State v. Williams , 2014 Ohio 3169 ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Williams, 
    2014-Ohio-3169
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR GREENE COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO/WRIGHT STATE                               :
    UNIVERSITY
    Plaintiff-Appellee                               :       C.A. CASE NO.         2013 CA 74
    v.                                                       :       T.C. NO.     CVF1200211
    BRIAN K. WILLIAMS                                        :        (Civil appeal from
    Municipal Court)
    Defendant-Appellant                              :
    :
    ..........
    OPINION
    Rendered on the          18th       day of         July       , 2014.
    ..........
    CHARLES F. GEIDNER, Atty. Reg. No. 0023889 and BRENT E. RAMBO, Atty. Reg. No.
    0076969, 15 W. Fourth Street, Suite 250, Dayton, Ohio 45402
    Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
    BRIAN K. WILLIAMS, P. O. Box 4931, Newark, Ohio 43058
    Defendant-Appellant
    ..........
    FROELICH, P.J.
    {¶ 1} Brian K. Williams appeals from a judgment of the Fairborn Municipal
    Court, which denied his Civ.R. 60(B) motion to set aside a default judgment. For the
    following reasons, the trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
    {¶ 2}     On February 14, 2012, the State of Ohio brought an action in the municipal
    court claiming that Williams owed $5,085.44 for goods and services rendered to him
    through Wright State University. The exhibits attached to the complaint indicated that
    Williams owed a principal balance of $2,688.77, interest in the amount of $667.62, and
    collection costs of $1,729.05. Williams was served with the complaint on February 28, 2012,
    as reflected by a United States Postal Service delivery confirmation card. Williams did not
    respond to the complaint. Consequently, in April 2012, the State moved for a default
    judgment. On April 12, 2012, the trial court granted the motion and awarded a default
    judgment to the State in the amount of $5,085.44, with statutory interest.
    {¶ 3}     Williams appealed from the default judgment.          We affirmed the trial
    court’s judgment, noting that Williams had failed to file an answer as required by Civ.R.
    12(A)(1), that the State’s complaint clearly set forth the amount owed, and the amount was
    supported with documentary evidence. Wright State Univ. v. Williams, 2d Dist. Greene No.
    2012-CA-37, 
    2012-Ohio-5095
    . We commented that, “[i]f Williams believes that grounds
    exist for setting aside the default judgment, he may be able to file a motion with the trial
    court, setting forth reasons why the default judgment should be set aside.” Id. at ¶ 10. We
    stated no opinion as to whether any such motion would have merit. Id.
    {¶ 4}     On April 11, 2013, Williams filed a “motion to set aside default judgment.”
    He stated that he did not answer the summons because he could not secure counsel to
    represent him due to his lack of employment and funds to employ an attorney. He further
    stated that he “was not educated enough to put forth an answer by himself because he had
    not attended any civil law classes or was pursuing a law degree.” Williams indicated that
    3
    he had a valid defense to the university’s claim, because he did not owe the full amount
    claimed by the university. Williams provided documentation to support his assertion that
    he owed a lesser principal balance.
    {¶ 5}   The matter was referred to a magistrate, who scheduled a hearing for May
    21, 2013. Williams did not appear for the hearing. On May 24, 2013, the magistrate ruled
    that Williams’s motion alleged a meritorious defense, but his reasons for failing to respond
    to the complaint did not constitute excusable neglect. The magistrate noted that pro se
    litigants are held to the same standards as other litigants. The trial court adopted the
    magistrate’s decision.
    {¶ 6}   On June 3, 2013, Williams filed a “motion to vacate judgment and request
    an evidentiary hearing,” which the trial court construed as objections to the magistrate’s
    ruling. Williams again emphasized that he did not owe the principal balance claimed by
    Wright State University, and he asserted that he was misled by the university’s financial aid
    counselor about what aid would be awarded to him for the spring quarter of 2004. In
    response, Wright State University argued that Williams’s motion was not timely and failed
    to establish excusable neglect. The trial court ordered Williams to have a transcript of the
    May hearing transcribed, but no transcript was filed.        The trial court scheduled an
    evidentiary hearing for July 30, 2013. The record reflects that both parties appeared for the
    July 30 hearing, but a transcript of that hearing was not ordered and is also not part of the
    record.
    {¶ 7}   On October 31, 2013, the trial court overruled Williams’s objections and
    denied his motion to set aside the default judgment. The court found that Williams’s
    4
    motion was timely and that he presented a meritorious defense to the judgment. It further
    found, however, that Williams failed to demonstrate that he was entitled to relief under
    Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5).
    {¶ 8}     Williams appeals from the trial court’s judgment, claiming that “the trial
    court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to set aside default judgment.” Williams asserts
    that relief should have been granted because his motion was timely and he has a meritorious
    defense to the judgment.
    {¶ 9}     Civ.R. 60(B) permits trial courts to relieve parties from a final judgment for
    the following reasons: (1) “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect;” (2) newly
    discovered evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
    (4) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; or (5) any other reason justifying
    relief from the judgment. To prevail on a motion brought under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant
    must demonstrate that (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is
    granted, (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B), and
    (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time and, for reasons under Civ.R. 60(B)(1)-(3),
    not more than one year after judgment. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc.,
    
