Nathan K. Baker v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Aug 28 2019, 8:53 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David A. Smith Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
McIntyre & Smith Attorney General of Indiana
Bedford, Indiana
George P. Sherman
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Nathan K. Baker, August 28, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-2744
v. Appeal from the Martin Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Lynne E. Ellis,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
51C01-1509-MR-140
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Nathan K. Baker appeals his convictions and 133-year aggregate sentence for
two counts of murder; two counts of burglary, as Level 4 felonies; and one
count of auto theft, as a Level 6 felony. Baker raises three issues for our review,
which we restate as follows:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
concluded that Baker’s statements to police officers while
in their custody were made voluntarily.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing
Baker when it declined to find Baker’s purported
intellectual disability to be a mitigating circumstance.
3. Whether Baker’s 133-year sentence is unconstitutionally
disproportionate under Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana
Constitution.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On August 25, 2015, Martin County Sheriff James Travis Roush spoke to Allan
Sims and Tom Tharp at Sims’ residence. Sheriff Roush “was looking for
Nathan K. Baker regarding an unrelated auto theft report.” Appellant’s App.
Vol. 2 at 36. Sims allowed Sheriff Roush to “check . . . on his property for any
signs of” Baker. Id. Sheriff Roush did so but did not see any evidence of
Baker’s presence, and he left.
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[4] However, Baker was in a wooded area near the men and overheard their
conversation. Baker believed that Sims and Tharp had accused Baker of
breaking into a nearby residence to Sheriff Roush. After he observed Sheriff
Roush leave the premises, Baker broke into Sims’ residence and obtained a
shotgun. Baker then confronted Sims by Sims’ garage and shot Sims “in the
head area” with the shotgun, killing him. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 36. A
very loud air compressor was running nearby at the moment, and Tharp did not
hear the shotgun blast because of it. Baker then confronted Tharp in a garden
at the residence and shot Tharp multiple times, killing him as well.
[5] After he murdered Sims, Baker dragged Sims’ body into the garage, pulled
down the garage door, and padlocked a side door from the outside. After he
murdered Tharp, he dragged Tharp’s body into the garden and covered the
body with some beans and vegetation. Baker then stole Tharp’s vehicle from
Sims’ residence and went to Tharp’s residence, broke into Tharp’s residence,
and stole another shotgun. Baker later sold the shotgun he had used to murder
Sims and Tharp to Doug May.
[6] Tharp’s family reported him missing the next morning, on August 26, and
Martin County law enforcement officers proceeded to Sims’ residence to try to
locate him. There, they observed Sims’ body in the garage. They then
contacted the Indiana State Police to open an investigation into an apparent
homicide. A few hours later, officers discovered Tharp’s body in the garden.
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[7] Later that day, Lawrence County law enforcement officers “spotted [Baker]
driving a vehicle . . . that . . . belonged to Tom Tharp.” Id. Those officers
attempted to initiate a traffic stop, but Baker fled. Baker crashed the vehicle,
and officers were able to take him into custody. Baker had a shotgun in the
vehicle.
[8] Indiana State Police officers took custody of Baker and advised him of his
Miranda rights both orally and in writing. After waiving those rights, Baker,
over two different interrogations, admitted to killing Sims and Tharp; to
attempting to hide Sims’ body in the garage and Tharp’s body in the garden; to
stealing Tharp’s vehicle; to breaking into both of the victims’ residences and
stealing shotguns from them; and to selling the murder weapon to May. Based
on Baker’s confession, officers later recovered that weapon from May.
[9] The State charged Baker with numerous offenses. Baker thereafter requested a
competency hearing. The court appointed Dr. Michael Cantwell and Dr.
Heather Henderson-Galligan to review Baker’s competency. Dr. Cantwell
found Baker “competent to stand trial.” 1 Tr. Vol. 2 at 48. However, Dr.
Henderson-Galligan concluded that Baker had an IQ of 70 and was not
competent, stating as follows:
Mr. Baker is not a mentally or cognitively intact individual.
Although he is able to articulate his current charges and has
cursory awareness of the legal system process, he does not
1
Dr. Cantwell’s report is not in the record on appeal, and he did not testify before the court.
