Antonio Jones v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Sep 28 2017, 7:47 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Antonio Jones Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Carlisle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
James B. Martin
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Antonio Jones, September 28, 2017
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
45A04-1611-PC-2565
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court, Criminal Division 4
State of Indiana, The Honorable Samuel L. Cappas,
Appellee-Respondent. Judge
The Honorable Natalie Bokota,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
45G04-0602-PC-2
Mathias, Judge.
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[1] Antonio Jones appeals the Lake Superior Court’s denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief. Jones argues that the post-conviction court clearly erred in
rejecting his claim that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Jones’s convictions for the murder of four people have spawned much
litigation. The facts underlying his convictions have been stated and restated by
this and other courts several times. Most recently, we set forth the facts as
follows:
On January 16, 2004, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Ronyale
Hearne dropped off her twenty-three-month-old son, A.J., at the
home of his father, Anthony McClendon, Sr., on Polk Street in
Gary. McClendon lived at the residence with Laurice and Jimmy
Jones (collectively, the Joneses).
Hearne and her cousin, Donte Mills, returned to the residence on
Polk Street to get A.J. shortly after midnight. She went upstairs,
the door was open, and she saw Laurice on the couch “like she
could be dead.” Tr. p. 382–84. Hearne called McClendon’s
brother, Roosevelt Pickens, who arrived at the scene shortly
thereafter. She walked further into the apartment and saw
Jimmy’s body on the bathroom floor. She then saw Pickens
standing over McClendon and holding A.J. It appeared as if
McClendon’s “whole face was just blown open.” Id. at 389.
Hearne took A.J. from Pickens and ran downstairs. Mills drove
A.J. and Hearne to Northlake Hospital. At some point, Hearne
pulled up A.J.’s shirt and noticed that he had a hole in his side.
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A.J. was eventually transported to the University of Chicago
Hospital by ambulance. It was determined that A.J. had suffered
two gunshot wounds that had passed through his body. A.J. later
died from his wounds.
Pickens telephoned his friend, Terrell Bowens, upon arriving at
the scene. Bowens went to the apartment, contacted the police,
and waited approximately ten minutes for their arrival. At the
residence, the police saw the bodies of McClendon and the
Joneses and also discovered scales and powder cocaine on the
kitchen counter as well as cocaine cooking on the stove.
During the investigation, the police were able to determine that
three different types of firearms were used in the murders.
Autopsies performed on McClendon and the Joneses revealed
that all three had died from multiple gunshot wounds.
[Also] [o]n January 16, 2004, Maurice Fuller and Anita Goldsby
held a party at their apartment in Gary that started around 7:00
p.m. There were about twenty people at the party, and James
Parks, Lenzo Aaron, and Jones were there and playing cards for
money. At some point, Fuller bumped into Jones in the kitchen.
The two were “joking around,” and Jones lifted up his shirt and
revealed the butt of a gun. Tr. p. 1159–60. Jones said, “You don’t
want none of this.” Id. Fuller described Jones’s handgun as an
automatic, “like a 9mm or a .45.” Id. at 1160.
While the three were playing cards at the party, Aaron and Parks
got into an argument over some money. Jones was Aaron’s
partner in the card game. The argument was settled, and Aaron
told Parks to keep the money in dispute. At some point, Jones
walked into the kitchen and said, “We just got a call from some
dude ... do you want to go rob him?” Id. at 1198. Jones said that
the caller had $6000 and some drugs in his possession. Aaron
and Parks both agreed to rob the caller, and Parks and Jones left.
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However, they returned to pick up Aaron, and the three then left
again in Jones’s white Buick Roadmaster to commit the robbery.
By this point, Aaron had seen the butt of the black semi-
automatic handgun tucked into Jones’s waist. An AK–47 assault
rifle was also on the backseat of Jones’s vehicle.
When the three arrived at the Polk Street residence, Jones went
in first, followed by Parks and then Aaron. Aaron was carrying
the AK–47 rifle. After the three went up the stairs, Jones
knocked, someone came to the door and asked who was there,
and Jones replied, “It’s Tone.” Id. at 1210. As soon as the person
inside opened the door, someone fired five or six shots. After the
three entered, Aaron saw Laurice and A.J. on the couch. Parks
and Jones had gone to the back of the residence, and at some
point, Aaron heard Parks say, “Where the sh*t at, man?” Tr. p.
1211. The man he was talking to responded, “Tone, James G.
It’s like this man? It’s like this?” Id. at 1216. Laurice was pleading
with Aaron, “Please, sir, don’t kill me. Please don’t kill me.” Id.
at 1213. Aaron shook his head to indicate he was not going to
harm her. However, Aaron, who was unable to see into the back
of the apartment because a sheet was hanging in the doorway,
heard Parks say, “Finish him off. Finish him off.” Id. at 1216.
