Jonathan Samuels v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 633 F. App'x 408 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              JAN 29 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JONATHAN E. SAMUELS,                             No. 12-56322
    Plaintiff - Appellant,            D.C. No. 2:11-cv-06067-PSG-PJW
    v.
    MEMORANDUM*
    WELLS FARGO BANK, NA,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted January 20, 2016**
    Before:        CANBY, TASHIMA, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
    Jonathan E. Samuels appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
    dismissing his action arising from foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim
    under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    ,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
    The district court properly concluded that Samuels’ action was barred by the
    California Superior Court’s earlier judgment in Wells Fargo’s unlawful detainer
    action against Samuels. See City of Martinez v. Texaco Trading & Transp., Inc.,
    
    353 F.3d 758
    , 762 (9th Cir. 2003) (setting forth requirements for application of res
    judicata under California law); Malkoskie v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 
    115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821
    , 825-27 (Ct. App. 2010) (judgment in unlawful detainer action
    brought under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code section 1161a necessarily resolves validity of
    title).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Samuels’ leave to
    file a third amended complaint because amendment would have been futile. See
    Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 
    232 F.3d 719
    , 725-26 (9th Cir. 2000) (setting forth
    standard of review and explaining that a district court may deny leave to amend
    where amendment would be futile); see also Chodos v. West Publ’g Co., Inc., 
    292 F.3d 992
    , 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a district court has already granted a
    plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to amend is
    particularly broad.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
    AFFIRMED.