In the Matter of the Honorable Dean A. Young, Judge of the Blackford Circuit Court , 92 N.E.3d 628 ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                       FILED
    Mar 14 2018, 2:36 pm
    CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    IN THE
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Supreme Court Case No. 05S00-1706-JD-430
    In the Matter of the Honorable
    Dean A. Young, Judge of the
    Blackford Circuit Court,
    Respondent.
    Decided: March 14, 2018
    Judicial Discipline Action
    Hon. Judith Stewart,
    Hon. Earl G. Penrod, Senior Judge, and
    Hon. Matthew C. Kincaid,
    Special Masters.
    Per Curiam Opinion
    Chief Justice Rush, Justice David, Justice Massa, and Justice Slaughter concur.
    Justice Goff did not participate.
    Per Curiam.
    We find that Respondent, the Honorable Dean A. Young, Judge of the
    Blackford Circuit Court, engaged in judicial misconduct relating to a
    temporary restraining order that he heard and issued without adequate
    notice to the responding party or witnesses, and while he had a specific
    interest in the subject matter. The Special Masters recommended, and the
    parties agree, that the appropriate discipline is to suspend Judge Young
    for six days without pay.
    This matter is before us on the report of the Special Masters we
    appointed to hear evidence on the Indiana Commission on Judicial
    Qualifications’ (“Commission’s”) “Notice of the Institution of Formal
    Proceedings and Statement of Charges” against Judge Young, and on the
    parties’ joint response to the report. We have original jurisdiction under
    Article 7, Section 4 of the Indiana Constitution and Indiana Admission
    and Discipline Rule 25.
    Background Facts1
    This case arose in 2015 from a disagreeable relationship between Derinda
    Shady, who was the elected Blackford County Clerk, and the County’s two
    judges: Circuit Court Judge Young and Superior Court Judge John Barry.
    The tension culminated in the two Judges holding a restraining-order
    hearing at which Shady was not present, then issuing a restraining order
    barring her from the courthouse until the order was vacated six days later.
    On August 3, 2015, the Blackford County Council announced its intent
    to cut funding for two positions in the Blackford County Clerk’s office.
    That announcement upset Shady, who did not think her office could do its
    work with only the two employees who would remain.
    Shady asked Judge Young to intervene with the County Council, but he
    and Judge Barry declined and instead transferred open criminal-court files
    1As discussed below, we accept the parties’ agreement with the Masters’ proposed findings of
    fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction. We therefore recite the facts consistent
    with the Masters’ findings.
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 05S00-1706-JD-430 | March 14, 2018                 Page 2 of 8
    to their own offices in an effort to lighten the Clerk’s workload. Those
    decisions angered Shady—she told Judge Young, “You can collect your
    own court costs, too,” and she told Judge Barry that he’d “better bring a
    cop” if he came to retrieve the files. She apologized a few days later and
    let the files be transferred without incident. But she also continued
    referring to the Judges by obscene names in front of office staff and the
    public. (The Judges knew secondhand of her insolence but took no action.)
    On August 19, the County Council held a public hearing for budget
    appeals. Shady attended to appeal the defunding decision, and the Judges
    attended the meeting for her part of the discussion before going back to
    Judge Young’s home. The Council rejected Shady’s staffing appeal, and
    Shady was rude to Council members afterward—but she made no specific
    threat not to do her job or to destroy court records. Judge Barry received
    reports about Shady’s rude behavior and told Judge Young about them,
    but Judge Young did not see Shady’s behavior firsthand.
    The next morning, August 20, Judge Young arrived at the courthouse at
    about 7:30 and began making phone calls, including to one of the Council
    members, asking about Shady’s behavior the previous evening. He then
    met with Judge Barry and suggested that they “would have a hearing and
    ‘lock [Shady] out of her office’” if her behavior did not change.
    By 8:00 that morning, Judge Young went to the Clerk’s Office to demand
    that Shady come upstairs to meet with him and Judge Barry. Shady was
    on the phone at the time, but after her call, she phoned Judge Young and
    told him “if he had something to say that he could come down to her
    office.” Judge Young replied, “Get up here! Now!” Shady came upstairs
    and brought her daughter, Deputy Clerk Patricia Milholland. But Judge
    Young was unwilling to have Milholland present. At a stalemate, Shady
    and Milholland went back downstairs after a few minutes, and no
    meeting happened that day.
    The Special Masters found that Judge Young probably told Shady that
    they would hold a hearing about her conduct if she refused to talk to
    them—but probably not that they would hold the hearing a matter of
    minutes later, or that the issue would involve contempt of court or
    enjoining her from entering the Courthouse.
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 05S00-1706-JD-430 | March 14, 2018   Page 3 of 8
    Unbeknownst to Judge Young, Shady went home upset after the
    abortive “meeting” and went to the hospital with a panic attack later that
    morning. Sometime after Shady left, Judge Young sent a Sheriff’s Deputy
    to bring Shady, Milholland, and another Deputy Clerk upstairs to court.
