Shawn M. Burnworth v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), Apr 12 2018, 8:10 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Emilee L. Stotts Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Marion, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Shawn M. Burnworth, April 12, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
35A05-1709-CR-2207
v. Appeal from the Huntington
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Jennifer E.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Newton, Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
35D01-1612-F5-259
35D01-0906-FA-122
Mathias, Judge.
[1] In 2009, Shawn M. Burnworth (“Burnworth”) pleaded guilty in Huntington
Superior Court to Class B felony dealing in methamphetamine. The court
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sentenced Burnworth to twenty years, with fourteen years executed and six
years suspended to probation. Burnworth was released from prison in 2014 and
began his probation. In 2016, while still on probation for the first conviction,
Burnworth pleaded guilty to Level 5 felony dealing in methamphetamine and
admitted to being an habitual offender and to violating the terms of his
probation. After this second plea, the trial court sentenced Burnworth to an
aggregate of twelve years of incarceration. The court also revoked Burnworth’s
probation and ordered him to serve the six-year balance of his previously
suspended sentence. Burnworth appeals and presents three issues, which we
restate as:
I. Whether the trial court erred by imposing a separate, consecutive sentence
on Burnworth’s habitual offender adjudication;
II. Whether Burnworth’s twelve-year sentence is inappropriate; and
III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Burnworth to
serve the balance of his previously suspended sentence.
The State concedes, and we agree, that the trial court erred by imposing the
habitual offender enhancement as a separate consecutive sentence instead of
attaching it to Burnworth’s underlying conviction. However, we reject
Burnworth’s other arguments. We therefore affirm Burnworth’s sentences but
remand with instructions that the trial court attach the habitual offender
enhancement to the sentence imposed on the Level 5 felony conviction.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On June 8, 2009, Burnworth drove his car in Huntington, Indiana while he
manufactured methamphetamine in the car. At some point, the portable
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methamphetamine lab he was using to manufacture the drug exploded, and the
car burst into flames. Burnworth jumped from the still-moving car, which hit a
telephone pole.
[3] As a result of this incident, the State charged Burnworth on June 10, 2009, with
Class A felony dealing in methamphetamine and Class A misdemeanor
purchasing three or more grams of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine within seven
days. On August 4, 2009, Burnworth entered into a plea agreement with the
State, pursuant to which he agreed to plead guilty to Class B felony dealing in
methamphetamine and receive a twenty-year sentence. The agreement gave the
trial court discretion to suspend a portion of the sentence. The trial court
accepted the plea and sentenced Burnworth to fourteen years executed and six
years suspended to probation. Burnworth was released from prison on
December 17, 2014, and began his probation.
[4] In the fall of 2016, the State filed a petition to revoke Burnworth’s probation
alleging that he had failed to report to scheduled appointments with his
probation officer, failed to report to scheduled drug tests, and failed to provide
his address to his probation office. At the hearing held on this petition,
Burnworth admitted to violating the terms of his probation. He also tested
positive for marijuana use. The trial court declined to revoke Burnworth’s
probation and decided instead to continue probation with modified conditions,
which included participation in an intensive outpatient treatment program.
Burnworth quickly squandered this second chance.
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[5] On September 14, 2016, Burnworth rode in a car in Huntington County with
several friends as he manufactured methamphetamine inside a twenty-ounce
bottle. As the car drove past a local high school, Burnworth noticed that a
police patrol car was driving behind them. Burnworth made the questionable
decision to throw the bottle out of the car in view of the police officer, who
immediately pulled the vehicle over. Inside the car, the police found other items
used in the manufacture and use of methamphetamine, including one empty
and one unopened box of pseudoephedrine pills, tools, scales, and hypodermic
needles. Burnworth admitted that he intended to sell the methamphetamine to
raise money so that he could leave town and had already made plans to sell the
methamphetamine.
[6] As a result of this incident, the State charged Burnworth on December 21, 2016,
with Level 5 felony dealing in methamphetamine. The State subsequently
added an allegation that Burnworth was an habitual offender. On August 15,
2017, Burnworth entered into an “open” plea agreement and pleaded guilty
without any limitations or agreement as to his sentence. At the September 12,
2018 sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a six-year sentence on the
Level 5 felony conviction and a consecutive six-year sentence on the habitual
offender adjudication. The trial court also revoked Burnworth’s probation and
ordered him to serve the six-year balance of his previously suspended sentence.
