Michael Coleman v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )


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  • Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    regarded as precedent or cited before
    any court except for the purpose of                       Dec 18 2014, 8:23 am
    establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:                          ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
    ANN SUTTON                                       GREGORY F. ZOELLER
    Marion County Public Defender Agency             Attorney General of Indiana
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    RYAN D. JOHANNINGSMEIER
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    MICHAEL COLEMAN,                                 )
    )
    Appellant-Defendant,                      )
    )
    vs.                                )         No. 49A02-1401-CR-1
    )
    STATE OF INDIANA,                                )
    )
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                       )
    APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
    The Honorable Barbara Cook Crawford, Judge
    Cause No. 49F09-1308-FD-53165
    December 18, 2014
    MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    NAJAM, Judge
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Michael Coleman appeals his convictions for two counts of intimidation, as Class
    D felonies, and disorderly conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor, following a jury trial.
    Coleman presents four issues for our review:
    1.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted
    evidence of Coleman’s intoxication and instructed the jury on
    voluntary intoxication.
    2.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted
    certain testimony in response to a jury question.
    3.     Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his
    disorderly conduct conviction.
    4.     Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him.
    We affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On August 12, 2013, at approximately 11:15 p.m., Indianapolis Metropolitan
    Police Department Officers Aaron Schlesinger and Ronald Sayles were dispatched to 315
    North Chester Avenue “on a call [regarding] a disturbance involving loud subjects, a
    possible fight, subjects arguing, [and] possible narcotic usage as well.” Tr. at 113. When
    the officers arrived, they found a large house party going on, with approximately eleven
    to fifteen people standing in the front yard, sidewalk, and street in front of the house, and
    loud music was being played on the front porch. Officer Schlesinger asked the group
    “several times” to turn down the music, to no avail. Id. at 118. And Officer Schlesinger
    asked the partygoers for the name of the homeowner, with no response. Finally, Officer
    2
    Schlesinger, in a raised voice, threatened to issue a ticket to the homeowner for violating
    a noise ordinance, and someone turned the music off.
    The officers continued trying to find the homeowner when some of the partygoers
    became “upset” and began “voicing their opinions [and] wondering why” the officers
    were there. Id. at 120-21. One of the partygoers, Coleman, “became more agitated” and
    raised his voice so much that three neighbors came outside to see what was going on. Id.
    at 121. Officer Schlesinger was “trying to calm people down and explain” why he was
    there, but Coleman remained agitated. Id. After some of the partygoers expressed to the
    officers that they thought the officers were just “messing with ‘em and harassing them for
    no reason,” the officers asked everyone for identification “to verify who they were.” Id.
    at 123.
    Officer Schlesinger approached Coleman and asked him for identification, but he
    responded that he did not have any identification on him. Officer Schlesinger then asked
    Coleman for his name, date of birth, and social security number. Officer Schlesinger
    smelled an odor of alcohol on Coleman’s breath and person, and Coleman’s speech was
    slightly slurred. Coleman was “slightly combative as if it was a waste of his time” and
    gave Officer Schlesinger false information two or three times before he gave his real
    name and birth date. Id. at 129. Coleman continued to yell at Officer Schlesinger and
    was perceived as the loudest of the partygoers. Because Coleman refused to quiet down
    after being asked to do so by Officer Schlesinger, the officer arrested Coleman for
    disorderly conduct.
    3
    After Coleman was placed in handcuffs and ordered to sit on the sidewalk, Officer
    Sayles monitored Coleman while Officer Schlesinger “conducted paperwork in [his]
    vehicle.” Id. at 131. Coleman started talking to Officer Sayles and said that “the arrest
    was bulls[***],” and Coleman was “calling Officer Schlesinger names[,]” including
    “racial slurs.” Id. at 159. Coleman then stated that he was going to “AK” the officers,
    which Officer Sayles interpreted to mean that he was going to “shoot us with an AK-47-
    style rifle.” Id. Coleman stated that he was “going to be on top of [the residence] with
    his rifle . . . [and would shoot] a hundred rounds every time [the officers drove by] in
    [their] police vehicles on Chester Avenue.” Id. Coleman stated that he was going to kill
    the officers, their wives, and their children. Coleman stated that he was going to go to
    their funerals and laugh at them and “sodomize [their wives] on top of [their] grave[s].”
