James Styers v. Charles Ryan ( 2015 )


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  •                FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    JAMES LYNN STYERS,                       No. 12-16952
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    D.C. No.
    v.                      2:98-cv-02244-
    JAT
    CHARLES L. RYAN,
    Respondent-Appellee.          OPINION
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    James A. Teilborg, Senior District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted
    October 24, 2013—San Francisco California
    Filed December 30, 2015
    Before: Jerome Farris, Alex Kozinski,
    and Carlos T. Bea, Circuit Judges.
    Opinion by Judge Bea
    2                        STYERS V. RYAN
    SUMMARY*
    Habeas Corpus
    The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of James
    Lynn Styers’s motion for an unconditional writ of habeas
    corpus after the Arizona Supreme Court, in response to the
    district court’s conditional writ ordered by this court in Styers
    v. Schriro, 
    547 F.3d 1028
     (9th Cir. 2008), conducted an
    independent review of Styers’s death sentence, and affirmed
    it in 2011.
    In Styers, this court held that when the Arizona Supreme
    Court initially affirmed the death sentence in 1993, it violated
    Eddings v. Oklahoma, 
    455 U.S. 104
     (1982), and Smith v.
    Texas, 
    453 U.S. 37
     (2004), which prohibit consideration of
    only mitigation evidence causally related to the crime.
    Styers argued in his petition for the unconditional writ
    that, after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Ring v.
    Arizona, 
    536 U.S. 584
     (2002), the Arizona Supreme Court
    was powerless to correct the constitutional error identified in
    Styers, and that the death sentence could now be imposed
    only by a jury’s determination of the aggravating factors.
    The Arizona Supreme Court denied the Ring claim on the
    ground that the sentence was final.
    The panel observed that the U.S. Supreme Court has
    never held that the issuance of a conditional writ of habeas
    corpus necessarily renders non-final a conviction or sentence
    *
    This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
    been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
    STYERS V. RYAN                        3
    that was predicated on constitutional error, and that the
    conditional writ in this case did not vacate Styers’s death
    sentence. The panel concluded that the Arizona Supreme
    Court’s determination that Styers’s sentence remained final
    at the time of the second independent review was therefore
    not contrary to federal law as determined by the U.S.
    Supreme Court.
    The panel rejected Styers’s contention that the Arizona
    Supreme Court failed to correct the error found by this court
    in Styers. The panel observed that the Arizona Supreme
    Court considered the mitigating evidence and decided to give
    it little weight, and that neither Tennard v. Dretke, 
    542 U.S. 274
     (2004), nor Eddings requires more.
    COUNSEL
    Julie S. Hall (argued), Oracle, Arizona; Amy Beth Krauss,
    Tucson, Arizona, for Petitioner-Appellant.
    Jeffrey A. Zick (argued), Thomas C. Horne, Kent E. Cattani,
    and Ginger Jarvis, Office of the Attorney General, Phoenix,
    Arizona, for Respondent-Appellee.
    OPINION
    BEA, Circuit Judge:
    We must determine whether a state court’s constitutional
    error in failing to consider certain evidence offered in
    mitigation of a death sentence can be corrected by the court
    4                      STYERS V. RYAN
    that committed the error, rather than require the convicted
    murderer to be sentenced anew, but before a jury.
    James Lynn Styers, an Arizona prisoner, was convicted of
    first degree murder and other charges and sentenced to death.
    Styers’s first degree murder conviction and his sentence of
    death were affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court. State v.
    Styers, 
    865 P.2d 765
    , 770 (Ariz. 1993) (“Styers I”). Styers
    sought federal habeas corpus, and was denied. On appeal to
    us, we found that the Arizona Supreme Court had erred in not
    considering certain mitigation evidence, because it found
    such evidence was not connected to Styers’s actions at the
    time of the murder. Styers v. Schriro, 
    547 F.3d 1026
    , 1028
    (9th Cir. 2008) (“Styers II”). We reversed and remanded to
    the district court with instructions to issue a conditional writ
    ordering Styers’s release from his death sentence unless the
    State were to initiate proceedings either to correct the
    constitutional error or to vacate the death sentence and
    impose a lesser sentence consistent with the law. 
    Id. at 1036
    .
    The district court so ordered.
    The Arizona Supreme Court conducted an independent
    review of Styers’s death sentence pursuant to its view of the
    Arizona statute which provides for independent reviews of all
    death sentences, A.R.S. § 13-755. State v. Styers, 
    254 P.3d 1132
    , 1133 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc) (“Styers III”). It again
    affirmed the death sentence, after expressly considering and
    weighing the mitigation evidence to which this court’s
    opinion referred. Styers then moved the district court for an
    unconditional writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Arizona
    Supreme Court was powerless to correct the constitutional
    error, because the law had changed since Styers I; the death
    sentence could be imposed only by a jury’s determination of
    the aggravating factors that rendered Styers eligible for the
    STYERS V. RYAN                            5
    death penalty. Ring v. Arizona, 
    536 U.S. 584
     (2002). The
    district court denied Styers’s petition for an unconditional
    writ. Styers timely appealed.
    We review de novo, and we affirm.
    I. Facts and Procedural History
    In 1989, Styers lived in an apartment with his daughter,
    a roommate, Styers’s co-defendant Debra Milke,1 and Debra
    Milke’s four-year-old son, Christopher. Styers provided
    childcare for Christopher while Milke was at work. On
    December 2, 1989, Styers borrowed Milke’s car to go to the
    mall. Christopher wanted to see Santa Claus and joined
    Styers. On the way to the mall, Styers picked up his friend
    Roger Scott. Scott, Styers, and Christopher had pizza for
    lunch and then drove to the desert. The men told Christopher
    that they were going to look for snakes in the wash.2 They
    then shot him three times in the head, leaving his body in the
    wash. State v. Styers, 
    865 P.2d 765
    , 769 (Ariz. 1993)
    (“Styers I”).
    A jury convicted Styers of first degree murder, conspiracy
    to commit first degree murder, child abuse, and kidnapping.
    
