Jeffrey Leonard Camp v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Dec 20 2017, 10:18 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kyle E. Cray Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Bennett Boehning & Clary, LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana Henry A. Flores, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jeffrey Leonard Camp, December 20, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
79A02-1707-CR-1676
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Sean M. Persin,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
79D05-1611-F6-1008
Brown, Judge.
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[1] Jeffrey Leonard Camp appeals his conviction and sentence for residential entry
as a level 6 felony. Camp raises three issues which we revise and restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
certain evidence;
II. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his
conviction; and
III. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
of the offense and his character.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] At approximately midnight on October 7, 2016, Camp went to the residence of
Julie Camp. The two had been divorced for approximately six years and had
two children together who lived with Julie. Camp and Julie had attempted to
reconcile but he had not lived at her residence since April of 2016. M.C., who
was Camp and Julie’s sixteen-year-old daughter, heard tapping on the window
of the front door of the house and went to the door, moved the curtain over the
window to the side, and observed Camp. Julie was not home and was with a
friend at a going away party. M.C., who was babysitting her younger brother
and the child of Julie’s friend, knew that she was not allowed to let Camp in the
house, was really scared, and ran to her phone to tell her mother that Camp
was at the house. Because Julie’s phone did not have cellular service, M.C.
used a messaging application to send messages to Julie’s friend. The messages
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stated “PLEASE HELP MY DAD IS HERE” and “PLEASE HELP PLEASE
HELP.” The time-stamp on the screenshot showing these messages displays
11:53 p.m. State’s Exhibit 3.
[3] M.C. went back to the living room “because [she] heard [Camp] at the door like
he was still there” and “checked if he was still there and he was in our house.”
Transcript Volume 2 at 66. Camp asked where Julie was and why M.C was
using her phone. M.C. replied “to text mom because he wasn’t supposed to be
there,” Camp told M.C. “[t]urn your phone off,” and she did so. Id. at 67-68.
Camp asked in a raised voice why M.C. was home by herself, and M.C. was
scared. Camp left the house, and M.C. immediately locked the door, turned
her phone on, and sent follow-up messages to Julie’s friend. The messages
stated “he left,” “[h]e made me shut my phone off,” and “[h]e just appeared at
the door and came in and I’m shaking.” State’s Exhibit 4. Julie arrived home
soon afterwards and called the police, and Julie and M.C. spoke to the
responding police officer.
[4] Camp sent numerous messages to Julie following the incident. Julie sent Camp
a message asking “[w]hy are you coming to the house late at night?!?!” State’s
Exhibit 5 at 1. Camp replied: “To catch you in your bullshit. Mission
accomplished.” Id. Camp sent numerous other messages to Julie throughout
the rest of the night and the next day. State’s Exhibit 5 contains approximately
seventy-four pages of messages he sent beginning at 11:47 p.m. The exhibit
shows that Julie sent several text messages to Camp at approximately 12:01
a.m. stating that she was not home and M.C. was babysitting and telling him to
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leave. She also sent messages at 12:24 a.m. stating that he had no right to go
inside the house. The remainder of the numerous and lengthy barrage of
messages were sent by Camp to Julie from 12:04 a.m. through 4:48 a.m. and
then again from 11:50 a.m. through 2:30 p.m. with additional messages sent
after that time. See State’s Exhibit 5 at 1-74.
[5] On November 7, 2016, the State charged Camp with residential entry as a level
6 felony. On January 9, 2017, prior to trial, Camp went to the prosecutor’s
office and indicated he was there to give a statement hoping to clear things up.
He was advised of his right to an attorney, that anything he said could be used
against him, and that there were not any promises made to him, and he
provided his version of events to Maria Hancock, an investigator for the
prosecutor’s office, and the deputy prosecutor. Camp did not have an
appointment and was not represented by counsel at the time. He disclosed that
he had gone inside Julie’s house and also stated that M.C. had “giggl[ed] [sic]
the door handle and it opened.” Transcript Volume 2 at 118.
[6] On May 2, 2017, Camp filed a motion in limine requesting in part that the court
exclude from evidence conversations that took place between the State and
Camp regarding the resolution of the case. In ruling on Camp’s motion, the
court stated that the request “remain[ed] under advisement until trial to see
whether a proper foundation/waiver exist.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume 2 at
52.
