Cesar Contreras-Munoz v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2015 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 06 2015, 6:15 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stephen T. Owens Gregory F. Zoeller
Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General
John Pinnow Brian Reitz
Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Anne C. Kaiser
Deputy Public Defender
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Cesar Contreras-Munoz, November 6, 2015
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A03-1504-PC-127
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Terry C.
Appellee-Respondent. Shewmaker, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20C01-1110-PC-24
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Cesar Contreras-Munoz appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief. Contreras-Munoz raises two issues for our
review, which we restate as follows:
1. Whether he entered into his guilty plea knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily, or whether he received
ineffective assistance from his trial counsel, when he did
not have an English-Spanish interpreter present during his
guilty-plea hearing or other court proceedings.
2. Whether he received ineffective assistance from his trial
counsel when counsel did not call two witnesses on
Contreras-Munoz’s behalf during the sentencing hearing.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On November 26, 2007, the State charged Contreras-Munoz with possession of
cocaine, as a Class A felony, and with a criminal gang enhancement.
Thereafter, Contreras-Munoz hired David W. Newman, Jr. as counsel.
Newman “every day represent[s] someone who speaks Spanish.” Tr. at 27.
Although Newman does not speak Spanish, his secretary does. If Newman has
any trouble communicating with a client, he brings his secretary in to translate.
[4] When he met Contreras-Munoz, Newman “didn’t notice any trouble” with
communicating in English “at all.” Id. at 20. Indeed, Newman not only
observed that Contreras-Munoz had “no difficulty” in speaking and
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understanding English, Newman observed that Contreras-Munoz was
“conversational” in English. Id. at 20-21. Contreras-Munoz and Newman
“had conversations” in English “throughout” Newman’s representation of him.
Id. at 28. Newman found Contreras-Munoz to be “a very likeable fellow in the
discussions, polite, funny.” Id. Contreras-Munoz’s responses to Newman were
“appropriate based on the questions and the context.” Id. During his
representation of Contreras-Munoz, Newman wrote him nine letters, each in
English. Contreras-Munoz also wrote letters to Newman in English. At no
time did Contreras-Munoz indicate to Newman that Contreras-Munoz did not
understand English, and at no time did Contreras-Munoz request that Newman
obtain a translator.
[5] On January 24, 2008, the court held a bond reduction hearing for Contreras-
Munoz. Contreras-Munoz appeared at that hearing with Newman. “At no
point during these proceedings did [Contreras-Munoz] appear to have difficulty
communicating in English,” and Contreras-Munoz did not request an
interpreter. Appellant’s App. at 283. The court ordered Contreras-Munoz’s
bond reduced.
[6] On May 22, 2008, the court held a status hearing, at which Contreras-Munoz
appeared with Newman. At that hearing, Contreras-Munoz “acknowledged his
trial date . . . in English and . . . did not request an interpreter or demonstrate
any difficulty understanding the proceedings.” Id. The court held another
status hearing just over one year later. Again, Contreras-Munoz appeared with
Newman and “acknowledged his trial date . . . in English.” Id. at 284.
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Contreras-Munoz “made no request for an interpreter” at that time. Id. A third
status hearing occurred four months after the second. Contreras-Munoz
appeared with Newman and again did not request an interpreter.
[7] In November of 2009, Newman negotiated a plea agreement with the State on
Contreras-Munoz’s behalf. The plea agreement was reduced to writing and in
English. Newman went over the terms of the written plea agreement with
Contreras-Munoz “on multiple occasions.” Tr. at 12. Contreras-Munoz signed
the plea agreement, pleading guilty to possession of cocaine, as a Class A
felony. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the criminal gang
enhancement.
[8] The court held a plea hearing on November 12, 2009. The court had an
English-Spanish interpreter present at that hearing, but neither Contreras-
Munoz nor Newman requested her services. Instead, the court engaged
Contreras-Munoz in English as follows:
THE COURT: Tell me your name.
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Cesar Contreras-Munoz.
***
THE COURT: All right. We have a plea agreement. Mr.
[Contreras-]Munoz, have you reviewed it?
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.
THE COURT: And did you sign it?
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MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.
THE COURT: The Plea Agreement says you’re going to plead
guilty to Count I, Dealing in Cocaine, a Class A Felony. Is that
correct?
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.