The others returned to the living room and grabbed the AK–47
off Aaron’s shoulder. Thereafter, they went to the rear of the
apartment and Aaron heard two more shots.
Jones left, while Aaron and Parks remained in the living room.
Parks told Aaron, “Finish the lady off, man.” Tr. p. 1216. Aaron
told Parks, “Man I didn’t come here for that, I ain’t killing
nobody,” then left the apartment. Id. at 1217. As Aaron was
leaving, he heard two more shots. Id.
Aaron did not take anything from the apartment, nor did he see
Parks or Jones take anything. However, he was originally told
that they were going to steal $6000, with each of them to take
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$2000 from the robbery. Thereafter, Jones drove the three to the
Oak Knoll apartments. Sometime after 12:50 a.m., Jones called
Janeth Alexander for a ride, explaining that he had lost his keys.
When Alexander arrived, Jones’s vehicle was outside. After
Alexander picked him up, and they were driving along a
drainage ditch on Chase Street, Jones asked her to stop the
vehicle. However, Alexander refused because the weather was
bad. Jones said he had been drinking, and Alexander thought
that he appeared to be “hot or sick.” Tr. p. 1659. Jones rolled the
window down, and she heard “something goes off—you know,
hit the water.” Id. Jones turned around and asked her, “you
didn’t see that, did you?” Id. Jones had tossed the gun into the
water.
After Jones was arrested, he called Alexander from the jail. Jones
told her that she was his alibi, and that his life was in her hands.
After Alexander testified in another proceeding, Jones called her
and said that he was going to kill her.
The day after the murders, Parks knocked on Aaron’s door, gave
him $230, and asked him, “was [he] straight,” which Aaron took
to mean, was he “cool with the $230.” Tr. p. 1232. Aaron feared
for his life and that of his girlfriend, so he accepted the $230. Id.
at 1233–34.
[O]n January 19, 2004, Detective Michael Jackson talked to
Jeffrey Lewis, Parks’s brother, about the incident on 2600 Polk,
but Lewis did not identify himself at that time. Detective Jackson
spoke again with Lewis on January 20, 2004, and for the first
time in person on January 21, 2004. Lewis provided a written
statement. Detective Jackson spoke with Lewis several times
thereafter. Lewis knew that Parks had an AK–47 and that Parks
had obtained the rifle through Shawn Dixon. He had seen Parks
with the AK–47 and also described to Detective Jackson a .22
caliber weapon that Parks had obtained from a person named
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“Hype.” Tr. p. 975–76, 986. Lewis had also seen Jones with a .45
caliber weapon on his lap before the night of the murders.
Based on information that Lewis had provided, police officers
were instructed to go to three separate locations to conduct
surveillance on Parks, Aaron, and Jones. Search warrants were
issued that culminated in ten searches, which included the
residences of Aaron, Dixon, Parks’s father, Parks’s cousins’
home, the address where Jones allegedly resided, and Parks’s
girlfriend’s home. Police also searched the home of Jones’s
girlfriend, Teshonta Champion.
Fuller had known Parks for almost six years and had gone to a
gun store with him to purchase the AK–47. However, they were
unable to make the purchase. Instead, Dixon went to the store
and made a down payment on the weapon. Dixon purchased the
rifle for Parks, who paid Dixon the money for the gun.
The AK–47 was later fired at Brandy Parks’s house at the Oak
Knoll Apartments on New Year’s Eve. The police subsequently
found nine shell casings from a 7.62 x 39 mm weapon at the
quadruple murder scene. This caliber of ammunition is fired from
AK–47 and AK–47 copy-type firearms. It was determined that
they all had been fired from the same weapon. The police also
found eighteen 7.62 x 39 mm casings near Dixon’s house, all of
which had been fired from the same weapon. These, in turn,
were fired from same weapon that fired the nine rounds found at
the Polk Street residence. The police also found seven more 7.62
x 39 mm cartridge casings, collected from Brandy’s residence.
Those rounds were also fired by the same weapon that fired the
7.62 x 39 mm rounds at the Polk residence.
On January 26, 2004, Aaron was arrested, and Parks was
arrested the next day. On the same day, Jones entered the police
station and stated that some detectives from Gary were looking
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for him. Jones was also placed under arrest. When Aaron was
asked about the incident on Polk Street, he requested legal
counsel, and the questioning ceased. Aaron later asked to talk
with Detective Richardson, and he provided a formal written
statement on January 28, 2004. Aaron implicated himself in the
murders on two occasions and was initially charged with four
counts of murder. Aaron subsequently entered into a plea
agreement on May 6, 2004, which called for him to plead guilty
to four counts of class A felony robbery. It was an open plea,
pursuant to which Aaron would be sentenced within a range of
twenty to fifty years for each count, to be served concurrently. As
a term of the plea agreement, Aaron agreed to cooperate with the
police.
