In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.M. (minor child) H.M. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                              FILED
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                   Nov 21 2019, 9:32 am
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    CLERK
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                      Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    estoppel, or the law of the case.                                                 and Tax Court
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Cristin L. Just                                          Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Crown Point, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Robert J. Henke
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Termination of the Parent-                        November 21, 2019
    Child Relationship of S.M.                               Court of Appeals Case No.
    (minor child);                                           19A-JT-924
    Appeal from the Jasper Circuit
    H.M. (Mother),                                           Court
    The Honorable John D. Potter,
    Appellant-Respondent,
    Judge
    v.                                               Trial Court Cause No.
    37C01-1810-JT-237
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Pyle, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-924 | November 21, 2019                     Page 1 of 10
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   H.M. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of the parent-child relationship with
    her daughter, S.M., (“S.M.”), claiming that the Department of Child Services
    (“DCS”) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) there is a
    reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in S.M.’s removal will
    not be remedied; (2) termination of the parent-child relationship is in S.M.’s
    best interests; and (3) adoption is a satisfactory plan for S.M.’s care and
    treatment. Concluding that there is sufficient evidence to support the trial
    court’s decision to terminate the parent-child relationship, we affirm the trial
    court’s judgment.1
    [2]   We affirm.
    Issue
    Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the termination of
    the parent-child relationship.
    Facts
    [3]   The evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment reveal that
    S.M. was born in August 2016. She was removed from Mother’s home in July
    2017 and placed in foster care after Father and another man became involved in
    a physical altercation at Mother’s home. At that time, the house was dirty and
    1
    S.M.’s father (“Father”) voluntarily relinquished his parental rights in 2018, and he is not a party to this
    appeal.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-924 | November 21, 2019                     Page 2 of 10
    had a foul smell, and there was debris and a beer bottle in S.M.’s bedroom.
    According to DCS, ‘[t]he home was not up to [a] minimum standard of
    living[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 14).
    [4]   The trial court adjudicated S.M. to be a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”)
    in October 2017. Following the adjudication, the trial court ordered Mother to:
    (1) maintain safe and stable housing; (2) abstain from drug use; (3) complete a
    parenting assessment and successfully complete all recommendations; (4)
    complete a substance abuse assessment and successfully complete all treatment
    recommendations; (5) submit to random drug screens; (6) complete a domestic
    violence assessment and successfully complete all recommendations; (7) attend
    visitation with S.M.; and (8) actively participate in a home-based counseling
    program.
    [5]   After Mother failed to comply with the CHINS dispositional order, DCS filed a
    petition to termination her parental rights in October 2018. Testimony at the
    March 2019 termination hearing revealed that DCS had been involved with
    Mother and a son since 2015 for the same reasons that it had become involved
    with Mother and S.M. In September 2017, during the course of the proceedings
    with S.M., Mother’s son was placed in a guardianship with his maternal aunt.
    [6]   The testimony further revealed that although Mother had completed parenting,
    substance abuse, and domestic violence assessments, she had failed to
    successfully complete the assessors’ recommendations. In addition, the
    testimony revealed that Mother had continued to use marijuana. She had also
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-924 | November 21, 2019   Page 3 of 10
    either refused to take drug tests or had tested positive. Further, during the
    course of the proceedings, Mother had attended only slightly more than half of
    her scheduled supervised visits with S.M. In addition, Mother, who often had
    to be redirected during visits because she was looking at her cellphone, had
    never progressed beyond supervised visitation.
    [7]   Mother had also failed to obtain stable and suitable housing. At the time of the
    termination hearing, she had told DCS Family Case Manager Holly Ammann
    (“FCM Ammann”) that she was living with her boyfriend at his grandparents’
    house. However, during a visit to the home, FCM Ammann had smelled
    marijuana and had been unable to speak to the homeowners to confirm that
    Mother lived there and that S.M. was welcome to live there as well. During
    that visit, Mother had also refused to give FCM Ammann the name of another
    adult who was present in the home. During the course of the proceedings,
    Mother had lived at ten different addresses, including the county jail for two
    days on a battery charge. Mother had often lived with friends who refused to
    allow DCS to enter their houses. She had also suffered from bouts of
    homelessness.
    [8]   FCM Ammann testified as follows regarding Mother’s lack of progress during
    the CHINS proceedings:
    [T]here have been several services put into place for [Mother.]
    [S]he has failed to make any progress in any of those . . . services
    up to this point[.] Not only have we been providing services in
    this case for the last 18½ months, but we have to remember there
    was an open CHINS case from 2015 to 2017 where we were
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-924 | November 21, 2019   Page 4 of 10
    consistently providing the exact same services and that there was
    . . . no progress in those case plan goals either.
    (Tr. 85-86). FCM Ammann explained as follows regarding her
    recommendation to terminate Mother’s parental rights: “[T]he services and
    goals put in place . . . to alleviate the reasons for involvement, [Mother’s] not
    made enough progress in those goals to say that those reasons for involvement
    have been alleviated at this time, continual instability.” (Tr. 89). FCM
    Ammann also testified that it was in S.M.’s best interests to terminate Mother’s
    parental rights and for S.M.’s paternal grandparents to adopt her because S.M.
    needed permanency and stability.
    [9]    CASA Marian Paskash (“CASA Paskash”) agreed with FCM Ammann that
    “none of the issues that initially started in this case ha[d] been resolved.” (Tr.
