In Re the Adoption of T.G., Eric Kelly v. Jesse Glover (mem. dec.) ( 2020 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                            Jun 23 2020, 7:40 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing                              CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                  Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    William A. Goebel                                        Mark Small
    Goebel Law Office                                        Indianapolis, Indiana
    Crawfordsville, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In Re the Adoption of T.G.,                              June 23, 2020
    Eric Kelly,                                              Court of Appeals Case No.
    19A-AD-2839
    Appellant,
    Appeal from the Clinton Superior
    v.                                               Court
    The Honorable Donald E. Currie,
    Jesse Glover,                                            Judge Pro Tempore
    Trial Court Cause No.
    Appellee.
    12D01-1904-AD-6
    Brown, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2839 | June 23, 2020                 Page 1 of 14
    [1]   Eric Kelly (“Stepfather”) appeals the denial of his petition for adoption. We
    affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   T.G. was born on October 27, 2010, to Melissa Kelly (“Mother”). Jesse Glover
    (“Father”) established paternity in 2017. Mother and Stepfather moved in
    together in 2017 and were married in 2018. According to the trial court, Father
    was incarcerated in March 2018 and has an early release date of July 25, 2021.
    [3]   On April 15, 2019, Stepfather filed a petition for adoption. 1 According to the
    chronological case summary, the court issued an order on May 14, 2019, stating
    that Father may appear by phone if contact information was provided, Father
    filed a motion to appear in person or by phone on May 15, 2019, and the court
    granted his motion on May 20, 2019, to appear by phone.
    [4]   On August 26, 2019, the court held a hearing at which Stepfather appeared in
    person and by counsel and Father appeared by phone from the Edinburgh
    Correctional Facility. Stepfather testified that he and Mother had been together
    for about three years and living together for almost two years and that they have
    a one-month-old child together. He indicated Father established paternity in
    2017, was given a graduated visitation schedule, and eventually had visitation
    every other weekend. 2 He indicated Father’s last visitation was March 2, 2018.
    1
    The petition for adoption is not included in the appellant’s appendix.
    2
    An order dated May 12, 2017, in the paternity cause stated that Father signed a paternity affidavit and is
    T.G.’s biological father and set forth a schedule phasing in Father’s parenting time, beginning with four hours
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2839 | June 23, 2020                     Page 2 of 14
    He indicated Father was aware of where T.G. lived and had not made any
    attempts to contact T.G. while he was incarcerated. Stepfather further testified
    Father had not voluntarily paid any child support since April 23, 2018. He
    indicated that, according to the support docket, a tax check of $382 was held on
    May 19, 2018, and there were no support payments since that date. 3 Stepfather
    testified that he was employed, had been supporting T.G. since he moved in
    with Mother in 2017, and had not been convicted of any crime.
    [5]   Mother testified that Father did not take any action to see T.G. until 2017. She
    testified that Father eventually had parenting time every other weekend and
    that he was in T.G.’s life for ten months between May 2017 and March 2018.
    She indicated he had not seen T.G. since March 2, 2018, she lived at the same
    address since that time, she has had the same phone number since the paternity
    action began, Father picked up T.G. from her mother’s house, her mother still
    lived at the same address, neither she nor T.G. had received any
    communication from Father since March 2, 2018, and she had not stopped any
    attempted communication between T.G. and Father since that date. She stated
    every other week, increasing parenting time every three or four weeks, and ending with Father having
    parenting time under the Parenting Time Guidelines. The order also required that Father pay child support
    of $85 per week by wage withholding order, found his support obligation was retroactive to the date of filing
    and his arrearage was $850, and ordered him to pay $10 per week toward the arrearage in addition to his
    weekly child support obligation. The attached child support obligation worksheet indicated Father’s weekly
    gross income was $360.
    3
    Petitioner’s Exhibit 1 contains a one-page payment history reflecting amounts paid in reverse chronological
    order. The document listing a payment of $382 by check on May 19, 2018, reflects seven other payments
    ranging from $20 to $170 from February 15, 2018, through April 23, 2018, and does not contain pages of any
    payment history prior to February 15, 2018.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2839 | June 23, 2020                     Page 3 of 14
    she had not received any support from Father since May 2019. She indicated
    Father had other children, she was in contact with the mother of one of his
    other children, and to her knowledge Father had made contact with his son
    E.G. while incarcerated. She indicated she believed Father’s criminal record
    rendered him unfit to continue as a parent of T.G., and when asked why she
    believed that, she answered “he does not have a license. He does he cannot
    [sic] hold down a job. So supporting T.G. is a rough thing for him I suppose.”
