Mitchell Carroll v. State of Indiana , 54 N.E.3d 1081 ( 2016 )

FILED
May 19 2016, 9:01 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David M. Payne Gregory F. Zoeller
Ryan & Payne Attorney General of Indiana
Marion, Indiana
Frances Barrow
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Mitchell Carroll, May 19, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
27A02-1510-MI-1743
v. Appeal from the Grant Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Dana J.
Appellee-Plaintiff Kenworthy, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
27D02-1507-MI-93
Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary
[1] Mitchell Carroll (“Carroll”) was charged with a number of offenses in the Grant
Superior Court. In response to Carroll’s behavior during hearings conducted
both by video conference and with Carroll physically present in the courtroom,
the trial court found Carroll to be in direct contempt of court and, as a result,
ordered Carroll incarcerated for ninety days. Carroll appeals.
[2] We affirm.
Issues
[3] Carroll raises two issues for our review. We restate these as:
I. Whether, because Carroll’s conduct occurred while he was
not physically present in the courtroom, a contempt
citation is barred under Indiana law; and
II. Whether the trial court erred when it concluded that
Carroll’s conduct on two occasions was contumacious.
Facts and Procedural History
[4] Carroll was arrested and charged in the Grant Superior Court with several
criminal offenses. The trial court conducted an initial hearing in Carroll’s case
on July 7, 2015. Carroll was not transported to the courtroom for this hearing.
Instead, Carroll (along with numerous other defendants that day) participated
in the hearing by means of a video conferencing system connecting the Grant
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County Jail with the courtroom. Carroll was represented by a public defender
at the hearing.
[5] During the initial hearing, Carroll answered the trial court’s questions
concerning his name and age. From that point, Carroll ceased cooperating with
the court, instead cutting across the trial court’s questions on numerous
occasions. Rather than responding to the trial court’s questions, Carroll stated
that the charges against him were “trumped up” (App’x at 6), used profanity,
and interrupted the court to say, “You all racist. I don’t want to hear it.”
(App’x at 7.)
[6] In response to Carroll’s conduct, the trial court told Carroll, “One more time
and I will hold you in contempt of court. Do you understand[?]” (App’x at 7.)
While the court was explaining the importance of a correct mailing address in
the event Carroll posted bond, Carroll cut across the court’s explanation and
stated his address. The court stated, “You just interrupted me again,” and
asked Carroll whether the address he provided was in Grant County. (App’x at
7.) Rather than respond to the court’s question, Carroll intimated that he
wanted to make a statement to the court. The court then stated, “We are done
with this hearing… What I am going to do is give you an opportunity to calm
down. If you act this way next time, you will be incarcerated for contempt.”
(App’x at 8.)
[7] Throughout this session, the trial court noted that Carroll “was clearly angry,
speaking in an irritated and disrespectful tone,” and “was slouched forward in
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his chair, with his hair covering his face.” (App’x at 3.) While the trial court
was still talking to him, the court noted, Carroll “got up and walked out of view
of the video, toward the exit door of the video room.” (App’x at 3.) As a result
of Carroll’s conduct, the trial court continued the initial hearing to the following
day, July 8, 2015.
[8] During the continued hearing, the trial court informed Carroll of the charges
against him and of the existence of a no-contact order as to his alleged victim.
The court asked Carroll whether he understood the charges against him and the
no-contact order, and Carroll stated he understood these matters. The trial
court also confirmed Carroll’s address. The trial court then asked Carroll why
the court should not hold him in contempt for his conduct the prior day. After
listening to Carroll’s statements that he had never been in trouble before, the
trial court reiterated that the hearing had been continued to allow Carroll to
calm down. The court went on to state that it would suspend the thirty-day
sentence for contempt that it had planned to impose “on the condition that you
just act right in Court from this point forward, okay?” (Jul. 8, 2015 Tr. at 7.)
[9] Accordingly, on July 8, 2015, the trial court entered an order finding Carroll to
have been in contempt of court on July 7, 2015, finding that Carroll’s conduct
was disrespectful and interfered with the operation of the court. However, the
trial court further found that Carroll had apologized, and suspended the
sentence for contempt, reiterating the requirement that Carroll “respect the
decorum of the Court in all further proceedings” in the case. (App’x at 4.)
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[10] During the pendency of the underlying criminal matter, Carroll requested and
was granted a speedy trial. The trial was scheduled to begin on September 22,
2015, and on the morning of September 21, 2015, the court was conducting a
hearing on motions in limine prior to trial. During the hearing, Carroll
requested that his public defender be dismissed and new counsel be appointed.
To afford the State an opportunity to respond to the motion, and in light of a
hearing in another case that had already been delayed by the hearing on
Carroll’s case, the trial court stated that the parties would reconvene later that
afternoon. (Sept. 21, 2015 Morning Tr. at 12.)