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[7] During the trial, the jury heard testimony from M.C., Julie, Investigator
Hancock, and Camp. M.C. testified that the door was locked. When asked
how she knew it was locked, she answered “[b]ecause we are supposed to check
it, it’s part of our safety plan.” Transcript Volume 2 at 59. When asked if she
ever had to unlock the door for anything, M.C. answered “[o]nly when my
mom tells me to if it’s her” and “[t]o let our cats inside or outside.” Id. at 59-60.
M.C. indicated that she, her brother, and her mother were allowed to unlock
the door to let the cats in and out, that she did not unlock the door that night to
let the cats out, and that she did not know if her younger brother did so. She
testified that Camp did not live at the house and did not have a key to the house
and that she was not allowed to let him in. When asked what happened after
she sent the messages to Julie’s friend, she responded: “I went back to the living
room because I heard dad at the door like he was still there and I checked if he
was still there and he was in our house.” Id. at 66. When asked if the door was
unlocked, M.C. replied “[n]o, not that I know of” and again indicated that she
did not know if her younger brother had unlocked the door. Id. When asked if
she opened the door for Camp, M.C. answered “[n]o.” Id. at 67. When asked
how she felt while Camp was present, she testified she “was really scared.” Id.
at 68. When asked how long Camp talked to her, M.C. answered “[m]aybe
thirty minutes, I don’t know exactly,” and when asked “[b]ut minutes at least,”
she answered “[y]es.” Id.
[8] On cross-examination, M.C. indicated that she and Julie had an understanding
that Camp was not to come into the house. When asked who would have
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unlocked the front door, M.C. replied probably her younger brother but she did
not know for sure. When asked if the front door was difficult to open, M.C.
replied affirmatively and stated that her brother could open it but that it took
him a minute. When asked if she told Camp to leave or if there was any
conversation, M.C. replied “I couldn’t get any words to come out.” Id. at 72.
She indicated that Camp had told her to open the back door but that she went
to her phone. When asked “why didn’t you just lock the door,” M.C. replied
“[b]ecause I thought it was locked, I didn’t know if anyone unlocked it.” Id. at
73. When asked about her testimony about the length of time she talked to
Camp, she answered that “[i]t felt like thirty minutes, I’m not quite sure.” Id. at
74. When asked if she recalled a conversation with her mother after the police
arrived during which Julie told her not to allow Camp to come into the house,
M.C. answered affirmatively. When asked, “if it were already the case that you
knew and your mom made it clear that he wasn’t supposed to be there, why
was it necessary for her to tell you at that point that he’s not to be in the house,”
M.C. replied “[s]he’s just reiterating so we don’t forget.” Id. at 75. On redirect
examination, M.C. indicated that she had been told and reminded more than
once before that Camp could not come inside, that to her knowledge Camp did
not have a key, that Camp did not have permission to enter the house, and that
she did not open the door for him.
[9] Julie testified that the door was locked when she left her house, that her
children would unlock the door to let their cats outside and were supposed to
lock the door again, and that her children have previously forgotten to lock the
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door. She testified that Camp did not have permission to enter her house that
night, she went home immediately after learning he was present, M.C. was
extremely upset when she arrived home, and she called the police. She stated
that Camp admitted in text messages to going inside the house, and that he was
not on the lease, did not have a key, and did not have permission to enter the
house. On cross-examination, Julie indicated that the police interviewed
everyone who was present at the same time and that she reiterated to M.C. in
front of the officer that Camp was not allowed in the house and nothing had
changed. Upon questioning by the court, Julie answered she was sure Camp
did not have a key, and when asked if he could have kept one without her
knowledge, she responded affirmatively.
