In re Adoption of A.R., S.R. v. J.W. (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), May 30 2018, 6:26 am
this Memorandum Decision shall not be CLERK
regarded as precedent or cited before any Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
court except for the purpose of establishing and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Craig Goedde
Johnson Carroll Norton Kent & Goedde, P.C.
Evansville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In re Adoption of A.R., May 30, 2018
S.R., Court of Appeals Case No.
82A01-1710-AD-2426
Appellant-Respondent,
Appeal from the Vanderburgh
v. Superior Court
The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier,
J.W., Judge
The Honorable Renee Allen
Appellee-Petitioner.
Ferguson, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
82D04-1505-AD-48
Mathias, Judge.
[1] S.R. appeals the trial court’s decree of adoption allowing M.W. to adopt S.R.’s
minor child, A.R., after concluding that S.R.’s consent to the adoption was not
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necessary. S.R. argues that the evidence does not support the trial court’s
conclusion that his consent was not necessary.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] A.R. was born to S.R. and J.W. (“Mother”) in February 2002. S.R.’s and
Mother’s marriage was dissolved in 2008, and they agreed to share physical and
joint legal custody of A.R. Because they agreed to share physical custody and
agreed to equally divide A.R.’s expenses, no child support order was issued.
[4] S.R. was abusive toward Mother during their marriage, and A.R. was often
present and witnessed the abuse. In 2008, the same year the marriage was
dissolved, Mother obtained a protective order against S.R. He violated the
protective order and was convicted of misdemeanor invasion of privacy.
[5] There was no change to the parties’ agreement until August 2014 when S.R.’s
parenting time was limited to supervised parenting time through the Parenting
Time Center. Prior to this date, S.R. had not exercised regular parenting time,
in part due to an injury suffered in a work-related accident and out-of-state
employment. During this time, S.R. sporadically communicated with A.R. via
telephone calls and text messages.
[6] S.R. initially refused to participate in supervised parenting time. S.R. also failed
to respond to Mother’s requests for reimbursement of A.R.’s medical and
school expenses.
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[7] In April 2015, S.R. filed a petition to modify visitation and child support. On
May 13, 2015, A.R.’s stepfather, M.W., filed a petition to adopt her.1 The
petition alleged that S.R.’s consent to the adoption was not necessary. S.R. filed
a notice to contest the adoption on June 5, 2015. Mother later filed a motion to
terminate S.R.’s parenting time in the dissolution proceedings.
[8] On November 19, 2015, the parties agreed to consolidate the adoption
proceedings with their dissolution proceedings. The hearings on the adoption
petition were held on September 26 and 27, 2016, October 3, 2016, and January
11, 2017. The trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on
March 20, 2017.2 The trial court found:
9. On September 22, 2016, Guardian Ad Litem Amy Brandsasse
filed a 14 page report concerning the issues at hand, [3]
recommending adoption as in the best interests of the minor
child. In her report and testimony at the time of trial, she found
that child had signed a consent to her adoption, does not have a
bond with Father, never had a healthy bond with Father, is
fearful of Father due to her experiences with him, and specifically
had an “increase in anxiety, poor sleep and nightmares and
worrying thoughts” concerning the possibly of seeing Father after
two years of not having contact with him. Child’s memories and
reasons given were those of her own, some of which Mother was
unaware when questioned by the Guardian Ad Litem.
1
Mother and M.W. were married in April 2014.
2
The trial court adopted J.W.’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on this date.
3
The trial court took judicial notice of the guardian ad litem’s report. The report was not included in the
record on appeal.
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10. Brandsasse further testified that she found that Mother was
not influencing the child concerning what to say or think and had
not found evidence that Mother kept child away from Father.
Brandsasse further testified that the child expressed her personal
refusal to speak to Father on the phone consistently, and child
gave the reason that Father would get angry and yell on the
phone at her and/or her Mother to the point that others in the
room could hear his yelling.
11. Brandsasse found the child to be intelligent, mature for her
age and consistent in her accountings over the years of therapy
and currently. Child recounted events regarding domestic
violence between Mother and Father, and she reported Father
being repeatedly intoxicated to the point of being unable to
respond to her or driving with her while intoxicated. The child’s
information established that Father was not fit to parent.
12. Brandsasse spoke to the Maternal Grandmother who
recounted domestic violence between Father and Mother, that
Father was not attentive to [A.R.]’s needs and not “fatherly,” and
she witnessed [A.R]’s refusal to speak with or have interaction
with her Father. Grandmother further became emotional when
discussing how step-father was so good, loving and kind with
[A.R.] and the relationship between him, Mother and [A.R.]. She
described Step-father and [A.R.’s] relationship as “precious.”