[11] When the parties reconvened at 1:30 p.m. that day, the court asked Carroll to
explain the reason for his request for new counsel. Carroll complained that his
attorney had been “speaking…as if he is a Prosecuting [sic] the case,” and that
the court’s earlier decision to continue the hearing from the morning was
“illegal” because the court “rudely stopped” him. (Sept. 21, 2015 Afternoon
Tr. at 5.) Carroll further contended that the trial court judge “had it out for me”
because he had said that the judge and prosecutor were racist, and accused the
trial court judge of being a “Women’s Advocate.” (Sept. 21, 2015 Afternoon
Tr. at 7.) Carroll continued to air his grievances, and concluded by again
requesting new counsel.
[12] When asked, Carroll’s counsel indicated that despite Carroll’s change in
demeanor over the prior week, the case was ready for the scheduled trial. The
trial court explained to Carroll that requesting appointment of a new attorney
would result in waiver of the speedy trial setting for the following day. Carroll
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insisted that he receive new counsel and denied that he was waiving his speedy
trial rights, interrupting the trial court’s efforts to explain the consequences of a
change in counsel. When the trial court pointed out Carroll’s conduct and
asked why he should not be held in contempt for continuously interrupting the
court proceedings, Carroll again interrupted the trial court judge, accused the
court of bias, and aired numerous grievances concerning the proceedings.
[13] The trial court judge then pointed out to Carroll that he was being provided
with “a chance right now to apologize and avoid contempt.” (Sept. 21, 2015
Afternoon Tr. at 23.) The court told Carroll that “after you um, accused the
Court of being angry at you for setting this case at 1:30, you sat there in the jury
box and continued to talk and be disrespectful to another inmate sitting in that
jury box.” (Sept. 21, 2015 Afternoon Tr. at 23.) Carroll then interrupted the
trial court again, prompting the court to reinstate the previously-suspended
contempt sentence of thirty days. As Carroll continued to insist that the
contempt citation was illegal, the court further noted that “this morning you
continued to make guttural sounds throughout…another Defendant’s hearing.
Continued to be disruptive… You are being treated this way because of how
you have appeared in this Court.” (Sept. 21, 2015 Afternoon Tr. at 23-24.)
[14] As the trial court continued to issue its rulings on Carroll’s motion for new
counsel and the question of speedy trial waiver, Carroll continued to interrupt
the court and threatened to sue the court. The trial court then increased the
total term of imprisonment for the contempt citation to ninety days “[f]or the
continued interruption.” (Sept. 21, 2015 Afternoon Tr. at 25.)
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[15] In a subsequent written order finding Carroll in contempt, the trial court found
that from the outset of the September 21, 2015 hearings, Carroll was agitated
and “his tone demanding and aggressive.” (App’x at 19.) Carroll also argued
with his counsel, “increasing both the volume and pace of his speech.” (App’x
at 19.) The court also observed that during the hearing following Carroll’s
morning hearing, Carroll glared “in an intimidating manner” at the court’s
bailiff, the prosecuting attorneys, and at the trial court judge. Carroll also
attempted to physically intimidate a courtroom deputy, “puffing his chest
outward” and calling the deputy a “[C]racker.” (App’x at 22.) Carroll had also
admitted, in one of his lengthy statements to the trial court, that he had been in
contact with his alleged victim, in violation of the no-contact order.
[16] The court found that Carroll’s conduct continued to “impede communications
and waste Court time,” and that Carroll’s conduct at the afternoon hearing
precluded the court from issuing advisements of rights related to the change of
trial counsel. (App’x at 23.) Entering its finding of contempt, the trial court
reaffirmed its oral statement that Carroll would serve a ninety-day period of
incarceration as sanction for contempt of court.
[17] New counsel was appointed to represent Carroll at trial and on appeal of the
contempt order. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
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Standard of Review
[18] Carroll challenges the trial court’s imposition of contempt sanctions, arguing
that no direct contempt sanctions were available for one of his hearings, and
that there was in any event insufficient evidence to sustain the contempt
citations.
[19] The power to impose contempt sanctions is inherent in the courts, and is
essential to ensuring that each court is not deterred “from the performance of its
duties” due to interferences that undermine the judicial process. Hopping v.
State, 637 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (Ind. 1994), cert. denied. On appeal, we afford
great deference to trial courts’ contempt decisions. Accordingly, we accept as
true the statement of facts entered by the trial court. Davidson v. State, 836
N.E.2d 1018, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). Indiana appellate courts will only
interfere with a contempt finding “where it clearly appears the acts do not
constitute contemptuous acts.” In re Nasser, 644 N.E.2d 93, 95 (Ind. 1994).