    Id.
     At sentencing, without a jury, the trial court found three
    statutory aggravating factors that rendered Styers eligible for
    the death penalty. Along with mitigating evidence as to
    Styers’s family relationships, military service, and character,
    1
    Milke and Roger Scott were also convicted of first degree murder for
    the murder of Christopher Milke. Milke’s conviction has been vacated for
    reasons not relevant to this case.
    2
    A wash is a dry channel in the desert.
    6                      STYERS V. RYAN
    Styers submitted evidence of mental health problems
    including post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) caused by
    Styers’s military service. The trial court found no mitigating
    factors sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The trial
    court imposed the death penalty. 
    Id.
    Styers appealed his convictions and sentence to the
    Arizona Supreme Court. The Arizona Supreme Court
    reversed Styers’s child abuse conviction for insufficiency of
    evidence and affirmed Styers’s first degree murder,
    conspiracy, and kidnapping convictions and the death penalty
    sentence. 
    Id. at 772, 778
    .
    Styers filed a federal habeas petition in the district court,
    challenging his conviction and sentence on various grounds.
    The district court denied Styers’s petition, and Styers
    appealed to this court. Styers v. Schriro, 
    547 F.3d 1026
    , 1028
    (9th Cir. 2008) (“Styers II”). This court affirmed the district
    court in part, and reversed and remanded in part because
    when the Arizona Supreme Court conducted its 1993
    independent review of Styers’s death sentence, that court
    “appear[ed] to have imposed a test directly contrary to the
    constitutional requirement that all relevant mitigating
    evidence be considered by the sentencing body” when it
    found that Styers’s PTSD did not qualify as mitigating
    evidence because it had not affected his actions at the time of
    the crime. 
    Id. at 1035
    . Specifically, this court found that the
    Arizona Supreme Court violated Eddings v. Oklahoma,
    
    455 U.S. 104
     (1982) and Smith v. Texas, 
    453 U.S. 37
     (2004),
    which prohibit consideration of only mitigation evidence
    causally related to the crime. On remand, the district court
    entered an order directing that
    STYERS V. RYAN                            7
    Petitioner’s Writ of Habeas Corpus as to his
    sentence of death is granted unless the State of
    Arizona, within 120 days from entry of this
    Judgment, initiates proceedings either to
    correct the constitutional error in Petitioner’s
    death sentence or to vacate the sentence and
    impose a lesser sentence consistent with the
    law.3
    The State then moved the Arizona Supreme Court to “remedy
    its initial independent review of Styers’ death sentence by
    conducting a new independent review and considering Styers’
    PTSD as a mitigating circumstance.” State v. Styers,
    