[10] When the State indicated that it intended to call Investigator Hancock as a
witness, the court heard testimony from Investigator Hancock outside the
presence of the jury regarding her recollection of the January 9, 2017 meeting
and Camp’s statements at the meeting. Investigator Hancock informed the
court that she and the deputy prosecutor met with Camp, that Camp was given
warnings about his right to counsel and that anything he said could be used
against him, that a plea agreement was not discussed, that the meeting was
completely unexpected, and that no promises were made regarding the outcome
of the case. Investigator Hancock stated that Camp was told that his statement
would not necessarily have an impact on his case. Camp’s defense counsel
objected to Investigator Hancock’s testimony and argued “she hasn’t been
named as witness” and “[s]o one of my concerns is I guess not meeting that
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foundation requirement providing you know the notes that she needs to refresh
her recollection and then with the statements (inaudible) helpful and then she
doesn’t remember that well either.” Id. at 108. The court permitted
Investigator Hancock to testify before the jury regarding Camp’s statements at
the prosecutor’s office, and she testified that Camp had stated at the meeting
that he had gone into Julie’s house. When asked if Camp had said how he
entered the house, she answered “[h]e said that he had come to the door that
[M.C.] was on the other side” and “[w]hat I recall is that he mentioned her
giggling [sic] the door handle and it opened.” Id. at 118.
[11] Camp testified that he went to Julie’s house and knocked on the door, M.C.
pulled the curtain back from over the window, he noticed over M.C.’s shoulder
that there was a small child who was passed out on the couch, at that point he
was merely concerned about what he saw, and that he began asking M.C. to
open the door. He testified that M.C. “fiddled with the door for a few
moments” and “said she couldn’t get it open.” Id. at 137. He stated that he
instructed M.C. to let him in the back door, that he went to the back door but
M.C. never arrived, and that he went back to the front door and knocked again.
He stated that M.C. pulled the curtain aside, began to try to open the door
again, and said it was stuck. He testified that he said “[M.C.], I need you to
open the door” and that “through the fidgeting of the door, she did open the
door.” Id. at 138. Camp testified that he stepped inside the house and was
there for approximately eight to ten minutes, that he was trying to speak to
M.C. and asked why she had not contacted him, that M.C. “was texting during
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this time so I asked her to put it down so that she could pay attention to me,”
and that M.C. did so. Id. at 139.
[12] The jury found Camp guilty of residential entry as a level 6 felony. At
sentencing, the trial court found that his criminal history, pretrial release
violation, and disdain for authority were aggravating circumstances, that his
military service was a mitigating circumstance, that the aggravators outweighed
the mitigator, and sentenced Camp to 730 days with 365 days to be executed
and 365 days on Tippecanoe County Community Corrections at a level to be
determined.
Discussion
I.
[13] The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
Camp’s statements at the January 9, 2017 meeting at the prosecutor’s office. A
trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission or exclusion of
evidence. Palilonis v. State, 970 N.E.2d 713, 731 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans.
denied. The trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence will be disturbed
on review only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of
discretion occurs when the trial court’s ruling is clearly against the logic, facts,
and circumstances presented. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we
consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Id. at
731-732. We will not reverse an error in the admission of evidence if the error
was harmless. Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1058 (Ind. 2011). Errors in the
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admission of evidence are generally to be disregarded unless they affect the
defendant’s substantial rights. Id. at 1059. In viewing the effect of the
evidentiary ruling on a defendant’s substantial rights, we look to the probable
effect on the fact finder. Id. The improper admission is harmless error if the
conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt satisfying
the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood the challenged
evidence contributed to the conviction. Id. The erroneous admission of
evidence which is cumulative of other evidence admitted without objection
does not constitute reversible error. Hoglund v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1230, 1240
(Ind. 2012) (citation omitted), reh’d denied.
[14] Camp asserts that his statements at the January 9, 2017 meeting were
inadmissible statements made in connection with plea negotiations and that the
court erred in admitting them. He argues that the deputy prosecutor present at
the meeting had authority to enter into a plea agreement with him, that he was
unrepresented at the time, and the fact he was speaking about the case with the
prosecutor at all demonstrates his purpose of alleviating the potential
consequences of his charges. He also argues he sufficiently preserved his
argument for appeal.
[15] The State contends that Camp waived his argument on appeal because it is
different than the argument he raised at trial. The State further maintains that
Camp’s statements were not part of any plea negotiations, that he arrived at the
prosecutor’s office to “clear things up” and was advised of his right to counsel,
and that his statements could be used against him, and that there were no
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promises made, and that the statements were nothing more than unilateral
assertions on Camp’s part. Appellee’s Brief 17 (citing Transcript Volume 2 at
118). The State also argues that any error in the admission of the statements
was harmless as they were not prejudicial to the defense, that in fact they
bolstered Camp’s credibility as his trial testimony mirrored his statements to the
investigator, and that the statements were merely cumulative of his own
testimony.