    Id. at 19.
    [6]   On cross-examination, Father asked “previously before [he requested visitation]
    what was the arrangements that we [] made when we separated,” Mother
    replied “[w]e didn’t have an arrangement,” he asked “so before our separation
    how long was I in T.G.’s life,” and she answered “[y]ou weren’t cause you were
    in jail.”
    Id. at 20-21.
    Father asked which address he used when he filed for
    visitation, she answered “Meadow Lane” because that was her mother’s old
    address.
    Id. at 21.
    She indicated she lived on Green Street at the time. Father
    asked “but you just testified that you’ve been living at the same address with”
    Stepfather, and she replied “I forgot about that address.”
    Id. at 22.
    She testified
    “you were updated when I had moved to Three Fifty Nine from Green Street”
    and “I don’t believe I had to inform you of my mother’s because that’s where
    you presided [sic] to pick up T.G. after school.”
    Id. Father asked
    “wasn’t I the
    one that was paying for everything when we stayed in Lafayette and moved to
    Frankfort,” and she answered “[n]o.”
    Id. at 23.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2839 | June 23, 2020   Page 4 of 14
    [7]   The court asked Mother if she was living with Father when T.G. was born, she
    answered “[n]o,” the court asked “[s]o you’ve never lived with him,” she
    replied “[w]e didn’t live together,” it asked “[w]hen you talk about separation
    you guys were never physically living together,” she said “[n]o,” the court
    asked “[y]ou’ve never lived with him,” and she replied “[j]ust before she was
    born.”
    Id. at 23-24.
    Mother then stated “[b]ut when she was born he was
    incarcerated.”
    Id. at 24.
    The court asked if Father’s name was on the birth
    certificate, she answered affirmatively, the court asked when Father saw T.G.
    for the first time, and Mother answered “when she was born.”
    Id. The court
    asked “[s]o he was not incarcerated when she was born,” and she replied
    “[a]fter she was born. I’m sorry.”
    Id. at 24-25.
    She indicated Father did not
    see T.G. on a regular basis after she was born. On redirect examination, she
    indicated Father saw T.G. a couple of times at the hospital when she was born
    and did not see her again until 2017.
    [8]   Upon questioning by Stepfather’s counsel, Father indicated he was in the
    Edinburgh Correctional Facility and was there for “an HTV violation as a Level
    Five felony.”
    Id. at 29.
    When asked if “[i]t was a repeat HTV violation” and
    “[y]ou got sentenced in fact on the HT first HTV in March” 2018 and “then
    you violated by driving two weeks after that,” he answered affirmatively.
    Id. He testified
    he did not have a phone number for T.G., he “tried for a number
    yes and was not successful,” Mother’s phone number was in his cell phone
    which was in police custody, and “the person I tried to get the number from I
    was not they weren’t able to get a number for me.”
    Id. at 30.
    He indicated
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2839 | June 23, 2020   Page 5 of 14
    there was a child support order and he was delinquent before he was
    incarcerated. When asked if he had not made a payment since April 23, 2018,
    he answered “I had just got locked up in March so April’s was the last payment
    that apparently was received yes.”
    Id. at 31.
    He indicated he was not aware of
    the May 2018 payment. He indicated this was the first time he was
    incarcerated in the Department of Correction (the “DOC”), he had been
    incarcerated in county jails about three times since he moved to Indiana in
    2008, he did not have a record in Illinois, he had a conviction for driving while
    suspended, and he “had one OWI” and “that was four months in Clinton
    County.”
    Id. at 32.
    He indicated he had been in contact with his son E.G.
    several times while incarcerated, E.G’s mother filed some paperwork and he
    obtained her number and address through the paperwork, and “[u]nlike T.G. I
    haven’t got any address or numbers or anything. I only have your address and
    the Courthouse.”
    Id. at 33.