    254 P.3d 1132
    , 1133 (Ariz. 2011) (en banc) (“Styers III”).
    Styers objected to the procedure, arguing that by again
    conducting an independent review under A.R.S. § 13-755, the
    Arizona Supreme Court had reopened Styers’s case on direct
    review and Styers’s sentence was no longer final.4 Id. at
    3
    In the same order, the district court denied a motion by the State to
    remand the case to the Arizona Supreme Court for reweighing pursuant to
    Clemons v. Mississippi, 
    494 U.S. 738
     (1990).
    4
    A.R.S. § 13-755 provides:
    (A) The supreme court shall review all death sentences.
    On review, the supreme court shall independently
    review the trial court's findings of aggravation and
    mitigation and the propriety of the death sentence.
    (B) If the supreme court determines that an error was
    made regarding a finding of aggravation or mitigation,
    the supreme court shall independently determine if the
    mitigation the supreme court finds is sufficiently
    substantial to warrant leniency in light of the existing
    aggravation. If the supreme court finds that the
    mitigation is not sufficiently substantial to warrant
    8                       STYERS V. RYAN
    1134. Under Teague v. Lane, 
    489 U.S. 288
     (1989), if Styers’s
    sentence was not final when the Arizona Supreme Court
    conducted its second independent review, Styers would be
    entitled to all constitutional rules which had been announced
    at the time of Styers III. These rules would include the
    requirement of Ring v. Arizona, 
    536 U.S. 584
     (2002), that
    defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on
    which their eligibility for the death penalty is conditioned.
    The Arizona Supreme Court granted the State’s motion,
    holding that (1) the Arizona Supreme Court was not required
    to remand the case to the trial court for a new resentencing,
    and that (2) even if Styers’s sentence was not final, Ring
    requires jury findings only of aggravating factors, and the
    aggravating factors in Styers’s case were not at issue in
    determining the weight of the mitigating evidence. Styers III,
    
    254 P.3d at
    1133–34.
    The Arizona Supreme Court did not review its prior
    Eddings error for harmlessness. Instead, the court reviewed
    anew whether the mitigation evidence was sufficiently
    substantial to warrant leniency when weighed against the
    aggravating factors found by the trial court. 
    Id. at 1135
    . On
    its review of the PTSD evidence, the court opined that
    leniency, the supreme court shall affirm the death
    sentence. If the supreme court finds that the mitigation
    is sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency, the
    supreme court shall impose a life sentence pursuant to
    § 13-751, subsection A. (C) The independent review
    required by subsection A does not preclude the supreme
    court from remanding a case for further action if the
    trial court erroneously excluded evidence or if the
    appellate record does not adequately reflect the
    evidence presented.
    STYERS V. RYAN                        9
    because Styers had produced no evidence establishing a
    causal connection between his PTSD and the crime, the
    PTSD evidence was of little weight. Id. at 1136. The
    Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Styers’s sentence of death.
    Id.
    Styers then moved the federal district court to enter
    judgment granting an unconditional writ of habeas corpus on
    the basis that the state had not complied with the conditional
    writ of habeas corpus because (1) the constitutional error
    could not be corrected without resentencing by a jury; (2) the
    Arizona Supreme Court employed an unconstitutional process
    in its attempt to cure the constitutional error; and (3) the
    Arizona Supreme Court failed to correct the constitutional
    error because it did not properly consider Styers’s mitigation
    evidence. The district court denied the motion for habeas
    relief because
    [t]he conditional writ of habeas corpus entered
    in [Styers’s] case gave the State the
    opportunity to cure the constitutional defect
    found by the Ninth Circuit. At the request of
    the State, the Arizona Supreme Court
    undertook a new independent review of
    [Styers’s] capital sentence, reweighing the
    proven aggravating and mitigating
    circumstances.         This remedied the
    constitutional infirmity found in Styers II and
    satisfied the condition precedent contained in
    the conditional writ.
    Styers moved the district court for a certificate of
    appealability, and the district court granted a certificate of
    appealability on the issue whether, in correcting Styers’s
    10                     STYERS V. RYAN
    sentence, the State was required to provide him a jury
    resentencing. Styers timely appealed.
    II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
    The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    , and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1291
     and 2253. We review de novo the district court’s
    denial of the writ of habeas corpus. Harvest v. Castro,
    
