Raymond Kerr v. City of South Bend , 48 N.E.3d 348 ( 2015 )

Dec 23 2015, 9:54 am
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Gregg Romaine Aladean M. DeRose
Romaine Law City of South Bend
Fishers, Indiana Department of Law
South Bend, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Raymond Kerr, December 23, 2015
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
71A03-1502-CT-49
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
City of South Bend, The Honorable David C.
Appellee-Defendant Chapleau, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
71D06-1208-CT-206
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 1 of 15
[1] Raymond Kerr filed a complaint against the City of South Bend alleging that
noxious gases from its sewer line had been forced into his home. Kerr alleged
that this constituted nuisance, trespass, negligence, and inverse condemnation,
resulting in injury to his person and his property. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that Kerr’s claims were
time-barred and that he was owed no duty. Finding that the trial court erred as
to this latter point, we nevertheless find that Kerr’s claims are barred by the
statute of limitations insofar as they relate to injury to his health. We do find,
however, that a portion of Kerr’s claims may proceed insofar as they relate to
damage to his property. Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand for further proceedings.
Facts 1
[2] Kerr owns a home at 240 South Meade Street in South Bend (the City). A
lateral sewer line runs under Kerr’s home and connects it to a main sewer line.
While the lateral line is Kerr’s private property, the main line is owned and
maintained by the City. At all times relevant to this case, the New Energy
Corporation manufactured ethanol at a plant located approximately two miles
southwest of Kerr’s home. The City had issued New Energy a permit to dump
various waste liquids into the City’s main sewer line. These liquids ran through
the main line and passed by Kerr’s home before they eventually reached a
1
We held oral argument in this case in Indianapolis on October 28, 2015. We would like to thank counsel
for the excellent oral advocacy.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 2 of 15
treatment plant to the north. New Energy has since filed for federal bankruptcy
protection.
[3] In 2001, a relative of Kerr by the name of Leolia Kerr made a complaint to the
City regarding odors coming into the home from the sewer. The City sent a
contractor who made repairs to Kerr’s lateral sewer line. Following this,
however, fumes from the sewer continued to enter Kerr’s home. At some point
prior to 2004, Kerr contacted the City to discuss the issue. At the time, the City
was aware of other complaints about odors coming from the sewer in and
around Kerr’s neighborhood. Kerr spoke with Deputy Mayor Lynne Coleman,
who assured Kerr that the City would either fix the problem or buy his home
and assist with his relocation costs. In 2005, Kerr moved away from his home
as a result of the fumes, but he did not sell his home at that time.
[4] In late 2006, the City hired an environmental consulting firm to conduct a study
on the odors coming from the sewer. The study found that discharge from New
Energy’s plant had a significant impact on the level of hydrogen sulfide present
in the sewer and that this could account for the odor.2 It also found that New
Energy was adding ferrous chloride to the wastewater that “binds up the
wastewater sulfide” and that City staff had found a layer of black slime covering
the walls of several manholes in and around Kerr’s neighborhood. Appellant’s
2
The study focused on hydrogen sulfide, but noted: “Whereas hydrogen sulfide may be one of the most
prevalent odor compounds associated with domestic wastewater, it is not the only odor present. But it just
happens to be the only odor parameter we can evaluate without doing a lot of time consuming and costly
field sampling.” Appellant’s App. p. 41.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 3 of 15
App. p. 42-43. The study made several recommendations to the City as to how
to deal with these problems.3
[5] In March 2012, Kerr returned to his home to make some repairs to the
property. While inside, he once again detected fumes entering his home from
the sewer. On May 7, 2012, Kerr was diagnosed with chronic bronchitis. Tests
revealed the presence of bacteria and fungi in Kerr’s lungs. On May 18, 2012,
Kerr was hospitalized for ketoacidosis and treated for undisclosed infections.
[6] Following his hospitalization, Kerr hired an environmental consultant to
determine what types of gases were present in sewer lines connected to his
home. The consultant measured the fumes emanating from two points in the
sewer line, one just outside the home and the other underneath the bathroom.
