Wallace v. Watkins , 253 So. 3d 1204 ( 2018 )

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
BERNICE WATKINS WALLACE, HEIR
AND BENEFICIARY OF THE ESTATE OF
HELEN HICKS WATKINS, AND RODNEY J.
STRAWTER,
Appellants,
v. Case No. 5D17-4066
TERRY JOSEPH WATKINS, SR.,
DELPHINE WATKINS AND JOYCE
ELIZABETH WATKINS, HEIRS AND
BENEFICIARIES OF THE ESTATE OF
HELEN HICKS WATKINS,
Appellees.
________________________________/
Opinion filed August 17, 2018
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for St. Johns County,
J. Michael Traynor, Judge.
Andrew J. Bernhard, Miami, for Appellants.
No Appearance for Appellees.
EVANDER, J.
Bernice Wallace and her son, Rodney Strawter, appeal an order allowing
Appellees, Terry Watkins, Sr., Delphine Watkins, and Joyce Watkins, to reopen the
summary administration of the estate of Wallace’s mother, Helen Watkins, and
determining Appellees to be intestate heirs of the decedent. We have jurisdiction to
review this non-final order pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.170(b)(5)
because it is an order determining heirship. Because Wallace and Strawter have failed
to demonstrate reversible error, we affirm.
The decedent died intestate in 1971. In 2000, Wallace and her sister, Helen
Mansell, filed a petition for summary administration to distribute the decedent’s sole asset,
a parcel of real property located in St. Augustine, Florida. The verified petition alleged
that Wallace and Mansell were the only known “heirs at law and next of kin and
beneficiaries of this estate.” The record reflects that Wallace and Mansell did not serve
notice of the petition for summary administration on Appellees, nor did they list Appellees
as potential beneficiaries of the estate. In February 2001, the trial court entered an order
of summary administration finding in part that “all interested persons have been served
proper notice of the petition and hearing or have waived notice thereof; that the material
allegations of the petition are true . . . .” The order distributed a half interest in the property
to Wallace and a half interest to Mansell. During this time period, Mansell purportedly
conveyed her interest in the property to Wallace and Strawter.
In 2016, Appellees filed a petition to reopen summary administration. They alleged
that they were Mansell’s biological children but had been adopted by the decedent (their
maternal grandmother) in 1963. A copy of the adoption decree was attached to the
petition. The petition further alleged that Appellees “were not given notice of the filing of
the Petition for Summary Administration or entry of the Order of Summary Administration,
despite the fact that they were and are easily ascertainable, and obviously, heirs of the
decedent.”
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Wallace and Strawter filed a response requesting denial of the petition to reopen,
arguing, inter alia, that: (1) the petition was time-barred, and (2) reopening the estate
could not provide Appellees relief because Strawter purchased an interest in the property
for value in a bona fide sale.
The trial court subsequently conducted a non-evidentiary hearing. At the hearing,
Appellants voiced no objection to the court taking judicial notice of official court records
to confirm the existence of the alleged adoption decree. Thereafter, the trial court filed
the final decree of adoption entered in the official records for St. Johns County, Florida,
reflecting that the decedent, Helen Watkins, had adopted Appellees on March 4, 1963.
Ultimately, the trial court entered an order granting the petition to reopen summary
administration and determining that Appellees were legal heirs of the decedent at the time
of her death. This appeal followed.
Appellants argue that the trial court violated their due process rights by granting
relief not requested by Appellees in their petition and by failing to hold an evidentiary
hearing. We disagree. In their petition to reopen summary administration, Appellees
specifically alleged that they were excluded from the original petition for summary
administration although they were known heirs of the decedent. More importantly, the
transcript of the hearing held below reflects that Appellants’ counsel twice agreed to allow
the trial court to determine whether Appellees were the decedent’s legal heirs by taking
judicial notice of the adoption decree:
THE COURT: My inclination, though, . . . is if I do have a
record in the public records of St. Johns County that shows
the adoption, I'm probably in a position to, depending on what
I decide, to at least accept that as a fact.
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[APPELLANTS’ COUNSEL]: I can't say anything to it, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Okay.
[APPELLANTS’ COUNSEL]: Without -- you know, without
more access, I can't say anything to it, but I trust Your Honor.
....
THE COURT: Well, I'll deal with whether or not I'm going to
reopen the estate. I mean, I don't -- I'm going to, you know
unless you don't want me to take judicial notice of the records
of my own court --
[APPELLANTS’ COUNSEL]: I would never do that.
Appellants also argue that Appellees’ petition to reopen summary administration
was time-barred by section 733.710(1), Florida Statutes (2016), commonly referred to as
the nonclaim statute.1 That statute provides:
Limitations on claims against estates.
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the code, 2 years
after the death of a person, neither the decedent’s estate, the
personal representative, if any, nor the beneficiaries shall be
liable for any claim or cause of action against the decedent,
whether or not letters of administration have been issued,
except as provided in this section.
Florida’s nonclaim statute applies to claims brought against the estate by creditors. It
does not apply to the beneficial interests of heirs. See In re Estate of Robertson, 520 So.
2d 99, 102 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (rejecting argument that nonclaim statute barred claim of
heirship because such claims were “not the type of ‘claim’ contemplated” by nonclaim
1 The parties below appear to have assumed that this case is governed by current
Florida Statutes, as opposed to the statutes that existed at the time of the decedent’s
death or at the time of the original petition for summary administration. Because the
parties did not further address this issue below, or on appeal, we similarly decline to
address this issue.
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statute); see also Frank T. Pilotte, Creditors’ Claims and Family Allowance, in Practice
Under Florida Probate Code (9th ed. 2017) (“[H]owever, the definition of claims and the
nonclaim statute clearly do not apply to the beneficial interests of beneficiaries.”).
In addition, the summary administration statute, section 735.206, Florida Statutes
(2016), has its own nonclaim provision and a separate provision allowing heirs not
included in a summary administration to enforce their rights. These separate provisions
state:
(f) After 2 years from the death of the decedent, neither the
decedent's estate nor those to whom it may be assigned shall
be liable for any claim against the decedent, unless
proceedings have been taken for the enforcement of the
claim.
(g) Any heir or devisee of the decedent who was lawfully
entitled to share in the estate but who was not included in the
order of summary administration and distribution may enforce
all rights in appropriate proceedings against those who
procured the order and, if successful, shall be awarded
reasonable attorney's fees as an element of costs.
§ 735.206(4)(f), (g), Fla. Stat. (2016). The plain language of these provisions, and the
fact that they are separate, makes clear that the summary administration nonclaim
provision only bars claims “against the decedent,” not actions by heirs who were not
included in the summary administration to enforce their rights.
Appellants also argue that the petition to reopen summary administration should
have been denied because Appellant Strawter was a bona fide purchaser of an interest
in the sole asset of the estate. However, the trial court’s order did not address the issue
of whether Strawter was a bona fide purchaser, nor did it preclude Appellants from raising
any statutory or equitable defenses to any claims to the property that may be asserted by
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Appellees.2 Thus, we conclude that this argument, as well as the other issues raised by
Appellants, are without merit.
AFFIRMED.
TORPY and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.
2 We agree with Appellants that the language in the trial court’s order stating that
Wallace and Mansell knew or should have known of the adoption is not supported by
substantial competent evidence. We view such statements as unnecessary surplusage
to the court’s determination that Appellees were lawful heirs of the decedent and were
entitled to have the summary administration reopened.
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