    531 F.3d 737
    , 741 (9th Cir. 2008). This court may reverse
    the district court only if the state court ruling “resulted in a
    decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
    application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
    by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1).
    III. Analysis
    A. Certified Issue: Ring Sentencing
    When a constitutional rule is announced, its requirements
    apply to defendants whose convictions or sentences are
    pending on direct review or not otherwise final. Griffith v.
    Kentucky, 
    479 U.S. 314
    , 323 (1987). The rule announced in
    Ring, under which “[c]apital defendants are entitled . . . to a
    jury determination of any fact on which the legislature
    conditions an increase in their maximum punishment,” Ring,
    
    536 U.S. at
    589 is a procedural rule that applies to capital
    defendants on direct review, see Schriro v. Summerlin,
    
    542 U.S. 348
    , 358 (2004).
    Styers made a Ring claim before the Arizona Supreme
    Court, arguing that the conditional writ of habeas corpus
    required that Styers be re-sentenced and that a jury must find
    STYERS V. RYAN                               11
    the aggravating factors rendering him eligible for the death
    penalty. The Arizona Supreme Court denied the Ring claim
    on the ground that Styers’s sentence was final. To prevail,
    Styers must show that the Arizona Supreme Court’s
    determination that his conviction was final (and therefore that
    he was not entitled to a Ring sentencing) “was contrary to, or
    involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
    federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United
    States.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1).
    The Arizona Supreme Court in Styers III rejected Styers’s
    contention that the Arizona Supreme Court “must remand this
    case to the trial court for a new resentencing proceeding
    because this case is now on ‘direct review.’” Styers III,
    
    254 P.3d at 1133
    . The court observed
    “a judgment of conviction has been rendered,
    the availability of appeal exhausted, and the
    time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a
    petition for certiorari finally denied.”
    Because Styers had exhausted available
    appeals, his petition for certiorari had been
    denied, and the mandate had issued almost
    eight years before Ring was decided, his case
    was final, and he therefore is not entitled to
    have his case reconsidered in light of Ring.
    Styers III, 
    254 P.3d at
    1133–34 (citing Griffith, 
    479 U.S. at 328
    ).5 The U.S. Supreme Court has never held that the
    5
    The Arizona Supreme Court further held that “nothing in § 13-755
    limits our review to direct appeals. Instead, for murders committed before
    August 2002, the statute imposes an obligation on this court to ‘review all
    death sentences.’” Styers III, 
    254 P.3d at
    1134 n.1. Our now colleague,
    12                         STYERS V. RYAN
    issuance of a conditional writ of habeas corpus necessarily
    renders non-final a conviction or sentence that was predicated
    on constitutional error, and the conditional writ of habeas
    corpus in this case did not vacate Styers’s death sentence.
    Therefore, the Arizona Supreme Court’s determination that
    Styers’s sentence remained final at the time of the second
    independent review was not contrary to federal law as
    determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.6,7
    then-Vice Chief Justice Hurwitz dissented and noted that “[t]he statute
    mandating independent review of death sentences, A.R.S. § 13–755(A),
    applies to direct review, not to post-conviction proceedings . . .
    independent review is the paradigm of direct review—we determine, de
    novo, whether the trial court, on the facts before it, properly sentenced the
    defendant to death.” Styers III, 
    254 P.3d at 1147
     (Hurwitz, V.C.J.,
    dissenting). Styers urges this court to adopt Justice Hurwitz’s analysis.
    However, the question whether an independent review under A.R.S. § 13-
    755 is limited to direct review is a question of statutory interpretation of
    an Arizona statute. Here that question was determined by Arizona’s
    highest court, and it held that “nothing in § 13-755 limits our review to
    direct appeals.” Styers III, 
    254 P.3d at
    1134 n.1. We are constrained to
    defer to the highest state court on a matter of state law and may not
    construe A.R.S. § 13-755 differently than did the Arizona Supreme Court.
    Johnson v. Fankell, 
    520 U.S. 911
    , 916 (1997).
    6
    The U.S. Supreme Court has been silent on whether the finality of a
    conviction or sentence, for Teague purposes, is a question of federal law,
    and has never held that a conditional writ of habeas corpus, regardless of
    its terms, necessarily renders a conviction non-final. Alternatively, if the
    question of finality is purely a matter of state law, then the Arizona
    Supreme Court’s decision that Styers’s sentence remained final and he
    was not entitled to a Ring re-sentencing is not reviewable because it rests
    on an adequate and independent state ground. Coleman v. Thompson,
    
