Vincent P. Wells, Sr. v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Mar 06 2018, 9:32 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Anthony S. Churchward Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Lee M. Stoy, Jr.
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Vincent P. Wells, Sr., March 6, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
02A04-1709-CR-2126
v. Appeal from the Allen Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Frances C. Gull,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
02D05-1705-F5-118
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1709-CR-2126 | March 6, 2018 Page 1 of 10
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Vincent P. Wells, Sr. (Wells), appeals his sentence
following his conviction for domestic battery, a Level 5 felony, Ind. Code § 35-
42-2-1.3(c).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Wells raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as: Whether Wells’ sentence
is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] Wells and Ladonna Hinton (Hinton) have been married since September 21,
2013. Wells and Hinton have one child together, B.H. Wells also has several
adult children from prior relationships, including Kayasha Wells (Kayasha).
[5] In approximately January of 2017, Wells and Hinton, along with five-year-old
B.H., moved into Kayasha’s apartment in Fort Wayne, Allen County, Indiana.
Sometime in March of 2017, Kayasha and her pastor, Cynthia Bennett (Pastor
Bennett), traveled to Arkansas for “a revival.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 127). Wells
offered to care for Kayasha’s three children, ages nine, six, and five, and Pastor
Bennett’s three grandchildren, ages three, two and one, during their absence.
[6] On March 17, 2017, at 6:30 a.m., Hinton awoke to the sound of Wells “yelling
and shouting throughout the house,” followed by him hitting her on the “lower
back and legs” with his belt. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 27). Hinton subsequently got out
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1709-CR-2126 | March 6, 2018 Page 2 of 10
of bed, readied B.H. for preschool, and walked with B.H. to the bus stop. A
short time later, Kayasha’s children walked themselves to their bus stop. Pastor
Bennett’s grandchildren remained inside the apartment, sleeping or playing in
their bedrooms.
[7] When Hinton returned to the apartment, she informed Wells that she had a
meeting at B.H.’s school at 11:00 a.m.; however, Wells told her “no . . . that
[she] had to stay and watch [Pastor Bennett’s grandchildren because] there’s
nobody to watch them.” (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 30-31). Wells purportedly had plans
that morning to repair someone’s vehicle, but Hinton was suspicious that Wells
was actually engaging in extramarital activity with another female.
Furthermore, Hinton had no interest in babysitting Pastor Bennett’s
grandchildren. Thus, a shouting match ensued, which escalated to a “tussle”
consisting of them “pushing each other back and forth.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 32).
Hinton ripped Wells’ shirt, and he pushed her so that she “fell back onto the
couch,” at which time Wells had “one hand [grabbing Hinton’s hair] and the
other hand, he [used to] hit[] [Hinton] upside [her] head.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 32).
By then, Hinton “was doing everything that [she] could to get away from
[Wells].” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 32). Wells eventually stopped hitting, but the arguing
persisted. Hinton began “calling him names,” including telling “him he was the
devil.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 36). Then, when Hinton said, “Shut up, you child
molester,” Wells responded by punching her in the nose. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 36).
Blood immediately began “dripping,” and Hinton was crying and shaking and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1709-CR-2126 | March 6, 2018 Page 3 of 10
“couldn’t breathe.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 37). She asked Wells to get a towel before
she “just blacked out.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 37).
[8] After Hinton “came to,” she began packing up her belongings, and those of
B.H., with the intention of leaving. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 37). However, after
gathering her bags, Wells stood in front of the door to block her. Wells called
Pastor Bennett, who convinced Wells to allow Hinton to leave. As Hinton
walked away from the building, she called the police.
[9] On May 2, 2017, the State filed an Information, charging Wells with Count I,
domestic battery resulting in serious bodily injury, a Level 5 felony, I.C. § 35-
42-2-1.3(c); Count II, domestic battery in the presence of a child under sixteen
years of age, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(b); and Count III, criminal
confinement, a Level 6 felony, I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a). On May 5, 2017, the trial
court issued a no-contact order against Wells, prohibiting him from contacting
Hinton “in person, by telephone or letter, through an intermediary, or in any
other way, directly or indirectly . . . while released from custody pending trial.
