Mosher, C. v. Quattrocchi, R. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COLIN J. MOSHER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
ROSSANA QUATTROCCHI, : No. 173 EDA 2017
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Decree, December 8, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Family Division at No. A06-10-60566-DQYR
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 16, 2018
Rossana Quattrocchi (“Wife”) appeals pro se from the December 8,
2016 divorce decree entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks
County. For the following reasons, we dismiss Wife’s appeal.
The trial court provided the following relevant procedural history:
On January 4, 2017, [Wife] filed a Notice of Appeal
with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania from the
Divorce Decree of the Court of Common Pleas and
Equitable Distribution Order entered on December 8,
2016 as well as this Court’s Order of the same date
denying and dismissing her Petition to Enforce the
Marital Agreement. . . .
[Wife] filed a Concise Statement on January 30,
2017, consisting of thirty-three enumerated
paragraphs which were anything but concise, and a
“Supplemental Concise Statement” on February 3,
2017, consisting of thirty-three (33) enumerated
single-spaced paragraphs which were essentially
redundant recitations of the issues and matters that
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[Wife] had already addressed or included in her
Concise Statement. [Wife] did not file separate
statements for each Order from which she was
appealing.
Trial court opinion, 3/6/17 at 1.
As noted by the trial court, Wife’s “concise” statement fails to comply
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). This court has long recognized that “Rule 1925 is a
crucial component of the appellate process because it allows the trial court
to identify and focus on those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal.”
Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 400 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied,
880 A.2d 1239 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1092 (2006). “The
Statement shall concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant
intends to challenge with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for
the judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). However, the filing of a timely
Rule 1925(b) statement alone “does not automatically equate with issue
preservation.” Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa.Super. 2007),
affirmed, 977 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2009). In Tucker, we explained that:
this Court has held that when appellants raise an
outrageous number of issues in their
1925(b) statement, the appellants have deliberately
circumvented the meaning and purpose of
Rule 1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby effectively
precluded appellate review of the issues [they] now
seek to raise. We have further noted that such
voluminous statements do not identify the issues
appellants actually intend to raise on appeal because
the briefing limitations contained in
Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) make[] the raising of so many
issues impossible. Further, this type of extravagant
1925(b) statement makes it all but impossible for
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the trial court to provide a comprehensive analysis of
the issues.
Id. at 346 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in
original). Thus, “the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement must be sufficiently
concise and coherent such that the trial court judge may be able to
identify the issues to be raised on appeal, and the circumstances must not
suggest the existence of bad faith.” Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d
206, 210 (Pa.Super. 2008) (emphasis added), appeal denied, 958 A.2d
1048 (Pa. 2008); see also Kanter, 866 A.2d at 401 (finding issues in
Rule 1925(b) statements waived where the court determined that
“outrageous” number of issues was deliberate attempt to circumvent
purpose of Rule 1925).
Here, we cannot conclude that Wife’s five-page, 33-issue statement
and subsequent six-page, 33-issue supplemental concise statement were so
concise and coherent that the trial court was able to conduct a meaningful
review of all the issues she sought to raise. (See Wife’s Concise Statement;
Supplemental Concise Statement.) Accordingly, Wife waives all issues on
appeal for circumventing the meaning and purpose of Rule 1925(b) so as to
preclude meaningful judicial review.
Alternatively, even if Wife had complied with Rule 1925(b), we could
nonetheless dismiss this appeal because her brief entirely fails to adhere to
the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is well settled that parties
to an appeal are required to submit briefs in conformity, in all material
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respects, with the requirements of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, as
nearly as the circumstances of the particular case will admit.
Pa.R.A.P. 2101. “Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials
filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the
appellant.” In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211-1212 (Pa.Super. 2010),
appeal denied, 20 A.3d 489 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). We will not
advocate or act as counsel for an appellant who has not substantially
complied with our rules. Bombar v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 93
(Pa.Super. 2007) (citation omitted). “This Court may quash or dismiss an
appeal if the appellant fails to conform to the requirements set forth in the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.” Ullman, 995 A.2d at 1211
(citation omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2101.
Instantly, Wife’s 72-page pro se brief falls well below the standards
delineated in our Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, Wife’s entire
brief is comprised of prose in which she includes ad hominem attacks
against Colin Mosher (“Husband”), the trial court, and Husband’s attorney.1
1 For example, Wife avers that Husband’s attorney engaged in unethical
conduct by hiring a private investigator during the course of the litigation of
the divorce case. (Wife’s brief at 20.) Wife also alleged that Husband,
Husband’s counsel, the trial judge, and other trial court personnel drank
excessively. (Wife’s reply brief at 2.) Wife further attempted to compare
Husband to United States Attorney General Jeff Sessions in an unflattering
manner. (Wife’s brief at 28.) Finally, Wife also attached a photograph of
her cat as an exhibit to the brief in an attempt to establish that she owned a
certain type of office chair which appears in the background. (Id. at 67;
see also exhibit to Wife’s brief.)
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Wife also fails to include any citation to relevant authority in the
argument,2 nor does she develop any analysis of the issues raised. We
further note that Wife’s brief lacks the necessary citations to the record in
violation of Rule 2119(b), and fails to provide this court with references to
the record, in violation of Rule 2119(c). In her certificate of compliance,
Wife certified that the word count of her brief is 16,400 words—2,400 words
in excess of the 14,000 word maximum pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2135.
Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a)(1).
Based on the foregoing, we find all of Wife’s issues waived.
Accordingly, we dismiss Wife’s appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
2 We do note that Wife includes citations to Koon v. United States, 518
U.S. 81 (1996), and United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195 (9th Cir.
1984). Both cases are cited to discuss the standard of review in this case,
and thus do not develop the argument. Moreover, McConney is not binding
authority on this court, nor is it relevant, as there is no issue involving a
federal question. See, e.g., Chiropractic Nutritional Associates, Inc. v.
Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 669 A.2d 975, 980 (Pa.Super. 1995)
(“Although the decisions of the federal courts lower than the United States
Supreme Court are not binding on Pennsylvania courts, they do have a
persuasive authority with regard to federal questions.” (emphasis
added)).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/16/18
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