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demonstrate an understanding of the legal system as a whole. He
was able to demonstrate examples of right from wrong, when a
scenario was provided by this examiner. Based on historical
psychological data, including childhood school records leading to
Social Security benefits, and this recent psychological testing, this
expert opines, Mr. Baker does indeed have an intellectual
disability rendering him cognitively unsound. Mr. Baker is not
able to participate in his own defense and is clearly incompetent
to stand trial.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 3 at 7.
[10] Thereafter, Baker was additionally evaluated by Dr. Megan Shaal. Dr. Shaal
reviewed Baker’s medical, social, educational, employment, and legal histories
and the evaluations by Dr. Cantwell and Dr. Henderson-Galligan. Dr. Shaal
also administered an IQ test for Baker, which placed him “within the Average
range of intellectual functioning.” Id. at 15. She further assessed that “[h]is
mental status examination revealed a score indicating no presence of cognitive
impairment.” Id. Her review of his educational history stated that, at a young
age, Baker was “noted to be capable of making good grades but to not take
responsibility for his schoolwork and to have a poor attitude towards school.”
Id. at 14. Dr. Shaal concluded that Baker “understands the nature and
objectives of his legal proceedings,” that he “presents with the ability to assist
his attorney in his defense,” and that he “is competent to stand trial.” Id. at 19-
20. Following a hearing, the court determined Baker competent to stand trial.
[11] Largely based on Dr. Henderson-Galligan’s assessment, Baker moved to
suppress his confession on the ground that he could not have voluntarily made
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the statements he had made to investigating officers while he was in their
custody. The trial court rejected that argument after an evidentiary hearing. In
particular, explicitly relying on “the totality of the circumstances” and Dr.
Shaal’s evaluation, the court stated as follows:
I do not believe there was police coercion. I do not believe the
length of the interrogation and the location of the interrogation
would lead to an involuntary statement. The continuity of the
interrogation I do not believe that that would le[a]d to the
involuntariness of the statement.
The Defendant’s maturity is an issue. The Defendant’s
education is a[n] issue. And the Defendant’s physical condition
is not a[n] issue for me as to voluntariness. The Defendant’s
mental health is a[n] issue. Whether the Defendant was
intoxicated is not a[n] issue. That was proven that he had no
medication or [il]licit drugs in his system. Whether a defendant
was sleep deprived, that’s not an issue. And whether the police
deceived the Defendant is not a[n] issue. So I’m looking at
Defendant’s maturity, Defendant’s education, and Defendant’s
mental health.
Now, as it relates to the Defendant’s maturity, Mr. Baker was in
his 30[s]. I reviewed and watched [his recorded interrogations]
and I’ve . . . had Mr. Baker in front of me since 2015. He has
never made any indication personally, on the tape, that he has an
immaturity about him that would make his confession
involuntary. In looking . . . [at] the school records, medical
records, testimony of the doctors[,] . . . he didn’t finish school.
He had issues with reading and comprehension. And yet there
was testimony by Dr. Shaal about his ability to survive in the
woods. And he had enough intelligence . . . to make it feasible
that he could take care of himself even in difficult situations. So,
I believe he had a particular maturity about him to know how to
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take care of himself and what was right and wrong as it relates to
imposing upon others for his needs.
Intellectually—first of all, I want it known right now that
I . . . understand that his [IQ] is at a 70 unmedicated. The
Defense used the term “he is a point above mental retardation.”
That’s why we have the cutoff. He’s not considered mentally
retarded . . . . So, I do not believe he is so low functioning that
he doesn’t understand and did not understand the totality of the
circumstances where he sat the day of the interrogation and what
was going on.
There is no issue as to the Miranda advisements. . . . [O]ne thing
that I’ll note . . . —did he ask it more than on[ce]? “What am I
being charged with?” He was very concerned about what he was
being charged with. And . . . in fact, that’s one of the things that
stands out in his initial hearing. The State had not completed the
charging information yet. He was being held. It’s on videotape.