Jones v. State, No. 45A03-1111-CR-00496, 2012 WL 4048847 (Ind. Ct. App.
Sept. 14, 2012), trans. denied.
[4] The State charged Jones with four counts of felony murder. A jury trial
commenced on May 17, 2004, at the conclusion of which the jury found Jones
guilty as charged. The trial court subsequently sentenced Jones to four
consecutive terms of sixty years, for a total executed term of 240 years.
[5] On direct appeal, Jones claimed that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay
evidence and challenged the legality and propriety of his sentence. We rejected
Jones’s claims and affirmed his convictions and sentence in an unpublished
memorandum decision. Jones v. State, No. 45A03-0407-CR-339 (Ind. Ct. App.
June 30, 2005), trans. denied. Jones subsequently petitioned for post-conviction
relief, claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective. We affirmed in another
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unpublished memorandum decision. Jones v. State, No. 45A03-0711-PC-511,
2008 WL 2746486 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.
[6] Having exhausted his remedies at the state level, Jones turned to the federal
courts for relief, filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. On September 24, 2009, the
District Court entered a well-reasoned, but unpublished, opinion dismissing
Jones’s habeas petition. Jones v. Finnan, No. 2:09-cv-052-RLY-WGH (N.D. Ind.
Sept. 24, 2009). Jones appealed, arguing that the admission of certain hearsay
evidence violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. A panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding
that this court’s opinion was not simply incorrect, but amounted to an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the
United States Supreme Court. Jones v. Basinger, 635 F.3d 1030, 1044 (7th Cir.
2011).1 The Seventh Circuit panel ordered the State to release Jones if he was
not retried within 120 days of the Court’s mandate.
[7] Jones was then retried on four counts of felony murder, and a jury found him
guilty as charged. The trial court again sentenced Jones to four consecutive
sixty-year terms of incarceration for a total of 240 years. Jones appealed again
and argued: (1) that the trial court erred by permitting Lewis to testify about
1
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, a petitioner seeking habeas corpus relief
in a federal court must show, inter alia, that “his detention was the result of a state court decision (1) ‘contrary
to, or involv[ing] an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States;’ or (2) ‘based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Jones, 635 F.3d at 1040 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
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statements that were made by James Parks, Lewis’s brother; (2) that the trial
court erred in excluding evidence that Aaron implicated Jones in the killings as
retaliation for Jones’s prior testimony in an unrelated federal case against
Aaron’s friend; and (3) that the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions. We affirmed Jones’s convictions in another unpublished decision.
See Jones v. State, No. 45A03-1111-CR-496, 2012 WL 4048847 (Ind. Ct. App.
Sept. 14, 2012).
[8] Jones then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief on November 10,
2015, claiming that his trial counsel during his retrial was ineffective. The trial
court held evidentiary hearings on Jones’s petition on December 11, 2014,
February 17, 2015, April 13, 2015, and July 9, 2015. On October 21, 2016, the
post-conviction court issued detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law
denying Jones’s petition. Jones now appeals.
Post-Conviction Standard of Review
[9] Post-conviction proceedings are not “super appeals” through which convicted
persons can raise issues they failed to raise at trial or on direct appeal. McCary v.
State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 391 (Ind. 2002). Post-conviction proceedings instead
afford petitioners a limited opportunity to raise issues that were unavailable or
unknown at trial and on direct appeal. Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 443
(Ind. 2002). The post-conviction petitioner bears the burden of establishing
grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Henley v. State, 881
N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. 2008). Thus, on appeal from the denial of a petition for
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post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing
from a negative judgment. Id. To prevail on appeal from the denial of post-
conviction relief, the petitioner must show that the evidence as a whole leads
unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-
conviction court. Id. at 643–44.
[10] The post-conviction court made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law
in accordance with Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). On review, we must
determine if the court’s findings are sufficient to support its judgment. Graham
v. State, 941 N.E.2d 1091, 1096 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d on reh’g, 947 N.E.2d
962. Although we do not defer to the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions,
we review the post-conviction court’s factual findings for clear error. Id.Accordingly, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of
witnesses, and we will consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences flowing therefrom that support the post-conviction court’s decision.
Id.Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel
[11] Jones claims that his trial counsel was ineffective. Our supreme court has
summarized the law regarding claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel as
follows:
A defendant claiming a violation of the right to effective
assistance of counsel must establish the two components set forth
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, the
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.