    Stepfather’s counsel asked “[h]ave you written me
    to see T.G.,” Father replied that he had not, Stepfather’s counsel asked “whose
    fault is it that you don’t have addresses? Is it [Mother’s] or your own,” and
    Father replied “I think the responsibility it is my fault that I do not have her
    address.”
    Id. [9] The
    court asked if Father had anything else for the court to consider. Father
    testified that Mother’s statements were false, he and Mother lived together in
    three different apartments, two in Lafayette and one in Frankfort, they paid rent
    to her mother and her stepfather for an apartment they owned above a sports
    bar in Frankfort, he was working at US Cold Storage when T.G. was born, he
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2839 | June 23, 2020   Page 6 of 14
    was fired because he took an extended stay to be with Mother in the hospital,
    and “also we lived together after that continuously for after that cause I got my
    lock up was in . . . July of Two Thousand Eleven.”
    Id. at 34.
    He further
    testified:
    And once I got out I had another job at Wal-Mart that [Mother] was
    still living together until she moved out one day while I was at work.
    Um and the other thing is we did have an arrangement that we was
    couldn’t be we had alot of arguments. So that the arrangement was
    that [Mother] would never see was in town because she was staying
    at her mother’s. Whenever she was in town that I would see T.G.
    After that I moved out of Clinton County and back to Lafayette.
    And that arrangement was still standing. Because I would take gifts
    out to T.G.’s grandmother and leave it at her house. Gifts, cards,
    birthday, every holiday. Uh I found out through previously at that
    time through friends that [Mother] was taking the stuff back and
    getting the money for it. . . . I know I did my part. And until
    recently like Two Thousand Seventeen I got fed up with the well I’ll
    bring her whenever I have time or whenever she makes time for me.
    So I filed for the visitation. And even still then after that [Mother]
    did not apply to bringing T.G. when she was suppose to. Even her
    lawyer we sat down one day after Court and established that she was
    suppose to bring her for Christmas. That never happened. And I
    tried to contact her lawyer at that time and didn’t get a response. So
    yes and not contacting her lawyer I failed (inaudible) this. So no I
    did not contact him trying to get any information about T.G.
    Because that time being he didn’t give me a response back. So no I
    did not try to contact him again.
    Id. at 34-35.
    He indicated that his release date was in June of 2021. Father also
    testified “as far as the child support . . . money does not matter because I keep
    jobs in plenty of times when we first started I was working two jobs . . . to be
    able to try to pay for to catch up on my other child support,” “I had caught up
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2839 | June 23, 2020   Page 7 of 14
    except for like a Hundred and some dollars,” “that was pretty much kind of the
    reason part of the reason for me filing the child support because I don’t care
    about the money,” and “I need to be able to see my daughter on a regular see
    my kids on a regular.”
    Id. at 35-36.
    The court took the matter under
    advisement.
    [10]   On October 1, 2019, the trial court issued an order denying Stepfather’s petition
    for adoption. The court found Father had been incarcerated since March 2018,
    was in the DOC, had an early release date of July 25, 2021, and does not
    consent to the adoption petition. It further found:
    3. The Father was present in the child’s [] early life as biological
    Mother and Father lived together on and off and the parties both
    significantly contributed to the child’s support (physical, emotional,
    and financial). Father was present at the child’s birth and voluntarily
    signed the birth certificate of the child.
    4. The Father paid support for the child prior to his incarceration.
    Some tax intercept support has also been paid on behalf of the child
    since his period of incarceration.
    5. The Father has not had the ability to have contact with the child
    since his incarceration, however he indicated a strong desire to do so
    and remain actively engaged in his child’s wellbeing.
    6. The mother has not been accommodating or welcoming of
    contact between the father and minor child since March 2, 2018.
    Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 8-9. The court concluded that Stepfather
    “has failed to prove that the objecting biological Father’s consent is not
    necessary to approve the Petition for Adoption” and that “Father has not
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2839 | June 23, 2020   Page 8 of 14
    abandoned, nor is he unfit, nor has his lack of communication or contact been
    voluntary but only because he is an inmate in the Indiana Department of
    Correction.” 4
    Id. at 9.
    Stepfather filed a motion to correct error, which the
    court denied.
    Discussion
    [11]   In family law matters, we generally give considerable deference to the trial
    court’s decision because we recognize that the trial judge is in the best position
    to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, and obtain a feel for the family
    dynamics and a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children.