When he first came before the Court, the Court wanted to make
sure that . . . he ha[d] legal counsel immediately. And I read a
probable cause affidavit to the Defendant, appointed legal
counsel, and the State . . . asked for additional time . . . to file
charges.
. . . To me, that was very telling as to his ability to understand
what was going on and understand the situation and the
allegations against him because he was quite concerned. He was
aware enough of the allegations and had great concern as to what
he was being charged with. That was telling to me.
. . . Baker was not in a psychological unit when questioning
occurred. . . . He also was not on psychotropic drugs. . . .
[A]nd I understand that ADHD is on the mental health scale, but
it does not rise to the level of schizoaffective behavior. . . . Then
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in talking about . . . borderline feeblemindedness . . . [a]gain, I’m
going back to— . . . he is . . . a point above. . . . He was not on
the mental retardation scale. He was a point above. And
therefore, I believe he had the ability to understand what he was
doing and the severity of the situation as it relate[d] to his
confession. And I believe his confession was voluntary.
Tr. Vol. 3 at 120-24.
[12] Baker renewed his objection to the admissibility of his confession at his ensuing
jury trial, which the court overruled. The jury thereafter found Baker guilty as
charged. The trial court entered judgment of conviction against Baker for two
counts of murder, two counts of Level 4 felony burglary, and one count of
Level 6 felony auto theft.
[13] Following a sentencing hearing, the court found the following mitigating and
aggravating circumstances:
The Court finds the following mitigating factors: testimony of
possible remorse by Indiana State Police, and [Baker was]
cooperative with [the] investigation[.]
[Baker’s] intellectual disability was mitigated by [the State] not
filing . . . Life Without Parole.
The Court finds the following aggravating factors: prior criminal
history[:] 13 prior convictions, at least 5 Petitions to Revoke
Probation and at least one Community Corrections Revocation;
one victim was at least 65 years of age; multiple victims; one
victim was a family member by marriage and provid[ed Baker]
with a place to live; [Baker] had taken [a] multitude of drugs
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immediately preceding [the] acts; one victim was a long[-]time
friend and neither victim provoked [Baker].
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 26. The court then sentenced Baker to an aggregate
term of 133 years in the Department of Correction, the entirety of which is to be
executed. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Admissibility of Confession
[14] On appeal, Baker first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion under
Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution when it permitted the State to
introduce Baker’s confession at his jury trial. 2 “The decision whether to admit a
defendant’s custodial statement is within the discretion of the trial court.” Ellis
v. State, 707 N.E.2d 797, 801 (Ind. 1999). “In making a determination as to the
voluntariness of a statement, the trial court must consider the totality of the
circumstances.” Id. “[W]e do not reweigh the evidence but instead examine
the record for substantial, probative evidence of voluntariness.” Id.
[15] Baker asserts on appeal that, under Article 1, Section 14, the absence of police
coercion here is not dispositive on the issue of the voluntariness, or not, of his
statements to police and that Baker’s purported “mental disease or defect”
alone can render his statements involuntarily made. Appellant’s Br. at 30. He
2
Baker’s argument on appeal regarding the admissibility of his confession is limited to the Indiana
Constitution and is not raised under the federal constitution. See Appellant’s Br. at 25-30.
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further asserts that the trial court’s ruling “was contrary to the vast weight of the
evidence . . . regarding Baker’s intellectual disabilit[y].” Id. And he asserts that
the trial court unduly emphasized his IQ and failed to apply the totality-of-the-
circumstances test.
[16] We reject Baker’s arguments. First, the trial court explicitly reviewed the
totality of the circumstances, considering no fewer than eleven different factors
in determining the voluntariness of Baker’s statements. Tr. Vol. 3 at 120-24.
That the court thought Baker’s IQ deserved some commentary that other
factors did not deserve does not demonstrate that the court unduly emphasized
that factor or that the court applied the wrong test. Baker’s argument on those
two points fail to place the court’s comments in their proper and explicit
context.
[17] Second, accepting for the sake of argument Baker’s position that his purported
mental deficiency alone might establish involuntariness under Article 1, Section
14, Baker’s argument on this issue merely requests this Court to reweigh the
evidence that was before the trial court. Specifically, he asks that we give more
weight to Dr. Henderson-Galligan’s opinion and to selected portions of Dr.