[16] Statements and admissions made by a defendant during plea negotiations are
generally inadmissible at a subsequent trial in the matter. See Gonzalez v. State,
929 N.E.2d 699, 701-702 (Ind. 2010); Ind. Evidence Rule 410. To constitute
plea negotiations, however, the following criteria must be present: (1) the
defendant must have been charged with a crime at the time of the statement; (2)
the statement must have been made to someone with authority to enter into a
binding plea bargain; and (3) the parties must have agreed to negotiate.
Gonzalez, 929 N.E.2d at 701-702.
[17] While Camp had been charged at the time of his statements and made his
statements to both Investigator Hancock and the deputy prosecutor, the record
does not establish that there was an agreement to negotiate. After Camp
arrived unannounced and without representation at the prosecutor’s office, he
was advised of his right to counsel and that anything he said could be used
against him. No promises were made to Camp, he was told that his statement
would not necessarily have an impact on his case, and a plea agreement was
not discussed. Camps’ statements constitute unilateral assertions on his part
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and not plea negotiations. See Martin v. State, 537 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ind. 1989)
(“A unilateral offer of evidence to induce a party to negotiate is not protected.”)
(citing Chase v. State, 528 N.E.2d 784, 786 (Ind. 1988)).
[18] Further, the evidence of Camp’s statements at the January 9, 2017 meeting was
cumulative of his testimony before the jury. At both the January 9, 2017
meeting and in his trial testimony, Camp stated that he entered Julie’s residence
but that M.C. had opened the door. Any error in admitting the statements of
Camp at the January 9, 2017 meeting was harmless.
II.
[19] The next issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Camp’s
conviction. When reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not
reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 656
N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 1995), reh’g denied. We look to the evidence and the
reasonable inferences therefrom that support the verdict. Id. The conviction
will be affirmed if there exists evidence of probative value from which a
reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[20] Camp argues that M.C.’s testimony is incredibly dubious and cannot support
his guilty verdict and that she was the sole testifying witness to his alleged
criminal actions. He argues “[s]pecifically, whether [he] turned the door knob
and opened the door or whether M.C. opened the door for him[,] M.C.’s
testimony regarding whether or not the door was locked, the length of time [he]
was in the residence, and the conduct of [Julie] during the police interview
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together demonstrates the incredible dubiosity of M.C.’s testimony.”
Appellant’s Brief 10. He also argues there is a lack of circumstantial evidence
he used force to enter the residence. The State responds that M.C.’s testimony
was not incredibly dubious, M.C. was unequivocal that it was Camp who
opened the door, it is irrelevant how much time Camp spent in the house,
whether the door was locked is immaterial, and Camp’s argument urges this
court to reweigh the evidence and M.C.’s credibility.
[21] Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5 provides that a person who knowingly or intentionally
breaks and enters the dwelling of another person commits residential entry as a
level 6 felony. A person engages in conduct “intentionally” if, when he engages
in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so, and a person engages in
conduct “knowingly” if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high
probability that he is doing so. Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2. In order to establish that
a breaking has occurred, the State need only introduce evidence from which the
trier of fact could reasonably infer that the slightest force was used to gain
unauthorized entry. McKinney v. State, 653 N.E.2d 115, 117 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995). The opening of an unlocked door is sufficient. Id. “Lack of consent is
not an element of the offense the State is required to prove.” Id. at 118.
“Rather, it is the defendant who must claim and prove the defense of consent.”
Id. “A defendant’s belief that he has permission to enter must be reasonable in
order for the defendant to avail himself of the defense of consent.” Id.
[22] We observe that the uncorroborated testimony of one witness is sufficient to
sustain a conviction. Ferrell v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1070, 1072-1073 (Ind. 1991).
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To the extent Camp asserts that the incredible dubiosity rule requires reversal of
his conviction, we note that the rule applies only in very narrow circumstances.
See Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002). The rule is expressed as
follows:
If a sole witness presents inherently improbable testimony and
there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence, a defendant’s
conviction may be reversed. This is appropriate only where the
court has confronted inherently improbable testimony or coerced,
equivocal, wholly uncorroborated testimony of incredible
dubiosity. Application of this rule is rare and the standard to be
applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or
inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.
Id.
[23] Camp fails to show that the testimony of M.C. was inherently contradictory.
To the extent her testimony conflicted with Camp’s testimony, this is an issue
of witness credibility. Also, the jury heard testimony regarding when M.C. and
her brother were permitted to unlock the door, M.C.’s recollection as to
whether the door was locked, M.C.’s actions after Camp knocked on the door
including her testimony that she did not unlock or open the door, the length of
time Camp was inside the house, and the statements of Julie to police and M.C.
after the incident, and the witnesses were thoroughly examined and cross-
examined. The function of weighing witness credibility lies with the trier of
fact, not this Court. Whited v. State, 645 N.E.2d 1138, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App.
1995). Further, we cannot say that M.C.’s testimony was so inherently
improbable that no reasonable person could believe it. The jury also heard
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testimony that Camp had not lived at the residence for months, was not on the
lease, and to the knowledge of Julie and M.C. did not have a key. Camp does
not show how the testimony against him was somehow internally inconsistent
and has not shown M.C.’s testimony to be incredibly dubious.
[24] Based upon our review of the evidence and testimony most favorable to the
conviction as set forth in the record and above, we conclude that sufficient
evidence exists from which the jury as the trier of fact could find Camp guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of residential entry as a level 6 felony.
III.
[25] The next issue is whether Camp’s sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and his character. Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that
we “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of
the trial court’s decision, [we find] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of
the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Under this rule, the
burden is on the defendant to persuade the appellate court that his or her
sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
[26] Camp argues that his offense was committed in a less egregious way than a
typical level 6 felony for residential entry, that he had lived at the residence only
six months prior, that at worst he turned a door knob and walked through an
unlocked door, and that he did not attempt to enter without the occupant’s
knowledge or damage any property to enter the residence. He argues that he
had been employed for nearly two years and letters from his co-workers
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affirmed his good character and that his military record speaks highly of his
character. He also argues that the remoteness of his two prior convictions
should be taken into account and that the violations of pre-trial release involved
the use of marijuana and did not threaten the safety or welfare of the public or
victims in this case. The State responds that Camp has not shown that his
sentence is inappropriate, that his actions were selfish and completely
disregarded any emotional distress they may have caused his sixteen-year-old
daughter who was frightened and pleaded for help when he showed up
unannounced at midnight, and that his prior convictions for domestic battery
and invasion of privacy and his violation of pre-trial release by using marijuana
multiple times also support his sentence.
[27] Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7 provides that a person who commits a level 6 felony shall
be imprisoned for a fixed term of between six months and two and one-half
years with the advisory sentence being one year. The court found that Camp’s
criminal history, pretrial release violation, and disdain for authority were
aggravating circumstances, that his military service was a mitigating
circumstance, and that the aggravators outweighed the mitigator. It sentenced
him to 730 days with 365 days to be served on community corrections.
[28] Our review of the nature of the offense reveals that Camp showed up
unannounced at Julie’s residence around midnight, instructed M.C. to open the
door, entered the residence without Julie present and without permission, asked
M.C. about Julie’s location, and told M.C. to turn off her phone. M.C. was
frightened and sent messages to Julie’s friend asking for help. Camp sent a
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barrage of aggressive messages to Julie over the course of hours through that
night and the following day.
[29] Our review of the character of the offender reveals that Camp was honorably
discharged from the United States Army, that he has had the same employment
for nearly two years, and that several of his co-workers submitted letters to the
court positively describing his character. He was convicted of domestic battery
against Julie as a felony in 2007 for which he received 545 days with 180 days
on community corrections, and of invasion of privacy as a misdemeanor
against Julie in 2010. He also violated his pretrial release conditions by testing
positive for marijuana more than once.
[30] After due consideration, we conclude that Camp has not sustained his burden
of establishing that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
offense and his character.
Conclusion
[31] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Camp’s conviction and sentence for
residential entry as a level 6 felony.
[32] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and Riley, J., concur.
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