    E.B.F. v. D.F., 
    93 N.E.3d 759
    , 762 (Ind. 2018). Accordingly, when reviewing
    an adoption case, we presume that the trial court’s decision is correct, and the
    appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption.
    Id. When reviewing
    the trial court’s ruling in an adoption proceeding, we will not disturb that ruling
    unless the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial judge reached an
    opposite conclusion. In re Adoption of T.L., 
    4 N.E.3d 658
    , 662 (Ind. 2014). The
    trial court’s findings and judgment will be set aside only if they are clearly
    erroneous. 
    E.B.F., 93 N.E.3d at 762
    . A judgment is clearly erroneous when
    there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the
    judgment.
    Id. We will
    not reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of
    4
    After the court issued the order, Father filed a letter with the trial court requesting an address and phone
    number for Mother so that he is able to contact T.G. “since threw [sic] all this I have not been given the exact
    info to be able to contact her.” Appellee’s Appendix Volume II at 11.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2839 | June 23, 2020                      Page 9 of 14
    witnesses.
    Id. Rather, we
    examine the evidence in the light most favorable to
    the trial court’s decision.
    Id. We generally
    review rulings on motions to correct
    error for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC, 
    45 N.E.3d 15
    , 18
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
    [12]   Stepfather asserts the trial court erred in finding that he failed to prove that
    Father’s consent was not necessary and cites Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(1), (2),
    and (11). He argues that Father abandoned T.G., had contact while
    incarcerated with his son E.G. but not with T.G., and admitted it was his fault
    that he did not have contact information available to him. He argues Father
    failed to communicate with or support T.G., had no contact with her since
    March 2, 2018, and made no child support payments since the middle of May
    2018. He also states that he “believes that in the context of [Father’s] limited
    exercise of his parental rights and obligations (a 10-month period after the child
    was 6 years of age), coupled with the fact that through his own fault he has
    placed himself in prison until at least July 25, 2021, shows that he is unfit to be
    a parent.” Appellant’s Brief at 11.
    [13]   Father maintains the evidence is sufficient to support the court’s findings and to
    show Stepfather failed to meet his burden of proof. He argues the evidence
    supports the finding that he did not have a phone number for Mother and the
    court found he paid child support prior to his incarceration. He argues
    Stepfather simply asks this Court to disregard the standard of review and
    reweigh the evidence. He also argues that, while Mother indicated a belief that
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2839 | June 23, 2020   Page 10 of 14
    he was an unfit parent due to his criminal record and lack of a license, the trial
    court noted his involvement and desire to be involved in T.G.’s life.
    [14]   Ind. Code § 31-19-11-1 provides in part that the trial court shall grant a petition
    for adoption if it hears evidence and finds in part that the adoption requested is
    in the best interest of the child and “proper consent, if consent is necessary, to
    the adoption has been given.” A petition to adopt a child may be granted only
    if written consent to adoption has been executed by the father of a child whose
    paternity has been established. See Ind. Code § 31-19-9-1. However, Ind. Code
    § 31-19-9-8(a) provides that consent to adoption “is not required from any of the
    following”:
    (1) A parent or parents if the child is adjudged to have been abandoned
    or deserted for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the date of
    the filing of the petition for adoption.
    (2) A parent of a child in the custody of another person if for a period of
    at least one (1) year the parent:
    (A) fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly
    with the child when able to do so; or
    (B) knowingly fails to provide for the care and support of the
    child when able to do so as required by law or judicial decree.
    *****
    (11) A parent if:
    (A) a petitioner for adoption proves by clear and convincing
    evidence that the parent is unfit to be a parent; and
    (B) the best interests of the child sought to be adopted would be
    served if the court dispensed with the parent’s consent. . . .
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2839 | June 23, 2020   Page 11 of 14
    If a petition for adoption alleges that a parent’s consent to adoption is
    unnecessary under Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(1) or (2) and the parent files a
    motion to contest the adoption, the “petitioner for adoption has the burden of
    proving that the parent’s consent to the adoption is unnecessary under IC 31-19-
    9-8.” Ind. Code § 31-19-10-1.2(a). If a petition for adoption alleges that a
    parent’s consent to adoption is unnecessary under Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(11)
    and the parent files a motion to contest the adoption, the “petitioner for
    adoption has the burden of proving that the requirements of IC 31-19-9-8(a)(11)
    are satisfied and that the best interests of the child are served if the court
    dispenses with the parent’s consent to adoption.” Ind. Code § 31-19-10-1.2(e).
