State of Indiana v. Lawrence Lucas , 112 N.E.3d 726 ( 2018 )

FILED
Sep 28 2018, 9:39 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana
Caryn N. Szyper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
State of Indiana, September 28, 2018
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-92
v. Appeal from the Tippecanoe
Superior Court
Lawrence Lucas, The Honorable Randy J. Williams,
Appellee-Defendant. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
79D01-1704-F4-20
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-92 | September 28, 2018 Page 1 of 9
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Plaintiff, State of Indiana (State), appeals the trial court’s suppression
of evidence obtained after a search of the home and garage of Appellee-
Defendant, Lawrence Lucas (Lucas).
[2] We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
ISSUE
[3] The State presents one issue, which we restate as: Whether the trial court’s
grant of Lucas’ motion to suppress is contrary to law.
[4] On the morning of May 11, 2016, Sergeant Matthew Gard (Sergeant Gard) of
the Lafayette Police Department took a report from Bernard Brooks (Brooks)
regarding an assault and theft. Brooks had been fighting with Lucas’ mother,
Anita, the previous evening and had gone to Lucas’ home to sleep. Brooks fell
asleep on Lucas’ floor, only to be awakened by Anita hitting him on the head
with an aluminum baseball bat and by Lucas’ sister, Sharmeka, hitting him
with her fists. Brooks was injured in the fracas and fled the home, leaving
behind a jacket and a hat. Brooks also reported to Sergeant Gard that Anita
and Sharmeka had taken his cell phone and $60 from his pocket.
[5] Based on Brooks’ report, Sergeant Gard procured a search warrant for Lucas’
home which provided for a search in relevant part as follows:
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A yellow two story home with an attached two car garage with
brick siding on the first level and yellow siding on the second
floor, located at 3023 Yorktown Court, Lafayette, Indiana[,]
and to diligently search for, seize and forensically examine:
Clothing, [a] baseball bat, a cellular phone, U.S. currency, blood
evidence or any evidence relating to an assault and/or theft
occurring with said residence.
(Appellant’s Appendix Vol. II, p. 42).
[6] Upon executing the search warrant, Sergeant Gard found blood about the home
and a bloody baseball bat which matched the description Brooks had given him
in the kitchen. While searching, Sergeant Gard went through a door located in
the living room and into the attached garage. A black vehicle was parked inside
the garage. Next to the vehicle on the ground, Sergeant Gard found a bloodied
jacket matching the description of Brooks’ jacket. Sergeant Gard looked inside
the black vehicle and saw a large mound in the back seat which had been
covered by a blanket. Sergeant Gard was concerned that objects could be
concealed under the blanket, so he reached inside one of the vehicle’s partially-
opened windows and moved the blanket, revealing a large paper bag containing
what Sergeant Gard suspected through his training and experience was
synthetic marijuana.
[7] Based on the discovery of the suspected synthetic marijuana, as well as a safe,
“shake” on the garage floor, and a large cardboard box in the garage which
bore the label “California Herb Company,” Sergeant Gard stopped his search
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and procured a second search warrant authorizing a search of the home and the
black vehicle for evidence of narcotics activity. (Transcript Vol. II, p. 15). That
search yielded additional evidence.
[8] On April 20, 2017, the State filed an Information charging Lucas with one
Count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, a Level 4
felony; one Count of dealing in a synthetic drug or synthetic drug lookalike
substance, a Level 6 felony; one Count of possession of a synthetic drug or
synthetic drug lookalike substance, a Class A misdemeanor; and one Count of
maintaining a common nuisance, a Level 6 felony.
[9] On October 16, 2017, Lucas filed a motion to suppress in which he argued that
the evidence procured from the search exceeded the scope of the warrant
because “there was only bare speculation by Officer Gard regarding what was
under the blanket.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 56). On November 27, 2017,
the trial court held a hearing on Lucas’ motion. On December 20, 2017, the
trial court entered its order granting Lucas’ motion to suppress, ruling in
relevant part “that the officer’s entry into the vehicle and moving of the blanket
exceeded the scope of the warrant and all evidence seized as a result of said
action is suppressed.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 62).
[10] The State now appeals. Additional facts will be added as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[11] We begin by noting that Lucas did not file a brief responding to the State’s
appeal. As such, the State need only establish prima facie error to merit reversal
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of the trial court’s ruling in Lucas’ favor. State v. Costas, 552 N.E.2d 459, 462
(Ind. 1990). The State appeals following the trial court’s grant of a motion to
suppress, which effectively terminated the prosecution of this case. Because the
State appeals from a negative judgment, it bears the burden to show that the
trial court’s ruling was contrary to law. State v. Brown, 70 N.E.3d 331, 335 (Ind.
2017). When reviewing a trial court’s suppression ruling, we determine
whether the record contains substantial evidence of probative value that
supports the trial court’s decision. Id. “We evaluate the trial court’s findings of
fact deferentially, neither reweighing the evidence nor reassessing the credibility
of the witnesses.” Id. However, we review the trial court’s conclusions of law
de novo. Id.