    501 U.S. 722
    , 736–37 (1991).
    7
    The Arizona Supreme Court held in the alternative that “regardless of
    what one calls the type of review we now undertake, Ring requires jury
    findings only of aggravating factors that make a defendant eligible for the
    STYERS V. RYAN                               13
    B. Uncertified Issue: The Arizona Supreme Court
    Corrected the Eddings Error
    Styers also contends that the Arizona Supreme Court
    failed to correct the Eddings error found by this court in
    Styers II because it treated Styers’s mitigation evidence as de
    minimis.
    The U.S. Supreme Court has “never held that a specific
    method for balancing mitigating and aggravating factors in a
    capital sentencing proceeding is constitutionally required.”
    Kansas v. Marsh, 
    548 U.S. 163
    , 175 (2006). Rather, the
    Constitution prohibits considering exclusively only that
    mitigation evidence that bears a relationship to the crime.
    Tennard v. Dretke, 
    542 U.S. 274
    , 284–86 (2004).
    Here, when the Arizona Supreme Court conducted its
    second independent review, it did not preclude consideration
    death penalty.” Styers III, 
    254 P.3d at 1134
    . This reading of Ring is
    directly contrary to our decision in Murdaugh v. Ryan, 
    724 F.3d 1104
     (9th
    Cir. 2013), and inconsistent with the Arizona Supreme Court’s own
    opinion on remand in Ring, which held that “[b]ecause a trier of fact must
    determine whether mitigating circumstances call for leniency, we will
    affirm a capital sentence only if we conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,
    that no rational trier of fact would determine that the mitigating
    circumstances were sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. If we
    cannot reach that conclusion, we must find reversible error and remand the
    case for resentencing.” State v. Ring, 
    65 P.3d 915
    , 946 (Ariz. 2003).
    However, the Arizona Supreme Court’s alternative holding does not affect
    its determination that its independent review per A.R.S. § 13-755 is not a
    direct review. Because of the Arizona Supreme Court’s finding that
    Styers’s sentence remained final after issuance of the conditional writ,
    Ring does not apply, and so the Arizona Supreme Court’s conclusion that
    Ring requires consideration only of aggravating factors does not affect the
    outcome in this case.
    14                        STYERS V. RYAN
    of Styers’s PTSD, as it appeared to do in Styers I. There, the
    Arizona Supreme Court held that PTSD could constitute
    mitigating evidence in another case, but that it did not warrant
    leniency because Styers’s PTSD was not causally related to
    Christopher Milke’s murder. Styers II, 
    547 F.3d at
    1035
    (citing Styers I, 865 P. 3d at 777–78). In Styers III, the
    Arizona Supreme Court found that Styers failed to present
    evidence that his PTSD affected him at the time of the crime
    and that his actions belied any claim that the disorder did
    affect him. 
    254 P.3d at
    1135–36. Based on this finding, the
    Arizona Supreme Court considered the mitigating evidence
    and decided to give it little weight.8 Neither Tennard,
    
    542 U.S. at 285
    , nor Eddings, 
    455 U.S. at
    113–15, requires
    more.
    Conclusion
    Styers has not shown that the Arizona Supreme Court
    made a decision contrary to, or involving an unreasonable
    application of, federal law as determined by the Supreme
    Court of the United States when it deemed his sentence final,
    refused to remand his case for a jury resentencing, and
    instead conducted an independent review under its death
    penalty statute. For these reasons, we AFFIRM.
    8
    To the extent that Styers argues that the determination that his PTSD
    did not affect him at the time of the crime was an unreasonable
    determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
    court proceeding under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(2), we decline to expand the
    certificate of appealability.