    130). CASA Paskash also testified that termination of Mother’s parental rights
    and grandparent adoption was in S.M.’s best interests. According to CASA
    Paskash, paternal grandparents were able to provide S.M. with a “loving, caring
    and stable home.” (Tr. 133).
    [10]   Following the hearing, the trial court issued a detailed order terminating
    Mother’s parental relationship with S.M. Mother now appeals.
    Decision
    [11]   Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the termination of
    her parental rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
    Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-924 | November 21, 2019   Page 5 of 10
    raise their children. In re K.T.K., 
    989 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1230 (Ind. 2013). However,
    the law provides for termination of that right when parents are unwilling or
    unable to meet their parental responsibilities. In re Bester, 
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 147
    (Ind. 2005). The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the
    parents but to protect their children. In re L.S., 
    717 N.E.2d 204
    , 208 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 1999), trans. denied.
    [12]   When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we will not weigh the
    evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229.
    Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support
    the judgment. Id. Where a trial court has entered findings of fact and
    conclusions thereon, we will not set aside the trial court’s findings or judgment
    unless clearly erroneous. Id. (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)). In determining
    whether the court’s decision to terminate the parent-child relationship is clearly
    erroneous, we review the trial court’s judgment to determine whether the
    evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings and the findings clearly
    and convincingly support the judgment. Id. at 1229-30.
    [13]   A petition to terminate parental rights must allege:
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
    that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
    placement outside the home of the parents will not be
    remedied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-924 | November 21, 2019   Page 6 of 10
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
    of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
    being of the child.
    (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
    adjudicated a child in need of services;
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
    (D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
    the child.
    IND. CODE § 31-35-2-4(B)(2). DCS must prove the alleged circumstances by
    clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231.
    [14]   Here, Mother argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the
    termination of her parental rights. Specifically, she first contends that the
    evidence is insufficient to show that there is a reasonable probability that the
    conditions that resulted in S.M.’s removal will not be remedied. In determining
    whether the conditions that resulted in a child’s removal or placement outside
    the home will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 
    4 N.E.3d 636
    , 643 (Ind. 2014). We first identify the conditions that led to
    removal or placement outside the home and then determine whether there is a
    reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. 
    Id.
     The
    second step requires trial courts to judge a parent’s fitness at the time of the
    termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed
    conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of
    conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect
    or deprivation. 
    Id.
     Habitual conduct may include parents’ prior criminal
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-924 | November 21, 2019   Page 7 of 10
    history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support,
    and a lack of adequate housing and employment. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
    Servs., 
    987 N.E.2d 1150
    , 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The trial court
    may also consider services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent’s
    response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied.
    
    Id.
     Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not
    preclude them from finding that a parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of
    his future behavior. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643.
    [15]   Here, our review of the evidence reveals that S.M. was adjudicated to be a
    CHINS in October 2017 because of domestic violence in the home, Mother’s
    drug use, and unstable and inappropriate housing. Nearly two years later,
    Mother had not successfully completed any of the court-ordered services, was
    still using drugs, and still had not obtained stable and appropriate housing.
    Both FCM Ammann and CASA Paskash testified that reasons for S.M.’s
    removal had not been remedied. This evidence supports the trial court’s
    conclusion that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that
    resulted in S.M.’s placement outside the home would not be remedied. We find
    no error.
    [16]   Mother also argues that there is insufficient evidence that the termination was
    in S.M.’s best interests. In determining whether termination of parental rights
    is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality
    of the evidence. In re D.D., 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.
    denied. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-924 | November 21, 2019   Page 8 of 10
    those of the child involved. 
    Id.
     Termination of the parent-child relationship is
    proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. In
    re R.S., 
    774 N.E.2d 927
    , 930 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. “‘A parent’s
    historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision
    coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that
    continuation of the parent-child relationship is contrary to the child’s best
    interest.’” In re B.D.J., 
    728 N.E.2d 195
    , 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting
    Matter of Adoption of D.V.H., 
    604 N.E.2d 634
    , 638 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans.
    denied, superseded by rule on other grounds). Further, the testimony of the service
    providers may support a finding that termination is in the child’s best interests.
    McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family and Children, 
    798 N.E.2d 185
    , 203 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2003).
    [17]   Here, our review of the evidence reveals that Mother has historically been
    unable to provide housing, stability, and supervision for S.M. and was unable to
    provide the same at the time of the termination hearing. In addition, both FCM
    Ammann and CASA Paskash testified that termination was in S.M.’s best
    interests. The testimony of these service providers, as well as the other evidence
    previously discussed, supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination was
    in S.M.’s best interests.
    [18]   Last, Mother argues that DCS does not have a satisfactory plan for S.M.’s care
    and treatment. This Court has previously explained that the plan for the care
    and treatment of the child need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general
    sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-924 | November 21, 2019   Page 9 of 10
    relationship is terminated. In re L.B., 
    889 N.E.2d 326
    , 341 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
    Here, the DCS caseworker testified that the plan for the care and treatment of
    S.M. is adoption. This is a satisfactory plan. See In re A.N.J., 
    690 N.E.2d 716
    ,
    722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
    [19]   We reverse a termination of parental rights “only upon a showing of ‘clear
    error’—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake
    has been made.” Egly v. Blackford Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 
    592 N.E.2d 1232
    ,
    1235 (Ind. 1992). We find no such error here and therefore affirm the trial
    court.
    [20]   Affirmed.
    Robb, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-924 | November 21, 2019   Page 10 of 10