13. Brandsasse reviewed Father’s hospital records which were
consistent with the angry persona witnessed by the child wherein
the records reflected his anger towards his own family members
such that they left the hospital, reporting to the staff why they
were leaving.
14. Brandsasse further reported that Father was not truthful in his
reporting. He contacted the child’s therapist informing her that
he needed to set up visits through the therapist as his visits at The
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Parenting Time Center had been discontinued which was not
true.
15. Father also reported to Brandsasse that he did not have drug
and alcohol problems and had never been fired from
employment. In review of his employment records, she found
that he had been terminated for testing positive for drugs while
on the job, had been terminated for failing to show for work and
that employment records document a history of substance abuse
inconsistent with Father’s assertions.
16. Father made these same assertions in his depositions
submitted by the Mother.
17. Further, Mother submitted the therapist record that shows
that Father had called the child’s therapist on November 20,
2015, indicating that Father did have the contact information
contrary to his pleading on January 22, 2016.
18. Kathryn Kornblum from the Parenting Time Center testified
concerning her personal observations and interaction with the
child and the parties.
19. Kornblum testified that she received the August 1, 2014 order
requiring Father’s parenting time to be exercised through the
Parenting Time Center. Mother had completed her intake on
August 12, 2014. Kornblum stated that after she spoke with the
Father, she submitted a Notice to the Court filed on September
23, 2014 stating that Father had refused their services. At that
time, the Parenting Time Center had grant monies which would
have allowed for services to be provided for little to no cost to
Father due to the domestic violence that had been involved. She
did not hear from Father again until approximately one year
from the order with the first visit occurring September 15, 2015
that lasted one half hour, with another half hour visit on
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September 22, 2015. On September 29, 2015, the child left the
visit and requested visits be terminated without the Mother being
present. Kornblum filed her Notice to the Court that prior to
resuming visits at The Parenting Time Center, the parties would
need therapeutic visitation.
20. Kornblum testified that in her interactions with the child, she
observed that the child had no bond with Father, and further, she
did not believe Mother to be influencing the child in such a
manner to alienate the child. She stopped visits based upon the
child’s reaction to the Father, her conversations with the child
and her belief that supervised parenting time with the Father was
not appropriate at this time.
21. Neither Kornblum nor Brandsasse believed that therapeutic
parenting time or visitation would necessarily aid in restoring the
parent-child relationship between the child and Father nor could
they state it was in the child’s best interests.
22. On May 16, 2016, law enforcement was called to Father’s
residence due to his being intoxicated at his home and having a
gun in his possession. His current girlfriend had reported the
incident as it was occurring to the police.
23. Mother testified that Father had not supported [A.R], and she
had filed Informations for Contempt and Petitions to Modify in
order to obtain a valid continuing and regular support order and
to protect [A.R.] from unsafe conditions while in Father’s care.
She also submitted her filed pleadings consistent with her
testimony and the dissolution’s chronological case summary.
24. She further testified that she had been unaware of Father’s
whereabouts at various times even though she maintained a good
relationship with Paternal Grandparents. She was unable to get
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good service on the Father. She had been attempting to receive
child support for multiple years.
25. Mother submitted Father’s employment records from Penske,
Gibco, Thornton’s and C.R. England. The addresses on the
chronological case summaries are consistent with the addresses
revealed in Father’s employment records.
26. Step-father testified that Father had come to their home a
couple of times to visit but had not had contact for a couple years
until he started calling again after the adoption petition was filed.
He testified that he had observed [A.R.’s] reactions to her Father
which were fearful and anxious. Step-father sought to adopt
[A.R.] because he had been providing for her care as long as they
had all resided together. He testified that he loved her and
supported her in her academic and extracurricular activities, and
they were a family.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 59–63. The trial court concluded that S.R.’s
consent to the adoption was not required because he failed to communicate
with A.R. for more than one year, failed to support A.R. for more than one
year, and that S.R. is unfit to parent A.R.
[9] For some unknown reason, the decree of adoption was not issued until August
8. 2017.4 Thereafter, S.R. filed a motion to correct error, which was denied.
S.R. now appeals.
4
Both Judge Niemeier and Magistrate Ferguson signed the findings of facts and conclusions of law which
concluded that S.R.’s consent to the adoption was not necessary, but only Magistrate Ferguson signed the
adoption decree. Magistrates “may not enter a final appealable order unless sitting as a judge pro tempore or
a special judge.” Ind. Code § 33-23-5-8(2). Judge Niemeier and Magistrate Ferguson have repeatedly been
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Standard of Review
[10] Initially, we observe that Mother and M.W. did not file an appellee’s brief.