    The Special Masters found that neither Deputy Clerk probably knew why
    they were being brought into court, even though Judge Young was probably
    considering enjoining them from the building, too. (Findings 17–19)
    Beginning at 8:25 a.m., Judges Young and Barry sua sponte began a
    hearing to enjoin Shady from the Courthouse. There was no written
    application, affidavit, or verified complaint. Shady had no written notice
    of the date and time of the hearing or its subject, nor did the Deputy
    Clerks who were present have prior written notice of the allegations
    against them before Judge Young questioned them.
    At the hearing, with no personal knowledge of the reasons for Shady’s
    absence, Judge Young stated that she had “stormed out” and “fled the
    courthouse grounds.” He also stated that the Sheriff was “unable to secure
    her attendance,” even though there had been no further efforts in that
    regard—and even though Shady’s daughter Milholland was present. Judge
    Young also made comments evincing bias against Shady—including that
    she was “totally poisoning this workplace” and that if she’d made her
    “bring a cop” comment to him instead of Judge Barry, “she would be here
    in hunter orange this morning, in chains, where she would stay and enjoy
    her Thanksgiving dinner, probably her Christmas dinner as well.”
    Judge Young then declared an “emergency” that “the Clerk is unfit to
    assume her duties,” and that she would be “locked out of the entire
    courthouse square.” He further announced that Shady “will be arrested” if
    she appeared at the courthouse before the next hearing, which he set for
    August 26, six days later—even though there had been no evidence or
    allegations that Shady had threatened to sabotage the Court’s files.
    Only after making those statements (and letting Judge Barry make brief
    remarks) did Judge Young begin questioning the Deputy Clerks who were
    present. The Special Masters listened to a recording of the hearing and
    specifically found that Judge Young’s tone did not “reflect anger or
    upset”—but they also found that his questioning was like “an investigator
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 05S00-1706-JD-430 | March 14, 2018   Page 4 of 8
    rather than a neutral and impartial arbiter” and that the Deputy Clerks
    were probably intimidated and upset by the questioning.
    By 1:30 the same afternoon, Judges Young and Barry issued a temporary
    restraining order (“the TRO”) of Judge Young’s drafting, barring Shady
    from the courthouse grounds until a hearing set for August 26 at 11:00 a.m.
    The TRO stated in part that “evidence indicates that [Shady] will refuse to
    obey the lawful commands of the Courts regarding Court business” and
    “refuse or sabotage” the Superior Court’s business. Even though Judge
    Young was the requestor of the TRO, he presided over the hearing and
    did not disqualify or request appointment of a special judge.
    On the morning of August 25, Shady’s attorney called Judges Young
    and Barry on the phone, seeking a continuance of the next day’s hearing
    and pointing out “that the case was in an odd posture because the judges
    were both parties and presiding over the case.” At that point, the Judges
    sought advice from counsel for the Commission, who recommended that
    the judges “deescalate the situation and work towards a settlement.” By
    that afternoon, the TRO was dissolved.
    Discussion
    A judicial officer may be disciplined for, among other things, conduct
    prejudicial to the administration of justice and violation of the Code of
    Judicial Conduct. Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 25(III)(A). The
    Commission bears the burden of proving judicial misconduct by clear and
    convincing evidence. Admis. Disc. R. 25(VIII)(K)(6).
    Even though the parties have asked us to adopt the Masters’ findings
    and conclusions, we are not bound by their agreement. Rather, we review
    the Masters’ report de novo—specifically retaining “discretion to adopt or
    reject all or part of the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, or
    recommended disposition with or without objection by a party.” Admis.
    Disc. R. 25(VIII)(P)(3). But even though our review is de novo, we
    recognize that the Masters are best positioned to assess witness demeanor
    and judge the credibility of conflicting testimony. In re Danikolas, 
    838 N.E.2d 422
    , 428 (Ind. 2005). We therefore give their findings special
    weight, especially when, as here, their findings are unanimous. 
    Id. Indiana Supreme
    Court | Case No. 05S00-1706-JD-430 | March 14, 2018   Page 5 of 8
    Our review of the record shows ample support for the Masters’ findings,
    and we find it significant that the parties, after a contested hearing, concur
    with those findings. We therefore accept the Masters’ findings, consistent
    with the parties’ agreement.
    In turn, the Masters concluded that the Commission had proved all
    charged violations of the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct by clear and
    convincing evidence:
    • Count 1 charged that, by enjoining Shady from the courthouse after
    a hearing at which she was not present and of which she had not
    been adequately notified, Judge Young violated Rules 1.12, 1.23, 2.24,
    2.65, and 2.9(A)6.
    • Count 2 charged that Judge Young’s conduct prior to and during the
    August 20 hearing did not reflect patience, dignity, or courtesy and
    did not promote public confidence in judicial impartiality, in
    violation of Rules 1.2 and 2.8(B)7.