    Id. at 160. Coleman eventually communicated the threats directly to Officer Schlesinger,
    too. Coleman also stated to Officer Sayles that “he had shot somebody before and [had]
    gotten away with it . . . [because] he had gotten the witnesses silenced.” Id. at 171-72.
    The State charged Coleman with two counts of intimidation, as Class D felonies,
    and disorderly conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor. The State also charged Coleman with
    being an habitual offender. At trial, after the jury began deliberating on the first phase of
    the trial, the State dismissed the habitual offender count. The jury found Coleman guilty
    of the remaining charges. The trial court entered judgment accordingly and sentenced
    Coleman to an aggregate sentence of 545 days in the Department of Correction and 185
    days on home detention. This appeal ensued.
    4
    DISCUSSION AND DECISION
    Issue One: Voluntary Intoxication
    Coleman first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted
    evidence of his intoxication and instructed the jury on voluntary intoxication.                     In
    particular, Coleman maintains that “the State both raised the issue of intoxication[] and
    then sought to discredit it.” Appellant’s Br. at 7. And Coleman argues that it was
    “defense counsel’s decision whether to put forth an intoxication defense,” and he chose
    not to do so. Id. at 8. Coleman asserts that “[r]aising a defense that the actual defendant
    did not put forth in order to discredit him must be a due process violation of great
    magnitude[] and should not be permitted.”1 Id.
    Our standard of review of a trial court’s admission of evidence is an abuse of
    discretion. Speybroeck v. State, 
    875 N.E.2d 813
    , 818 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). A trial court
    abuses its discretion if its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
    circumstances before the court or if the court misapplies the law. See 
    id.
     With respect to
    jury instructions, we have explained that
    [t]he purpose of a jury instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable
    to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the
    case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict. Instruction of the
    jury is left to the sound judgment of the trial court and will not be disturbed
    absent an abuse of discretion. Jury instructions are not to be considered in
    isolation, but as a whole and in reference to each other. The instructions
    must be a complete, accurate statement of the law which will not confuse or
    mislead the jury.
    1
    Coleman makes no cogent argument to support his bald assertion that he was denied his right to
    due process or his Sixth Amendment right “to present a defense.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. Those issues are
    waived. Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).
    5
    Williams v. State, 
    891 N.E.2d 621
    , 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citations and quotations
    omitted).
    Here, at trial, the State presented evidence that Coleman was intoxicated,
    including the fact that he smelled of alcohol, his speech was slightly slurred, and his eyes
    were slightly glassy and red. Coleman did not object to any of the State’s evidence
    regarding his intoxication. Failure to object to the admission of evidence at trial normally
    results in waiver and precludes appellate review unless its admission constitutes
    fundamental error. Konopasek v. State, 
    946 N.E.2d 23
    , 27 (Ind. 2011). But, in his brief
    on appeal, Coleman does not contend that the admission of that evidence was
    fundamental error. Coleman has waived the admission of evidence issue on appeal.
    Next, the trial court gave the following jury instruction proffered by the State:
    “Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to the charges of intimidation and disorderly
    conduct. You may not take voluntary intoxication into consideration in determining
    whether the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly[,] or recklessly as alleged in the
    information.” Appellant’s App. at 161. Coleman objected to the instruction as follows:
    [W]e do not object as to the first line, however, we would object as to the
    second [line]. With the fact that it’s going into the intentionally knowingly
    or recklessly [sic] as alleged in this information. So, therefore, we would
    argue that the second line of the jury instruction should be stricken.