The consultant issued a report on July 18, 2012, which indicated that fumes in
the sewer contained several carcinogens—benzene, chloroform,
dibromochloromethane, 1,4-dichlorobenzene, methylene chloride, naphthalene,
and tetrachloroethene—as well as high levels of other chemicals. The
consultant made clear that the ambient air conditions within the home were not
evaluated, but that the measurements from the sewer could offer insight into
what may be emanating into the home. Appellant’s App. p. 50-51.
[7] On June 5, 2012, Kerr filed a notice of tort claim with the City. Kerr claimed
that the “management of the ethanol wastes in the sewers has negligently
3
It is not clear from the record whether the City followed the study’s recommendations.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 4 of 15
caused pollution to continuously trespass and act as a public and private
nuisance,” forcing him to move from his home. Id. at 29. Kerr claimed that the
“loss has been continuous since the late 1980’s.” Id. at 30. The City denied
Kerr’s claim on June 11, 2012.
[8] On August 31, 2012, Kerr filed a complaint against the City claiming that the
City negligently managed the sewer line, which resulted in fumes entering his
home. Kerr also claimed that the fumes had rendered his home valueless,
caused him personal injury, and diminished his earning capacity. The City
filed a motion to dismiss Kerr’s complaint. The trial court conducted a hearing
on November 19, 2012, and reserved ruling on the matter, allowing both parties
more time to conduct discovery. The trial court denied the City’s motion to
dismiss on December 20, 2012. The City filed an answer to Kerr’s complaint
on January 30, 2013.
[9] On April 30, 2014, the City filed a motion for summary judgment. Kerr filed a
motion in response on November 3, 2014. The trial court conducted a hearing
on the matter and, on January 20, 2015, issued its order granting the City’s
motion. The trial court found that Kerr had failed to give proper notice under
the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA) by failing to file his claim within 180 days
of discovering the fumes. It also found that Kerr’s claims were barred by all
applicable statutes of limitations. Finally, the trial court found that Kerr had
not established that the City owed him a duty. It reasoned that if any fumes
had entered the home, they had entered through the lateral sewer line, which
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 5 of 15
was Kerr’s private property and his responsibility to maintain. Kerr now
appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[10] Summary judgment is appropriate “if the designated evidentiary matter shows
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We review
a grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as
the trial court. City of Bloomington Utils. Dep’t v. Walter, 904 N.E.2d 346, 349
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009). All disputed facts and doubts as to the existence of
material facts must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Id.“[A]lthough the non-moving party has the burden on appeal of persuading us
that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous, we carefully assess the trial
court’s decision to ensure that he was not improperly denied his day in court.”
Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014).
[11] In this case, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City,
concluding that Kerr’s claims were barred by the applicable statutes of
limitations and for failure to provide notice in accordance with the ITCA. The
trial court also found that Kerr’s claims must fail because the City owed him no
duty. We deal with this issue first.
I. Duty
[12] To avoid summary judgment on his claim of negligence, Kerr was required to
show a duty owed to him by the City. City of Muncie ex rel. Muncie Fire Dep’t. v.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 6 of 15
Weidner, 831 N.E.2d 206, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Whether a defendant owes
a plaintiff a duty is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. Courts will
generally find a duty where reasonable persons would agree that one exists. Id.“A duty, when found to exist, is the duty to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances.” Id.[13] Here, the trial court framed the issue as whether the City owed Kerr a duty to
maintain the lateral sewer line that connected Kerr’s house to the main sewer
line. The trial court then found that the City owed Kerr no such duty, as the
lateral sewer line was Kerr’s private property. In support of this finding, the
trial court cited a provision of the ITCA noting that a governmental entity is not
liable for losses that result from failures to inspect private property. Appellant’s
App. p. 23 (citing Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(12)).