THE COURT: And on Count I, whatever sentence is imposed
will be up to the Court’s discretion, is that correct?
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.
THE COURT: The other Count, Criminal Gang Activity, will
be dismissed, the enhancement, and the State consents to
jurisdiction for a modification from January 1, 2012, after that
date. The State doesn’t agree to a modification[] but only grants
to give the Court jurisdiction. The modification must be filed in
calendar year 2012.
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.
THE COURT: Is there any other term of this . . . agreement of
which I’m unaware?
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: No.
THE COURT: Did I describe it correctly?
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.
THE COURT: . . . All right, Mr. Contreras-Munoz, are you
telling me you committed the offense, the Class A felony, as
alleged on page one?
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.
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THE COURT: Are you telling me on November 19, 2007, in
Elkhart County, Indiana, you knowingly possessed cocaine with
the intent to deliver the cocaine?
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.
THE COURT: And the amount of the cocaine was three grams
or more, is that correct?
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.
***
THE COURT: Mr. Contreras-Munoz, before I can accept your
plea of guilty, I must be satisfied that you fully understand your
constitutional rights; that your plea of guilty is made freely and
voluntarily; and, that you are, in fact, guilty.
It will, therefore, be necessary that I ask you certain
questions and, perhaps, hear some evidence. If you do not
understand the questions or words that I use, please let me know.
I will explain them to you.
You may talk with your attorney about any matter during
questioning and prior to answering any questions.
First of all, do you read, write[,] and understand the
English language?
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.
THE COURT: Have you ever been treated for any mental
illness, or[,] to your knowledge, do [you] now suffer from any
mental or emotional disability?
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: No.
THE COURT: Are you now under the influence of alcohol or
any drugs that would affect your ability to understand these
proceedings?
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MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: No.
THE COURT: Mr. Contreras-Munoz, your attorney[ ha]s
informed the Court that you want to withdraw your former plea
of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty to page one of the charge,
the Class A Felony. Is that what you want to do?
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.
THE COURT: You and I have reviewed your plea agreement,
correct?
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions about it?
MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: No.
Appellant’s App. at 300-04. The court then advised Contreras-Munoz of his
rights. With each advisement, the court asked Contreras-Munoz if he
understood the right described. Contreras-Munoz repeatedly acknowledged
that he understood. The court then again reviewed the terms of Contreras-
Munoz’s plea agreement as well as the State’s charging information and
relevant statutes, each of which, again, Contreras-Munoz stated he understood.
And the court thoroughly described the sentencing process. At each point,
Contreras-Munoz affirmed that he understood the court’s description. When
asked fact-specific questions that required either a yes or no answer, Contreras-
Munoz answered appropriately as the facts required. E.g., id. at 310 (“THE
COURT: Are you now on parole? MR. CONTRERAS-MUNOZ: No.”).
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The court then accepted Contreras-Munoz’s guilty plea and entered judgment
of conviction accordingly. Thereafter, the court sentenced Contreras-Munoz to
thirty-seven years in the Department of Correction.
[9] On August 12, 2010, Contreras-Munoz filed a hand-written request, in English,
with the trial court in which Contreras-Munoz requested “all information”
pertaining to his case. Id. at 91. Around that same time, Contreras-Munoz sent
a request to Newman, partly hand-written and partly typed, in English, in
which Contreras-Munoz requested his “entire client file” in anticipation of a
“petition for post-conviction relief.” State’s Ex. 4.
[10] On August 23, 2010, Contreras-Munoz filed a pro se motion for modification of
sentence. This motion was partly hand-written and partly typed, all in English.
Over eight consecutive paragraphs, Contreras-Munoz hand wrote his
explanations for why his sentence should be modified. The court denied
Contreras-Munoz’s motion the same day.
[11] On February 14, 2011, Contreras-Munoz filed a pro se petition for direct
placement into community corrections. This motion was partly hand-written
and partly typed, all in English, and included a lengthy, hand-written letter
from Contreras-Munoz to the trial court explaining the basis for the petition.
The court denied the petition the following day.
[12] On May 24, 2011, Contreras-Munoz sent a letter to the Clerk of Elkhart Circuit
Court. This letter was hand-written and in English. Contreras-Munoz
requested case-file documents potentially relevant to “a Post-Conviction Relief
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Petition.” Id. at 104. Contreras-Munoz sent two additional such letters to the
trial court clerk on July 15 and July 25.