    Tr. at 193. Coleman did not object to the instruction on the grounds that the evidence did
    not support the instruction.
    On appeal, Coleman’s sole contention is that the jury instruction was improper
    because he never raised an intoxication defense and “the facts brought by the defense did
    not support giving such an instruction.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. But it is well settled that a
    6
    defendant may not raise one ground for objection at trial and argue a different ground on
    appeal. Small v. State, 
    736 N.E.2d 742
    , 747 (Ind. 2000). And, again, Coleman makes no
    contention that the trial court committed fundamental error when it gave the challenged
    jury instruction. Coleman has waived this issue for our review.
    Issue Two: Admission of Evidence
    Coleman contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted
    Officer Sayles to respond to the following jury question: “In what way was Mr. Coleman
    saying that he’d gotten away with it before? Did he describe anything?” Tr. at 171. The
    trial court permitted Officer Sayles to answer the question over Coleman’s objection.
    Officer Sayles testified as follows: “He said he had shot somebody before and gotten
    away with it. He said he had gotten the witnesses silenced.” 
    Id. at 171-72
    .
    On appeal, Coleman contends that the trial court should have excluded this
    evidence under Evidence Rules 403 and 404(b). But Coleman does not direct us to any
    part of the record to show that he objected to the evidence on those grounds to the trial
    court.    Rather, the “court reporter was unable to hear [Coleman’s] objections and
    arguments” regarding the challenged jury question, and “they are described as ‘inaudible’
    in the appellate record.” Ind. Appellate Rule 31(C) Verified Statement of Evidence at 4.
    Accordingly, Coleman prepared, and the trial court certified, a Verified Statement of the
    Evidence to clarify that, in response to the challenged jury question, he “reiterated the
    continuing objection stated earlier in Mr. Sayles’ testimony with respect to Mr.
    Coleman’s statements to the officers.” 
    Id.
    7
    But, in support of his contention on appeal, Coleman does not direct us to any part
    of the record showing that his continuing objection to Coleman’s statements to the
    officers, “stated earlier in Mr. Sayles’ testimony,” was based on Trial Rule 403 or 404(b)
    grounds.   
    Id.
       And our review of the record does not indicate on what grounds a
    continuing objection was made. As we explained in Showalter v. Town of Thorntown,
    
    902 N.E.2d 338
    , 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied:
    A party generally waives appellate review of an issue or argument unless
    that party presented that issue or argument before the trial court. . . .
    ***
    This rule exists because trial courts have the authority to hear and
    weigh the evidence, to judge the credibility of witnesses, to apply the law to
    the facts found, and to decide questions raised by the parties. Appellate
    courts, on the other hand, have the authority to review questions of law and
    to judge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a decision. The rule of
    waiver in part protects the integrity of the trial court; it cannot be found to
    have erred as to an issue or argument that it never had an opportunity to
    consider. Conversely, an intermediate court of appeals, for the most part, is
    not the forum for the initial decisions in a case. . . .
    (Emphasis in original; citations and quotations omitted).      Because Coleman has not
    demonstrated that he made an objection to the challenged jury question on Trial Rule 403
    or 404(b) grounds to the trial court, Coleman has waived this issue for our review.
    Issue Three: Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Coleman next contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support
    his disorderly conduct conviction.     When reviewing a claim of sufficiency of the
    evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Jones
    v. State, 
    783 N.E.2d 1132
    , 1139 (Ind. 2003). We look only to the probative evidence
    supporting the judgment and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that
    8
    evidence to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the defendant
    was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id.
     If there is substantial evidence of probative
    value to support the conviction, it will not be set aside. 
    Id.
    To prove disorderly conduct, as a Class B misdemeanor, the State was required to
    show that Coleman recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally made unreasonable noise and
    continued to do so after being asked to stop. 
    Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3
    (a)(2). Coleman
    maintains that the State “must prove the defendant produced decibels of sound that were
    too loud for the circumstances” and that the harm suffered as a result of the noise “rose
    above the level of a ‘fleeting annoyance.’” Appellant’s Br. at 12-13 (citing Whittington
    v. State, 
    669 N.E.2d 1363
    , 1367 (Ind. 1996), and Price v. State, 
    622 N.E.2d 954
    , 960
    (Ind. 1993)). This, Coleman contends, the State failed to do.
    But the State presented evidence that Coleman was the “loudest” of the
    partygoers, and he was yelling so loudly that, on two separate occasions, several
    neighbors emerged from their houses to see what was going on. Tr. at 123. Officers told
    Coleman to stop yelling multiple times, but he continued to yell. Officer Schlesinger
    testified that he “lost count” of how many times he had told Coleman to stop yelling. 
    Id. at 139
    .   Coleman’s argument on appeal amounts to a request that we reweigh the
    evidence, which we will not do. The State presented sufficient evidence to support his
    disorderly conduct conviction.
    Issue Four: Sentencing
    Finally, Coleman contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it
    sentenced him. Sentencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court
    9
    and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    , 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on other grounds on reh’g, 
    875 N.E.2d 218
     (Ind.
    2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect
    of the facts and circumstances before the court or the reasonable, probable, and actual
    deductions to be drawn therefrom. 
    Id.
    One way in which a trial court may abuse its discretion is failing to enter a
    sentencing statement at all. Other examples include entering a sentencing
    statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a
    finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does
    not support the reasons, or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are
    clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or the
    reasons given are improper as a matter of law . . . .
    [However, b]ecause the trial court no longer has any obligation to
    “weigh” aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when
    imposing a sentence, . . . a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its
    discretion in failing to “properly weigh” such factors.
    Id. at 490-91.
    Coleman contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it did not identify
    as mitigating:   “the hardship [of his incarceration on] Mr. Coleman’s children, Mr.
    Coleman’s drinking as an untreated disease, the letter of apology [to the victims,] and the
    fact that there was no physical injury sustained in this case.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. The
    determination of mitigating circumstances is within the trial court’s discretion. Rogers v.
    State, 
    878 N.E.2d 269
    , 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The trial court is not
    obligated to accept the defendant’s argument as to what constitutes a mitigating factor,
    and a trial court is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as
    does a defendant. 
    Id.
     A trial court does not err in failing to find a mitigating factor
    where that claim is highly disputable in nature, weight, or significance. 
    Id.
     An allegation
    10
    that a trial court abused its discretion by failing to identify or find a mitigating factor
    requires the defendant on appeal to establish that the mitigating evidence is significant
    and clearly supported by the record. 
    Id.
    On appeal, Coleman argues that the trial court should have identified his proffered
    mitigators based solely on his self-serving statements at the sentencing hearing. But
    Coleman has not demonstrated that the proffered mitigators are significant and clearly
    supported by the record. Indeed, as the State points out, “absent special circumstances,
    trial courts are not required to find that imprisonment will result in an undue hardship.”
    Dowdell v. State, 
    720 N.E.2d 1146
    , 1154 (Ind. 1999). Coleman alleges no special
    circumstances here. Further, “a history of substance abuse is sometimes found by trial
    courts to be an aggravator, not a mitigator.” Iddings v. State, 
    772 N.E.2d 1006
    , 1018
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. And Coleman apologized to the victims as follows:
    “I would like to apologize to the officers if I said anything to ‘em about their families or
    kids or to ‘em while I was drunk. I would never say ‘em things if I had a sober mind.”
    Pre-Sentence Investigation Report at 15. That attempt at an apology does not clearly
    support mitigation of Coleman’s sentence. Finally, Coleman does not explain how the
    fact that no one was injured by his actions supports a finding of mitigation. We hold that
    the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Coleman.
    Affirmed.
    MATHIAS, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
    11