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This requires a showing that counsel’s representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the errors were
so serious that they resulted in a denial of the right to counsel
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome.
Counsel is afforded considerable discretion in choosing strategy
and tactics, and we will accord those decisions deference. A
strong presumption arises that counsel rendered adequate
assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment. The Strickland Court
recognized that even the finest, most experienced criminal
defense attorneys may not agree on the ideal strategy or the most
effective way to represent a client. Isolated mistakes, poor
strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not
necessarily render representation ineffective. The two prongs of
the Strickland test are separate and independent inquiries. Thus,
if it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground
of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.
Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 (Ind. 2001) (citations and quotations
omitted).
[12] Here, Jones claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because of his actions or
inaction with regard to the testimony of three witnesses. We address each of
these witnesses and their testimony in turn.
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I. Janeth Alexander’s Testimony
A. Testimony Concerning Jones’s Threats
[13] Jones first claims that his trial counsel should have acted to prevent the jury
from hearing the testimony of Janeth Alexander (“Ms. Alexander”) regarding a
threat Jones allegedly made to her in 2004. During Jones’s second trial, the
defense listed Ms. Alexander as a defense witness to support Jones’s alibi
defense. The State, however, called Ms. Alexander during its case-in-chief.
During direct examination by the State, Ms. Alexander testified that in 2004
Jones called her at her place of employment. Jones testimony continued as
follows:
A. He called -- Antonio called my job.
Q. And what did he say?
A. He had me thinking that he had got released.
Q. And do you recall what he said? Was this a good call,
baby, I am coming home? What was the nature of the call?
A. No, it was a scary call to me because I was scared of him.
Q. Okay. And do you remember what he said?
A. That he no. I believe he said he was going to kill me or get
me or something like that. But I know I left work.
Q. Okay.
A. Because I thought he was out.
Trial Tr. p. 1671.
[14] At this point, Jones’s trial counsel objected to this testimony based on a lack of
specificity with regard to what Jones allegedly said and because the State had
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not given him any notice that Ms. Alexander would testify regarding a threat
made by Jones. The State responded that Ms. Alexander was listed as a defense
witness and her testimony should have been no surprise to the defense. After
hearing arguments on the matter outside the presence of the jury, the trial court
ruled, “State[,] ask the question, do you recall specifically what he said to you?
If the answer is no, that’s the end of the inquiry. If she says yes, then [it] may be
a statement by a party opponent.” Id. at 1673. Jones’s counsel then requested
that the trial court give “a limiting instruction that she [Ms. Alexander] is not
sure and the jury should disregard it [her statement as to what Jones said to
her].” Id. The trial court responded, “Well, let’s see what the next question is. I
don’t know just yet. Ask to approach again after we get that answer if you think
it is necessary.” Id at 1674.
[15] The State then questioned Ms. Alexander as follows:
Q. Miss Alexander, the phone call that you’re talking about to
your job, do you remember specifically what was said?
A. He [Jones] said something that scared me. Like he was
going to --
Id. at 1674. Jones’s trial counsel again objected, and the trial court sustained the
objection. Ms. Alexander then testified that she was scared after speaking with
Jones.
[16] Jones acknowledges that his trial counsel did object to Ms. Alexander’s
testimony regarding Jones’s threat to her over the telephone. But he claims that
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his trial counsel should also have requested an admonishment when the trial
court sustained his objection. However, our review of the trial transcript
indicates that Jones’s trial counsel did, in fact, request an admonishment.
Jones’s trial counsel requested that the trial court give the jury a “limiting
instruction” informing the jury to disregard that aspect of Ms. Alexander’s
testimony. Id. at 1673. The trial court did not give the admonishment,2 but this
cannot form the basis for a claim that Jones’s trial counsel was ineffective when
he actually did what Jones claims he should have done.3
[17] Moreover, it has long been held that evidence of threats made by the accused
against a prosecution witness can be considered as admissions of guilt and
therefore are relevant and admissible to demonstrate an accused’s guilty
knowledge. Matthews v. State, 866 N.E.2d 821, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing
Johnson v. State, 472 N.E.2d 892, 910 (Ind. 1985)), trans. denied.4 Thus, Ms.
2
Jones claims that he was entitled to an admonishment, noting the use of mandatory language in Evidence
Rule 105, which provides, “If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or for a purpose—
but not against another party or for another purpose—the court, on timely request, must restrict the evidence
to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.” (emphasis added). But this rule is applicable when the
evidence at issue is admissible for one purpose but not another. Here, however, Jones claims that the threat
evidence was inadmissible for any purpose. Therefore, Evidence Rule 105 is inapplicable.
