Jeffery Allen Ring v. Kimberly S. Ring , 51 N.E.3d 1245 ( 2016 )

FILED
Mar 17 2016, 8:47 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Abbigail A. Rohmiller R. Scott Hayes
Amy Noe Law Joel E. Harvey
Richmond, Indiana Hayes Copenhaver Crider Harvey,
LLP
New Castle, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jeffery Allen Ring, March 17, 2016
Appellant-Respondent, Court of Appeals Case No.
33A01-1507-DR-1024
v. Appeal from the Henry Circuit
Court
Kimberly S. Ring, The Honorable Mary G. Willis,
Appellee-Petitioner. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
33C01-1210-DR-282
Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Respondent, Jeffery A. Ring (Jeffery), appeals the trial court’s Order
Appointing Commissioner to Operate and Sell Farm Real Estate to Satisfy
Petitioner’s Judgment following its Decree of Dissolution of Marriage to
Appellee-Petitioner, Kimberly S. Ring (Kimberly).
[2] We affirm in part, and reverse in part.
ISSUES
[3] Jeffery raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as follows:
1) Whether the parties’ subsequent agreement to sell a small parcel of a farm
was a permissible modification of the dissolution decree; and
2) Whether the trial court’s appointment of a commissioner to operate and sell
the farm following Jeffery’s non-compliance with the terms of the
dissolution decree was an impermissible modification of the dissolution
decree.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] Jeffery and Kimberly were married in October 1991. During their marriage,
they had two children, both of whom are emancipated. Jeffery was a farmer
and Kimberly worked for the Union School Corporation. Jeffery farmed his
own land as well as rented agricultural land. By the time the parties separated,
they had acquired two parcels of farmland, one consisting of approximately 145
acres (Parcel A) and one consisting of approximately 79 acres (Parcel B), silage,
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farming equipment, machinery, livestock, and other property. Parcel A was
valued at $929,500, and Parcel B was valued at $471,600. Both parcels secured
three loans with a total amount of approximately $170,000. 1 At the time of the
separation, the total marital estate, after subtracting liabilities, had a value of
$2,353,854.89.
[5] On October 18, 2012, Kimberly filed a petition to dissolve the parties’ marriage.
The trial court held a final dissolution hearing on November 19, 2014 and
entered its Decree of Dissolution of Marriage on December 9, 2014. The trial
court determined that an equal division of the marital estate between the parties
was equitable and granted Jeffery possession of the marital home, Parcel A and
Parcel B, and farming equipment. To realize the equitable distribution of the
martial estate, the trial court ordered Jeffery to pay $1,140,825.45 to Kimberly
under the following conditions:
[Jeffery] has testified that he has made [an] effort to borrow funds
and that he is able to borrow the sum of $400,000. The [trial
court] directs him to do so immediately and directs [Kimberly] to
cooperate by signing such documents as are necessary to enable
[Jeffery] to borrow against [Parcel A and Parcel B]. In the event
[Jeffery] is unable to borrow said sum, he is directed to borrow
the maximum amount that he can borrow and to pay the same to
[Kimberly] immediately. [Jeffery] shall have ninety (90) days
from the date of this [D]ecree to complete the loan application
1
Jeffery admits to the total loan amount, but does not specify the distribution of it as to the parcels of land.
(Ex. 2); (Transcript p. 35).
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process. Upon receiving funds, they shall be paid over to
[Kimberly] immediately.
***
[After payment of $400,000 to Kimberly, the balance] shall be
paid in full with interest at the rate of 5.5% per annum within ten
(10) years of the date hereof with a minimum of $75,000 being
paid each year on or before the anniversary of this Decree. The
judgment shall be a lien on all real estate owned by [Jeffery]
junior in priority only to the loan [Jeffery] has been directed to
obtain in this paragraph.
(Appellant’s App. pp. 51-52).
[6] Shortly thereafter, Jeffery and the parties’ son borrowed $413,000 from a bank
to purchase a farm for the son. The new loan was secured by Parcel A. Due to
the new loan, Jeffery was unable to obtain $400,000 to satisfy the judgment.
[7] On March 23, 2015, Kimberly filed a Citation for Contempt alleging that
Jeffery had failed to comply with the trial court’s order to complete the loan
application process within ninety days from the Decree of Dissolution of
Marriage. 2 On May 18, 2015, Kimberly filed a Request for Orders to Enforce
Decree of Dissolution of Marriage requesting the trial court to appoint a
commissioner to sell the farms to satisfy the judgment. The trial court held a
hearing on June 17, 2015, and, on June 30, 2015, the trial court entered its
2
There is no indication in the record that Jeffery was found in contempt for failing to complete the loan
application.
