Murphy v. Hogan Transports, Inc. , 607 F. App'x 70 ( 2015 )


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  •    15-317-cv
    Murphy v. Hogan Transports, Inc.
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
    SUMMARY ORDER
    RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO
    A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
    GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S
    LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
    THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
    ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING
    TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED
    BY COUNSEL.
    At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
    held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
    New York, on the 9th day of June, two thousand fifteen.
    PRESENT:
    ROBERT D. SACK,
    PETER W. HALL,
    SUSAN L. CARNEY,
    Circuit Judges.
    _____________________________________
    Paul J. Murphy, Acting Regional Director of the
    Third Region of the National Labor Relations
    Board, for and on behalf of National Labor
    Relations Board,
    Petitioner-Appellee,
    v.                                                                    15-317-cv
    Hogan Transports, Inc.,
    Respondent-Appellant.
    _____________________________________
    FOR PETITIONER-APPELLEE:                              KYLE ANDREW MOHR, Attorney
    (Elinor L. Merberg, Laura T. Vazquez,
    on the briefs) National Labor Relations
    Board, Washington, DC.
    1
    FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT:                                    JEDD MENDELSON, Esq., Littler
    Mendelson, PC, Newark, NJ.
    Appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
    New York (Sharpe, C.J.).
    UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
    DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Appellant Hogan Transports, Inc., appeals from an order of the district court granting an
    interim bargaining order and additional temporary injunctive relief pursuant to § 10(j) of the
    National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), in favor of Paul J. Murphy, Acting Regional
    Director of the Third Region of the National Labor Relations Board, for and on behalf of the
    National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
    underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.1
    1
    On October 14, 2014 this Court remanded this case for further proceedings on the precise issue
    now on appeal. We explained in relevant part:
    [T]he district court is free to revise its decision or again conclude that an
    interim bargaining order is not “just and proper” relief pursuant to Section
    10(j). However, in order to appropriately exercise its discretion, the
    district court should explain, beyond simply stating that an interim
    bargaining order “goes too far,” why such relief is warranted or
    unwarranted in light of the serious violations it found, and the apparent
    disconnect between these violations and the other interim relief afforded.
    In addition, “[o]n remand, the district court should consider not only the
    transcript of the hearing which was before the court at the time of its initial
    decision, but also the findings which have since been made by the
    administrative law judge.” The district court may also consider the time
    the NLRB might take to resolve this matter, and it may seek reasonable
    assurances of timely disposition.
    Murphy ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Hogan Transports, Inc., 
    581 F. App'x 36
    , 38 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal
    citation omitted).
    2
    We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s determination of whether relief is just
    and proper. Hoffman ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. Inn Credible Caterers, Ltd., 
    247 F.3d 360
    , 364 (2d Cir.
    2001). A district court abuses its discretion “when (1) its decision rests on an error of law (such as
    application of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) its
    decision—though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual
    finding—cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” In re Holocaust Victim
    Assets Litig., 
    424 F.3d 158
    , 165 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We conclude that the district court acted in accord with our October 14, 2014 summary
    order and did not exceed the bounds of its discretion by issuing an interim bargaining order in
    favor of the NLRB. We have considered Hogan’s remaining arguments and find them to be
    without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.
    FOR THE COURT:
    Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-317-cv

Citation Numbers: 607 F. App'x 70

Filed Date: 6/9/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023