[14] However, the trial court’s determination that the City is not responsible for the
maintenance of Kerr’s private property, while correct, misses the point. Kerr is
not claiming that the City failed to properly maintain his lateral sewer line;
rather, he is claiming that the City failed to properly maintain its own main
sewer line, to which his line connects. Reply Br. p. 6. Appellate courts of this
State have long recognized that municipalities have a duty to use reasonable
care in the maintenance of their sewer lines, and it is this duty that Kerr believes
was breached.4 City of Bloomington Utils. Dep’t, 904 N.E.2d at 353; Murphy v.
4
The City also claims immunity, pointing to provisions of the ITCA immunizing governments from losses
that result from the “issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or failure to refuse to issue” a permit or
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 7 of 15
City of Indianapolis, 63 N.E.2d 469, 470, 158 Ind. 238 (1902); City of South Bend
v. Paxon, 67 Ind. 228, 234-35 (1879).
[15] The City may be correct that Kerr contributed to his damages by failing to
properly maintain his property. And were the factfinder to find that he has, he
would be denied recovery for negligence, as “contributory negligence on the
part of a plaintiff provides a complete defense to liability for the State and other
government actors. . . .” Kader v. State Dep’t of Correction, 1 N.E.3d 717, 728
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013); Ind. Code § 34-51-2-2. However, while these allegations
of contributory negligence are relevant to the question of Kerr’s eventual
recovery, they are not relevant to threshold question of the City’s duty to
maintain its own property.5
II. Timeliness of Kerr’s Claims
[16] While Kerr’s claims are not precluded because of any lack of duty on the City’s
part, they may nevertheless be time-barred. The trial court found that Kerr’s
action was barred by statutes of limitations as well as by his failure to comply
“failure to make an inspection . . . of any property, other than the property of a governmental entity.”
However, Kerr’s claim does not relate to the issuance of a permit to New Energy or a failure to make an
inspection of New Energy’s plant, but rather to the City’s failure to properly maintain its main sewer line.
The City cites to no authority for the broad proposition that issuing a permit to a private entity would
immunize a municipality from claims that the municipality negligently maintained its own property if such
claims could in any way relate to the permit. Nor does it give us any reason to read the ITCA in this manner.
5
The trial court appears to hold that a lack of duty on the part of the City would frustrate Kerr’s claims for
trespass, nuisance, and inverse condemnation as well. Once again, we find that any allegations that Kerr
improperly maintained his lateral sewer line would not preclude these claims. See Niagara Oil Co. v. Jackson,
91 N.E. 825, 828, 48 Ind. App. 238 (1910) (“It is the duty of every person or public body to prevent a
nuisance, and the fact that the person injured could, but does not, prevent damages to his property therefrom,
is no defense either to an action at law or in equity.”)
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 8 of 15
with the notice provisions of the ITCA. Kerr disagrees, arguing that because
the injury that he claims is of a recurring nature—gases repeatedly entering his
home—any statute of limitations or ITCA notice period renews upon each
instance. Kerr also advances equitable theories of estoppel based on alleged
statements made to him by Deputy Mayor Lynne Coleman. Kerr’s claims
encompass injury to both his health and his property, and we find it necessary
to analyze these claims separately.
A. Injury to Health
[17] Kerr claims that the City’s failure to properly maintain its main sewer line has
forced gases into his home, causing injury to his health. Indiana Code section
34-11-2-4 provides that actions for injury to person “must be commenced within
(2) years after the cause of action accrues.”
[18] Under what is known as the discovery rule, a cause of action accrues, and a
statute of limitations begins to run, “when the plaintiff knew, or, in the exercise
of ordinary diligence, could have discovered that an injury had been sustained
as a result of the tortious act of another.” Doe v. United Methodist Church, 673
N.E.2d 839, 842 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). This determination is a question of law.
Id. Here, the trial court determined that Kerr was aware that the gases may
have been injuring his health when he left his home in 2005, and that the
limitations period began to run at this time. We agree.