[13] On September 14, 2011, Contreras-Munoz, pro se, filed a petition for leave to
file a belated notice of appeal. The petition was entirely in English. The court
set a hearing date on Contreras-Munoz’s petition; Contreras-Munoz, in
English, requested an interpreter for this hearing, and the court granted
Contreras-Munoz’s request. At the hearing, however, Contreras-Munoz
withdrew his petition for a belated notice of appeal.
[14] On October 20, 2011, Contreras-Munoz, pro se, filed his initial petition for
post-conviction relief, which was typed in English. Contreras-Munoz’s original
grounds for post-conviction relief were based on Newman’s alleged “fail[ure] to
investigate the facts and circumstances of the case” and on the theory that
Contreras-Munoz’s “guilty plea was coerced by threats, false promises, and
counsel’s lack of effort on behalf of the petitioner.” Id. at 121-22. Thereafter,
Contreras-Munoz filed numerous documents with the court that were hand-
written and in English. Contreras-Munoz eventually moved to withdraw his
petition for post-conviction relief without prejudice, which the court permitted.
[15] On December 2, 2013, Contreras-Munoz, pro se, filed a new petition for post-
conviction relief, which was typed in English. On February 6, 2014, counsel
filed an appearance on Contreras-Munoz’s behalf, and, on September 18, 2014,
Contreras-Munoz, through counsel, filed an amended petition for post-
conviction relief. For the first time in his amended petition, Contreras-Munoz
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asserted that he did not understand the English language and, as such, he did
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter into his guilty plea. For the
same reason, Contreras-Munoz alleged that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance. Contreras-Munoz further alleged Newman to be
ineffective in his presentation of potential mitigating evidence at Contreras-
Munoz’s sentencing hearing.
[16] The post-conviction court held a hearing on Contreras-Munoz’s amended
petition for post-conviction relief on November 20, 2014. Thereafter, the court
entered findings of fact and conclusions of law denying the petition. In
particular, the post-conviction court noted that John Ford, Contreras-Munoz’s
employer, testified that Contreras-Munoz had “interpreted English to [other]
Spanish speaking employees” at his place of employment. And the court found
that it “had no reason to believe [Contreras-Munoz] did not understand English
as [he] communicated in English and indicated an understanding of all court
proceedings,” and Contreras-Munoz “understood English.” Id. at 294-95, 298.
The court then concluded that Contreras-Munoz had knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily entered into his guilty plea. The court further concluded that
Contreras-Munoz did not receive ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.
This appeal ensued.
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Discussion and Decision
Standard of Review
[17] Contreras-Munoz appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for
post-conviction relief. As our supreme court has explained:
“The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden
of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004).
“When appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, the
petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative
judgment.” Id. To prevail on appeal from the denial of post-
conviction relief, a petitioner must show that the evidence as a
whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion
opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Weatherford v.
State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind. 1993). Further, the post-
conviction court in this case made findings of fact and
conclusions of law in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction
Rule 1(6). Although we do not defer to the post-conviction
court’s legal conclusions, “[a] post-conviction court’s findings
and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear
error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d
102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (quotation omitted).
Hollowell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 268-69 (Ind. 2014) (alteration original to
Hollowell). Because the clearly erroneous standard “is a review for sufficiency of
evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of
witnesses.” Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 258-59. Rather, we “consider only the
evidence that supports that judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
from that evidence.” Id.
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[18] On appeal, Contreras-Munoz asserts that he did not knowingly, intelligently, or
voluntarily plead guilty because “he did not have an interpreter at the guilty
plea hearing.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. Contreras-Munoz also asserts that
Newman rendered ineffective assistance when he did not request an interpreter
be present during court proceedings. And Contreras-Munoz asserts that
Newman rendered ineffective assistance when he did not present certain
evidence during Contreras-Munoz’s sentencing hearing. We address the
English-language issues first and the sentencing-hearing issue second.