3
A considerable portion of Jones’s argument on this issue appears to be that the trial court erred in admitting
Ms. Alexander’s threat testimony. But it appears that the trial court sustained Jones’s objection to Ms.
Alexander’s threat testimony. Regardless, Jones cannot bring a free-standing claim of evidentiary error on
post-conviction. See Sanders v. State, 765 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 2002) (in post-conviction proceedings,
complaints that something went awry at trial are generally cognizable only when they show deprivation of
the right to effective counsel or issues demonstrably unavailable at the time of trial or direct appeal);
Timberlake, 753 N.E.2d at 597 (if an issue is known and available on direct appeal but not raised on direct
appeal, it is waived; and if an issue is raised on direct appeal, but decided adversely, it is res judicata).
4
Jones’s citation to Bassett v. State, 795 N.E.2d 1050 (Ind. 2003), is unavailing. In that case, our supreme
court held that testimony regarding defendant’s prior acts of raping two other women and threatening to kill
them if they reported the rapes was inadmissible under Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b). Id. at 1052–53. The
court held that evidence of these crimes was improperly admitted to prove the defendant’s character to show
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Alexander’s testimony regarding what Jones told her over the telephone was
admissible evidence, and any attempt by Jones’s trial counsel to request an
admonishment could not have been properly granted. The same is true for
Jones’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a
mistrial after Ms. Alexander relayed the threats made by Jones. Such evidence
was admissible and there were no grounds for a mistrial. Jones’s claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to move for a mistrial or request
an admonishment are therefore without merit.
[18] Jones also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to somehow
exclude Ms. Alexander’s testimony regarding Jones’s threats on the grounds
that her testimony constituted perjury. Because Ms. Alexander did not mention
these threats in her 2004 deposition or her 2004 trial testimony, Jones claims
that her mention of them in 2011 must be false. But the fact that Jones did not
mention the threats in 2004 does not make her 2011 testimony false.
Alexander’s 2011 testimony demonstrates, at most, that her earlier testimony
was incomplete, not that her later testimony was false.
[19] Given that there is no indication that Ms. Alexander’s testimony was false,
much less knowingly false, as is required for false testimony to be perjury, we
cannot fault Jones’s trial counsel for failing to attack or somehow exclude it for
that he was more likely to have committed the crimes for which he was on trial. Id. at 1053. Here, the State
did not introduce evidence that Jones had committed a prior crime and threatened the victim of this prior
crime. There was merely a brief mention that Jones threatened Ms. Alexander, and such threats have been
held admissible. Matthews, 866 N.E.2d at 825.
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being perjury. We also therefore reject his claims that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request an admonishment and move for a mistrial based
upon the alleged falsity of Ms. Alexander’s testimony.
[20] Nor can we say that Jones’s trial counsel was ineffective for not attempting to
impeach Ms. Alexander with her prior statements, in which she did not
mention Jones’s threats. But the fact that she did not mention the threats in her
prior statement is not necessarily inconsistent with her 2011 testimony. And
Ms. Alexander was consistent in her testimony that she drove Jones to her
house on the night of the shootings and that she heard him throw something
out the car window, which splashed in the water beside the street. Counsel’s
decision not to confront Ms. Alexander with her prior statements, which were
consistent with regard to her interaction with Jones on the night of the
shooting, did not constitute ineffective assistance.
B. Testimony Regarding Jones’s Demeanor
[21] Jones contends that his trial counsel was also ineffective for failing to attack or
exclude Ms. Alexander’s testimony regarding Jones’s demeanor on the night of
the murders when she drove him to her house in her vehicle. In the 2011 trial,
Ms. Alexander testified as follows:
Q. Okay. So, he [Jones] gets in the car with you. What was
his demeanor or how was he acting once he got in the car with
you?
A. Quiet.
Q. Was that normal for hm?
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A. No.
Tr. pp. 1654–55.
[22] In her 2004 deposition, Ms. Alexander testified:
Q. When you picked [Jones] up on the evening of January
16th, 2004, how was he acting?
A. His self.
Q. He was acting himself?
A. He was acting himself.
Q. And what is that like when you say “himself?”
A. He didn’t seem like anything was wrong.
Q. So he wasn’t nervous.
A. No.
Q. Scared?
A. No.
Q. He didn’t seem agitated --
A. No.
Q. -- or anything.
A. But the next morning, that Saturday, I fixed him breakfast,
he didn’t want to eat.
PCR Exhibit Vol. 2, Petitioner’s Ex. 10, pp. 22–23.
[23] Again, we cannot say that Jones’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
attack this relatively minor inconsistency in Ms. Alexander’s testimony. And
we reject Jones’s contention that this inconsistency necessarily means that Ms.