    47 Ohio St.2d 146
    , 
    351 N.E.2d 113
     (1976), paragraph two of the syllabus. All of these
    requirements must be satisfied, and the motion should be denied if any one of the
    requirements is not met. Strack v. Pelton, 
    70 Ohio St.3d 172
    , 174, 
    637 N.E.2d 914
     (1994);
    Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Schaub, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 22419, 
    2008-Ohio-4729
    , ¶ 15.
    {¶ 10}    We review the trial court’s determination of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for an
    abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Jackson v. Ohio Adult Parole Authority, Slip Opinion No.
    5
    
    2014-Ohio-2353
    , ¶ 22; Griffey v. Rajan, 
    33 Ohio St.3d 75
    , 77, 
    514 N.E.2d 1122
     (1987). An
    abuse of discretion means that the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or
    unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    , 219, 
    450 N.E.2d 1140
     (1983).
    {¶ 11}    At the outset, we reiterate that Williams failed to provide a transcript of the
    May hearing before the magistrate and of the July hearing before the trial court. As a result
    of that failure, we have no record of the evidence presented to the magistrate and the trial
    court at those hearings, and we cannot review their factual findings. See Knapp v. Edwards
    Laboratories, 
    61 Ohio St.2d 197
    , 
    400 N.E.2d 384
     (1980) (duty to provide transcript for
    appellate review); Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) (objection to magistrate’s factual findings). With
    the limited record before us, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling.
    {¶ 12}    First, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that Williams
    did not establish that his failure to respond to the complaint was due to excusable neglect.
    The Ohio Supreme Court has defined “excusable neglect” in the negative, stating that “the
    inaction of a defendant is not ‘excusable neglect’ if it can be labeled as a ‘complete disregard
    for the judicial system.’” Kay v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 
    76 Ohio St.3d 18
    , 20, 
    665 N.E.2d 1102
     (1996); State ex rel. Jackson at ¶ 23. Williams claimed in his motion that he did not
    respond to the complaint due to his inability to hire an attorney and his lack of legal training.
    {¶ 13}    In finding no excusable neglect, the trial court noted that Williams did not
    argue that he did not know that he had to file a response to the complaint or that he was not
    served with the complaint. The trial court found that Williams had received the complaint
    and summons and that he was on notice of both the requirement that he respond to the
    complaint and that, if he did not respond, Wright State University could be granted a default
    6
    judgment against him for the amount stated in the complaint. The court emphasized that
    pro se litigants are held to the same standards as other litigants. The court concluded that
    Williams’s explanation for his failure to respond (i.e., he lacked legal training and was
    unable to hire an attorney) was not a justifiable excuse for his failure to attempt a timely
    response to the complaint. On the record before us, the trial court’s determination was not
    an abuse of discretion.
    {¶ 14}    Second, the court found that Williams was not entitled to relief from
    judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)(3), concerning fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct
    by an adverse party. Williams had argued that he was misled by a Wright State University
    financial aid counselor that he would not be receiving financial aid in the spring of 2004.
    The trial court noted that Williams had acknowledged receiving documentation about the
    financial aid in 2004. The trial court concluded: “[N]one of this documentation is newly
    discovered.     Defendant also did not present any information that he appealed the
    University’s decision. Taking all of the documents provided by Defendant in tandem, the
    Court cannot ascertain any fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by Plaintiff in its
    actions notifying Defendant that he was not eligible for federal student aid for the spring
    quarter of 2004 or how that alleged activity impacted whether Defendant owed monies on
    account to Plaintiff.”
    {¶ 15}    Williams’s arguments do not demonstrate that he can satisfy Civ.R.
    60(B)(3).     “The fraud or misconduct contemplated by Civ.R. 60(B)(3) is fraud or
    misconduct on the part of the adverse party in obtaining the judgment by preventing the
    losing party from fully and fairly presenting his defense, not fraud or misconduct which in
    7
    itself would have amounted to a claim or defense in the case.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v.
    Brandle, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2012 CV 2, 
    2012-Ohio-3492
    , ¶ 13. Even accepting
    Williams’s argument that Wright State University misled him about the issuance of financial
    aid, that argument may have constituted a defense to Wright State University’s original
    claim or may have concerned a potential claim against the university for fraud; it does not
    allege that Wright State University engaged in any conduct that prevented him from timely
    responding to the complaint and presenting a defense. The trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in finding that Williams failed to satisfy Civ.R. 60(B)(3).
    {¶ 16}    Williams’s assignment of error is overruled.
    {¶ 17}    The trial court’s judgment will be affirmed.
    ..........
    FAIN, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
    Copies mailed to:
    Charles F. Geidner
    Brent E. Rambo
    Brian K. Williams
    Hon. Beth W. Root
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2013 CA 74

Citation Numbers: 2014 Ohio 3169

Judges: Froelich

Filed Date: 7/18/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/19/2016