Crystal Williams, Stephan Williams, and Lorenzo Washington v. Chicago South Shore & South Bend Railroad, Jonathan Manigold, and William Cummings (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
FILED
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Jun 16 2017, 5:38 am
precedent or cited before any court except for the
CLERK
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
Robert D. Brown Michael E. Tolbert
Sarah M. Cafiero Tolbert & Tolbert, LLC
Kenneth J. Allen Law Group, LLC Gary, Indiana
Valparaiso, Indiana
Attorneys for Crystal Williams and David M. Alt
Stephan Williams Katherine L. Hartley
BatesCarey LLP
William A. Walker Chicago, Illinois
The Walker Law Group
Gary, Indiana
Attorney for Lorenzo Washington
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Crystal Williams, Stephan June 16, 2017
Williams, and Lorenzo Court of Appeals Case No.
Washington, 45A04-1612-CT-2819
Appeal from the Lake County
Appellants,
Circuit Court.
The Honorable Thomas W. Webber,
v. Sr., Judge Pro Tempore.
Cause No. 45C01-1308-CT-124
Chicago South Shore & South
Bend Railroad, Jonathan
Manigold, and William
Cummings,
Appellees.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1612-CT-2819 | June 16, 2017 Page 1 of 10
Friedlander, Senior Judge
[1] Crystal Williams, Stephan Williams, and Lorenzo Washington appeal the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment to Chicago South Shore & South Bend
Railroad (“CSS”) and CSS’s employees, Jonathan Manigold and William
Cummings. We reverse and remand.
[2] On December 24, 2011, at around 9:54 p.m., seventeen-year-old Crystal
Williams was walking home in Gary, Indiana. She was accompanied by her
boyfriend, Lorenzo Washington, and Washington’s friend, who is identified in
the record by his first name, Joseph. Crystal was in a hurry because her father,
Stephan Williams, had set a curfew of 9:00 p.m., and she was late.
[3] The three had to cross a set of railroad tracks to reach Crystal and Stephan’s
home. The tracks were owned by the Northern Indiana Commuter
Transportation District (NICTD), and CSS had “trackage rights” to operate
1
trains on that line. Appellants’ App. Vol II, p. 7. At the location in question,
the tracks ran parallel to U.S. Highway 20 at street level. Crystal lived close to
the tracks and had frequently crossed them in the past, both on foot and in
vehicles, at designated crossings. She and her father Stephan had seen trains
stopped in that area, sometimes for hours, blocking the nearby street crossings.
1
Crystal, Stephan, and Washington incorrectly alleged in their civil complaints that CSS owned the railroad
tracks, but NICTD’s ownership of the tracks was revealed during discovery.
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In their experience, the stopped trains sounded their whistles before moving
again.
[4] Stephan once saw a person climb through a stopped train in that area. Several
other residents of the area had seen trains stopped there, and they also saw
people climb through the stopped trains. This practice had been going on for
decades.
[5] As Crystal and her companions approached the train tracks, their path was
blocked by a stopped train. The train consisted of three locomotive engines and
125 empty coal hauling cars, and it was more than a mile long. CSS operated
the train, Manigold was the conductor, and Cummings was the engineer. The
train had stopped so that Manigold could leave the first engine to realign a
switch on the track.
[6] Crystal and her companions approached the stopped train at a street crossing.
Next, they walked over to a grassy area nearer to the train. Washington and his
friend climbed up between two cars, went across the coupler that joined them,
and jumped down to the ground on the other side of the train. Crystal had
never climbed over a stopped train before. She climbed up between the cars,
and the train lurched forward, without warning, as she climbed across the
coupler. Crystal fell onto the tracks and the train rolled over her, injuring her
legs. Her left leg was severed at the scene, and her right leg had to be surgically
amputated later.
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[7] After the accident, Crystal was unable to continue living near train tracks
because the sound of the train “made me panic. I just really couldn’t deal with
it.” Id. at 75. She left school and was homeschooled for a while. Later, she
moved to her own apartment, but she did not “go outside anymore” unless she
had to. Id. at 78.
2
[8] Crystal and Stephan sued CSS, Manigold, and Cummings, claiming
negligence. They also sued Washington, asserting he was a necessary party to
the case. Washington filed a cross-claim against CSS, alleging negligence.
[9] CSS filed a motion for summary judgment. The Williamses and Washington
filed a response, and CSS filed a reply. The court held oral argument and
granted CSS’s motion. This appeal followed.