Alexander’s testimony at the 2011 trial was false and constituted perjury.
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Therefore, Jones’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to this
testimony or request an admonishment or move for a mistrial based on this
allegedly-false testimony.
[24] Nor was Jones’s counsel ineffective for failing to attempt to impeach Ms.
Alexander’s testimony regarding Jones’s demeanor. There was, at most, a
relatively minor inconsistency in her testimony regarding Jones’s demeanor,
and trial counsel’s choice not to attack her credibility on this issue could well
have been a choice not to emphasize that her prior statements were, in relevant
part, consistent over time. Moreover, we cannot say that there was a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s decision not to impeach Ms. Alexander’s
2011 testimony on the issue of Jones’s demeanor, the result of Jones’s trial
would have been different.
[25] Accordingly, we agree with the post-conviction court that Jones’s trial counsel
was not ineffective with regard to his handling of Ms. Alexander’s testimony.
II. Lenzo Aaron’s Testimony
[26] Jones next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to or
move for a mistrial based on portions of the testimony of Lenzo Aaron
(“Aaron”). As explained above, Aaron participated in the robbery but denied
shooting anyone, and later pleaded guilty and testified on behalf of the State as
the key witness at both trials.
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A. Inconsistency in Testimony Regarding Telephone Calls
[27] In the second trial in 2011, Aaron testified that, on the night of the shootings,
Jones had two telephone conversations: one with the victim McClendon and
the other with an unknown woman. Aaron testified that he was present while
Jones spoke with the woman on the telephone for approximately fifteen
minutes. Aaron testified that he was not present when Jones spoke with
McClendon and therefore did not know when that call took place.
[28] Jones claims that this testimony is in conflict with a proffer statement Aaron
gave prior to the first trial in 2004. In that statement, Jones claims, Aaron
indicated that Jones had actually spoken to McClendon for fifteen minutes on
the telephone, not the woman. Jones argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to point out this inconsistency and object to it on the
grounds that it was perjury. Jones’s claim fails for a variety of reasons.
[29] First, Jones’s trial counsel did use this inconsistency in an attempt to impeach
Aaron’s testimony. Jones’s trial counsel confronted Aaron with his 2004
proffer, noting that it seemed to indicate that Jones was on the phone with a
man for fifteen minutes, not a woman. See Trial Tr. pp. 1287–1293. Thus, the
jury was well aware of this apparent inconsistency.
[30] Second, although Jones claims that Aaron’s 2011 testimony was necessarily
false, Jones points us to no authority that suggests that one may object to
testimony on the grounds that it is false. Indeed, it is up to the jury to decide
who is telling the truth. See Wallace v. State, 474 N.E.2d 1006, 1008 (Ind. 1985)
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(holding that State was under no duty to prevent testimony of witness who gave
testimony contradicting another witness or force the witness to admit that he
was lying, and that resolution of inconsistencies between witness’s deposition
and trial testimony which were brought out on cross-examination were for the
jury to resolve). The remedy for knowingly false testimony is a charge of
perjury, not exclusion of the evidence.
[31] Perhaps more importantly, it is not entirely clear that there was an actual
inconsistency between Jones’s 2004 statement and his testimony in 2011. In his
2004 proffer statement, Aaron was questioned as follows:
Q. At some point during this evening, while you guys were
playing cards, was there a discussion about someone
getting money?
A. At the card table?
Q. Right.
A. No.
Q. Did that happen at all that night?
A. Yes.
Q. Who was doing the talking?
A. Tone [i.e., Jones].
Q. What was he saying?
A. He said Dude called him to take him to get a dime piece,
he had all the money. And did we want to go rob him.
Q. Did you ever see Tone on the phone that night?
A. Yes.
Q. What kind of phone.
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A. A speakerphone. Nextel.
Q. It was a cell phone as opposed to a land line, is that
correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And did you ever hear him identify who he was talking to?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever identify to you who he was talking to?
A. No.
Q. How long would you say that conversation happened?
A. He was talking to him for about fifteen minutes.
Q. Were you in his presence when he was on the phone the
whole time?
A. Yes.
Q. What did he say to you when he got off the phone?
A. He didn’t say nothing to me.
Q. Where were you?
A. We was sitting, everyone in the house was laughing.
Q. Why were you guys laughing?
A. He was asking the girl if he could come over.
Q. And have sex with her?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. When did you find out about this conversation that
Dude was calling and talking of robbing -- of taking his
money came up?
A. After he was talking about how he was on the phone with
the girl and all that.
PCR Ex. Vol. 1, Petitioner’s Ex. 7, pp. 43–44 (emphases added).
