arrowhead-senior-living-community-self-insured-administered-by-berkley ( 2015 )


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  • STATE OF MINNESOTA OFFICE OF
    APPELLATE COURTS
    MAR 0 4 21115
    A14-1521
    Arrowhead Senior Living Community,
    Self-Insured, administered by Berkley Risk
    Administrators Co.,
    IN SUPREME COURT
    Employer-Relator,
    vs.
    Carol J. Kainz,
    Employee-Respondent.
    Edward Q. Cassidy, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for relator.
    Steven T. Moe, Petersen, Sage, Graves, Layman & Moe, P.A., Duluth, Minnesota, for
    respondent.
    Considered and decided by the court without oral argument.
    0 R D E R
    Respondent Carol Kainz fractured her ankle on a staircase at her workplace, and
    filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The sole contested issue before the
    compensation judge was whether Kainz’s injuries “arose out of’ her employment. See
    Minn. Stat. § 176.021, subd. 1 (2014). The compensation judge awarded benefits to
    Kainz, concluding that the injuries “arose out of” her employment. The Workers’
    Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) affirmed, relying on its previous decision in
    Dykhofl v. Xcel Energy, 
    2012 WL 6592145
    (Minn. WCCA Nov. 29, 2012), which had
    applied a “work-connection test” that balanced the “arising out of” element with the “in
    the course of” element to determine the compensability of a workplace injury. See Kainz
    v. Arrowhead Senior Living Community, 
    2013 WL 1704315
    at *4 (Minn. WCCA Apr. 1,
    2013). We stayed Arrowhead’s appeal while we considered Dykhofl. After reversing the
    WCCA’s decision in Dykhofi‘, see Dykhofl v. Xcel Energy, 
    840 N.W.2d 821
    (Minn.
    2013), we remanded this case to the WCCA for further consideration. See Kainz v.
    Arrowhead Senior Living Community, 
    843 N.W.2d 785
    (Minn. 2014).
    On remand, the WCCA again affirmed. Kainz v. Arrowhead Senior Living
    Community, 
    2014 WL 4253406
    (Minn. WCCA Aug. 6, 2014). This time, the WCCA
    applied the “increased risk” test from our decision in Dykhofi‘, which requires an
    employee to show that her workplace “exposed her to a risk of injury that was increased
    over what she would face in her everyday life”—in other words, a “special 
    hazard.” 840 N.W.2d at 827
    .
    The WCCA primarily relied on two factual findings to conclude that the injury in
    this case was compensable under the increased-risk test. First, the WCCA held that the
    compensation judge’s finding that “[n]o handrails were on that portion of the stairway
    where [Kainz] inverted and twisted her ankle” was supported by substantial evidence in
    the record. After our review of the record, however, we conclude that this finding is
    “manifestly contrary to the evidence.” Pelowski v. K-Mart Corp, 
    627 N.W.2d 89
    , 92
    (Minn. 2001). Specifically, the WCCA failed to observe that the compensation judge’s
    findings were self-contradictory. In his order, the compensation judge found that the
    injury occurred on the sixth step out of twelve on the stairway, where there was “[n]o
    2
    handrail[],” yet also found that the handrails extended “about two-thirds” of the way
    down the staircase. Both findings cannot be true; one or the other must be incorrect. The
    WCCA also relied on photographic evidence to conclude that the compensation judge’s
    “no-handrails” finding was not clearly erroneous. However, we have reviewed the
    photographic evidence in the record, which conclusively shows that the handrails extend
    all the way down the staircase.
    Second, the WCCA relied on Kainz’s testimony that the staircase was “kind of
    steep” to hold that the injury was compensable under the increased-risk test. However,
    the compensation judge did not make a finding regarding the steepness of the stairs, and
    there is potentially conflicting evidence in the record (including the photographs)
    regarding whether the stairs are so steep that they presented a “special hazard” for Kainz.
    Of course, when the compensation judge made his findings, he did not have the benefit of
    our decision in Dykhofi‘.
    Because the WCCA’s decision was “manifestly contrary to the evidence,” see
    
    Pelowskz', 627 N.W.2d at 92
    , we reverse. To give the compensation judge an opportunity
    to reconsider his decision in light of Dykhofi‘, we remand to the compensation judge for
    further proceedings consistent with this order.
    Therefore, based upon all the files, records, and proceedings herein,
    IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the decision of the Workers’ Compensation
    Court of Appeals filed August 6, 2014, be, and the same is, reversed, and the matter is
    remanded to the compensation judge for the purpose of reconsideration consistent with
    this order and with Dykhojj’v. Xcel Energy, 
    840 N.W.2d 821
    (Minn. 2013). See Hofi’v.
    3
    Kempton, 
    317 N.W.2d 361
    , 366 (Minn. 1982) (explaining that summary dispositions
    “have no precedential value because they do not commit the court to any particular point
    of View,” doing no more than establishing the law of the case).
    Dated: March 4, 2015
    BY THE COURT:
    @111 M:
    David R. Stras
    Associate Justice
    LILLEHAUG, J ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: A14-1521

Filed Date: 3/4/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/1/2016