    Ind. Code § 31-19-10-0.5 provides: “The party bearing the burden of proof in a
    proceeding under this chapter must prove the party’s case by clear and
    convincing evidence.”
    [15]   The clear and convincing evidence standard is an intermediate standard of
    proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence and less than proof beyond
    a reasonable doubt. See T.D. v. Eskenazi Health Midtown Cmty. Mental Health
    Ctr., 
    40 N.E.3d 507
    , 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). In order to be clear and
    convincing, the existence of a fact must be highly probable.
    Id. “The clear
    and
    convincing standard is employed in cases where the wisdom of experience has
    demonstrated the need for greater certainty, and where this high standard is
    required to sustain claims which have serious social consequences or harsh or
    far reaching effects on individuals.” Civil Commitment of T.K. v. Dep’t of Veterans
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2839 | June 23, 2020   Page 12 of 14
    Affairs, 
    27 N.E.3d 271
    , 276 (Ind. 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks
    omitted).
    [16]   This Court has observed that imprisonment standing alone does not establish
    statutory abandonment. Lewis v. Roberts, 
    495 N.E.2d 810
    , 813 (Ind. Ct. App.
    1986) (citation omitted) (cited with approval by In re Adoption of E.A., 
    43 N.E.3d 592
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied). Neither should confinement alone
    constitute justifiable reason for failing to maintain significant communication
    with one’s child.
    Id. Incarceration, however,
    unquestionably alters the means
    for significant communication.
    Id. What constitutes
    insignificant
    communication with a free parent may be significant in relation to an
    incarcerated parent with limited access to his child.
    Id. We are
    also mindful
    that in general an incarcerated parent’s child support obligation should reflect
    the parent’s real financial capacity. See In re Adoption of T.L., 
    4 N.E.3d 658
    , 663
    (Ind. 2014).
    [17]   The burden was on Stepfather, as the petitioner for adoption, to prove that the
    requirements of Ind. Code § 31-19-9-8(a)(1), (2), or (11) were satisfied by clear
    and convincing evidence. See Ind. Code §§ 31-19-10-0.5 and -1.2. The evidence
    most favorable to the trial court’s decision reveals that Father was present at the
    hospital when T.G. was born and signed her birth certificate and that, in 2017,
    he filed a petition to establish paternity. Father testified that he took gifts and
    cards to the house of T.G.’s grandmother and that he discovered Mother was
    returning the gifts for money. Father obtained a court order requiring him to
    pay child support based on his weekly gross income of $360 and phasing in
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2839 | June 23, 2020   Page 13 of 14
    parenting time until he was exercising parenting time pursuant to the Parenting
    Time Guidelines. The parties agree that Father stopped his visitation with T.G.
    due to his incarceration. The record reveals Father was employed prior to his
    incarceration and had made child support and arrearage payments, and
    Stepfather did not demonstrate that Father was able to continue making support
    payments while incarcerated. The trial court heard and was able to consider
    the testimony of Stepfather, Mother, and Father regarding Father’s
    incarceration and his relative efforts to communicate with and provide care and
    support for T.G. prior to and following his incarceration. The court specifically
    found that Father was present in T.G.’s early life as he and Mother lived
    together on and off and significantly contributed to the child’s support, Father
    paid support for T.G. prior to his incarceration, Father has not had the ability
    to have contact with T.G. since his incarceration but indicated a strong desire to
    do so and to remain actively engaged in T.G.’s wellbeing, and Mother has not
    been accommodating or welcoming of contact between Father and T.G. The
    trial court was in the best position to judge the facts, and we will not reweigh
    evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. We cannot say under these
    circumstances that Stepfather has met his burden to overcome the presumption
    the trial court’s decision is correct or that the evidence leads to but one
    conclusion and the trial court reached the opposite conclusion.
    [18]   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    [19]   Affirmed.
    Najam, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-AD-2839 | June 23, 2020   Page 14 of 14
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19A-AD-2839

Filed Date: 6/23/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021