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[32] Jones claims that Aaron’s statement that Jones was “talking to him for about
fifteen minutes,” necessarily means that Jones’s telephone conversation with
McClendon lasted fifteen minutes, which contradicts Aaron’s testimony at the
second trial that Jones’s conversation with the woman lasted fifteen minutes.
However, immediately after stating that Jones was talking to “him” for fifteen
minutes, Aaron stated that Jones was asking “the girl” if he could come over to
her house to have sex. Thus, it is not clear if Aaron was referring to McClendon
when he said Jones was on the phone with “him” for fifteen minutes, or if
Aaron was referring to the woman and simply used the wrong pronoun, or if
the transcriptionist misheard Aaron.5 Indeed, Aaron claimed at the second trial
that the reference to “him” had to be a misprint. Trial Tr. pp. 1292–93.
[33] Even if Jones is correct that Aaron’s 2004 statement indicated that Jones spoke
with McClendon for fifteen minutes as opposed to the woman, we cannot say
that Jones’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State’s use of
this testimony on the ground that it constituted perjury. Perjury is a crime
defined as making a false, material statement under oath or affirmation,
knowing the statement to be false or not believing it to be true, or knowingly
making two or more material statements in a proceeding before a court or grand
jury which are inconsistent to such a degree that one of them is necessarily
5
Indeed, “him” could well have been a mishearing of the pronoun “them” or “‘em,” often used as a gender-
neutral pronoun. See The Chicago Manual of Style Online, § 5.48 “Singular ‘they,’” available at:
http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/book/ed17/part2/ch05/psec048.html (“Normally, a singular
antecedent requires a singular pronoun. But because he is no longer universally accepted as a generic pronoun
referring to a person of unspecified gender, people commonly (in speech and in informal writing) substitute
the third-person-plural pronouns they, them, their, and themselves (or the nonstandard singular themself)”).
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false. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-1(a). And it has long been held that that
inconsistency alone is not enough to prove perjury. Daniels v. State, 658 N.E.2d
121, 123 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Without any suggestion that Aaron’s statement
was not only false but knowingly false, there was no basis for Jones’s trial
counsel to allege that Aaron’s testimony was perjury.6
[34] We also reject Jones’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
impeach Aaron’s testimony with the alleged inconsistency regarding the
telephone call. As noted above, Jones’s trial counsel did confront Aaron
regarding this alleged inconsistency in an attempt to impeach him. See Trial Tr.
pp. 1287–1293.
[35] Still, Jones claims that his counsel should have attempted to (further) impeach
Aaron with McClendon’s telephone records, which he claims shows that there
was no call made by McClendon to Jones and that the conversation did not last
fifteen minutes. But McClendon’s telephone records show that Jones made a
call to McClendon, not the other way around, on the night of the murders at
approximately 6:07 p.m. Jones had also telephoned McClendon three other
times that day. The salient point was not who called whom, but the content of
the call. Under these facts and circumstances, we cannot say that Jones’s trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to attempt to impeach Aaron’s testimony
further by referencing McClendon’s telephone records, which would have
6
In fact, another witness, Maurice Fuller, testified that Jones spoke with a woman on speakerphone the night
of the murder. Tr. pp. 1158–59.
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simply emphasized that Jones and McClendon had spoken several times that
day.
2. Inconsistency Regarding the Reason for the Robbery
[36] Jones also faults his trial counsel for failing to prevent Aaron from testifying at
the second trial with regard to the reason Jones gave the others for robbing
McClendon. Jones claims that in the 2004 trial, Aaron testified that Jones told
him that McClendon said he wanted Jones to get him “a 9 piece,”7 i.e., cocaine,
and that McClendon “got six G’s on him,” i.e., $6,000. PCR Exhibit Vol. 1,
Petitioner’s Ex. 8, p. 81.8 In other words, at the 2004 trial, Aaron testified that
Jones informed him that McClendon had money and was looking for cocaine.
According to Jones, Aaron testified to something different in the 2011 trial, i.e.,
that Jones informed him of an opportunity to rob McClendon of both “drugs”
and “money,” Appellant’s Br. at 34, which he claims is different than Aaron’s
2004 testimony where he indicated that Jones stated that McClendon had
money and was looking to buy drugs.
[37] Aaron’s testimony at the 2011 trial was as follows:
Q. Did [Jones] indicate to you why he was saying, “did you
want to go rob this dude”?
7
In Aaron’s 2004 proffer statement, this was transcribed as a “dime piece” instead of a “nine piece.” PCR
Exhibit Vol. 1, Petitioner’s Ex. 7, p. 42.