When an appellee does not submit a brief on appeal, we need not undertake the
burden of developing an argument on his behalf. Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang,
848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). Rather, we will reverse if the appellant’s
brief establishes a case of prima facie error. Id. Prima facie error in this context is
error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. If the appellant
is unable to meet this burden, we will affirm. Id.[11] Pursuant to statute, a trial court shall grant a petition for adoption if the
adoption is in the child’s best interest, the petitioners are sufficiently capable of
rearing and supporting the child, and proper consent, if required, has been
given. Ind. Code § 31-19-11-1(a). We will not disturb a trial court’s ruling in an
adoption proceeding unless the evidence leads only to the conclusion opposite
that of the trial court. E.W. v. J.W., 20 N.E.3d 889, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014),
trans. denied. “Appellate deference to the determinations of our trial court
judges, especially in domestic relations matters, is warranted because of their
unique, direct interactions with the parties face-to-face, often over an extended
period of time.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011). We do not
reweigh evidence, and we consider evidence most favorable to the decision
advised of the limits on the power of a magistrate. See e.g. In re Adoption of I.B., 32 N.E.3d 1164, 1173 n.6
(Ind. 2015); In re D.F., 83 N.E.3d 789, 794-95 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Because S.R. has not raised an objection
to the authority of the magistrate in this case, we address his appeal on its merits.
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together with reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. E.W., 20 N.E.3d
at 894. Where, as here, an adoption petition is filed without the required
parental consent, the party seeking to adopt bears the burden to prove the
statutory criteria for dispensing with consent by “clear and convincing
evidence.” In re Adoption of M.A.S., 815 N.E.2d 216, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
[12] In this case, the trial court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of
law pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). Therefore, we determine whether the
evidence supports the findings of fact, and second, we determine whether the
findings support the judgment. In re Adoption of A.S., 912 N.E.2d 840, 851 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. Our court “shall not set aside the findings or
judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” T.R.
52(A).
Discussion and Decision
[13] Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8 provides that consent to adoption is not
required from
A parent of a child in the custody of another person if for a
period of at least one (1) year the parent:
(A) fails without justifiable cause to communicate significantly
with the child when able to do so; or
(B) knowingly fails to provide for the care and support of the
child when able to do so as required by law or judicial decree.
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The statute also provides that consent is not required from a parent if the
petitioner “proves by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit to be
a parent” and “the best interests of the child sought to be adopted would be
served if the court dispensed with the parent’s consent.” Id. Finally, the statute
provides that “if a parent has made only token efforts to support or to
communicate with the child the court may declare the child abandoned by the
parent.” Id. The statute is written in the disjunctive, and therefore, proof on any
one of the statutory grounds for dispensing with consent is sufficient to support
the granting of an adoption petition. In re Adoption of M.L., 973 N.E.2d 1216,
1222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
[14] Ultimately, the primary concern in every adoption proceeding is the best
interests of the child. Id. at 1224. Even if a court determines that a natural
parent’s consent is not required for an adoption, the court must still determine
whether adoption is in the child’s best interests. See I.C. § 31-19-11-1(a)(1). In
making this determination, the trial court must consider “the totality of the
evidence to determine the best interests of a child.” In re Adoption of M.S., 10
N.E.3d 1272, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “Relevant factors include, among
others, a parent’s historical and current inability to provide a suitable
environment for the child; the recommendations of the child’s case worker or
guardian ad litem; and the child’s need for permanence and stability.” Id. at
1281–82 (internal citations omitted).
[15] S.R. argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that his consent to the
adoption was not required. He contends that he never failed to communicate
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with S.R., but that his attempts at communication were thwarted by Mother.
He claims that he supported A.R. by reimbursing Mother for school, medical
and extracurricular expenses when he was able to do so. Finally, S.R. argues
that Mother and M.W. failed to prove that he is an unfit parent and that the
adoption is in A.R.’s best interests. Although the statute is written in the
disjunctive, we will address whether sufficient evidence supports the three
statutory prongs at issue in this appeal.
A. Communication
[16] The test for communication is not whether the noncustodial parent had no
communication with the child, but whether he failed without justifiable cause to
have significant communication when able to do so. In re Adoption of S.W., 979
N.E.2d 633, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). “[T]he purpose of this statutory
provision is to foster and maintain communication between non-custodial
parents and their children, not to provide a means for parents to maintain just
enough contact to thwart potential adoptive parents’ efforts to provide a settled
environment to the child.” Id.[17] In August 2014, the trial court ordered S.R. to exercise his parenting time
through the Parenting Time Center. S.R. notified the Center that he did not
intend to use their services. S.R. did not exercise parenting time with A.R. for
over a year because he refused comply with court-ordered supervised visitation.
S.R. did not have a justifiable reason for his refusal to exercise parenting time at
the Parenting Time Center. See Appellant’s App. p. 65.