[10] Crystal, Stephan, and Washington argue the trial court should not have granted
summary judgment to CSS. The Indiana Supreme Court has stated that a party
seeking summary judgment must meet a “relatively high bar.” Hughley v. State,
15 N.E.3d 1000, 1004 (Ind. 2014). The Court explained:
Summary judgment is a desirable tool to allow the trial court to
dispose of cases where only legal issues exist. But it is also a
blunt instrument, by which the non-prevailing party is prevented
from having his day in court. We have therefore cautioned that
summary judgment is not a summary trial, and the Court of
Appeals has often rightly observed that it is not appropriate
merely because the non-movant appears unlikely to prevail at
2
We refer to the three appellees collectively as CSS for the remainder of the opinion unless otherwise
appropriate.
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trial. In essence, Indiana consciously errs on the side of letting
marginal cases proceed to trial on the merits, rather than risk
short-circuiting meritorious claims.
Id. at 1003-1004 (quotations, ellipsis, and citations omitted). Summary
judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because they are fact
sensitive and are governed by a standard of the objective, reasonable person.
Rhodes v. Wright, 805 N.E.2d 382 (Ind. 2004). Such a standard is best applied
by a finder of fact after hearing all the evidence. Id.
[11] On review of a motion for summary judgment, our standard of review is the
same as that of the trial court. City of Beech Grove v. Beloat, 50 N.E.3d 135 (Ind.
2016). Summary judgment is appropriate only where “the designated
evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial
Rule 56(C). Thus, a party requesting summary judgment must put forward
undisputed material evidence that negates at least one element of a claim.
Rhodes, 805 N.E.2d 382. The facts and reasonable inferences are construed in
favor of the non-moving party. City of Beech Grove, 50 N.E.3d 135. We may
consider only the evidence designated by the parties. Id. The appellant bears
the burden of demonstrating the trial court erred. Whitmore v. South Bend Pub.
Transp. Corp., 7 N.E.3d 994 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.
[12] To prevail on a claim of negligence the plaintiff must show (1) a duty owed by
the defendant; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) an injury to the plaintiff
proximately caused by the breach. Schmidt v. Indiana Ins. Co., 45 N.E.3d 781
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(Ind. 2015). The question of whether a duty was owed is generally a question
of law, but the existence of a duty sometimes depends on underlying facts that
require resolution by the trier of fact. Rhodes, 805 N.E.2d 382. Whether an act
or omission is a breach of one’s duty is generally a question of fact for the jury.
Winchell v. Guy, 857 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
[13] Crystal, Stephan, and Washington alleged that CSS was negligent. CSS argued
in its motion for summary judgment that it owed no duty to Crystal, Stephan,
or Washington under the doctrine of premises liability. Pursuant to that
doctrine, a person entering upon the land of another comes upon the land as an
invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser, and the person’s status defines the duty, if
any, owed by the landowner to the visitor. Christmas v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd.
P’ship, 952 N.E.2d 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Premises liability applies only to
parties that own or occupy the land. Duffy v. Ben Dee, Inc., 651 N.E.2d 320 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied.
[14] CSS has failed to provide sufficient facts to allow us to determine whether, as a
matter of law, CSS owed no duty to Crystal, Stephan, and Washington under
the doctrine of premises liability. The parties cite several Indiana cases in
which premises liability applied to alleged torts on properties that were owned
by a defendant railroad. See, e.g., Chicago, South Shore & South Bend R.R. Co. v.
Sagala, 140 Ind. App. 650, 221 N.E.2d 371 (1966) (the victim, a child, was a
trespasser and was not owed a duty of reasonable care by owner of railroad
tracks); New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Wyatt, 135 Ind. App. 205, 184 N.E.2d 657
(1962) (owner of railroad tracks owed duty to truck driver in relation to
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accident at a railroad intersection), trans. denied; see also Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co.
v. Jones, 220 Ind. 139, 41 N.E.2d 361 (1942) (owner of railroad switch track
owed no duty to child injured while playing in freight car on track); Terre Haute
I. & E. Traction Co. v. Sanders, 80 Ind. App. 16, 136 N.E.54 (1922) (owner of
train track owed duty to plaintiff’s estate because victim was licensee).
