Lois Goodman v. Yulai Wang ( 2019 )


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  •                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION                              FILED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       DEC 16 2019
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    LOIS GOODMAN, an individual,                    No.    18-55586
    Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
    2:13-cv-05959-JAK-MAN
    v.
    YULAI WANG, individually and in his             MEMORANDUM*
    official capacity as an employee of the Los
    Angeles County Coroner's Office,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of California
    John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
    Argued and Submitted October 17, 2019
    Pasadena, CA
    Before: NGUYEN and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and VITALIANO,** District
    Judge.
    On remand following our decision in Goodman v. City of Los Angeles Police
    Dep’t et al., 708 F. App’x 888 (9th Cir. 2017), appellant Lois Goodman proceeded
    to trial against Dr. Yulai Wang, a Los Angeles County medical examiner, on her
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
    **
    The Honorable Eric N. Vitaliano, United States District Judge for the
    Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
    1
    surviving claim that Dr. Wang’s erroneous autopsy findings that her husband’s
    death was a homicide had intentionally or recklessly caused her injury because
    they had resulted in her unlawful arrest, extradition and prosecution for that crime.
    A jury found for Dr. Wang. Goodman timely appealed, invoking our jurisdiction
    under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
    Goodman’s appeal focuses, principally, on evidentiary rulings made by the
    district court precluding the admission of evidence relating to DNA samples
    collected in the course of the police investigation into the death of her husband,
    which she sought to admit to support her claim that Dr. Wang’s autopsy findings
    were falsified. Assuming, as we do, that the evidence proffered by Goodman and
    excluded by the district court satisfied the test of relevance under Federal Rule of
    Evidence 401, the issue presented is whether the district court’s determination to
    exclude that evidence abused the discretion accorded it by Rule 403 to weigh the
    probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial impact. We are mindful that,
    absent abuse of discretion, a district court’s evidentiary rulings should not be
    disturbed on appeal. McEuin v. Crown Equip. Corp., 
    328 F.3d 1028
    , 1032 (9th
    Cir. 2003), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (June 17, 2003).
    We first review Goodman’s broad challenge to the district court’s exclusion
    of evidence relating to DNA collection and analysis. As it is undisputed that the
    proffered DNA evidence was unavailable until after Dr. Wang issued the autopsy
    2
    findings which are the subject of Goodman’s claim, it was not an abuse of
    discretion for the district court to exclude it. Balanced against its limited probative
    value, the finding by the district court that the admission of such evidence would
    have been confusing to the jury, and would have needlessly prolonged the trial was
    not error.
    Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in excluding certain exhibits
    and testimony proffered by Goodman regarding the National Association of
    Medical Examiners (“NAME”) standards for the conduct of forensic medical
    examinations and the content of autopsy reports. The record makes clear that the
    district court admitted other evidence proffered by Goodman to the same effect,
    including relevant excerpts from the NAME standards Goodman sought to
    introduce in their entirety. These rulings were well within the bounds of the
    district court’s authority under Rule 403.1
    We also find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining
    objections to certain lines of inquiry during Goodman’s examination of Dr. Wang
    and his expert, Dr. Marcella Fierro. Goodman was given a sufficient opportunity
    1
    Goodman tries to bolster her arguments on this point by contriving a law of the
    case theory based on our 2017 memorandum disposition remanding her case
    against Dr. Wang for trial which makes reference to consideration of NAME
    standards. That argument is meritless. See Thomas v. Bible, 
    983 F.2d 152
    , 154
    (9th Cir. 1993).
    3
    to examine each witness as to Dr. Wang’s findings, the expert’s opinion, and their
    respective credentials in their relevant field of expertise.
    Also unavailing is Goodman’s contention that the limits on the duration of
    trial imposed by the district court were overly restrictive, warranting a new trial.
    Though “[r]igid and inflexible” time limits are “generally disfavored,” a district
    court is empowered “to impose reasonable time limits on a trial.” Amarel v.
    Connell, 
    102 F.3d 1494
    , 1513 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended (Jan. 15, 1997). The
    time limits set by the district court were imposed after pre-trial consultation with
    the parties and supplemented by an additional hour to each side for closing
    argument. Other than in connection with her attempt to introduce DNA evidence
    excluded by the district court on other grounds, there is no indication in the record
    that Goodman sought at any point during trial additional time, much less that any
    such request was denied. The time limitations imposed by the district court, rather
    than rigid or inflexible, “when viewed in the context of the entire trial, were
    reasonable.” Gen. Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 
    66 F.3d 1500
    ,
    1508 (9th Cir. 1995).
    AFFIRMED.
    4