Lake County, Indiana v. Guy Mikulich (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Sep 18 2019, 8:33 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral
CLERK
estoppel, or the law of the case. Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Kevin C. Smith Christopher Cooper
Kristen D. Hill Law Office of Christopher Cooper,
Smith Sersic Inc.
Munster, Indiana Griffith, Indiana
Angela M. Jones
Law Offices of Angela M. Jones
Munster, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Lake County, Indiana, September 18, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-PL-420
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
Court
Guy Mikulich, The Honorable John M. Sedia,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45D01-1803-PL-32
Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PL-420| September 18, 2019 Page 1 of 6
Case Summary
[1] In May of 2017, Guy Mikulich filed a disability-retirement-benefit application
with the Lake County Sheriff’s Merit Board (“Merit Board”). In January of
2018, the Merit Board denied Mikulich’s application, causing Mikulich to file a
complaint seeking administrative review. In August of 2018, Lake County (“the
County”) moved to dismiss Mikulich’s complaint pursuant to Indiana Trial
Rules 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6) (“Rule 12 Motion”). In November of 2018, the trial
court denied the County’s motion and remanded the matter to the Merit Board
for a full evidentiary hearing. The County contends that the trial court erred by
(1) remanding the matter to the Merit Board as part of its order denying the
County’s Rule 12 Motion and (2) failing to dismiss Count IV of Mikulich’s
complaint. Because we agree, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this memorandum decision.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On May 27, 2017, Mikulich, a former Lake County Sheriff’s Department police
officer, filed his third disability-retirement-benefit application with the Merit
Board. During its July 20, 2017, public meeting, the Merit Board reviewed
Mikulich’s application and directed the application to the Pension Committee
for its review and recommendation. At its January 18, 2018, public meeting, the
Merit Board adopted the Pension Committee’s recommendation and denied
Mikulich’s application.
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[3] On January 30, 2018, Mikulich filed for administrative review of the Merit
Board’s denial of his disability application. On August 6, 2018, the County filed
a Rule 12 Motion. On November 14, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on the
County’s motion. On November 15, 2018, the trial court denied the County’s
motion and remanded the matter to the Merit Board, ordering the Merit Board
to conduct a full evidentiary hearing on Mikulich’s disability application. On
December 14, 2018, the County filed its answer to Mikulich’s complaint, a
motion to correct error, and a motion to stay enforcement of the trial court’s
order. On January 24, 2019, the trial court denied the County’s motion to
correct error but granted its motion to stay.
Discussion and Decision
[4] The County contends that the trial court erred by (1) ordering that the matter be
remanded to the Merit Board before allowing the County an opportunity to file
an answer to Mikulich’s complaint pursuant to Trial Rule 6(C), and (2) failing
to dismiss Count IV of Mikulich’s complaint. Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1) is a
motion to dismiss for “[l]ack of jurisdiction over the subject matter[.]”
The standard of review for Trial Rule 12(B)(1) motions to dismiss
is a function of what occurred in the trial court. If the facts before
the trial court are not in dispute, then the question of subject
matter jurisdiction is purely one of law. Under those
circumstances no deference is afforded the trial court’s
conclusion because appellate courts independently, and without
the slightest deference to trial court determinations, evaluate
those issues they deem to be questions of law. Thus, we review
de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss under Trial
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Rule 12(B)(1) where the relevant facts before the trial court are
undisputed.
Bellows v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Cty. of Elkhart, 926 N.E.2d 96, 111 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) is
a motion to dismiss for “[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted[.]”
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal
sufficiency of the claim, not the facts supporting it. When ruling
on a motion to dismiss, the court must view the pleadings in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, with every
reasonable inference construed in the non-movant’s favor. We
review a trial court’s grant or denial of a Trial Rule 12(B)(6)
motion de novo. We will not affirm such a dismissal unless it is
apparent that the facts alleged in the challenged pleading are
incapable of supporting relief under any set of circumstances.
Thornton v. State, 43 N.E.3d 585, 587 (Ind. 2015) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
I. Trial Rule 6(C)
[5] The County contends that the trial court erred by ordering that this matter be
remanded to the Merit Board when it denied the County’s motion to dismiss.
Indiana Trial Rule 6(C) provides that
(C) Service of Pleadings and Rule 12 Motions. A responsive
pleading required under these rules, shall be served within twenty
[20] days after service of the prior pleading. Unless the court
specifies otherwise, a reply shall be served within twenty [20]
days after entry of an order requiring it. The service of a motion
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permitted under Rule 12 alters the time for service of responsive
pleadings as follows, unless a different time is fixed by the court:
(1) if the court does not grant the motion, the responsive pleading
shall be served in ten [10] days after notice of the court’s action[.]
[6] Here, the trial court denied the County’s Rule 12 motion to dismiss; however, it
also granted Mikulich a remedy by remanding the matter to the Merit Board for
a full evidentiary hearing. Said remedy was not at issue in the County’s Rule 12
motion but, rather, a prayer for relief sought by Mikulich in his complaint, a
complaint to which the County had the right to file a responsive pleading after
the trial court denied its Rule 12 Motion. We conclude that the trial court was
required to allow the County to file a responsive pleading to Mikulich’s
complaint and consider it before determining whether a remedy was
appropriate. Therefore, the trial court’s order remanding this matter to the
Merit Board was erroneous.
II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
[7] The County contends that the trial court erroneously denied its Rule 12 Motion
regarding Count IV of Mikulich’s complaint. Count IV of Mikulich’s complaint
alleges that he was denied due process as a result of Justin Murphy’s service as
the Merit Board’s attorney in the appellate proceedings regarding the denial of
Mikulich’s first application and the current proceedings regarding Mikulich’s
third application, both of which were occurring simultaneously. Specifically,
the County argues that because Mikulich failed to raise this issue before the
Merit Board, he failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him.
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[8] Indiana law requires a claimant with an administrative remedy available to
pursue that remedy before being allowed access to the courts. Lake Cty. Sherriff’s
Merit Bd. v. Peron, 756 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). If a party fails to
exhaust available administrative remedies, the trial court lacks jurisdiction over
the subject matter. Id. “By requiring a party to first pursue all available
administrative remedies before allowing access to the courts, premature
litigation may be avoided, an adequate record for judicial review may be
compiled, and agencies retain the opportunity and autonomy to correct their
own errors.” Id. A review of the record in this matter demonstrates that
Mikulich failed to raise his concern with Murphy’s representation before the
Merit Board. Because Mikulich failed to exhaust the administrative remedies
available to him, we conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Count IV of Mikulich’s complaint and erroneously denied the
County’s motion to dismiss said count.
[9] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum decision.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
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