Devontae S. Brodnax v. State of Indiana ( 2014 )

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of
establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. Dec 24 2014, 9:42 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
DAVID T.A. MATTINGLY GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Lafayette, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
RICHARD C. WEBSTER
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
DEVONTAE S. BRODNAX )
)
Appellant-Defendant, )
)
vs. ) No. 79A02-1405-CR-344
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
)
Appellee-Plaintiff. )
APPEAL FROM THE TIPPECANOE SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Randy J. Williams, Judge
Cause No. 79D01-1308-FB-24
December 24, 2014
MEMORANDUM DECISION – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS, Judge
Devontae Brodnax (“Brodnax”) pleaded guilty to Class B felony burglary and was
sentenced to thirteen years, with nine years executed in the Indiana Department of
Correction and four years suspended to probation. Brodnax now appeals and argues that
his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and character of the
offender.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
On August 2, 2013, sixteen-year-old Brodnax and two accomplices broke into the
residence of Tadd Culver (“Culver”) in Lafayette, Indiana. They stole, among other
things, an iPod, an iPad, two video game systems, and a skateboard. These items were
later discovered in Brodnax’s bedroom.
On August 27, 2013, the juvenile court waived jurisdiction of the case. Three
days later, on August 30, 2013, the State charged Brodnax with Class B felony burglary
and three counts of Class D felony theft. On March 13, 2014, Brodnax agreed to plead
guilty to Class B felony burglary. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges.
The plea agreement provided that sentencing would be left to the trial court’s discretion.
On April 9, 2014, the trial court accepted the plea agreement and held a sentencing
hearing. At the hearing, the trial court considered Brodnax’s guilty plea, his young age,
and that he earned a GED while in the Tippecanoe County jail as mitigating
circumstances. The trial court then found the following aggravating factors: Brodnax’s
extensive juvenile history; his regular use of alcohol and marijuana; and the fact that
numerous previous attempts at rehabilitation, including probation, teen court, substance
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abuse treatment, aggression replacement training, case management, individual and
family counseling, multi-systemic therapy, home detention, and residential placement,
had failed. After determining that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating
factors, the trial court sentenced Brodnax to thirteen years, nine years to be executed in
the Department of Correction and four years suspended to supervised probation.
Brodnax now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
Brodnax argues that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Even
if a trial court acted within its statutory discretion in imposing a sentence, Article 7,
Sections 4 and 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorize independent appellate review and
revision of a sentence imposed by the trial court. Trainor v. State, 950 N.E.2d 352, 355-
56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 491
(Ind. 2007)). This authority is implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which
provides that the court on appeal “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due
consideration of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Id.
Still, we must and should exercise deference to a trial court’s sentencing decision,
because Rule 7(B) requires us to give due consideration to that decision and because we
understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its sentencing
decisions. Id. Although we have the power to review and revise sentences, the principal
role of our review should be to attempt to level the outliers and identify some guiding
principles for trial courts and those charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes
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but not to achieve what we perceive to be a “correct” result in each case. Fernbach v.
State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied (citing Cardwell v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). The appropriate question is not whether
another sentence is more appropriate; instead, the question is whether the sentence
imposed is inappropriate. Former v. State, 876 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
When we review the appropriateness of a sentence, we consider “the culpability of the
defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors
that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant has the
“burden to persuade us that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate.”
Shell v. State, 927 N.E.2d 413, 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
Here, Brodnax was convicted of Class B felony burglary. See Ind. Code § 35-43-
2-1. On the date of Brodnax’s offense, the sentencing range for a Class B felony was six
to twenty years, with ten years being the advisory sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5
(2012). The sentence imposed by the trial court was thirteen years, which is three years
greater than the advisory but also seven years less than the maximum sentence. The trial
court ordered Brodnax to serve nine years of the sentence in the Department of
Correction, with the remaining four years to be served on supervised probation. Brodnax
argues that his sentence is inappropriate because, while he has a “significant juvenile
criminal history,” he has no adult criminal convictions. Appellant’s Br. at 8. He also
argues that because he is still a teenager, he is “not beyond rehabilitation.” Id. at 9. He
further emphasizes that his criminal history consists primarily of property offenses.
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We note that Brodnax, although only sixteen years old at the time of his offense,
had already been adjudicated a delinquent twice for criminal trespass, four times for theft,
one time for resisting law enforcement, and one time for conspiracy to commit burglary.
He had received a range of rehabilitative services, including probation, teen court,
substance abuse treatment, aggression replacement training, case management, individual
and family counseling, multi-systemic therapy, home detention, residential placement,
secure detention, and a two-week Department of Correction diagnostic evaluation.
Brodnax was released from the Indiana Boy’s School only four months before he
committed the present offense. What’s more, he initially denied involvement in the
burglary and attempted to place the blame on his accomplices. Brodnax has been given
ample rehabilitative opportunities but has seemingly failed to benefit from any of them.
In sum, Brodnax has continuously demonstrated a disregard for the law and a failure to be
rehabilitated by lenient treatment.
With regard to the nature of Brodnax’s offense, we note that Brodnax and his co-
perpetrators broke into a residence and stole several electronics from the home, which
were later discovered in Brodnax’s bedroom. The evidence indicates that it was Brodnax
who planned the burglary and who broke and entered into Culver’s home.
Under these facts and circumstances, we cannot say that Brodnax’s thirteen-year
sentence, with nine years executed and four years suspended to supervised probation, is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
Affirmed.
NAJAM, J., and BRADFORD, J., concur.
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