in Re v. Hunt Minor ( 2017 )


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  •                            STATE OF MICHIGAN
    COURT OF APPEALS
    UNPUBLISHED
    In re HUNT, Minor.                                                    June 15, 2017
    No. 335550
    Lake Circuit Court
    Family Division
    LC No. 13-001540-NA
    Before: GADOLA, P.J., TALBOT, C.J., and GLEICHER, J.
    PER CURIAM.
    Respondent appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his
    minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (the conditions that led to the adjudication continue to
    exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm if the
    child is returned to the parent). We affirm.
    Respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred when it ruled that clear and
    convincing evidence was presented to establish the statutory grounds for termination and that
    termination was in the child’s best interests. We review for clear error a trial court’s decision
    that a statutory ground has been established by clear and convincing evidence, In re Mason, 
    486 Mich. 142
    , 152; 782 NW2d 747 (2010), and that termination is in the best interests of the child,
    In re LaFrance Minors, 
    306 Mich. App. 713
    , 723; 858 NW2d 143 (2014). A decision is clearly
    erroneous if, “although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
    is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re JK, 
    468 Mich. 202
    , 209-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003).
    The trial court concluded that clear and convincing evidence supported terminating
    respondent’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j). MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)
    provides that a trial court may terminate a parent’s rights if “[t]he conditions that led to the
    adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be
    rectified within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” This statutory ground exists
    when the conditions that brought the child into foster care continue to exist despite “time to make
    changes and the opportunity to take advantage of a variety of services . . . .” In re Powers
    Minors, 
    244 Mich. App. 111
    , 119; 624 NW2d 472 (2000). MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) states that the
    trial court may terminate parental rights if “[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide
    proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be
    able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.”
    Finally, MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) provides that the trial court may terminate parental rights if
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    “[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the
    child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.”
    Termination of respondent’s parental rights was proper under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). It
    is undisputed that the order terminating respondent’s parental rights was entered more than 182
    days after the initial dispositional order was entered. Indeed, the order was entered three years
    after the initial dispositional order was entered. The condition that led to this adjudication was
    respondent’s continuing substance abuse. The record shows that respondent never successfully
    addressed this barrier to reunification. During the pendency of this case, respondent was
    involved in four substance abuse treatment programs, two of which he completed and two of
    which he was discharged from for rules violations. Although respondent showed progress for a
    time after his initial incarceration for failing to complete one of the substance abuse treatment
    programs, he relapsed within weeks of being released on parole after completing an outpatient
    substance abuse treatment program, and withdrew from any involvement with his son.
    Respondent was ordered to enter a third substance abuse treatment program, but was discharged
    from this program for a rules violation. He was then incarcerated before entering a fourth
    substance abuse treatment program, in which he remained at the time of the termination hearing,
    with a release date several months in the future. Given this history, the court correctly concluded
    that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent could successfully rectify his substance
    abuse, and its attendant impact on his son, within a reasonable time considering the child’s age.
    Only one statutory ground need be established by clear and convincing evidence in order
    to terminate a respondent’s parental rights. In re Ellis, 
    294 Mich. App. 30
    , 32; 817 NW2d 111
    (2011). Nonetheless, we further conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support termination
    under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j), considering respondent’s history of substance abuse, his
    failure to maintain stable employment and suitable housing throughout the proceedings, and his
    inconsistent interactions with his son.
    A trial court must order termination of parental rights if a statutory ground for
    termination is established by clear and convincing evidence and the trial court finds by a
    preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests. MCL
    712A.19b(5); In re Moss, 
    301 Mich. App. 76
    , 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). In making a best-
    interest determination, the court may consider a variety of factors, including the parent’s history,
    parenting ability, and participation in treatment programs, the child’s age and bond to the parent,
    the foster-care environment, and the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality. In re
    Olive/Metts Minors, 
    297 Mich. App. 35
    , 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012); In re VanDalen, 293 Mich
    App 120, 141; 809 NW2d 412 (2011).
    At the time of the termination hearing, the child was six years old and had been in foster
    care in at least three different placements for over three years. The trial court waited more than
    two years for respondent to complete substance abuse treatment programs and to be released
    from prison. When respondent was released from prison and began parenting time and play
    therapy with the child, two service providers and the child’s guardian ad litem supported the goal
    of reunification. However, after just ten weeks of parenting time/play therapy, and just a number
    of weeks after completing outpatient substance abuse treatment, respondent relapsed, stopped
    communicating with the caseworker, and stopped attending parenting time/play therapy. At this
    point, the therapist directing the play therapy sessions could no longer support reunification
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    efforts. She opined that the child would be further damaged if respondent entered his life and
    disappeared again. She indicated that three years in foster care is too long and that the child
    needed stability and permanency in order to address his significant attachment issues. The trial
    court did not err in concluding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the child’s
    best interests.
    Affirmed.
    /s/ Michael F. Gadola
    /s/ Michael J. Talbot
    /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
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Document Info

Docket Number: 335550

Filed Date: 6/15/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 6/16/2017