Treyone Devon Johnston v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Mar 13 2018, 7:51 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Rory Gallagher Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Appellate Division
Tyler G. Banks
Indianapolis, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Treyone Devon Johnston, March 13, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1709-CR-2169
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David J. Certo,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
49G12-1607-CM-26450
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Following a bench trial, Treyone Devon Johnston (“Johnston”) was convicted
of Disorderly Conduct, as a Class B Misdemeanor. 1 Johnston now appeals,
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence rebutting his claim of self-defense.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Around 2:00 a.m. on July 10, 2016, Officer Kevin Moore of the Indianapolis
Metropolitan Police Department (“Officer Moore”) was parked in his patrol
car, observing the crowd at a nightclub in downtown Indianapolis. At some
point, Officer Moore heard and saw an argument between Johnston and
another man. Officer Moore exited his car, approached the club, and saw
Johnston punch the man. A fight ensued. Officer Moore’s verbal attempt to
break up the fight was unsuccessful, at which point Officer Moore deployed his
taser. Johnston was arrested and charged with Disorderly Conduct. The trial
court then held a bench trial, at which Johnston claimed self-defense. The court
found Johnston guilty and imposed a sentence. Johnston now appeals.
1
Ind. Code § 35-45-1-3(a)(1).
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Discussion and Decision
[4] Johnston argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to rebut his claim
of self-defense. In reviewing such challenges, we use “the same standard as for
any claim of insufficient evidence.” Carroll v. State, 744 N.E.2d 432, 433 (Ind.
2001). We “will reverse only if no reasonable person could say that self-defense
was negated by the State beyond a reasonable doubt.” Wilson v. State, 770
N.E.2d 799, 800-801 (Ind. 2002). Moreover, in conducting our review, “[w]e
neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses.” Sanders v.
State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 123 (Ind. 1999). Rather, we consider the evidence, and
all reasonable inferences, in a light most favorable to the judgment. Id.
[5] To obtain a conviction, the State was obligated to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Johnston “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally . . . engage[d] in
fighting or tumultuous conduct.” I.C. § 35-45-1-3(a). At trial, Johnston argued
that he was acting in self-defense. Under the Indiana self-defense statute, “[a]
person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect
the person . . . from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use
of unlawful force.” I.C. § 35-41-3-2(c). However, the use of force is not
justified if “the person has entered into combat with another person or is the
initial aggressor unless the person withdraws from the encounter and
communicates to the other person the intent to do so and the other person
nevertheless continues or threatens to continue unlawful action.” I.C. § 35-41-
3-2(g)(3). “When a claim of self-defense is raised and finds support in the
evidence,” Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 800, the State must then “disprove, beyond a
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reasonable doubt, at least one element of self-defense,” Carroll, 744 N.E.2d at
433. To meet this burden, the State may either “rebut[] the defense directly or
rely[] on the sufficiency of evidence in its case-in-chief.” Id. at 434.
[6] Johnston’s self-defense argument relied on testimony indicating that he was not
the initial aggressor—testimony that conflicts with Officer Moore’s testimony.
Moreover, there was no evidence that Johnston withdrew from the physical
altercation. See I.C. § 35-41-3-2(g)(3); Wilson, 770 N.E.2d at 801. Ultimately,
the evidence favorable to the judgment indicates that Johnston argued outside a
nightclub, threw the first punch, and kept fighting even after Officer Moore
arrived. We conclude that this is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable
trier of fact could reject a claim of self-defense and find Johnston guilty.
[7] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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