Com. v. Seals, D. Appeal of: Jones, S. ( 2016 )


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  • J-A31016-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    DANTE OMAR SEALS
    No. 1563 MDA 2014
    APPEAL OF: SYLVESTER CASEY JONES,
    BAIL BONDSMAN
    Appeal from the Orders Entered August 20, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0003928-2013
    CP-36-CR-0004577-2013
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    DANTE OMAR SEALS
    No. 2113 MDA 2014
    APPEAL OF: SYLVESTER CASEY JONES,
    BAIL BONDSMAN
    Appeal from the Orders Entered November 21, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-36-CR-0003928-2013
    CP-36-CR-0004577-2013
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.                            FILED MARCH 18, 2016
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A31016-15
    In these consolidated appeals, Appellant, Sylvester Casey Jones, bail
    bondsman, appeals from the orders entered August 20, 2014 by the
    Honorable Margaret C. Miller, Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
    which reset Donte Omar Seals’ (Defendant’s) bail. Appellant also appeals
    from the orders entered November 21, 2014, by the Honorable Dennis E.
    Reinaker, Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, which denied
    Appellant’s petition to set aside or remit forfeiture of Defendant's bail and
    exonerate as surety. After review, we dismiss as moot the appeal from the
    August 20 orders at docket number 1563 MDA 2014. In the appeal docketed
    at 2113 MDA 2014, we reverse the trial court’s orders of November 21 and
    remand for further proceedings.
    Appellant posted bail for Defendant in the amount of $110,000 for
    charges docketed at CP-36-0004577-2013 and CP-36-000-3928-2013. On
    August 4, 2014, Defendant failed to appear for a hearing. The trial court
    issued a bench warrant, and Defendant was apprehended on August 19,
    2014. At a bench warrant hearing held on August 20, 2014, at which a
    representative of Appellant was present, but allegedly did not have an
    opportunity to speak, the trial court reset Defendant’s bail at $1,000,000 at
    both docket numbers, but did not set aside the bail forfeiture previously
    posted by Appellant. See Order, 8/20/14. On September 12, 2014,
    Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the August 20 orders, which
    the trial court denied. Appellant filed a timely appeal.
    -2-
    J-A31016-15
    Subsequent thereto, on October 21, 2014, Appellant filed with the
    court motions for exoneration and credit of surety at CP-36-0004577-2013
    and CP-36-000-3928-2013. On November 21, 2014, the trial court denied
    the Appellant’s motions and Appellant thereafter filed a timely appeal. On
    December 23, 2014, Appellant filed an application for consolidation of the
    appeals filed at 1563 MDA 2014 and 2113 MDA 2014, which this Court
    granted.
    On appeal, Appellant argues, inter alia, that both the Honorable Dennis
    Reinaker and the Honorable Margaret C. Miller erred in denying the request
    for exoneration of bail forfeiture without a hearing. See Appellant’s Brief at
    6. We will first address the propriety of Judge Reinaker’s November 21
    orders denying Appellant’s motions for exoneration and credit of surety
    without a hearing.     We review that decision pursuant to the following
    standard.
    The decision to allow or deny a remission of bail forfeiture lies
    within the sound discretion of the trial court. Accordingly, our
    review is limited to a determination of whether the court abused
    its discretion in refusing to vacate the underlying forfeiture
    order. To establish such an abuse, the aggrieved party must
    show that the court misapplied the law, exercised manifestly
    unreasonable judgment, or acted on the basis of bias, partiality,
    or ill-will to that party’s detriment. If a trial court erred in its
    application of the law, an appellate court will correct the error.
    Our scope of review on questions of law is plenary.
    Commonwealth v. Riley, 
    946 A.2d 696
    , 698 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
    omitted).
    -3-
    J-A31016-15
    In Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 
    827 A.2d 462
     (Pa. Super. 2003),
    this Court adopted a three-part test a trial court must utilize to determine
    whether forfeiture is required in light of a request for set-aside or remission:
    When a defendant breaches a bail bond, without a justifiable
    excuse, and the government is prejudiced in any manner, the
    forfeiture should be enforced unless justice requires otherwise.
    When considering whether or not justice requires the
    enforcement of a forfeiture, a court must look at several factors,
    including: 1) the willfulness of the defendant's breach of the
    bond, 2) the cost, inconvenience and prejudice suffered by the
    government, and 3) any explanation or mitigating factors.
    
    Id.
     at 468 (citing United States v. Ciotti, 
    579 F.Supp. 276
    , 278 (W.D. Pa.
    1984)). “A hearing is required on a bail bondsman’s request for remission of
    forfeited money.” Commonwealth v. Nolan, 
    432 A.2d 616
    , 618 (Pa.
    Super. 1981) (citation omitted; emphasis added).
    Such a hearing is necessary in this case so that the court may
    have before it evidence of the extent of the appellant’s
    participation in the return of the defendants, ..., and any other
    relevant evidence appellant may produce which may properly
    guide the lower court in its future decision as to whether to
    return any portion of the forfeited bonds herein involved.
    
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    Instantly, there is no indication on the record that the trial court
    conducted a hearing on the motions to exonerate surety. In light of the clear
    pronouncement in Nolan requiring a hearing on a request for remission of
    forfeited bond money, we are constrained to reverse the trial court’s orders
    denying Appellant’s motions to exonerate surety and remand for a hearing
    -4-
    J-A31016-15
    on the cost incurred by the Commonwealth in apprehending Defendant and
    the amount of remission, if any, warranted in this matter.
    Based on our disposition of the appeal docketed at 2113 MDA 2014,
    we dismiss Appellant’s appeal from the orders entered August 20 as moot.
    Appellant did not file motions for exoneration and credit of surety at any
    time prior to the trial court’s August 20 orders resetting Defendant’s bail.
    Although Appellant maintains that the trial court failed to address the issue
    of forfeiture of the bail bond previously posted, Judge Miller correctly noted
    in the September 17, 2014 opinion denying Appellant’s motion for
    reconsideration that Appellant was first required to file the appropriate
    exoneration request in a petition or motion before the court could address
    that claim. He did not do so at that time and the court prudently declined to
    address a claim not properly before it.1 Nonetheless, because we have
    reversed the court’s November 21 orders denying Appellant’s subsequent
    motions for exoneration and credit of surety without a hearing, we find our
    disposition at docket number 2113 MDA 2014 effectively moots Appellant’s
    appeal of the orders entered August 20.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Although the transcript of the bench warrant hearing reveals that Judge
    Miller expressed the opinion that the surety had not made any effort for the
    return of the defendant and that bail would remain forfeited, that decision is
    not addressed in the court’s August 20 orders. See N.T., Bench Warrant
    Hearing, 8/20/14 at 3-4 (unnumbered). More importantly, the court had not
    yet conducted a hearing on the matter prior to stating its conclusion as
    required by the decision in Nolan. Thus, the trial court’s opinion expressed
    at the bench warrant hearing is merely dictum.
    -5-
    J-A31016-15
    Appeal at docket number 1563 MDA 2014 dismissed as moot. Orders
    entered November 21, 2014 at docket number 2113 MDA 2014 reversed.
    Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/18/2016
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1563 MDA 2014

Filed Date: 3/18/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/18/2016