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[18] Approximately one year after the court ordered supervised parenting time and
after M.W. filed a petition to adopt A.R., S.R. agreed to participate in
supervised parenting time. In September 2015, S.R. and A.R. had three visits at
the Parenting Time Center. The third visit ended after just five minutes because
A.R. did not want to visit with S.R. A.R. was anxious and felt sick to her
stomach, and she asked to leave. S.R. has not seen A.R. since that last brief
supervised visit.
[19] S.R. occasionally sent texts and made phone calls to A.R., but S.R. did not
communicate with A.R. at all during her fifth-grade school year. At some point,
A.R.’s phone number changed, and S.R. was not provided with A.R.’s phone
number. S.R. sporadically texted or called Mother when he wanted to speak to
A.R. A.R. refused to speak with S.R.
[20] S.R. argues that Mother thwarted his attempts to communicate with A.R. But
S.R. refused to participate in visitation with A.R. for approximately one year,
and he did not communicate with A.R. during her fifth-grade school year.
When S.R. called to speak with A.R., if A.R. was available, she was given the
option to speak to S.R. but refused. Moreover, S.R.’s attempts to communicate
with A.R. resumed and were more frequent after M.W. filed his petition to
adopt A.R. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the trial court’s finding
that, for at least a period of one year, S.R. failed without justifiable cause to
communicate significantly with A.R. when he was able to do so, is supported by
the evidence.
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B. Support
[21] Next, we address S.R.’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to establish
that he supported A.R. Aside from a period of time when S.R. was injured, S.R.
was employed, and his employment records were admitted into evidence. A
child support order was never issued in the parties’ dissolution proceedings, but
the parties agreed to equally share expenses because they had joint custody of
A.R.
[22] Indiana law imposes a duty upon a parent to support his child. In re M.A.S., 815
N.E.2d at 220. “This duty exists apart from any court order or statute.” Id. It is
well-settled that parents have a common law duty to support their children, and
the lack of a court order did not relieve S.R. of that obligation. See In re Adoption
of M.B., 944 N.E.2d 73, 77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
[23] Mother filed a petition to modify support in 2011 but was unable to serve S.R.
with the petition, and it was dismissed. In 2014, she filed a second petition to
modify support. S.R. agreed to pay all of A.R.’s education expenses and $110
per month for A.R.’s medical expenses.
[24] Mother requested reimbursement for these expenses, but S.R. did not reimburse
Mother as agreed. The parties entered into mediation after the adoption petition
was filed, and S.R. eventually agreed to pay approximately $800 to reimburse
Mother for educational and medical expenses. S.R. occasionally deposited
money in A.R.’s lunch account and bought her a few clothing items over the
years. But generally in the last several years, S.R. has provided minimal
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financial support for A.R. despite his ability to do so, and he failed to support
A.R. for over a year prior to paying the mediated amount after the adoption
petition was filed.
C. Unfit Parent
[25] Finally, we address S.R.’s fitness to parent A.R. During the marriage, S.R.
abused Mother in A.R.’s presence, traumatizing A.R. S.R. refuses to
acknowledge how his actions affected A.R. even though A.R. has been in
therapy on multiple occasions, in part, to address the issue.
[26] Also, S.R. was often intoxicated in A.R.’s presence and has driven with A.R. in
the vehicle after drinking alcohol. Just prior to the adoption hearings, S.R.’s
girlfriend called 911 because S.R. was drinking alcohol and had a gun he was
not allowed to possess. S.R. refused to acknowledge any issue with alcohol or
drugs despite the fact that he was fired from one of his jobs because he failed a
drug test. S.R. denies any drug use even when faced with evidence that he failed
a drug test.
[27] S.R. has anger management issues. Moreover, A.R. fears S.R. because of the
abuse she witnessed. S.R. often yelled at A.R during their sporadic telephone
conversations. When A.R. was told that S.R. might attend her eighth-grade
graduation, she refused to attend. S.R. also did not communicate with A.R.
either in person or via telephone for significant lengths of time. A.R. does not
have a bond with S.R.
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[28] For all of these reasons, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that S.R. is
unfit to parent A.R. Moreover, adoption is in A.R.’s best interests. A.R. is not
bonded with S.R. and fears him. A.R. and her stepfather, M.W., have a loving
relationship, and M.W. has provided support for A.R. since his marriage to
Mother.
Conclusion
[29] M.W. proved that S.R. failed to significantly communicate with A.R. or
support A.R. for at least one year, and that S.R. is not fit to parent A.R. M.W.
also proved that adoption was in A.R.’s best interests. We therefore affirm the
trial court’s finding that S.R.’s consent to the adoption was unnecessary and
affirm the adoption decree.
[30] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and May, J., concur.
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