In Re: S.L., a minor, Appeal of: C.L. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S18015-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: S.L., A MINOR                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
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    APPEAL OF: C.L., NATURAL             :
    FATHER                               :   No. 1585 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Decree October 10, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Orphans’ Court at No: CP-02-AP-0000043-2017
    IN RE: B.L., A MINOR                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
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    APPEAL OF: C.L., NATURAL             :
    FATHER                               :   No. 1587 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Decree October 10, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Orphans’ Court at No: CP-02-AP-0000042-2017
    IN RE: K.L., A MINOR                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
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    APPEAL OF: C.L., NATURAL             :
    FATHER                               :   No. 1588 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Decree October 10, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Orphans’ Court at No: CP-02-AP-0000041-2017
    BEFORE: STABILE, J., MUSMANNO, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    J-S18015-18
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                             FILED APRIL 16, 2018
    C.L. (“Father”) appeals from the decrees entered October 10, 2017, in
    the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, which terminated
    involuntarily his parental rights to his minor daughters, K.L., born in March
    2010; B.L., born in February 2012; and S.L., born in March 2014 (collectively,
    “the Children”).1 After careful review, we affirm.
    The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) first
    became involved with the Children on November 2, 2015.          CYF received a
    referral, indicating that Mother had a known drug problem, and that she
    moved from Indiana to Pennsylvania to escape her abusive boyfriend, Father.
    Mother lived with a cousin in Pennsylvania until the cousin forced her to leave
    in March 2016.    Mother and the Children then moved to a shelter.         Soon
    thereafter, Mother began to exhibit significant mental health issues, and
    sought treatment at a hospital.     CYF obtained emergency custody of the
    Children on March 18, 2016, and the juvenile court adjudicated the Children
    dependent on April 13, 2016.         Throughout the time of the Children’s
    dependency, Father remained in Indiana.
    For the next year, Father called the Children approximately twice per
    week via either telephone or FaceTime. Father maintained only sporadic in-
    person contact with the Children.     Father had one supervised visit in April
    1 The decrees also terminated involuntarily the parental rights of the Children’s
    mother, C.S. (“Mother”). Mother appealed the termination at Superior Court
    Docket Nos. 140 WDA 2018, 141 WDA 2018, and 142 WDA 2018. Her appeal
    is not before this panel.
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    2016 and one unsupervised visit in May 2016.        Father then had weeklong
    unsupervised visits in both June 2016 and July 2016. However, Father did not
    visit with the Children again until March 2017.
    On March 20, 2017, CYF filed petitions to terminate Father’s parental
    rights to the Children involuntarily.       The orphans’ court conducted a
    termination hearing on October 10, 2017. Following the hearing, the court
    entered decrees terminating Father’s parental rights.        Father timely filed
    notices of appeal on October 24, 2017, along with concise statements of errors
    complained of on appeal.
    Father now raises the following issue for our review.       “Whether the
    [orphans’ c]ourt abused its discretion and/or err[ed] as a matter of law by
    determining that termination of Father’s parental rights would meet the needs
    and welfare of the [C]hildren under Section 2511(b), in spite of testimony
    from an evaluator showing a strong bond between [F]ather and daughters[?]”
    Father’s Brief at 7.
    We review Father’s issue mindful of our well-settled standard of review.
    The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
    requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
    credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
    by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
    courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
    or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
    of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
    court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
    the record would support a different result. We have previously
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    emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
    observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
    In re T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
    omitted).
    Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
    Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
    Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
    seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
    that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
    termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
    determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
    or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
    the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
    needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
    of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
    concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
    parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
    of permanently severing any such bond.
    In re L.M., 
    923 A.2d 505
    , 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
    In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights
    pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), which provides as
    follows.
    (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
    be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
    grounds:
    (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
    at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
    the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
    relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused
    or failed to perform parental duties.
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    (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
    neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
    to be without essential parental care, control or
    subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
    being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
    abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
    remedied by the parent.
    ***
    (5) The child has been removed from the care of the
    parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
    with an agency for a period of at least six months, the
    conditions which led to the removal or placement of
    the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will
    not remedy those conditions within a reasonable
    period of time, the services or assistance reasonably
    available to the parent are not likely to remedy the
    conditions which led to the removal or placement of
    the child within a reasonable period of time and
    termination of the parental rights would best serve the
    needs and welfare of the child.
    ***
    (8) The child has been removed from the care of the
    parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement
    with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from
    the date of removal or placement, the conditions
    which led to the removal or placement of the child
    continue to exist and termination of parental rights
    would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
    ***
    (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
    of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
    physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
    of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
    environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
    income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
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    control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
    to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
    efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
    which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
    filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).
    In his brief on appeal, Father makes no effort to argue that the orphans’
    court abused its discretion by terminating his parental rights pursuant to
    Section 2511(a). Father also failed to include Section 2511(a) in his concise
    statements and statement of questions involved. Therefore, Father waived
    any challenge to Section 2511(a), and we focus our attention on Section
    2511(b). See In re M.Z.T.M.W., 
    163 A.3d 462
    , 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017)
    (holding that the appellant waived Section 2511(a) by failing to develop it in
    her brief, and that she waived Section 2511(b) by failing to include it in her
    concise statements and statement of questions involved).          The requisite
    analysis is as follows.
    Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights
    would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional
    needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained,
    Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and
    the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law,
    however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
    between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of
    our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
    is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
    it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
    court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
    [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
    equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
    should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
    comfort, security, and stability the child might have
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    with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated
    that the trial court should consider the importance of
    continuity of relationships and whether any existing
    parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental
    effects on the child.
    In re Adoption of C.D.R., 
    111 A.3d 1212
    , 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
    In re N.A.M., 
    33 A.3d 95
    , 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and
    citations omitted).
    Here, Father argues that the orphans’ court abused its discretion by
    concluding that CYF presented clear and convincing evidence pursuant to
    Section 2511(b). Father’s Brief at 10. Father emphasizes the testimony of
    psychologist, Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., who conducted an evaluation of the
    Children and their parents, and concluded that K.L. and B.L. continue to share
    a strong bond with Father.     
    Id. at 12-13.
      Father further emphasizes Dr.
    Rosenblum’s testimony that K.L. and B.L. would suffer trauma if they never
    see Father again. 
    Id. at 13.
    In its opinion, the orphans’ court found that the Children share a bond
    with their foster parents, and refer to them as “mom and dad.”        Orphans’
    Court Opinion, 1/2/18, at 5 (unnumbered pages). The court found that the
    Children also share a bond with Father. 
    Id. However, the
    court concluded
    that the Children’s bond with Father is not necessary or beneficial, and that
    the potential damage that would result from prolonging this bond substantially
    outweighs whatever harm the Children may experience if Father’s parental
    rights are terminated. 
    Id. -7- J-S18015-18
    Our review of the record supports the findings of the orphans’ court.
    During the termination hearing, Dr. Rosenblum testified that he conducted an
    evaluation of the Children and their parents on September 8, 2017.       N.T.,
    10/10/2017, at 96. Dr. Rosenblum recalled that the older children, K.L. and
    B.L., were excited to see their parents and ran to hug them, while the
    youngest child, S.L., stayed back and was more reserved. 
    Id. K.L. and
    B.L
    interacted well with their parents, while S.L. “seemed to be lost at times and
    did not receive nearly the same degree of attention from birth parents as her
    older two sisters did.” 
    Id. at 96-97.
    Based on this evaluation, Dr. Rosenblum concluded that K.L. and B.L.
    continue to share a strong bond and close relationship with their parents. 
    Id. at 126-27.
    K.L. retains the strongest attachment to her parents, with B.L.
    “somewhere in the middle,” and S.L. not displaying much of an attachment at
    all. 
    Id. at 108.
    Dr. Rosenblum believed that K.L. and B.L. would suffer severe
    emotional trauma if they never saw their parents again. 
    Id. at 111.
    Nonetheless, Dr. Rosenblum testified that the Children’s primary
    attachment is to their foster parents, with whom they have lived since March
    2016.     
    Id. at 88,
    112.   Dr. Rosenblum explained that he conducted an
    evaluation of the Children and their foster parents on September 6, 2017. 
    Id. at 88.
    During the evaluation, the Children displayed a “very strong, loving
    relationship” with their foster parents. 
    Id. at 89.
    Dr. Rosenblum continued,
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    “There’s no question that they are very securely attached to them. They refer
    to them as mommy and daddy.” 
    Id. Dr. Rosenblum
    further testified that both K.L. and B.L. indicate that they
    want to stay with their foster parents. 
    Id. at 112.
    K.L. explained that her
    foster parents “help her feel safe, and she loves her foster parents more
    because her birth parents treated her badly.” 
    Id. at 138.
    She stated that she
    does not feel bad when her parents fail to call her, because “she can play
    games instead . . . .”   
    Id. B.L. recalled
    that living with her parents “was
    dangerous . . . that her dad kept throwing things at her.” 
    Id. at 94.
    She
    stated that she “wouldn’t miss her old mom and dad as she wants to be in a
    safe home . . . .” 
    Id. at 138.
    Ultimately, Dr. Rosenblum recommended an open adoption, so that the
    Children can maintain ongoing contact with their parents.2 
    Id. at 113,
    134,
    143. When asked whether he would recommend an adoption even if there
    were no assurance of ongoing contact, Dr. Rosenblum confirmed that he
    would. 
    Id. at 133.
    However, he cautioned once again that ending all contact
    would cause the Children “further trauma.” 
    Id. at 133-34.
    Thus, the record confirms that terminating Father’s parental rights
    would best serve the Children’s needs and welfare. S.L. does not share a bond
    2Dr. Rosenblum expressed concern that the Children’s foster parents did not
    appear to be interested in an open adoption. N.T., 10/10/17, at 115. CYF
    caseworker, Erin Frawley, testified that she met with the foster parents after
    Dr. Rosenblum’s evaluation, and that they indicated that they would “consider
    some type of post[-]adoption agreement.” 
    Id. at 26,
    46.
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    with Father. While K.L. and B.L. do share a bond with Father, their feelings
    toward him are mixed.      K.L. and B.L. speak negatively about Father, and
    indicate that they would like their foster parents to adopt them. It is not clear
    from the record whether the foster parents will enter into an agreement
    allowing Father to maintain contact with the Children. However, even in the
    absence of such an agreement, the benefits of permanency through adoption
    will outweigh whatever emotional harm the Children may experience.
    Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not
    abuse its discretion by terminating Father’s parental rights involuntarily.
    Therefore, we affirm the court’s October 10, 2017 decrees.
    Decrees affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/16/2018
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1585 WDA 2017

Filed Date: 4/16/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021