J.G. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                         FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be
    Jan 18 2018, 10:06 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                   CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                       Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Deborah Markisohn                                        Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Marion County Public Defender Agency                     Attorney General of Indiana
    Appellate Division
    Indianapolis, Indiana                                    J.T. Whitehead
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    J.G.,                                                    January 18, 2018
    Appellant-Respondent,                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
    49A02-1709-JV-2004
    v.                                               Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Marilyn A.
    Appellee-Petitioner.                                     Moores, Judge
    The Honorable Scott B. Stowers,
    Magistrate
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49D09-1703-JD-410
    Bradford, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-JV-2004 | January 18, 2018            Page 1 of 5
    Case Summary
    [1]   On July 12, 2017, following a fact-finding hearing, Appellant-Respondent J.G.
    was found to be a delinquent child for committing what would be Class A
    misdemeanor theft if committed by an adult. On appeal, J.G. contends that the
    juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence during the
    fact-finding hearing. Because any error the juvenile court committed could only
    have been harmless, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   On February 28, 2017, Rodney Snider was looking to purchase a PlayStation 3
    gaming console for his son. Using a service called OfferUp,1 Snider agreed to
    purchase a PlayStation 3 from J.G. for $40.00. When he arrived at the agreed
    upon location, Snider observed that J.G. had a “PlayStation 3 box sitting right
    next to him.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 17. Snider approached J.G. and gave him $40.00.
    J.G. took the money but did not give Snider the PlayStation 3 in return.
    Instead, J.G. walked away from Snider taking both the $40.00 and the box
    purportedly containing the PlayStation 3 with him. Snider subsequently
    1
    OfferUp is a mobile marketplace in the United States. See https://offerup.com/about/ (last visited
    January 8, 2018). It allows users to list items for sale, browse local listings of items for sale, and purchase
    items by using a program which can be downloaded onto their mobile phones. See
    https://offerup.com/howitworks/ (last visited January 8, 2018).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-JV-2004 | January 18, 2018                Page 2 of 5
    identified J.G. as the individual who had taken his money without giving him
    the PlayStation 3 in return.
    [3]   On March 20, 2017, Appellee-Petitioner the State of Indiana (“the State”) filed
    a delinquency petition alleging that J.G. committed what would have been
    Class A misdemeanor theft if committed by an adult. The juvenile court
    conducted a fact-finding hearing on June 30, 2017. At the conclusion of the
    fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court took the matter under advisement. On
    July 12, 2017, the juvenile court found J.G. to be a delinquent child for
    committing what would have been Class A misdemeanor theft if committed by
    an adult. Following an August 4, 2017 disposition hearing, the juvenile court
    discharged J.G. and closed the case. This appeal follows.
    Discussion and Decision
    [4]   In challenging the juvenile court’s finding that he is a delinquent child, J.G.
    contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting certain
    evidence during the fact-finding hearing. The juvenile court “has broad
    discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence.” Houston v. State, 
    957 N.E.2d 654
    , 657 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Edwards v. State, 
    930 N.E.2d 48
    , 50
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied). We will reverse such a ruling only when the
    juvenile court abuses its discretion. 
    Id.
     (citing Edwards, 
    930 N.E.2d at 50
    ). “An
    abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of
    the facts and circumstances before the [juvenile] court.” 
    Id.
     (citing Boggs v.
    State, 
    928 N.E.2d 855
    , 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-JV-2004 | January 18, 2018   Page 3 of 5
    [5]   J.G. argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in admitting State’s
    Exhibit D into evidence to prove his identity because it contained inadmissible
    hearsay. Exhibit D is made up of 156 pages of records connected to the
    OfferUp account used by J.G. when advertising the PlayStation 3 for sale.
    Hearsay is a “statement that: (1) is not made by the declarant while testifying at
    the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
    matter asserted.” Ind. Evidence Rule 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible unless
    it falls within one of the exceptions provided by in the evidence rules. Ind.
    Evid. R. 802.
    [6]   However, we need not determine whether State’s Exhibit D contained
    inadmissible hearsay because even if it did, the admission of this exhibit was
    harmless. “The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the
    reviewing court is satisfied that the conviction is supported by substantial
    independent evidence of guilt so that there is no substantial likelihood that the
    challenged evidence contributed to the conviction.” Meadows v. State, 
    785 N.E.2d 1112
    , 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In this case, the State provided
    substantial independent evidence of J.G.’s guilt. Snider testified during the fact-
    finding hearing that, using OfferUp, he agreed to purchase a PlayStation 3 from
    J.G. for $40.00. When he arrived at the agreed-upon location, Snider gave J.G.
    $40.00. J.G. took the money but did not give him the PlayStation in return.
    Snider subsequently identified J.G. as the individual who had taken his money.
    Given Snider’s testimony and identification of J.G., we conclude that even if
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-JV-2004 | January 18, 2018   Page 4 of 5
    the juvenile court erroneously admitted State’s Exhibit D, such error was
    harmless.
    [7]   The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.
    Robb, J., and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1709-JV-2004 | January 18, 2018   Page 5 of 5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 49A02-1709-JV-2004

Filed Date: 1/18/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/18/2018