This includes, but is not limited to, acts of harassment, stalking, intimidation,
threats, and physical force of any kind.” (Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II, p.
23). On May 24, 2017, the State filed notice of its intent to seek a habitual
offender sentencing enhancement based on Wells’ prior felony convictions.
[10] On July 25 and 26, 2017, the trial court conducted a bifurcated jury trial.
Despite Wells’ claim of self-defense, at the close of the evidence, the jury
returned a guilty verdict as to Counts I and II, the domestic battery charges.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1709-CR-2126 | March 6, 2018 Page 4 of 10
The jury found Wells not guilty of Count III, criminal confinement. Thereafter,
additional evidence was presented, and the jury found Wells to be a habitual
offender. The trial court entered judgments of conviction and acquittal in
accordance with the verdict. On August 22, 2017, the trial court held a
sentencing hearing. The trial court merged Count II into Count I and imposed
a six-year sentence for domestic battery as a Level 5 felony. The trial court then
added a six-year habitual offender enhancement, resulting in an aggregate, fully
executed sentence of twelve years.
[11] Wells now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[12] Wells claims that his twelve-year sentence is inappropriate. Pursuant to
Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), our court may revise a sentence that is otherwise
authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court’s decision,
[we] find[] that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.” “‘[S]entencing is principally a discretionary
function in which the trial court’s judgment should receive considerable
deference.’” Parks v. State, 22 N.E.3d 552, 555 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Cardwell v.
State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)).
[13] Appellate Rule 7(B) provides for sentence review in an “attempt to leaven the
outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged
with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived
‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1225. “[W]hether we
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1709-CR-2126 | March 6, 2018 Page 5 of 10
regard a sentence as appropriate at the end of the day turns on our sense of the
culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to
others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.
Our court focuses on “the length of the aggregate sentence and how it is to be
served.” Id. Wells bears the burden of persuading this court that his sentence is
inappropriate. Corbally v. State, 5 N.E.3d 463, 471 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
[14] With respect to the nature of the offense, “the advisory sentence is the starting
point [that] our legislature has selected as [an] appropriate sentence for the
crime committed.” Richardson v. State, 906 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Ind. Ct. App.
2009). In this case, Wells was convicted of Level 5 felony domestic battery
resulting in serious bodily injury, which is punishable by “a fixed term of
between one (1) and six (6) years, with the advisory sentence being three (3)
years.” I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). In addition, Wells was found to be a habitual
offender, which allows the trial court to impose “an additional fixed term that is
between . . . two (2) years and six (6) years[] for a person convicted of a Level 5
. . . felony.” I.C. § 35-50-2-8(i)(2). Thus, the trial court imposed the maximum
sentence allowed by the law—i.e., twelve years.
[15] The evidence establishes that Wells battered his wife, who is also the mother of
his child. He grabbed her by the hair while he repeatedly hit her in the head,
and in response to her name-calling, he punched her in the nose and caused her
to lose consciousness. Wells now argues that “the nature and circumstances of
this offense cannot be considered the absolute worst, and are simply the acts
necessary to commit the crimes with which . . . Wells was charged and
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1709-CR-2126 | March 6, 2018 Page 6 of 10
convicted.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 16). Thus, he insists that the maximum
sentence is inappropriate, as it “should generally be reserved for the worst
offenses and offenders.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 16).
[16] Our supreme court has observed that “the maximum possible sentences are
generally most appropriate for the worst offenders.” Buchanan v. State, 767
N.E.2d 967, 973 (Ind. 2002). “This is not, however, a guideline to determine
whether a worse offender could be imagined. Despite the nature of any
particular offense and offender, it will always be possible to identify or
hypothesize a significantly more despicable scenario.” Id. Thus, “we refer
generally to the class of offenses and offenders that warrant the maximum
punishment. But such class encompasses a considerable variety of offenses and
offenders.” Id.