[19] We are not required to determine what a person exercising ordinary diligence
would have discovered in this situation, because Kerr himself has admitted that
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 9 of 15
he knew of potential health problems as early as 2005. In his notice of tort
claim, he acknowledged that he “was forced from the Home in 2005 due to
health issues associated with breathing the noxious fumes.” Appellant’s App.
p. 29. Kerr’s acknowledgment compels us to agree with the trial court that the
limitations period for Kerr’s personal injury claims began to run more than
seven years before Kerr filed his complaint and that these claims are barred
accordingly.6
B. Injury to Property
[20] We reach a different conclusion, however, insofar as Kerr seeks damages to
compensate for any damage to or loss of use and enjoyment of his property that
may have resulted from the gases entering his home. In accordance with our
holding in Strickdorn v. Zook, we find that the limitations period began anew
each time the gases entered. 957 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
[21] The facts of Strickdorn are remarkably similar to the case before us now. In
Strickdorn, the Strickdorns had been forced to leave their property as a result of
the smell coming from their neighbor’s dairy farm. Id. at 1016. The Strickdorns
filed a complaint against their neighbors—the Lantzes, who had owned the
farm from 2003 to 2005, and the Zooks, who had owned it from 2005 to 2009.
6
Kerr has framed his claims as those of trespass, nuisance, negligence, and inverse condemnation, all of
which include reference to personal injury. Appellant’s App. p. 32-34. Given that the statute of limitations
applies to all actions for personal injury, our holding that Kerr’s personal injury claims are barred by the
statute applies to all claims, however framed, to the extent that Kerr seeks compensation for injury to his
health.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 10 of 15
The Strickdorns alleged that their neighbors had negligently stored and disposed
of animal waste, which constituted a nuisance and a continuing trespass, and
caused injury to person and property. Id. at 1018-19. The complaint was filed
six years and one month after their neighbors commenced dairy operations. Id.
at 1018.
[22] This Court first distinguished the Strickdorns’ negligence claim from their
nuisance and trespass claims. Id. at 1021-22. We noted that the two-year
statutory limitation period applied to their negligence claim, as it was “readily
apparent that the Strickdorns [were] seeking damages for personal injury and
not damage to their property, insofar as the negligence counts [were]
concerned.” Id. at 1021 (emphasis original). We then held that, because “the
Lantzes sold the property to the Zooks in April 2005, the claims for personal
injury had accrued and were ascertainable.” Id. Consequently, the Strickdorns’
personal injury claims were barred as a matter of law. Id.[23] As to their nuisance and trespass claims, we noted that:
The distinction between an injury caused by a nuisance that is
“permanent” or “original,” and one that is considered temporary,
transient, continuing, or recurring, is critical to determining when
the statute of limitations period for a nuisance action begins to
run. An intermittent, non-abated nuisance is a new and separate
injury that gives rise to a new cause of action. Successive actions
may be maintained so long as the nuisance is permitted to
continue, in which damages may be recovered for all injury
occasioned prior to the commencement of the action and within
the statute of limitations, not extending back of a former
recovery. When the nuisance is a continuing abatable one, an
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 11 of 15
action that is prosecuted to a finality will not bar another action
to recover for harm sustained in succeeding years, when it is
made to appear that the nuisance has not been abated and its
continuance has resulted in further injury. Similarly, a continued
trespass that causes harm triggers a new limitations period each
time it occurs.
Id. at 1022 (citations omitted).
[24] We then found that the nuisance odors that the Strickdorns complained of were
the result of their neighbor’s repeated manure spills, improper spreading of
waste, and refusal to cover their manure pit. Id. at 1023. These acts constituted
continuing instances of nuisance and trespass, which triggered new limitations
periods. Id. As to the manure pit, we found that it “became a temporary,
continuing nuisance through its use, and not a permanent one from its mere
existence.” Id. Accordingly, we held that the Strickdorns’ claims for nuisance
and trespass were not barred by the statute of limitations. Id.[25] The nuisance odors at issue in Strickdorn are directly analogous to the nuisance
gases Kerr claims to have been injured by here. They are the result, Kerr
alleges, of the City’s continued failure to properly maintain its main sewer line
and as such, trigger new limitations periods each time they damage or interfere
with the use and enjoyment of his property.