Burnworth now appeals.
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I. Habitual Offender Enhancement
[7] Burnworth first claims that the trial court erred by entering the sentence
enhancement for his habitual offender adjudication as a separate, consecutive
sentence. The State concedes the error, and we agree. An habitual offender
adjudication does not constitute a separate crime, nor does it result in a separate
sentence. Rose v. State, 36 N.E.3d 1055, 1064–65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing
Harris v. State, 964 N.E.2d 920, 927 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied). Instead,
an habitual offender adjudication results in a sentence enhancement imposed
upon the conviction of a subsequent felony. Id. at 1065. Accordingly, we
remand with instructions that the trial court vacate the separate sentence on the
habitual offender enhancement and attach the six-year enhancement to
Burnworth’s conviction for Level 5 dealing in methamphetamine. See id.II. Appropriateness of Sentence
[8] Burnworth next argues that the twelve-year sentence imposed by the trial court
is inappropriate. Even if a trial court acted within its statutory discretion in
imposing a sentence, Sections 4 and 6 of Article 7 of the Indiana Constitution
authorize independent appellate review and revision of a sentence imposed by
the trial court. Rose, 36 N.E.3d at 1063. This constitutional authority is
implemented through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which provides that we
“may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the
trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light
of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.”
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[9] Still, we must exercise deference to a trial court’s sentencing decision, because
Rule 7(B) requires us to give “due consideration” to that decision and because
we understand and recognize the unique perspective a trial court brings to its
sentencing decisions. Id. Although we have the power to review and revise
sentences, the principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to “leaven
the outliers,” and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those
charged with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve what
we perceive to be a “correct” result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d
1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008).
[10] Our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) should focus on “the forest—the
aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number
of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Id. The
appropriate question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate;
rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. Rose, 36
N.E.3d at 1063. It is the defendant’s burden on appeal to persuade us that the
sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848
N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006)).
[11] Here, Burnworth was convicted of a Level 5 felony and found to be an habitual
offender. The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is one to six years. Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-6(b). And the trial court had the discretion to impose an
habitual offender enhancement of two to six years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(2).
Thus, the trial court imposed the maximum sentence of twelve years.
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[12] “Although the maximum possible sentences are generally most appropriate for
the worst offenders, this rule is not an invitation to determine whether a worse
offender could be imagined, as it is always possible to identify or hypothesize a
significantly more despicable scenario, regardless of the nature of any particular
offense and offender.” Kovats v. State, 982 N.E.2d 409, 416 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
By stating that maximum sentences are ordinarily appropriate for the “worst
offenders,” we refer generally to the class of offenses and offenders that warrant
the maximum punishment, which encompasses a considerable variety of
offenses and offenders. Id. Accordingly, “[w]e concentrate less on comparing
the facts of this case to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on
focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the
defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant’s
character.” Wells v. State, 904 N.E.2d 265, 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied
(citing Brown v. State, 760 N.E.2d 243, 247 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied).
[13] In the present case, the nature of Burnworth’s offense does little to persuade us
that his sentence is inappropriate. For at least the second time, Burnworth was
operating a mobile methamphetamine lab in a car. Burnworth knew well that
doing so was dangerous, as his previous effort to do so resulted in his car
catching fire. And this time, there were others in the car with him. Moreover,
Burnworth threw the bottle in which he was making methamphetamine out of
the car window, near a high school football field, thereby exposing even more
people to the dangerous chemicals used in the making of methamphetamine.
Burnworth further admitted that he already had buyers for the illicit drugs he
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was making and that he planned to sell the methamphetamine to raise funds to
leave town, despite the fact that he was on probation.
[14] Burnworth’s character further supports the trial court’s sentencing decision.
Although Burnworth notes that he cooperated with the police and pleaded
guilty, this only marginally improves our view of his character. As a juvenile,
Burnworth was found to be delinquent for burglary and illegal possession of
alcohol, in addition to status offenses such as truancy and running away from
home. As an adult, Burnworth was twice convicted of Class D felony theft.