Issue One: Contreras-Munoz’s Understanding of English
[19] Contreras-Munoz first asserts that he did not enter into his guilty plea
knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily because he did not have an interpreter
present at the guilty-plea hearing. As our supreme court has explained:
As we have previously declared: “In considering the
voluntariness of a guilty plea we start with the standard that the
record of the guilty plea proceeding must demonstrate that the
defendant was advised of his constitutional rights and knowingly
and voluntarily waived them.” Turman v. State, 271 Ind. 332, 392
N.E.2d 483, 484 (1979) (citing Boykin [v. Alabama], 395 U.S. [238,
242 (1969)]). And Boykin requires that a trial court accepting a
guilty plea “must be satisfied that an accused is aware of his right
against self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right
to confront his accusers.” Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 171
(Ind. 2001) (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243). The failure to advise
a criminal defendant of his constitutional rights in accordance
with Boykin prior to accepting a guilty plea will result in reversal
of the conviction. Youngblood v. State, 542 N.E.2d 188, 188 (Ind.
1989) (quoting White v. State, 497 N.E.2d 893, 905 (Ind. 1986)).
Accordingly, a defendant who demonstrates that the trial court
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failed to properly give a Boykin advisement during the guilty plea
hearing has met his threshold burden for obtaining post-
conviction relief.
***
Courts have long recognized that “a foreign language defendant’s
capacity to understand and appreciate the proceedings, to
participate with his counsel, to confront his accusers, and to
waive rights knowingly and intelligently, is undermined without
an interpreter actively participating in his defense.” United States
v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 633 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing United
States ex rel. Negron v. New York, 434 F.2d 386, 389 (2d Cir. 1970)).
Undoubtedly, the defendant is denied due process when, among
other things, “what is told him is incomprehensible [or] the
accuracy and scope of a translation at a hearing or trial is subject
to grave doubt [.]” Cirrincione, 780 F.2d at 634. For this reason
we have declared that a “defendant who cannot speak or
understand English has [the] right to have his proceedings
simultaneously translated to allow for effective participation.”
Diaz, 934 N.E.2d at 1095 (alteration in original) (quoting
Martinez Chavez v. State, 534 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ind. 1989) (citation
omitted)). We elaborated that such interpretation must include
“the precise form and tenor of each question propounded,
and . . . in like manner translate the precise expressions of the
[defendant].” Id. at 1095 (quoting People v. Cunningham, 215
Mich. App. 652, 546 N.W.2d 715, 716 (1996) (quotation
omitted)). This is so because the interpreter’s role during a
criminal proceeding is a critical one. “Language interpreters
overcome the barriers and cultural misunderstandings that can
render criminal defendants virtually absent from their own
proceedings. Interpreters also eliminate the misinterpretation of
witnesses’ statements made to police or triers of fact during court
proceedings.” Lynn W. Davis, et al., The Changing Face of
Justice: A Survey of Recent Cases Involving Courtroom
Interpretation, 7 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 1, 3 (2004).
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Ponce v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1265, 1270, 1272 (Ind. 2014) (footnote omitted;
alterations and some omissions original).
[20] In Ponce, our supreme court held that a post-conviction petitioner had met his
burden on appeal to show that he did not enter into his guilty plea knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. In particular, in that case the petitioner
demonstrated that his Boykin advisements “were not accurately communicated
to [him] . . . in Spanish—the language he understood.” Id. at 1273. Moreover,
the only evidence that the petitioner in Ponce understood the English-language
version of his advisements was his statement, “I understand it, and I speak it a
little.” Id. As our supreme court held, this statement, standing alone, did not
show that the petitioner would understand “an explanation given in a foreign
language of his legal rights.” Id. And the court concluded that the State failed
to show that the record as a whole demonstrated that the petitioner understood
his constitutional rights and waived them. Id. at 1274.
[21] Contreras-Munoz’s case is readily distinguishable from Ponce. Viewing the
evidence most favorable to the post-conviction court’s judgment, as we must,
see Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 258-59, we cannot say that the evidence leads
unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-
conviction court, see Hollowell, 19 N.E.3d at 269. Indeed, here the trial court
expressly found that Contreras-Munoz understood the English language. That
finding is well-supported by the evidence. Specifically, over the course of about
six years, Contreras-Munoz wrote—sometimes by hand—numerous letters and
documents to Newman and the court, all of which were in English. Some of
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those documents made specific references to legal proceedings; others made
specific legal arguments with citations to authority. Further, Newman testified
that he frequently engages with Spanish-speaking clients and has an interpreter
on staff. But he had no problem communicating with Contreras-Munoz in
English at any point, either orally or in writing, and, as such, Newman did not
see the need to utilize his Spanish-speaking employee when communicating
with Contreras-Munoz. And the trial court engaged Contreras-Munoz in
numerous proceedings up to, during, and after Contreras-Munoz’s guilty plea.