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order appointing Halderman Farm Management Service, Inc. (Commissioner)
as a commissioner. The trial court authorized Commissioner to
[U]se its best efforts to maximize the value of the farms and the
farming operation to achieve satisfaction of the judgment held by
[Kimberly].
***
a. [T]ake possession and operate the two (2) farms . . . .
b. [P]ay to the [c]ourt for the benefit of [Kimberly] all revenue
generated by the farm operations over and above the costs
expended to generate said revenue.
c. [P]ay itself for services consistent with its usual and customary
management fees.
***
e. [S]ell so much of the farm real estate as Commissioner believes
to be prudent to maximize the value of the said farm real estate . .
..
(Appellant’s App. pp. 76-77).
[8] On August 26, 2015, Kimberly filed another Citation for Contempt alleging
that Jeffery made misleading representations to the trial court regarding his
efforts to borrow the funds and that Jeffery failed to cooperate with
Commissioner. On October 5, 2015, the trial court held a hearing on the
citation. At the conclusion of the hearing, Jeffery and Kimberly agreed that
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Commissioner would sell Parcel B to satisfy the judgment and that the citation
would remain pending. The trial court approved the parties’ agreement in its
order on October 7, 2015.
[9] Jeffery now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
I. Permissible Modification
[10] Jeffery’s appeal is centered on the trial court’s appointment of Commissioner.
After filing the appeal, however, Jeffery and Kimberly agreed to sell Parcel B
with the help of Commissioner to satisfy the judgment. Property distribution
settlements approved as part of a dissolution may be modified only where both
parties consent or where there is fraud, undue influence, or duress. Johnson v.
Johnson, 920 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2010); see also Marriage of Snow v.
England, 862 N.E.2d 664, 668 (Ind. 2007) (as with other contracts, a division of
property may only be modified according to the terms of the agreement, if the
parties consent, or if fraud or duress occurs); Myers v. Myers, 560 N.E.2d 39, 42
(Ind. 1990) (a property settlement agreement incorporated into a final
dissolution decree and order may not be modified unless the agreement so
provides or the parties subsequently consent). As such, following our review of
the record, we conclude that the parties’ subsequent agreement to sell Parcel B
approved by the trial court was a permissible post-dissolution modification of
their property distribution settlement.
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II. Impermissible Modification
[11] As to Parcel A, Jeffery argues that the appointment of Commissioner to operate
and, if needed, sell the farms was an impermissible modification of the
dissolution decree. Kimberly responds that it was not a modification but an
enforcement remedy pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-15-7-10. 3
[12] Recently, our supreme court provided a comprehensive analysis of the law
concerning the post-dissolution modification of property distribution between
former spouses in Ryan v. Ryan, 972 N.E.2d 359 (Ind. 2012). The Ryan court
reviewed the language of Indiana Code sections 31-15-2-17(c) and -7-9.1 and
reiterated that the legislature unambiguously prohibited the post-dissolution
modification of property distribution agreements between former spouses,
except in case of fraud or where both parties consent, because they are
economic in nature—ordinary contracts—and as with other contracts, may only
be modified according to their terms. Ryan, 972 N.E. at 361-63.
[13] Jeffery specifically points to the language of the dissolution decree and asserts
that he was only required “to complete the loan application process within
ninety days” and, if he failed to obtain the loan, to “borrow the maximum
amount that he [could] borrow.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 5). Jeffery insists that
there was no obligation to seek an outside person to manage or sell the land to
satisfy the judgment. Although a court has no authority to modify a property-
3
Kimberly does not allege that their original agreement incorporated into the dissolution decree was made
fraudulently.
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settlement agreement, it does not mean that a court has no authority to resolve
a dispute over the interpretation of a settlement agreement or property-division
order. Ryan, 972 N.E2d at 363. When a party asks a court to clarify a
settlement agreement, the court’s task is one of contract interpretation. Id. This
is because settlement agreements are contractual in nature and binding if
approved by the trial court. Id. As such, a settlement agreement is interpreted
according to the general rules for contract construction. Id. at 364. That is,
unless the terms of the contract are ambiguous, they will be given their plain
and ordinary meaning. Id. Clear and unambiguous terms in the contract are
deemed conclusive, and when they are present we will not construe the contract
or look to extrinsic evidence but will merely apply the contractual provisions.
Id. As this dispute requires us to interpret the decree of dissolution, our
standard of review is de novo. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs of Cnty. of Jefferson v. Teton
Corp., 30 N.E.3d 711, 713 (Ind. 2015).
[14] In Ryan, the parties agreed to sell two properties they owned and divide the
proceeds, subject to a proviso that neither party was required to accept a sale
yielding net proceeds below specified minimums. Ryan, 972 N.E.2d at 360.