Direct Contempt for Conduct on Video
[20] Carroll’s first contention on appeal is that the trial court abused its discretion
when it cited him for contempt related to his conduct during the video-based
hearing on July 7, 2015, because a video-based hearing is not a setting in which
direct contempt can occur. Carroll rests this argument on the language of the
Indiana Code, which provides:
Every person who disturbs the business and proceedings of a
court:
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(1) by creating any noise or confusion;
(2) in a court of record; and
(3) while the court is open for and engaged in the transaction of
business;
is considered guilty of a direct contempt of court.
Ind. Code § 34-47-2-1(a). Carroll draws our attention specifically to the second
element, Subsection 34-47-2-1(a)(2). Carroll argues that because he was not
physically in the courtroom on July 7, 2015, his conduct was not “in a court of
record.”
[21] We disagree. Read as a whole, the statute requires that the disturbance create
noise or confusion in a court of record while the court is conducting business—
not that the individual who creates the disturbance be physically present in the
courtroom. “To constitute direct contempt, the act must be within the judge’s
personal knowledge, though it does not necessarily have to occur inside the
court or during a judicial proceeding.” Williams v. State ex rel. Harris, 690
N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). Further, the statute does not in any
manner limit the means by which the disturbance may be caused: by its own
terms, it is applicable whether the disturbance is the result of criminal conduct,
talking or gesturing, or “in any other manner.” I.C. § 34-47-2-1(b).
[22] That Carroll’s conduct occurred while Carroll was in the Grant County Jail,
across the street from the courthouse in which the trial court was located, does
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not preclude applicability of the direct contempt statute, so long as his conduct
created a disturbance in a court of record. This is so whether or not Carroll
himself was physically present in the courtroom at the time. Holding otherwise
would read the statute too narrowly, and would compromise the ability of trial
courts to ensure their ability to conduct business and dispense justice. See
Hopping, 637 N.E.2d at 1296-97 (setting forth the rationale for the direct
contempt powers of Indiana’s trial courts).
Merits of the Contempt Citations
[23] Here, Carroll was twice held in direct contempt of court. “The power of
Indiana courts to summarily punish for direct criminal contempt, while
specified by statute, rests upon the common law. It is inherent in the courts.”
Id. at 1296. Vesting this power in the courts is “essential for a court to be able
to protect itself against gross violations of decency and decorum [ ] as it pursues
justice.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). It is not “actual interference
with a legal proceeding” that contempt seeks to prevent, “but the undermining
of the judicial process.” Id. at 1297. Accordingly, contempt citations have been
upheld on appeal “for merely making contumacious statements in a document
filed with a court, even where it is not read at a hearing.” Id. Crucially:
Contempt of court involves disobedience of a court which
undermines the court’s authority, justice, and dignity. Any act
related to a current or pending proceeding which tends to deter
the court from the performance of its duties may support a
contempt proceeding. Any act which manifests a disrespect and
defiance of a court may constitute direct criminal contempt.
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Id. (emphasis in original).
[24] Indiana courts have long held that “[d]isorderly conduct, insulting demeanor to
the court, and a disobedience of its orders in facie curiae constitute a direct
contempt.” Holman v. State, 105 Ind. 513, 5 N.E. 556, 557-58 (1886). The
contempt citations of trial courts have been affirmed where the entirety of the
contumacious conduct occurred when a defendant “referred to [a] judge using
profanity” after sentencing for several violent crimes. Holly v. State, 681 N.E.2d
1176, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
[25] In both incidents in question here, Carroll repeatedly interrupted the trial court
in separate hearings. During the first hearing, on July 7, 2015, Carroll simply
walked off-camera, forcing the court to reschedule Carroll’s initial hearing to
the following day. In light of Carroll’s improved conduct on July 8, 2015,
however, the trial court suspended the contempt sanction.
[26] During September 21, 2015, Carroll repeatedly interrupted the trial court judge,
as well as his counsel and counsel for the State. After Carroll’s hearing was
continued to allow the State time to respond to his request for a change of
appointed counsel, Carroll remained in the jury box and was disruptive,
speaking to another defendant, attempting to intimidate court staff and the trial
court judge, and making guttural sounds that disrupted the proceedings.
Throughout the proceedings, Carroll insisted that the trial court judge was racist
and biased against him and that the judge had a conflict of interest in the case.
Carroll repeatedly threatened to sue the judge, and upon being found in
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contempt again on the afternoon of September 21, 2015, attempted to
physically intimidate a courtroom deputy.
[27] Simply put, there is more than adequate evidence to sustain the trial court’s
findings that Carroll engaged in direct contempt of court.
Conclusion
[28] That Carroll’s conduct occurred during a video hearing, and not in a
courtroom, did not preclude application of the contempt statute. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in twice finding that Carroll was in contempt of
court.
[29] Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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