8
Similarly, in his 2004 proffer statement, Aaron stated that Jones said McClendon called him “to take him to
get a dime piece, he had all the money.” Id.Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1611-PC-2565 | September 28, 2017 Page 24 of 28
A. [Jones] just said he got six G’s on him and a 9-piece and he was
trying to --
Q. He said he had six G’s -- trying to buy a 9-piece?
A. Yes.
Trial Tr. p. 1199 (emphasis added).
[38] Jones argues that Aaron’s 2011 testimony was that Jones told Aaron that
McClendon had “six G’s on him” and already had a “9-piece,” and that they
went to rob McClendon of both. Jones contends that the State had to
immediately “correct” Aaron’s testimony to make it more consistent with his
2004 testimony by asking, “He said he had six G’s -- trying to buy a 9-piece.” Id.(emphasis added). But this is a rigid reading of Aaron’s 2011 testimony.
[39] Aaron’s 2011 testimony was that Jones said McClendon “got six G’s on him
and a 9-piece and he was trying to --” Id. We do not know what Aaron would
have said if not interrupted by the prosecuting attorney. But when asked by the
State if Jones said McClendon had “six G’s” and was “trying to buy a 9-piece,”
Aaron responded, “Yes.” Tr. p. 1199. Thus, Aaron’s testimony did not actually
conflict with his earlier 2004 testimony.
[40] Moreover, we agree with the State that the salient point of Aaron’s testimony
was that Jones told him McClendon had cash and asked if Aaron wanted to
help him rob McClendon. This aspect of Aaron’s testimony was consistent
between both trials. At the very least, Jones’s trial counsel was not ineffective
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for failing to somehow exclude Arron’s testimony on this point for being false
or perjury.
[41] Nor was counsel ineffective for failing to attempt to impeach Aaron’s testimony
with regard to the motive. Again, at most, there was a minor inconsistency in
Aaron’s testimony between trials. And bringing up Aaron’s prior statement
would have only emphasized that he had consistently testified that Jones told
him that McClendon had a large amount of cash and asked for Aaron’s help in
robbing McClendon.
[42] In short, we are unable to say that the post-conviction court clearly erred when
it determined that Jones’s trial counsel was not ineffective with regard to his
handling of Aaron’s testimony.
III. Maurice Fuller’s Testimony
[43] Jones also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach
the testimony of Maurice Fuller (“Fuller”), who testified that he saw Jones with
a handgun on the night of the murders. Fuller testified at the 2011 trial that
Jones lifted up his shirt and showed him the butt of a black 9 mm or .45 caliber
handgun tucked into his waistband. Trial Tr. pp. 1159–60.
[44] Jones contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not attempt
to impeach Fuller’s testimony by confronting him with his statement to the
police in 2004. In his police statement, Fuller stated that he saw in a newspaper
that a .45 caliber weapon had been used in the murders. He gave another police
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statement the same day stating that James Parks had someone purchase an AK-
47 style rifle but failed to mention that he saw Jones with a handgun. Jones
claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not impeach Fuller
with this prior “inconsistent” statement. We disagree.
[45] Fuller’s statements were not inconsistent. The failure to mention Jones’s gun to
the police is not the same as stating that Jones did not have a weapon.
Moreover, in Fuller’s other statement to the police that same day, Fuller clearly
stated that he had seen Jones with a gun at the card game the night of the
murders. See PCR Exhibits Vol. 2, Petitioner’s Ex. 14, p. 53 (“While at the
party I was in the kitchen along with Tone [i.e., Jones] and two other people
that I don’t recall, but we were joking around when Tone pulled up his shirt
and showed a gun stuck in his waist in the front . . . . I remember that so well
because it was the first time I had ever seen Tone with a gun.”). Thus, there was
no inconsistency to impeach Fuller with.
[46] To the extent that Jones’s argument is that Fuller never mentioned a .45 caliber
weapon until after he read the newspaper referring to this caliber, we again
cannot say that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to attack Fuller’s
testimony on this point.
[47] Fuller stated to the police that the weapon he saw “looked like a .45 to me,
that’s what I think it was, and I heard on the news that a .45 was used.” PCR
Exhibit Vol. 2, Petitioner’s Ex. 14, p. 56. Jones’s trial counsel testified at the
post-conviction hearing that he did not think that impeaching Fuller with his
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prior statement would have been helpful because it would have only stressed to
the jury that he saw Jones with a weapon. This strategic decision did not fall
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Accordingly, the post-conviction
court did not err in concluding that Jones’s trial counsel was not ineffective for
failing to confront Fuller with the minor differences between his testimony in
Jones’s first trial in 2004 and his second trial in 2011.
Conclusion
[48] Jones has failed to carry his heavy burden upon appeal of showing that the post-
conviction court clearly erred in determining that he was not denied the
effective assistance of trial counsel.
[49] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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