JACOBY, BRENT v. EVANS, ANDREA ( 2011 )


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  •          SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    539
    TP 10-02521
    PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., FAHEY, LINDLEY, GORSKI, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
    IN THE MATTER OF BRENT JACOBY, PETITIONER,
    V                             MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    ANDREA EVANS, CHAIRWOMAN, NEW YORK STATE
    DIVISION OF PAROLE, RESPONDENT.
    BRENT JACOBY, PETITIONER PRO SE.
    ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (MARLENE O. TUCZINSKI
    OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to the
    Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial
    Department by order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County [Bernadette T.
    Clark, J.], entered December 22, 2010) to review a determination of
    respondent. The determination found that petitioner violated the
    conditions of postrelease supervision and imposed a time assessment of
    18 months.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the petition is unanimously granted in
    part by annulling that part of the determination finding that
    petitioner is a Category 1 violator pursuant to 9 NYCRR 8005.20 and as
    modified the determination is confirmed without costs.
    Memorandum: In this proceeding transferred to us from Supreme
    Court pursuant to CPLR 7804 (g), petitioner contends that the
    determination of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) following a
    revocation hearing that petitioner violated the conditions of
    postrelease supervision (PRS) by possessing a weapon is not supported
    by substantial evidence. We reject that contention. It is undisputed
    that a parole officer assigned to supervise petitioner found a Sai, a
    three-pronged martial arts weapon, in a drawer in petitioner’s
    apartment, where he lived alone. Although petitioner claimed that the
    weapon belonged to his former girlfriend, who had moved out of his
    apartment several days before the weapon was found, petitioner
    admitted at the hearing that he knew the Sai was in his apartment and
    that he took no steps to return it to his former girlfriend or
    otherwise to dispose of it. Even assuming, arguendo, that
    petitioner’s former girlfriend owned the Sai, we conclude that such
    fact alone does not exonerate petitioner inasmuch as he may be found
    to possess an item that is owned by someone else.
    Petitioner further contends that the Sai is not a dangerous
    -2-                           539
    TP 10-02521
    instrument or deadly weapon within the meaning of the Penal Law
    because it is not readily capable of causing serious physical injury
    or death. Whether the Sai qualifies as a dangerous instrument or
    deadly weapon is of no moment, however, because the conditions of
    petitioner’s PRS prohibited him from possessing “any instrument
    readily capable of causing physical injury without a satisfactory
    explanation for ownership, possession or purchase.” There was ample
    evidence at the hearing establishing that the Sai was capable of
    causing physical injury and that petitioner lacked a satisfactory
    explanation for his possession of it.
    We agree with petitioner that the ALJ erred in designating him as
    a Category 1 violator within the meaning of 9 NYCRR 8005.20. We
    therefore grant the petition in part and modify the determination
    accordingly. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, however, the 18-
    month time assessment imposed by the ALJ is neither unauthorized nor
    illegal. As respondent correctly notes, 9 NYCRR 8005.20 applies to
    individuals on parole and conditional release, not those serving a
    period of PRS, such as petitioner (see 9 NYCRR 8005.1 et seq.).
    Violators of PRS are subject to Penal Law § 70.45 (1), pursuant to
    which “a violation of any condition of supervision occurring at any
    time during such period of [PRS] shall subject the defendant to a
    further period of imprisonment up to the balance of the remaining
    period of [PRS], not to exceed five years” (see Executive Law § 259–i
    [3] [f] [x] [D]). Here, the time assessment of 18 months was shorter
    than the remaining period of PRS.
    We have reviewed petitioner’s remaining contentions and conclude
    that they lack merit.
    Entered:   May 6, 2011                          Patricia L. Morgan
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: TP 10-02521

Filed Date: 5/6/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/8/2016