[12] Lucas argued before the trial court that the search of the black vehicle exceeded
the scope of the warrant because Sergeant Gard’s act of moving the blanket in
the vehicle was an extension of the warrant to a place where none of the objects
listed in the warrant could have been found. Lucas contended that Sergeant
Gard could only speculate what was under the blanket, and, therefore, his act of
moving the blanket was unreasonable. The State counters that the search
warrant permitted a search of the garage and that, therefore, any containers,
including the black vehicle located there, were also searchable under the
parameters of the warrant.
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[13] The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution1 requires that a
search warrant describe with specificity the place to be searched and the items
sought. Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016). If a search exceeds the
scope of the warrant, it is unconstitutional. Sidener v. State, 55 N.E.3d 380, 383
(Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Our United States Supreme Court has provided guidance
on the parameters of a warranted search:
A lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the entire
area in which the object of the search may be found and is not
limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening
may be required to complete the search. Thus, a warrant that
authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also
provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and
containers in which the weapon might be found . . . . When a
legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its
limits have been precisely defined, nice distinctions between
closets, drawers, and containers, in the case of a home, or
between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and
wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the
interest in the prompt and efficient completion of the task at
hand.
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982) (footnote omitted). It appears
that our Indiana state courts have not decided the precise issue of whether the
Fourth Amendment permits an officer who has procured a search warrant for a
1
We do not address whether the search at issue here was permitted under the Indiana Constitution, as Lucas
did not develop a separate state constitutional analysis below, Lucas has not filed an appellate brief, the trial
court did not specify the constitutional basis for its order granting Lucas’ motion to suppress, and, on appeal,
the State does not proffer any separate state constitutional analysis. (Appellant’s Br. p. 14 n.1).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-92 | September 28, 2018 Page 6 of 9
home and garage to also search any vehicles found on the premises. Although
we are not bound by federal authority, we may look to it for guidance in the
absence of state law. Stonger v. Sorrell, 776 N.E.2d 353, 355-56 (Ind. 2002).
[14] The State draws our attention to United States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600 (7th Cir.
1985). While executing a search warrant for Percival’s home and attached
garage, agents found a vehicle in the garage. Id. at 605. The agents unlocked
the trunk and found a suitcase containing a large amount of illegal drugs. Id.
Percival argued that the search of the vehicle located in his garage exceeded the
scope of the search warrant and that a vehicle should not be viewed the same
manner as other personal items found in a home because a vehicle has a lesser
connection to the premises than other household items such as furniture or
cabinets. Id. at 612.
[15] In rejecting that argument, the Percival court noted that while a vehicle is less
fixed than a closet or cabinet, it is “no less fixed than a suitcase or handbag
found on the premises, both of which can readily be searched under Ross if
capable of containing the object of the search.” Id. Observing the trend in
other jurisdictions upholding such searches, the Percival court held that “a
search warrant authorizing a search of particularly described premises may
permit the search of vehicles owned or controlled by the owner of, and found
on, the premises.” Id. Percival has subsequently enjoyed support in our federal
circuit and district courts. See e.g., United State v. Evans, 92 F.3d 540, 543 (7th
Cir. 1996) (search of trunk of vehicle in attached garage pursuant to warrant for
house “with detached garage”), cert. denied 519 U.S. 1020 (1996); see also United
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States v. Rivera, 738 F. Supp. 1208, 1218 (N.D. Ind. 1990) (search of truck in
driveway pursuant to warrant for home’s premises).
[16] We recognize that Hoosiers have a heightened expectation of privacy in their
vehicles. See Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77, 79 (Ind. 1995) (“With respect to
automobiles generally, it may safely be said that Hoosiers regard their
automobiles as private and cannot easily abide their uninvited intrusion.”).
However, we find the reasoning of Percival to be persuasive and hold that, under
the Fourth Amendment, a search warrant authorizing a search of a particularly
described premises permits the search of vehicles owned or controlled by the
owner of, and found on, the premises.
[17] Here, Sergeant Gard procured a search warrant for Lucas’ “two story home
with an attached two car garage” to search for “[c]lothing, [a] baseball bat, a
cellular phone, U.S. currency, blood evidence or any evidence relating to an
assault and/or theft occurring with said residence.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II,
p. 42). When Sergeant Gard entered the garage, he had not yet located the cell
phone or the $60 Brooks had reported stolen. Sergeant Gard was permitted to
search the black vehicle and, in the process, to lift the blanket covering the large
mound located in the back seat, because the vehicle and the mound were
capable of containing those objects. Ross, 456 U.S. at 820-21; Percival, 756 F.2d
at 612. The State has shown that the trial court’s ruling granting Lucas’ motion
to suppress was contrary to law.
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CONCLUSION
[18] Concluding that the search of the vehicle in Lucas’ garage did not
unconstitutionally exceed the scope of the search warrant, we reverse and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[19] Reversed and remanded.
[20] Vaidik, C. J. and Kirsch, J. concur
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