After almost 20 months on the market, the parties were unable to sell their
properties, so the former husband moved the trial court to order the properties
to be sold at the prevailing fair market value. Id. at 361. The trial court denied
the motion and, on appeal, our supreme court affirmed. Id. at 371. The Ryan
court found that there was “no ambiguity in the language of the parties’
agreement that would permit [the court] to conclude as a matter of contract law
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that [the former wife was] bound to agree to sales prices for the properties …
less than those stated in the agreement.” Id. at 364-65. Even though, the
former husband was trying to label his request as a clarification, in fact, it was a
request to modify the original agreement. Id. at 365.
[15] Here, similarly, the language of the parties’ agreement was unambiguous.
According to the dissolution decree, Jeffery was required to submit his loan
application, and if denied, try again. There was no language requiring the
parties to sell the land to satisfy the judgment in their original agreement.
[16] Kimberly, in turn, maintains that Jeffery’s assertion was a
“mischaracterization” of the trial court’s order. (Appellee’s Br. p. 6). The trial
court’s appointment of Commissioner, she continues, was an enforcement
remedy consistent with the appointment of a receiver, which was a permitted
method of enforcing an order issued in a dissolution proceeding. To support
her argument, Kimberly cites to Gore v. Gore, 527 N.E.2d 191, 198 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1988).
[17] In Gore, the former husband operated a pub. Id. at 192. After finding the
former husband in contempt three times for violating the order restraining him
from disposing of potential marital assets, the trial court appointed a receiver
over the pub. Id. On appeal, the Gore court reversed the imposition of the
receivership over the pub because there was no evidence presented to show that
the receivership was necessary to secure ample justice to the parties. Id. at 199.
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“[A] receivership [over a business operation] is a dangerous remedy which
could injure rather than protect the marital estate.” Id.
The appointment of a receiver is essentially a prerogative of
equity, which may be exercised as a means of conserving the
property or assets for the benefit of all parties in interest. The
court will be authorized to appoint a receiver if it appears that,
through fraud, mismanagement, misconduct, or otherwise, there
is a likelihood that the property will be squandered, wasted,
misappropriated or unlawfully diverted without the
court’s intervention. But, absent threatened destruction or
dissipation of the property, or where there is no good cause to
believe that benefit would result from the appointment of a
receiver, then the court should decline to make such an
appointment. The power to appoint a receiver is a delicate one
which is reluctantly exercised by the courts. The power to act
rests very largely within the sound discretion of the court. A
receiver should be appointed only when the court is satisfied that
the appointment will promote the interests of one or both parties,
that it will prevent manifest wrong, imminently impending, and
that the injury resulting will not be greater than the injury sought
to be averted.
Id. at 196-97 (citations omitted).
[18] We find the Gore court’s decision instructive. The evidence and circumstances
of the present case, similarly, do not warrant the imposition of the receivership
over Jeffery’s farm. There was no evidence presented to show that Jeffery was
mishandling his farming operation. Conversely, the record reveals that Jeffery
was farming the land even after the appointment of Commissioner. There was
no evidence presented to show that Jeffery lacked experience or ability to farm.
In fact, farming was his and his family’s livelihood for generations. Jeffery did
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not do anything wrong with his farm to warrant the court’s intervention. His
alleged refusal to cooperate with Commissioner and an attempt to make himself
less attractive to the lending institutions have nothing to do with the successful
handling of his farm, which is the crux of the receivership law. See, e.g.,
Tormohlen v. Tormohlen, 1 N.E.2d 596 (Ind. 1936) (held that a receivership was
not warranted over a large chicken hatchery because a farmer left trusted
persons to handle the farm to prevent waste before fleeing the state to escape
the dissolution court’s jurisdiction).
[19] Accordingly, because the language of the dissolution decree was unambiguous,
we conclude that the trial court’s appointment of Commissioner to operate and,
if needed, sell Parcel A was an impermissible modification of the original terms
between the parties because it went beyond Jeffery’s obligation to attempt to
obtain a loan to satisfy the judgment. Also, we reverse the appointment of
Commissioner as to Parcel A because no evidence was presented to show that
Jeffery was likely to mismanage, waste, misappropriate, or otherwise harm his
farm which could have warranted the court’s intervention and would have been
necessary to secure ample justice to the parties. Finally, we reiterate that this
decision is limited to Parcel A because Jeffery and Kimberly had successfully
modified their property dissolution agreement as to Parcel B by subsequently
agreeing to sell Parcel B with the help of Commissioner.
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CONCLUSION
[20] Based on the foregoing, we hold that the parties’ subsequent agreement to sell
Parcel B was a permissible modification of their original marital property
disposition settlement, and, as to Parcel A, the trial court’s appointment of
Commissioner without Jeffery’s consent and without assertion of fraud was an
impermissible modification of the parties’ original agreement.
[21] Affirmed in part, and reversed in part.
[22] Najam, J. and May, J. concur
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