by Mother and had been a CHINS and in the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1706-JT-1375 | November 30, 2017   Page 10 of 14
    custody of the DCS, with nonrelative placement, for over two years at the time
    of the termination hearing.
    [21]   Contrary to Father’s assertion on appeal, Rowlett does not compel a reversal in
    this case. Every termination case presents unique facts and under the
    circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in
    determining that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that
    resulted in E.C.’s removal and continued placement outside Father’s care will
    not be remedied. Cf. In re R.S., 
    56 N.E.3d 625
    , 631 (Ind. 2016) (reversing
    termination order in light of “the loving bond that R.S. and Father share,
    Father’s successful completion of multiple self-improvement and parenting
    courses, Father’s successful completion of probation, his repeatedly expressed
    desire to parent R.S., and his exercise of regular visitation”); K.E., 39 N.E.3d at
    643-44, 649 (reversing termination where child was in relative placement and
    incarcerated father had voluntarily “made extensive efforts to better himself by
    learning parenting skills, addressing his problems with substance abuse, and
    establishing a bond with both of his children”; “there is seemingly nothing else
    Father could have been doing to demonstrate his dedication to obtaining
    reunification”); In re O.G., 
    65 N.E.3d 1080
    , 1096 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
    (“[n]otwithstanding the FCM’s lack of direction, Father completed a parenting
    class while on work release and an anger management class while incarcerated”
    and when not incarcerated, “he made multiple attempts to contact the FCM
    and engage in services”), trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1706-JT-1375 | November 30, 2017   Page 11 of 14
    [22]   Next, Father challenges the trial court’s determination that termination is in the
    best interests of E.C. The court found that termination would allow E.C. to be
    adopted into the safe and stable home where he has resided and thrived since
    April 2015. The court observed the GAL’s opinion that it would be damaging
    to uproot E.C. from the only family he has known and place him with a
    stranger. The GAL and the FCM both opined that termination was in E.C.’s
    best interests.
    [23]   In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a
    child, the trial court is required to look beyond the factors identified by the DCS
    and consider the totality of the evidence. In re J.C., 
    994 N.E.2d 278
    , 290 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2013). In so doing, the trial court must subordinate the interest of the
    parent to those of the child, and the court need not wait until a child is
    irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. McBride v.
    Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 
    798 N.E.2d 185
    , 199 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2003). Our Supreme Court has explained that “[p]ermanency is a central
    consideration in determining the best interests of a child.” In re G.Y., 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1265 (Ind. 2009). “Moreover, we have previously held that the
    recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate to
    terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in
    removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing
    evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re J.S., 
    906 N.E.2d 226
    , 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1706-JT-1375 | November 30, 2017   Page 12 of 14
    [24]   Once again, Father attempts to liken this case to others in arguing that the trial
    court’s conclusion was clearly erroneous. In so doing, Father ignores the
    distinguishing characteristics of the cases he cites. For example, in G.Y., 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , the mother was incarcerated when her child was twenty months
    old for a crime she committed prior to her pregnancy. While incarcerated, she
    took “positive steps and made a good-faith effort to better herself as a person
    and a parent” and “maintained a consistent, positive relationship” with her
    child. Id. at 1262, 1264. Unlike Father, she demonstrated a “commitment to
    reunification with [her child] from the very point of her arrest.” Id. at 1264.
    Under these specific circumstances, the Court held that the child’s general need
    for permanency through adoption was not a sufficiently strong reason to
    conclude that termination was in the child’s best interests.
    [25]   As explained above, Father has not demonstrated the same type of commitment
    to reunification. He has spent his years in prison – for a crime committed after
    E.C.’s birth – essentially waiting until his release to attempt to make progress
    toward reunification with a son who does not know him. We acknowledge that
    Father advanced his education (resulting in time cuts) and apparently has a plan
    for housing and employment upon his release. But he admittedly did not take
    advantage of programs geared towards addressing parenting and domestic
    violence issues. Further, when he was out of prison after termination
    proceedings had begun, Father did not demonstrate a true commitment to
    reunification and quickly found himself back in prison. Considering the totality
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1706-JT-1375 | November 30, 2017   Page 13 of 14
    of the evidence, the trial court’s determination that termination is in E.C.’s best
    interests is not clearly erroneous.
    [26]   Finally, Father claims that the DCS has not established a satisfactory plan for
    the care and treatment of E.C. following termination. We cannot agree. The
    plan is for E.C. to be adopted by his foster parents, with whom he has lived
    since April 2015. “A DCS plan is satisfactory if the plan is to attempt to find
    suitable parents to adopt the child[].” In re A.S., 
    17 N.E.3d 994
    , 1007 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2014), trans. denied. The plan in this case is clearly satisfactory.
    [27]   Judgment affirmed.
    May, J. and Vaidik, C.J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1706-JT-1375 | November 30, 2017   Page 14 of 14