Contreras-Munoz had no problems communicating with the court in English
when the court engaged him.
[22] Contreras-Munoz asserts on appeal that his responses to the trial court during
the various proceedings are not indicative of his understanding of the English
language because he merely gave “yes” or “no” answers. But the trial court’s
questions were often fact-specific—to give a correct yes or no answer required
an understanding of the question’s factual reference. For example, during the
guilty plea hearing, the trial court asked Contreras-Munoz if he was on parole
or probation. Contreras-Munoz answered “[n]o” to both questions.
Appellant’s App. at 310. Contreras-Munoz does not explain on appeal how he
could correctly answer “yes” to some fact-specific questions and “no” to others
without first understanding the facts referenced in the question.
[23] In any event, Contreras-Munoz’s argument on appeal amounts to a request for
this court to reweigh the evidence before the post-conviction court. That is,
Contreras-Munoz’s appeal is premised on the evidence he presented to the post-
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conviction court rather than the evidence most favorable to the court’s
judgment, which is contrary to our standard of review. Thus, we decline
Contreras-Munoz’s invitation to reassess the evidence on appeal.
[24] We hold that the post-conviction court’s judgment that Contreras-Munoz
entered into his guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently is not
clearly erroneous. For the same reasons Contreras-Munoz cannot demonstrate
that the post-conviction court erred on this issue, he cannot demonstrate that
the post-conviction court erred when it concluded that Newman had not
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he failed to secure an interpreter
during any of the proceedings before the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the
post-conviction court’s judgment on these issues.
Issue Two: Sentencing Hearing
[25] Contreras-Munoz also argues on appeal that Newman rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel when he failed to present certain evidence on Contreras-
Munoz’s behalf during the sentencing hearing. When evaluating an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, we apply the two-part test articulated in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Hollowell, 19 N.E.3d at 269. To satisfy
the first prong, “the defendant must show deficient performance:
representation that fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
committing errors so serious that the defendant did not have the ‘counsel’
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392
(Ind. 2002) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). To satisfy the second prong,
“the defendant must show prejudice: a reasonable probability (i.e. a probability
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sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome) that, but for counsel’s
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
[26] Here, Contreras-Munoz asserts that Newman rendered ineffective assistance at
the sentencing hearing when he did not call Ford, Contreras-Munoz’s
employer, and Amy Contreras, Contreras-Munoz’s former wife, as witnesses on
Contreras-Munoz’s behalf. According to Contreras-Munoz, Ford would have
testified that Contreras-Munoz had worked for Ford for eight years and was a
trusted worker with supervisor authority. And Contreras-Munoz asserts that
Amy would have testified that Contreras-Munoz supported his family.
[27] But the Indiana Supreme Court has stated that “which witnesses to call is the
epitome of a strategic decision” that “we will not second-guess.” Wrinkles v.
State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1200 (Ind. 2001) (citations and quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, Contreras-Munoz cannot demonstrate that Newman’s
strategic decision to not call Ford and Amy as witnesses was objectively
unreasonable.
[28] Moreover, the post-conviction court concluded that there was not a reasonable
probability that the result of Contreras-Munoz’s sentence would have been
different had Newman called Ford and Amy as witnesses. Indeed, while
Newman did not call these potential witnesses, he did ask the trial court
to note [Contreras-Munoz’s] strong family support. His ex-wife
and his children have written letters. He has four children. He
was current on child support until he was incarcerated . . . . He
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had a good work history before his arrest, and he was . . . in a
supervisory position.
Appellant’s App. at 319. Thus, while Ford and Amy might have bolstered
Newman’s assertions, nonetheless the trial court at the sentencing hearing had
the information regarding Contreras-Munoz’s family support and work history
before it. And, despite having that information before it, the court still
concluded that the aggravating factors overcame the proffered mitigators. We
cannot say that the post-conviction court’s conclusion that Contreras-Munoz
would not have received a different sentence had Newman called Ford and
Amy as witnesses is clearly erroneous. As such, we affirm the post-conviction
court’s denial of Contreras-Munoz’s petition for post-conviction relief.
[29] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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