Jessica McCain v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )


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  •                                                                                  FILED
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    09/15/2017, 10:21 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this                                      CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as                                    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    precedent or cited before any court except for the
    purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
    collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Brian A. Karle                                           Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Lafayette, Indiana                                       Attorney General of Indiana
    Matthew B. Mackenzie
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Jessica McCain,                                          September 15, 2017
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    79A02-1703-CR-616
    v.                                               Appeal from the Tippecanoe
    Superior Court.
    The Honorable Randy J. Williams,
    State of Indiana,                                        Judge.
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Trial Court Case Number
    79D01-1606-F1-8
    Friedlander, Senior Judge
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1703-CR-606 | September 15, 2017             Page 1 of 9
    1
    [1]   After pleading guilty to one count of Level 1 felony child molesting, Jessica
    McCain appeals from the trial court’s sentencing order, contending that her
    forty-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
    character of the offender. We reverse and remand with instructions.
    [2]   On May 28, 2016, twenty-three-year-old McCain was at an apartment in
    Lafayette, Indiana, with the one-year-old victim. McCain was giving the victim
    a bath. McCain admitted that she intentionally placed her mouth on the
    victim’s penis while videotaping the incident on a borrowed cellphone. She had
    planned to send the video to her boyfriend. McCain also stated that she was
    aware that the victim was less than twelve years old.
    [3]   The State charged McCain with multiple offenses for this incident. McCain
    agreed to plead guilty to the most serious charge, Level 1 felony child
    molesting. Under the terms of the plea agreement, McCain’s sentence was left
    open to argument and the discretion of the trial court.
    [4]   After hearing the arguments of counsel and reviewing the pre-sentence
    investigation report, the trial court imposed a forty-year sentence with thirty-
    eight years executed and two years suspended to probation. McCain now
    appeals.
    1
    Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1) (2015).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1703-CR-606 | September 15, 2017   Page 2 of 9
    [5]   McCain contends that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the
    offense and the character of the offender, seeking review under Indiana
    Appellate Rule 7(B).
    [6]   Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we may revise a sentence authorized
    by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, we determine
    that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the
    character of the offender. Thompson v. State, 
    5 N.E.3d 383
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
    When a defendant requests appellate review and revision of his sentence, we
    have the power to affirm or reduce the sentence. Akard v. State, 
    937 N.E.2d 811
    Ind. 2010). In conducting our review, we may consider all aspects of the penal
    consequences imposed by the trial court in sentencing, i.e., whether it consists
    of executed time, probation, suspension, home detention, or placement in
    community corrections, and whether the sentences are ordered to run
    concurrently or consecutively. Davidson v. State, 
    926 N.E.2d 1023
    (Ind. 2010).
    [7]   We do not look to see whether the defendant’s sentence is appropriate or if
    another sentence might be more appropriate; rather, the test is whether
    the sentence is “inappropriate.” Fonner v. State, 
    876 N.E.2d 340
    , 344 (Ind. Ct.
    App. 2007). A defendant bears the burden of persuading this Court that
    his sentence meets the inappropriateness standard, Anglemyer v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 
    875 N.E.2d 218
    , and he must do so
    under both parts of the test. Childress v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    (Ind. 2006). Our
    resolution of whether a sentence is appropriate turns on myriad factors which
    come to light in a given case, including our sense of the culpability of the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1703-CR-606 | September 15, 2017   Page 3 of 9
    defendant, the severity of the crime, and the damage done to others. Cardwell v.
    State, 
    895 N.E.2d 1219
    (Ind. 2008).
    [8]    To assess whether the sentence is inappropriate, we look first to the statutory
    range established for the class of the offense. McCain pleaded guilty to one
    count of Level 1 felony child molesting for which the sentencing range is a fixed
    term of between twenty and fifty years, with the advisory sentence being thirty
    years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4 (2014).
    [9]    The advisory sentence is the starting point to determine the appropriateness of
    the sentence. Holloway v. State, 
    950 N.E.2d 803
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). A factor
    appellate courts consider when determining the appropriateness of a deviation
    from the advisory sentence is whether there is anything more or less egregious
    about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the
    “typical” offense contemplated by the legislature when setting the advisory
    sentence. Johnson v. State, 
    986 N.E.2d 852
    , 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
    [10]   We then look at the nature of the offense. Both parties acknowledge as we do
    the deplorable nature of McCain’s offense. McCain, the twenty-three-year-old
    mother of the one-year-old victim, placed her mouth on his penis while bathing
    him and admitted to being sexually aroused while doing so. She did so after
    having an oral sexual encounter with her boyfriend and a sexual conversation
    via text messages with him after he left. Additionally, at her boyfriend’s urging
    through those text messages, she recorded the incident on a borrowed cellphone
    with the intent of sending the recording to him.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1703-CR-606 | September 15, 2017   Page 4 of 9
    [11]   Also relevant to our review is that McCain’s offense was a solitary occurrence
    carried out at the urging of her boyfriend, but for which she readily accepted
    responsibility in carrying out. Although the victim will, at some point, learn of
    his mother’s victimization of him, unlike most victims of child molesting, he is
    too young now to understand what happened to him and will likely not have a
    memory of the event.