    • Count 3 charged that commanding the two Deputy Clerks to appear
    for a hearing without prior written notice of its purpose violated
    Rules 1.1, 1.2, and 2.2.
    • Count 4 charged that presiding over the TRO hearing, when he had
    a specific interest in the subject matter, would lead a reasonable
    2“A judge shall comply with the law, including the Code of Judicial Conduct.” Ind. Judicial
    Conduct Rule 1.1.
    3“A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
    independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the
    appearance of impropriety.” Jud. Cond. R. 1.2.
    4“A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly
    and impartially.” Jud. Cond. R. 2.2.
    5“A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that
    person's lawyer, the right to be heard according to law.” Jud. Cond. R. 2.6(A).
    6Subject to exceptions not applicable here, “[a] judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex
    parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside the
    presence of the parties or their lawyers, concerning a pending or impending matter.” Jud.
    Cond. R. 2.9(A).
    7In relevant part, “[a] judge shall be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, . . . ,
    witnesses, . . . , court staff, court officials, and others with whom the judge deals in an official
    capacity . . . .” Jud. Cond. R. 2.8(B).
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 05S00-1706-JD-430 | March 14, 2018                       Page 6 of 8
    person to question Judge Young’s impartiality in the matter,
    violating Rules 1.1, 1.2, 2.2, and 2.118.
    We agree and adopt those conclusions.
    As to sanction, the Masters suggest several aggravating and mitigating
    factors. In aggravation, they found that Judge Young’s misconduct occurred
    in his judicial capacity; that he lacks insight into the wrongfulness of his
    conduct; that Shady and the two Deputy Clerks suffered actual harm
    because Shady “was publicly humiliated by the TRO” and the deputies
    were “placed in fear of sanction”; and that his misconduct “demonstrated
    partiality in the handling of this controversy which undermines the
    perception of his impartiality generally.” But they also noted several
    factors in mitigation:
    • Judge Young’s “lengthy career in the law and public service” and
    reputation as “reasonable and cooperative” during his time in the
    Indiana Legislature;
    • his “reputation for honesty”;
    • he “mitigate[d] the harm” of his misconduct and “change[d] course”
    by calling counsel to the Commission and following her advice to
    promptly settle the matter;
    • his conduct, while “perhaps indicative of hubris, was not motivated
    by a desire for financial, personal or material gain”; and
    • he “was confronted by a difficult situation created by the Clerk’s
    behavior.”
    Weighing those factors, the Masters recommended that Judge Young
    should be suspended without pay for six days, “consistent with the six
    days the TRO was in place.” The parties have agreed to that sanction, and
    they further agree that costs of these proceedings should be assessed
    against Judge Young.
    “The purpose of judicial discipline is not primarily to punish a judge,
    but rather to preserve the integrity of and public confidence in the judicial
    8 In relevant part, “[a] judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the
    judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” including when the judge “has . . .
    personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding” or “was a material witness
    concerning the matter.” Jud. Cond. R. 2.11(A)(1), 2.11(A)(6)(c).
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 05S00-1706-JD-430 | March 14, 2018                    Page 7 of 8
    system and, when necessary, safeguard the bench and public from those
    who are unfit.” In re Hawkins, 
    902 N.E.2d 231
    , 244 (Ind. 2009). The sanction
    must be designed to deter similar misconduct and assure the public that
    judicial misconduct will not be condoned. 
    Id. And as
    we have noted, any
    “suspension from office without pay, regardless of duration, is . . . a
    significant blemish on a sitting judge's reputation”—more so than a public
    reprimand. 
    Id. at 246.
    In view of those principles, we agree that six days’
    suspension without pay and assessment of the costs of these proceedings is
    an appropriate sanction.
    Conclusion
    The Court orders that the Respondent, Dean A. Young, shall be
    suspended from the office of Judge in the Blackford Circuit Court without
    pay for six (6) days commencing at 12:01 A.M. on Monday, March 19,
    2018. The suspension shall terminate and the judge shall automatically be
    reinstated to office at 12:01 A.M. on Sunday, March 25, 2018. The costs of
    this proceeding are assessed against Respondent. The Special Masters
    appointed in this case are discharged, and the Court commends them for
    their conscientious service in this matter.
    Rush, C.J., and David, Massa, and Slaughter, JJ., concur.
    Goff, J., did not participate.
    A TT O RN E YS FO R RES P ON DE NT
    Scott E. Shockley
    James R. Williams
    Muncie, Indiana
    ATTORNEYS FOR INDIANA COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL
    QUALIFICATIONS
    Seth Pruden, Counsel to the Commission
    Marcus McGhee, Staff Attorney to the Commission
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 05S00-1706-JD-430 | March 14, 2018   Page 8 of 8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05S00-1706-JD-430

Citation Numbers: 92 N.E.3d 628

Filed Date: 3/14/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023