[15] In this case, the record clearly establishes that CSS does not own the tracks
upon which its train sat. Instead, NICTD owns the railroad line, and CSS has
“trackage rights” to use it. Appellants’ App. Vol. III, p. 7. The nature of CSS’s
trackage rights and responsibilities is undefined in the record. It appears that
CSS has the right to move its trains on NICTD’s tracks, but that alone is
insufficient to establish that CSS is an occupier of the tracks for purposes of
premises liability. See Duffy, 651 N.E.2d 320 (theory of premises liability did
not apply to contractor who placed a bulldozer on an employer’s land to
complete a project, even though plaintiff was injured climbing on the bulldozer;
the contractor was not considered an owner or occupier, and the bulldozer was
not a permanent fixture of the land). Based on the incomplete record before us,
the doctrine of premises liability does not establish the absence of a duty.
[16] If the trial court’s grant of summary judgment can be sustained on any theory or
basis in the record, we will affirm. Whitmore, 7 N.E.3d 994. Thus, we must
consider whether, as a general proposition, the law as applied to the facts of this
case established the absence of a duty by CSS to Crystal, Stephan, and
Washington regardless of the applicability of the doctrine of premises liability.
The Indiana Supreme Court has stated:
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It is the law, widely recognized and declared, that although a
railroad crossing is not a public street on [sic] highway, it
becomes a public crossing so as to impose upon a railroad
company the same duty of exercising reasonable care and the
same liability for a breach of it as a public crossing where the
company has by some act or designation invited or induced
persons to so regard and use it.
Lake Erie & W. R.R. Co. v. Fleming, 183 Ind. 511, 109 N.E. 753, 755 (1915).
[17] In another case, the Indiana Supreme Court noted there is a line of cases
“imposing a duty of reasonable care and lookout where railroad tracks pass at
street level through a city or town.” Sagala, 221 N.E.2d at 375; see also Stratton
v. Southern Ry. Co., 190 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1951) (plaintiff established jury
question on claim of negligence; evidence showed railroad blocked street for
long periods of time in city, and persons customarily climbed through the cars
such that railroad knew or should have known of crossings and should have
given a warning signal before moving).
[18] In this case, at the time of the incident Crystal and Stephan lived in Gary across
a street from the train tracks. The tracks ran at street level in that area, next to a
state highway and across several city streets. Crystal and Stephan’s house was
located between two street crossings. On prior occasions, Crystal had always
used a street crossing to cross the tracks on foot. She frequently saw other
people cross the tracks at locations other than the street crossings, and there
were no “no trespassing” signs by the tracks. Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 83.
Crystal saw trains come by frequently, day and night. She also noticed that the
trains would stop for long periods of time, “sometimes for hours.” Id. at 84.
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When the trains stopped, they blocked both street crossings near her house.
Stephan also saw trains parked on the tracks near his home, sometimes for two
to three hours, especially at night. Both Crystal and Stephan observed that the
trains blew their whistles “every time they start[ed] back up again.” Id. at 86.
[19] Stephan and several other residents in that area had seen people climb across
stopped trains in that location in the past, day and night, at the street crossings
or at other parts of the line. According to several residents who provided
affidavits, the practice of climbing across stopped trains in that area went back
several decades.
[20] On the night in question, Crystal was in a hurry to get home because she was
out past her curfew. As she, Washington, and Washington’s friend approached
the tracks, she saw a train stopped there, blocking the street. Next, they walked
away from the street crossing, to a grassy area, where Washington and his
friend crossed the train by climbing up between two cars and jumping to the
ground. Crystal climbed onto the train, but it moved suddenly, without
warning, and she fell to the ground and was grievously injured. The train did
not sound its whistle before moving. Manigold conceded that according to the
“black and white” letter of the safety rulebook, the whistle should have sounded
before the train began moving again. Id. at 131-32.
[21] Applying the law to these facts, we conclude that CSS knew or should have
known that people were climbing across their stopped trains in that busy urban
area, and that it is reasonable to conclude CSS had a duty to warn people near
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the tracks that the trains were preparing to move. In addition, there is at least a
dispute of fact as to whether CSS breached its duty by failing to give such a
warning.
[22] CSS argues that it is unlikely that its trains would have stopped in that area for
hours at a time, citing its published schedules. It further notes the specific train
in question stopped for only ninety seconds. CSS also asserts Crystal conceded
in her deposition that the train’s crew would not have had any specific reason to
know she and her companions were climbing across the train. Finally, CSS
argues that, according to CSS safety rules, its crew was not obligated to sound
the whistle before beginning to move the train. These arguments are all
requests to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the movant,
which our standard of review forbids.
[23] The trial court erred by granting CSS’s motion for summary judgment. It is
unnecessary to address the element of probable cause because there are disputes
of fact as to whether a duty existed and whether CSS breached a duty. For the
foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for
further proceedings.
[24] Judgment reversed and remanded.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.
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