    [12]   Next, we look at the character of the offender. In this case, the record reflects
    that McCain has no criminal history or history of the use of illegal substances.
    She also has a history of employment. Further, McCain accepted responsibility
    for her actions by pleading guilty to the highest-level felony with which she was
    charged and left the issue of sentencing open to argument and the trial court’s
    discretion. She admitted her crime to law enforcement when she was first
    confronted and interviewed. The trial court acknowledged that the first time
    she was in court she wished to plead guilty.
    [13]   McCain clearly committed her crime against a child under her care, custody,
    and control, and who was significantly under the age provided for by statute.
    Her victimization of her young son in an effort to please her boyfriend clearly is
    deplorable. We conclude, nonetheless, that under these circumstances a
    sentence above the advisory sentence of thirty years is inappropriate under these
    circumstances.
    [14]   We remand this matter to the trial court for the purpose of imposing a thirty-
    year advisory sentence.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1703-CR-606 | September 15, 2017   Page 5 of 9
    [15]   Judgment reversed and remanded with instructions.
    Najam, J., concurs.
    Mathias, J., concurs with separate opinion.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1703-CR-606 | September 15, 2017   Page 6 of 9
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Jessica McCain,                                          Court of Appeals Case No.
    79A02-1703-CR-616
    Appellant-Defendant,
    v.
    State of Indiana,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.
    Mathias, Judge, concurring.
    [16]   As a judge on the Court of Appeals of Indiana for the past seventeen years, I
    find it to be an extremely difficult decision to reduce the sentence of a
    convicted child molester, yet under the unique facts and circumstances of this
    case, I reluctantly join my colleagues in doing so. Therefore, I concur with
    Senior Judge Friedlander’s opinion and its conclusion that McCain’s maximum
    forty-year sentence is inappropriately harsh in light of the nature of the offense
    and the character of the offender. I write separately to emphasize the
    importance of the advisory sentence set forth by our General Assembly when
    considering cases such as the present one.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1703-CR-606 | September 15, 2017   Page 7 of 9
    [17]   Our supreme court has repeatedly held that the advisory sentence is the starting
    point when determining the appropriateness of a sentence. See, e.g., Anglemeyer
    v. State, 
    868 N.E.2d 482
    , 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g, 
    875 N.E.2d 218
    (citing Childress v. State, 
    848 N.E.2d 1073
    , 1081 (Ind. 2006)). Thus, all things
    being equal, a person convicted of any level of felony should receive the
    advisory sentence.
    [18]   Moreover, it has long been held that the maximum possible sentences are
    generally most appropriate for the worst offenders and offenses. Payton v. State,
    
    818 N.E.2d 493
    , 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (Mathias, J., concurring in part and
    dissenting in part) (citing Buchanan v. State, 
    767 N.E.2d 967
    , 973 (Ind. 2002)),
    trans. denied.
    [19]   It is clear here that McCain’s offense is deplorable, and indeed, I personally find
    it to be unthinkable. So are most cases of Level 1 felony child molestation,
    which is precisely why our General Assembly has set the advisory sentence at
    thirty years. But McCain, who has no prior criminal history of any kind, and for
    whom this was a single and immediately regretted incident, is not among the worst
    offenders.2 In addition, the sentencing court found several mitigators, including
    McCain’s immediate acceptance of responsibility and desire to plead guilty.
    2
    However, a first crime can warrant the maximum sentence when it involves multiple incidents of brutal
    behavior. See, e.g., Heinzman v. State, 
    970 N.E.2d 214
    , 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that defendant’s
    maximum sentence on three counts of child molesting was not inappropriate given the heinous circumstances
    of the crimes even though defendant did not have any prior criminal history at the time he committed his
    crimes), trans. granted, aff’d in relevant part, 
    979 N.E.2d 143
    (Ind. 2012); Booker v. State, 
    790 N.E.2d 491
    , 496
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that, even though defendant had no criminal history, imposition of maximum
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1703-CR-606 | September 15, 2017             Page 8 of 9
    [20]   Accordingly, I concur in Judge Friedlander’s conclusion that McCain’s
    maximum forty-year sentence is inappropriate and should be revised to the
    advisory sentence of thirty years.
    sentence on each count was not inappropriate given the heinous circumstances of the offenses), trans. denied;
    see also Grimes v. State, No. 31A01-1609-CR-2190, ___ N.E.2d ___ (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (affirming defendant’s
    111-year sentence despite his lack of criminal history).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 79A02-1703-CR-606 | September 15, 2017          Page 9 of 9