State of Iowa v. Megan Diana Reynolds ( 2015 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 14-1125
    Filed November 25, 2015
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    MEGAN DIANA REYNOLDS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Montgomery County, Timothy
    O’Grady, Judge.
    A defendant appeals from the revocation of her deferred judgment and the
    subsequent imposition of sentence by the district court. AFFIRMED.
    Richard C. Swenson of Swenson Law Office, L.L.C., Glenwood, for
    appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kelli A. Huser, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee.
    Considered by Danilson, C.J., Mullins, J., and Miller, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
    2
    DANILSON, Chief Judge.
    Megan Reynolds appeals from the district court’s revocation of her
    deferred judgment and the subsequent imposition of a term of incarceration not
    to exceed ten years for the offense of delivery of a controlled substance, in
    violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(c)(6) (2013), a class “C” felony.
    Reynolds maintains sufficient evidence does not support the court’s finding that
    she violated the conditions of her probation. In the alternative, she maintains the
    district court abused its discretion in imposing a ten-year sentence. Because
    sufficient evidence supports the district court’s finding that Reynolds violated the
    terms of her probation and deferred judgment, we cannot conclude the district
    court abused its discretion in imposing the sentence of incarceration. We affirm.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
    On September 23, 2013, Reynolds was charged by trial information with
    two counts of delivery of a controlled substance (methamphetamine).
    On March 10, 2014, Reynolds entered a guilty plea for one of the counts.
    In exchange, the State dismissed the second count and agreed not to resist
    Reynolds’ request for a deferred judgment. The district court accepted Reynolds’
    guilty plea, granted her request for a deferred judgment, and placed her on
    probation for two years. As part of the terms of her probation, Reynolds was to
    “receive no criminal law violations” and “completely abstain from all controlled
    substances.”
    On May 5, 2014, the State filed an application for the revocation of
    Reynolds’ probation. A hearing on the matter was held on June 16, 2014.
    3
    At the hearing, Reynolds’ probation officer testified that Reynolds tested
    positive for methamphetamine on April 29, 2014, and admitted to him that she
    had used methamphetamine in the week prior to the test. Additionally, when she
    was asked to appear for another drug test on May 2, 2014, she failed to show up.
    The same day, the district court found Reynolds had violated the terms of
    her probation and revoked her deferred judgment. She was sentenced to a term
    of incarceration not to exceed ten years.
    Reynolds appeals.
    II. Standard of Review.
    We review the district court’s revocation decision for the correction of
    errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907.
    We review a district court’s sentencing decision for corrections of error at
    law. State v. Liddell, 
    672 N.W.2d 805
    , 815 (Iowa 2003). “A sentence will not be
    upset on appellate review unless the defendant demonstrates an abuse of trial
    court discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure, such as trial court
    consideration of impermissible factors.” 
    Id.
    III. Discussion.
    Reynolds maintains sufficient evidence does not support the court’s
    finding that she violated the conditions of her probation. “Grounds for probation
    revocation must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence; thus, on review
    there must be sufficient evidence to support the district court’s revocation of
    probation.” State v. Allen, 
    402 N.W.2d 438
    , 443 (Iowa 1987). We look to see
    whether the district court’s reported findings, written or oral, show a factual basis
    for the revocation. State v. Kirby, 
    622 N.W.2d 506
    , 509-10 (Iowa 2001).
    4
    Here, the terms of Reynolds’ probation required her to “receive no criminal
    law violations” and “completely abstain from all controlled substances.”            The
    State presented evidence that Reynolds tested positive for the use of
    methamphetamine while on probation and had admitted to her probation officer
    she used methamphetamine. Sufficient evidence supports the district court’s
    finding that Reynolds violated the conditions of her probation.
    In the alternative, Reynolds maintains the district court abused its
    discretion in imposing a ten-year sentence. Reynolds concedes that Iowa Code
    section 908.11 permits the district court to “impose any section which might have
    originally been imposed.”      She also concedes that a ten-year sentence was
    within the discretion of the district court. Rather, she maintains the district court
    failed to exercise its discretion because it “fail[ed] without justification to take into
    consideration all of the options available to the court after finding a violation of
    probation.”1
    Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d) requires the court to “state on
    the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence.”                 However,
    “[g]enerally, a sentencing court is not required to give its reasons for rejecting
    1
    Iowa Code section 908.11(4) provides the court with four options after the violation of
    probation has been established:
    If the defendant is an adult or a youthful offender the court may hold the
    defendant in contempt of court and sentence the defendant to a jail term
    while continuing the probation or youthful offender status, order the
    defendant to be placed in a violator facility established pursuant to section
    904.207 while continuing the probation or youthful offender status, extend
    the period of probation for up to one year as authorized in section 907.7
    while continuing the probation or youthful offender status, or revoke the
    probation or youthful offender status and require the defendant to serve
    the sentence imposed or any lesser sentence, and, if imposition of
    sentence was deferred, may impose any sentence which might originally
    have been imposed.
    5
    particular sentencing options.” State v. Loyd, 
    530 N.W.2d 708
    , 713–14 (Iowa
    1995). Here, the court stated it was imposing the term of incarceration because
    Reynolds had been given opportunities to address her drug problem—including
    inpatient treatment—and had not utilized them.2 We cannot say the district court
    abused its discretion in imposing a term of incarceration not to exceed ten years.
    We affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    2
    The district court also noted that Reynolds once began inpatient treatment but left
    treatment without sufficient reason.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-1125

Filed Date: 11/25/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/25/2015