Shaal’s evaluation than the trial court gave them. He likewise asks that we
simply disregard the portions of Dr. Shaal’s evaluation and conclusions that
were not favorable to him. We cannot reweigh the evidence. Dr. Shaal’s
conclusions and the court’s own impressions of Baker based upon several
encounters with him support the trial court’s judgment on this issue. See Wilkes
v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 681 (Ind. 2009) (noting that it may be appropriate for
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the trial court to assess the defendant’s demeanor in determining the
voluntariness of his prior statements). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
admission of Baker’s confession.
Issue Two: Abuse of Sentencing Discretion
[18] Baker next asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced
him because the court, in Baker’s words, “refused to find Baker’s intellectual
disability as a mitigating circumstance.” Appellant’s Br. at 36. Sentencing
decisions “rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on
appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490
(Ind.), clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs
if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual
deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted). A
trial court may abuse its discretion by failing to enter a sentencing statement,
entering findings of aggravating and mitigating factors unsupported by the
record, omitting factors clearly supported by the record and advanced for
consideration, or giving reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-
91. “An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating
factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both
significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. at 493.
[19] In its sentencing order, the trial court stated that it had declined to find Baker’s
intellectual disability to be a mitigating circumstance because the State had
already extended him a benefit for that circumstance by not seeking life without
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parole. Baker asserts on appeal that the State’s decision is neither here nor
there with respect to the sentencing hearing and the evidence of his disability.
[20] Despite the parties’ arguments on appeal, we need not decide whether the
State’s decision not to seek life without parole mattered at all to this issue.
Baker has not met his burden to show that this purported mitigating factor “is
both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Id. Again, Dr. Shaal’s
evaluation and conclusion that Baker did not suffer an intellectual disability,
which is ample evidence that it is neither significant nor clearly supported, and
Baker’s assertions on appeal simply disregard that evidence and seek to have
this Court do the same, which we cannot do. We cannot say that the trial court
abused its discretion when it declined to find Baker’s purported intellectual
disability to be a mitigating circumstance.
Issue Three: Constitutionality of Baker’s Sentence
[21] Lastly, Baker asserts that his 133-year aggregate sentence is unconstitutionally
disproportionate under Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution given
his purported intellectual disability. 3 As our Supreme Court has explained:
Though Article 1, Section 16 sweeps somewhat more broadly
than the Eighth Amendment, its protections are still narrow. It is
violated only when the criminal penalty is not graduated and
proportioned to the nature of the offense. Though we cannot set
3
Although Baker cites some federal authority in this part of his brief, he expressly limits his analysis to
Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution and does not premise his argument on the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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aside a legislatively sanctioned penalty merely because it seems
too severe, Article 1, Section 16 requires us to review whether a
sentence is not only within statutory parameters, but also
constitutional as applied to the particular defendant. Our
standard for an as-applied proportionality challenge depends on
the type of penalty at issue. For . . . penalties not based on prior
offenses, we have undertaken a simpler inquiry into whether the
penalty is graduated and proportioned to the nature of the
offense.
Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1289-90 (Ind. 2014) (alteration, citations, and
quotation marks omitted).
[22] Baker’s argument on appeal, in essence, is that the State conceded that life
without parole would be an inappropriate sentence due to his intellectual
disability, yet, in effect, that is what he received. We reject Baker’s argument.
The trial court was not prohibited from sentencing Baker to a term of years due
to the State’s decision not to seek life without parole. And, again, the evidence
most favorable to the trial court’s judgment does not demonstrate a significant
and clearly supported intellectual disability in the first instance.
[23] Baker has not met his burden on appeal to show that his sentence—133 years
for two murders, two Level 4 felony burglaries, and one Level 6 felony auto
theft—is unconstitutionally disproportionate under Article 1, Section 16. And
he makes no argument on appeal that his sentence is inappropriate under
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Accordingly, we affirm his sentence.
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Conclusion
[24] In sum, we affirm Baker’s convictions and sentence.
[25] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.
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