[26] We agree with Kerr that new limitations periods are triggered as gases continue
to cause harm. At this point, however, the notice provisions of the ITCA
operate to limit Kerr’s recovery. Indiana Code section 34-13-3-8 provides that
tort claims against political subdivisions are barred unless notice is given to the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 12 of 15
subdivision’s governing body within 180 days after the loss occurs. Because in
this case Kerr has suffered recurring losses, rather than one individual loss, his
claim will not be entirely barred, but his recovery will be limited to losses which
occurred beginning 180 days before he filed his notice of tort claim.
[27] Kerr argues that he should be allowed to recover for injuries stemming from a
much longer period of time because he has substantially complied with ITCA’s
notice requirement and that the City has had notice of the problem for years
now. Appellant’s Br. p. 14-15. We have previously held that “liberal
application of the requirements of the ITCA notice statute is proper in order to
avoid denying plaintiffs an opportunity to bring a claim where the purpose of
the statute has been satisfied.” Brown v. Alexander, 876 N.E.2d 376, 381 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2007).
[28] As to what constitutes substantial compliance and its purpose, our Supreme
Court has recently stated:
Substantial compliance with the statutory notice requirements is
sufficient when the purpose of the notice requirement is
satisfied. The purposes of the notice statute include informing
the officials of the political subdivision with reasonable certainty
of the accident and surrounding circumstances so that the
political subdivision may investigate, determine its possible
liability, and prepare a defense to the claim. What constitutes
substantial compliance, while not a question of fact but one of
law, is a fact-sensitive determination. The crucial consideration
is whether the notice supplied by the claimant of his intent to
take legal action contains sufficient information for the city to
ascertain the full nature of the claim against it so that it can
determine its liability and prepare a defense. But mere actual
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 13 of 15
knowledge of an occurrence, even when coupled with routine
investigation, does not constitute substantial compliance.
Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 707 (Ind. 2013) (quotations omitted).
[29] Accordingly, we cannot find that Kerr has substantially complied with the
ITCA’s notice requirement in this case. While Kerr certainly notified the City
as to the odors entering his home, he did not notify the City that he intended to
take legal action until 2012. As the City was not aware that Kerr planned on
filing a claim against it until this date, it was certainly not given an opportunity
to ascertain the nature of Kerr’s claim and to prepare a defense to that claim.
Therefore, we cannot find that Kerr’s prior communications with the City
regarding this issue served the purpose behind the ITCA’s notice requirement.
[30] Kerr also points to the equitable doctrine of fraudulent concealment, arguing
that it should apply in this case to estop the City from asserting that Kerr’s
claims are time-barred. Kerr believes that his communications with Deputy
Mayor Coleman may amount to fraudulent concealment on the City’s part and
that this is a question of fact for the jury.
[31] We find the doctrine of fraudulent concealment inapplicable to the facts of this
case.
Fraudulent concealment is an equitable doctrine which operates
to prevent a defendant from asserting the statute of limitations as
a bar to a claim where the defendant, by his own actions,
prevents the plaintiff from obtaining the knowledge necessary to
pursue a claim. When this occurs, equity will toll the statute of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 14 of 15
limitations until the equitable grounds cease to operate as a
reason for delay.
Sagarin v. City of Bloomington, 932 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
[32] Although Kerr is correct that whether fraudulent concealment applies is usually
a question to be determined by the factfinder, Kerr has failed to allege that
anything was concealed in this case. Kerr’s claims are predicated on his
assertion that fumes have unlawfully entered his home. He was aware of these
fumes for years and he does not claim that Deputy Mayor Coleman acted in
any way to conceal their presence. To the extent that other equitable tolling
doctrines may be available in this case, Kerr has not directed our attention to
them, and we will not formulate an argument on his behalf. See Ind. Appellate
Rule 46(A)(8)(a).
[33] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. On
remand, Kerr’s claim against the City may proceed insofar as it relates to
damage to or loss of the use and enjoyment of his property beginning 180 days
prior to the filing of his notice of tort claim.
Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 71A03-1502-CT-49 | December 23, 2015 Page 15 of 15