Travis L. Woodruff v. State of Indiana , 80 N.E.3d 216 ( 2017 )

FILED
Jun 26 2017, 9:36 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Brooklyn, Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Travis L. Woodruff, June 26, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
32A01-1612-CR-2751
v. Appeal from the Hendricks
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Rhett M. Stuard,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
32D02-1607-F1-1
Crone, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Travis Lee Woodruff appeals his sentence, following a jury trial, for level 3
felony aggravated battery and level 5 felony intimidation, which was enhanced
based on the jury’s findings that he is a habitual offender and that he used a
firearm in the commission of the aggravated battery. He asserts that the trial
court erred by applying both enhancements. Finding that there has not been a
violation of the general rule against double enhancements, we affirm
Woodruff’s sentence. However, we remand with instructions that the trial
court attach his habitual offender enhancement to the sentence for his
aggravated battery conviction.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Woodruff and Chad Gore were recent acquaintances. On the morning of July
6, 2016, Gore and two companions were asleep in a motel room in Hendricks
County. A loud knock on the door awoke them. Gore directed one of his
companions to open the door. Woodruff, also accompanied by two people,
entered the room. Startled by the “aggressive commotion,” Gore arose and sat
at the edge of the bed. Tr. Vol. 2 at 207. As tensions escalated, Gore’s
companions left the room.
[3] Woodruff and his companions loudly accused Gore of either reporting them to
the police on a prior occasion or being a police officer. Gore denied the
allegations. Woodruff was not convinced, saying, “[Y]ou know here’s how it’s
going to go,” as he wielded a .22-caliber revolver. Id. at 208, 210. Woodruff
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fired two shots that narrowly missed Gore. Woodruff’s companions ran out of
the room. Woodruff was standing “right in front of [Gore] . . . less than arm’s
reach.” Id. at 233. Gore stood up and attempted to wrestle the revolver away
from Woodruff. During the struggle, Woodruff shot Gore in the chest.
Woodruff dropped the gun and fled the scene. Gore eventually received
emergency medical attention for injuries to a few internal organs and a
laceration on his head.
[4] The State charged Woodruff with level 1 felony attempted murder, level 3
felony aggravated battery, level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon,
level 5 felony intimidation, and level 6 felony criminal recklessness. The State
also alleged that Woodruff was a habitual offender and that he used a firearm in
the commission of the aggravated battery, each of which is a basis for
enhancing a defendant’s sentence. Following a jury trial, Woodruff was found
guilty of all charges except attempted murder. The jury also found that
Woodruff was a habitual offender and used a firearm in the commission of the
aggravated battery. The trial court vacated the guilty verdicts for battery with a
deadly weapon and criminal recklessness due to double jeopardy concerns. The
trial court imposed a fifteen-year sentence for the aggravated battery conviction
and a concurrent two-year sentence for the intimidation conviction. The trial
court enhanced Woodruff’s sentence by a fifteen-year term for the habitual
offender finding and a subsequent ten-year term for the use of a firearm, for an
aggregate forty-year sentence. Woodruff now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
[5] Woodruff’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in applying
both the habitual offender enhancement and the firearm enhancement to his
sentence for aggravated battery. Claims of multiple sentencing enhancements
are governed by statutory interpretation. Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660, 663
(Ind. 2010). We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo because
they raise pure questions of law. Id.
[6] Woodruff contends that the trial court ordered what he characterizes as an
impermissible double enhancement, citing Dye v. State, 972 N.E.2d 853 (Ind.
2012), aff’d on reh’g, 984 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. 2013). In Dye, our supreme court
explained that three types of statutes authorize enhanced sentences for repeat
offenders: the general habitual offender statute, specialized habitual offender
statutes, and progressive-penalty statutes. Id. at 857. Generally, double
enhancements are impermissible unless there is explicit legislative direction
authorizing them. Id. at 856. When more than one of these types of statutes
apply to the defendant at the same time, there are double enhancement issues.
Id. at 857. Conversely, if not more than one of these types of statutes apply,
then there is no double enhancement issue to review. Id.
[7] In Dye, the court held that it was impermissible for the defendant’s unlawful
possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon conviction to be enhanced
further by the general habitual offender statute. Id. at 858. On rehearing, the
supreme court further clarified that the defendant’s habitual offender
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enhancement was vacated not merely because the serious violent felon statute, a
progressive-penalty statute, and the general habitual offender enhancement
were simultaneously applied, but more precisely because the past felonious
conduct used as the basis for the habitual offender charge was a part of the same
“uninterrupted transaction” on which the serious violent felon charge was
based. Dye, 984 N.E.2d at 630.
[8] Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, Dye does not stand for the proposition that
whenever any two enhancements are applied to an underlying conviction there
is an impermissible double enhancement. Rather, Dye states that there is a
double enhancement issue when more than one of the types of statutes that
authorize enhancements for repeat offenders are applied to the same proof of an
“uninterrupted transaction.” Therefore, double enhancement analysis is proper
when the proof of previous criminal conduct is the basis of more than one
enhancement.
[9] Woodruff was convicted of level 3 felony aggravated battery. Aggravated
battery is neither a progressive-penalty statute nor a specialized habitual
offender statute. As such, the general habitual offender enhancement can be
attached to the aggravated battery conviction, as it is a criminal “status” that is
given to the defendant who has accumulated the required number of prior
unrelated felony convictions. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(j). Similarly, the firearm
enhancement can be attached to the aggravated battery conviction, as it does
not apply to the past criminal conduct of a repeat offender, but rather when the
offense, a felony under Indiana Code Article 35-42 which resulted in death or
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serious bodily injury, is committed by use of a firearm. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-
11(b)(1), -(d). The plain language of the firearm enhancement statute shows
that a defendant’s prior felonious conduct is not at issue. See id. In sum, there is
no impermissible double enhancement here because only one type of repeat
offender statute that enhanced Woodruff’s conviction was applied. Ultimately,
Woodruff’s aggravated battery conviction resulted in a dual enhancement, not
for the same prior crimes, but for committing aggravated battery with a firearm
while being a habitual offender. Because we find that there has not been a
violation of the general rule against double enhancements, we affirm
Woodruff’s aggregate forty-year sentence.
[10] However, the State points out that the trial court erroneously entered a separate
fifteen-year sentence for the habitual offender finding. A habitual offender
finding does not constitute a separate crime, nor does it result in a separate
sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(j). Rather, a habitual offender finding
results in a sentence enhancement imposed upon the conviction of a subsequent
felony. Hendrix v. State, 759 N.E.2d 1045, 1048 (Ind. 2001). Therefore, we
remand with instructions that the trial court vacate the separate sentence on the
habitual offender enhancement and attach the enhancement to Woodruff’s
sentence for aggravated battery.
[11] Affirmed and remanded.
Baker, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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