[17] Notwithstanding whether Wells’ conduct was more or less heinous than other
domestic abusers, we find that a review of his character warrants the sentence
imposed by the trial court. We first consider that he has amassed, as described
by the trial court, an “astonishing criminal record,” dating back to 1970. (Tr.
Vol. II, p. 244). As a minor, Wells incurred four delinquency adjudications,
two of which would have been felonies if committed by an adult (arson and
burglary). As an adult, Wells accumulated sixteen misdemeanor convictions
(for crimes that include battery, resisting law enforcement, disorderly conduct,
criminal conversion, operating while suspended, visiting a common nuisance,
criminal trespass, and possession of paraphernalia) and seventeen felony
convictions (for crimes that include burglary, theft, dealing in cocaine,
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1709-CR-2126 | March 6, 2018 Page 7 of 10
possession of cocaine, and failure to return to lawful detention). At the time of
the present offense, Wells was on parole.
[18] Wells acknowledges his lengthy criminal history but attempts to minimize its
significance by arguing that “many of his felony convictions were the result of
multiple [t]heft charges for which he was sentenced at the same time.”
(Appellant’s Br. p. 15). Wells also argues that “the vast majority of [his prior
convictions] amounted to non-violent property, driving or drug related crimes.”
(Appellant’s Br. pp. 15-16). We first note that the fact that sentencing
proceedings may have been combined does not negate the fact that Wells has
been convicted of eleven separate instances of felony theft. Furthermore, when
this court examines a criminal history as part of Appellate Rule 7(B) review, we
consider not just the severity of past and present crimes, but also, importantly,
whether the defendant’s past encounters with the criminal justice system have
served to rehabilitate him and deter future criminal conduct. See, e.g., Atwood v.
State, 905 N.E.2d 479, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.
[19] As the trial court described, Wells has “been given short jail sentences, longer
jail sentences, short terms of probation[,] longer terms of probation, short terms
in the Department of Correction, and longer terms in the Department of
Correction. [He has] been give[n] the benefit of parole, Community Control
Program, the Re-Entry Court Program, Criminal Division Services, and
substance abuse treatment.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 245). He has had “one suspended
sentence modified, one felony sentence modified, . . . [his] probation modified
once and revoked once, and . . . parole revoked once. Nothing has worked.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1709-CR-2126 | March 6, 2018 Page 8 of 10
(Tr. Vol. II, p. 245). In fact, Wells has previously been convicted of battery, but
the consequences of that conviction failed to dissuade Wells from committing
the instant offense. Simply, Wells has refused to lead a law-abiding life.
[20] Further reflective of his poor character and perpetual refusal to abide by the
court’s authority is that, while incarcerated, Wells—despite the no-contact
order—called Hinton. In at least one phone call, he repeatedly instructed
Hinton to contact the prosecutor and declare that she had decided not to
“press[] any charges.” (State’s Exh. 17). Wells had been informed of his
pending felony charges and realized that he was going to “miss out on
everything.” (State’s Exh. 17). Wells thus directed Hinton to inform the
prosecutor that “it was fake” and that she “made it up” so that the State could
not take the matter to trial. (State’s Exh. 17). Attempts to interfere with the
criminal justice process and to bully victims of domestic violence are not well-
taken by this court.
[21] We are also unpersuaded by Wells’ request to consider his “mental health
issues” as a reason for reducing his sentence because he has failed to
demonstrate a nexus between the crime committed and his self-reported
diagnoses of “depression, generalized anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder
and paranoid schizophrenia.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 16); see, e.g., Steinberg v. State,
941 N.E.2d 515, 534-35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. The record
establishes that Wells has repeatedly failed to take advantage of the court’s past
leniency and reform his criminal mindset. Wells is the very definition of a
habitual offender, and his sentence is not inappropriate.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1709-CR-2126 | March 6, 2018 Page 9 of 10
CONCLUSION
[22] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Wells’ twelve-year sentence is not
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.
[23] Affirmed.
[24] Baker, J. and Brown, J. concur
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1709-CR-2126 | March 6, 2018 Page 10 of 10