And, as noted above, he was also convicted for Class B felony dealing in
methamphetamine and was still on probation for this offense when he
committed the instant offense. He has also accumulated convictions for twelve
misdemeanors, including possession of marijuana, intimidation, battery,
criminal mischief, public intoxication, operating while intoxicated, failure to
stop at the scene of an accident, conversion, check deception, illegal possession
of alcohol, and the purchase of more than three grams of ephedrine or
pseudoephedrine.
[15] In addition, not only was Burnworth on probation at the time he committed the
instant offense, he was on probation for committing the exact same act—
manufacturing methamphetamine while in an automobile. And when
Burnworth first violated the terms of his probation, the trial court chose not to
revoke his probation and instead gave him a second chance on probation.
Burnworth then committed the same crime for which he was on probation, i.e.,
manufacturing methamphetamine.
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[16] Despite Burnworth’s argument that his criminal behavior was motivated by his
substance abuse problem—which we do not doubt—he squandered the
opportunity for treatment that was offered to him while on probation.
Specifically, when the trial court chose to continue Burnworth’s probation and
ordered him to participate in intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment,
Burnworth chose not to participate in treatment. Instead, he fled the State.
[17] All of these facts and circumstances lead us to the conclusion that the twelve-
year sentence imposed by the trial court is not inappropriate.1
III. Probation Sentence
[18] Lastly, Burnworth argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it
ordered him to serve the six-year balance of his previously suspended sentence.
Burnworth does not deny that he violated the terms of his probation; to the
contrary, he admitted to having done so. He claims only that, after he was
charged with the instant offense, he found gainful employment in North Dakota
and stopped using illicit drugs and that the trial court should therefore have not
ordered him to serve the entire balance of his previously suspended sentence.
1
We find Burnworth’s citation to Parks v. State, 22 N.E.3d 552 (Ind. 2014), unavailing. In that case, the
defendant was convicted of Class A felony dealing in methamphetamine and was sentenced under the prior
sentencing scheme to forty years of incarceration. On appeal, our supreme court revised his sentence to thirty
years, with twenty years executed at the Department of Correction, two years executed on Community
Corrections, and eight years suspended to probation. Id. at 556. Thus, even the revised sentence in Parks was
considerably greater than Burnworth’s sentence. Although this is due in part to the 2015 revision of the
criminal code, the fact remains that Parks’s sentence was much greater than Burnworth’s. Moreover,
Burnworth, unlike the defendant in Parks, was on probation for the exact same behavior when he committed
the instant offense. We therefore do not find Parks to be controlling.
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[19] Upon a finding of a probation violation, a trial court may impose one or more
of the following sanctions:
(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying
or enlarging the conditions.
(2) Extend the person’s probationary period for not more than
one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.
(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was
suspended at the time of initial sentencing.
Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h).
[20] A defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence in a probation program; rather,
such placement is a matter of grace and a conditional liberty that is a favor, not
a right. Abernathy v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). We
review the trial court’s sentencing decisions on probation violations for an
abuse of discretion. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). An abuse
of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of
the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. The trial court should be given
considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed following the revocation of
probation. Id. Consequently, so long as proper procedures have been followed,
the trial court may order execution of a suspended sentence after revoking
probation. Goonen v. State, 705 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); see also
I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h).
[21] Here, Burnworth had previously violated the terms of his probation. The trial
court could have revoked his probation and ordered him to serve the balance of
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his previously suspended sentence at that time. Instead, the trial court gave
Burnworth a second chance and extended his probation with the additional
condition of outpatient substance abuse treatment. Instead of taking advantage
of this opportunity, Burnworth failed to undergo treatment and committed the
very same act that resulted in him being placed on probation in the first place—
making methamphetamine. And after his arrest for this second incident,
Burnworth fled the state. The trial court was therefore well within its discretion
to order Burnworth to serve the six-year balance of his previously suspended
sentence.
Conclusion
[22] Burnworth’s aggregate twelve-year sentence is not inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Nor did the trial court
abuse its discretion in ordering Burnworth to serve the six-year balance of his
previously suspended sentence. The trial court did, however, err by entering the
habitual offender enhancement as a separate, consecutive sentenced instead of
attaching it to the six-year sentence imposed on the Level 5 felony conviction.
We therefore affirm Burnworth’s sentences and remand with instructions that
the trial court attach the habitual offender enhancement to the sentence
imposed on the Level 5 felony conviction.
[23] Affirmed and remanded.
Najam, J., and Barnes, J. concur.
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