G.I. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Jan 06 2016, 8:44 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Joel M. Schumm Gregory F. Zoeller
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Alexander Van Gorp Christina D. Pace
Certified Legal Intern Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
G.I., January 6, 2016
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A05-1504-JV-166
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court.
The Honorable Geoffrey Gaither,
State of Indiana, Magistrate.
Appellee-Petitioner. Cause No. 49D09-1501-JD-27
Friedlander, Senior Judge
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[1] G.I. appeals her adjudication as a juvenile delinquent based upon a true finding
for the offense of receiving stolen auto parts, a Level 6 felony if committed by
1
an adult. We reverse.
[2] G.I. presents one issue for our review, which we restate as: whether there was
sufficient evidence to support her juvenile delinquency adjudication for
receiving stolen auto parts.
[3] On December 28, 2014, India Simms’ silver Monte Carlo automobile was
stolen. Two days later on December 30, 2014, M.B. asked her friend P.D. to
hang out and ride with M.B. when she drove her cousins to a party. P.D.
agreed, and M.B. arrived to pick up P.D. driving a silver car in which G.I. was
a passenger. At some point after picking up P.D., M.B. stopped the car and got
in the back seat with P.D. while G.I. drove. Due to a non-illuminated
headlight, Officer Rabensteine initiated a traffic stop on the silver Monte Carlo
being driven by G.I. He also performed a check of the license plate on the
Monte Carlo, which showed that the plate was stolen. Before Officer
Rabensteine exited his car, a door of the Monte Carlo opened, and M.B. and
P.D. fled from the car. Another officer chased M.B. and P.D. while Officer
Rabensteine approached the car to speak with G.I., who had remained in the
car. Officer Rabensteine performed a check of the Monte Carlo’s VIN, which
showed that the car was stolen, and G.I. was arrested.
1
Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2.5 (c) (2014).
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[4] The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that G.I. had committed the
offense of receiving stolen auto parts, a Level 6 felony if committed by an adult.
Following a fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court entered a true finding. G.I.
was placed on formal probation, and this appeal followed.
[5] G.I. contends the State failed to prove that she knew the car was stolen. When
the State seeks to have a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent for committing an
act that would be a crime if committed by an adult, the State must prove every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. C.L. v. State, 2 N.E.3d 798
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014). When reviewing on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting a juvenile adjudication, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge
the credibility of the witnesses. Z.A. v. State, 13 N.E.3d 438 (Ind. Ct. App.
2014). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment and the
reasonable inferences therefrom, and we will affirm if the evidence and those
inferences constitute substantial evidence of probative value to support the
judgment. C.L., 2 N.E.3d 798.
[6] In order to make a true finding of delinquency against G.I. for receiving stolen
auto parts, the State must have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that G.I. (1)
knowingly or intentionally (2) received, retained, or disposed of (3) Simms’
silver Monte Carlo (4) that had been the subject of theft. See Ind. Code § 35-43-
4-2.5 (c). In addition to proving the explicit elements of the crime, the State
must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person knew the property
was stolen. Fortson v. State, 919 N.E.2d 1136 (Ind. 2010). Knowledge that
property is stolen may be established by circumstantial evidence; however, such
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knowledge may not be inferred solely from the unexplained possession of
recently stolen property. Id.
[7] Simms testified at the fact-finding hearing that her silver Monte Carlo was
stolen while it was running with the keys in the ignition. She also testified that
the car was damaged prior to it being stolen, including damage to the driver’s
side and the front bumper and that there was further damage when her car was
returned to her, including ashes and food on the inside, damaged air vents,
paint scratches on one side, and a door not closing completely. P.D. testified
that M.B. contacted her to “come and chill” and ride with her when she took
her cousins to a party. Tr. p. 12. M.B. was driving G.I. and another girl when
they picked up P.D. in a two-door gray car that P.D. had not seen before. At
some point, M.B. and P.D. got into the back seat together, and G.I. drove. The
fourth girl was dropped off before they were stopped by Officer Rabensteine.
P.D. testified that when they were pulled over, M.B. suggested they run, and
she followed M.B. P.D. further testified that she did not know who owned the
car. Officer Rabensteine testified that M.B. told him that P.D. had stated the
car belonged to her. M.B. did not testify at the fact-finding hearing.
[8] Here, it is reasonable to infer from the evidence presented at the fact-finding
hearing that G.I. believed the car to belong to M.B. Teenagers driving a used
car and/or one that is messy and has bumps and scrapes is not unusual.
Further, the evidence shows the car was stolen with the keys in it, and there
was no evidence presented of any damage to the steering column or other
components which would be indicative of a stolen vehicle. Moreover, G.I. did
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not flee when the car was stopped by Officer Rabensteine. From this evidence
we determine that the circumstances do not support a reasonable inference that
G.I. knew, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the car she drove only briefly was
stolen. We therefore conclude that the evidence presented to support G.I.’s
delinquency adjudication was not sufficient.
[9] Reversed.
[10] Riley, J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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