Rodriguez, Nilda Iliana ( 2014 )


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  •             IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
    OF TEXAS
    NO. PD-1189-13
    NILDA ILIANA RODRIGUEZ, Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    ON APPELLANT’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
    FROM THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
    BELL COUNTY
    A LCALA, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which J OHNSON, J., joined.
    DISSENTING OPINION
    I respectfully dissent from this Court’s judgment reversing the conviction of Nilda
    Iliana Rodriguez, appellant, for felony murder and would instead hold that the evidence is
    sufficient to uphold her conviction for that offense. Although I agree with the majority
    opinion that the law on felony murder requires commission of an “act,” which means
    voluntary or involuntary bodily movement, I disagree that the fact finder was irrational in
    Rodriguez - 2
    deciding that the circumstances of this case fit within that definition. See T EX. P ENAL C ODE
    §§ 1.07(a)(1); 19.02(b)(3). In light of appellant’s claim that she fed the infant with bottles,
    a fact finder could reasonably determine that her act—repeatedly feeding the baby an
    inadequate amount—caused him to starve from malnutrition and dehydration.
    Courts have held that a fact finder is rational in deciding that the starvation of a child
    can constitute an act of commission and omission. See People v. Jennings, 
    237 P.3d 474
    ,
    524-25 (Cal. 2010) (describing the “prolonged and purposeful” starvation of child as a
    “deliberate act,” and finding evidence sufficient to uphold defendant’s conviction for first-
    degree murder involving infliction of torture); see also Fairchild v. State, 
    998 P.2d 611
    , 621
    n.17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (op. on reh’g) (describing willfully starving a child as one of
    several examples of “acts which result in injury or death but do not require force”);
    Commonwealth v. Cottam, 
    616 A.2d 988
    , 1004 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (describing parents’
    conduct in providing inadequate sustenance to children as “acts of commission and
    omission” that created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, and upholding
    defendants’ convictions for reckless endangerment of another person on that basis). This
    Court should similarly hold that the fact finder here was rational in determining that
    appellant’s providing inadequate sustenance that led to the child’s death was an act of
    commission.
    In recognition of the reality that factual circumstances underlying a criminal offense
    are often complicated, Texas law permits the State to plead cases in the alternative, including
    Rodriguez - 3
    allegations of acts of commission and omission, and allows fact finders to use their common
    sense to resolve factual discrepancies for the purpose of arriving at a verdict in the case. The
    majority opinion is inconsistent with these principles and will wreak havoc on other statutes
    that provide for criminal liability under similar situations. If, for example, a person drives
    his car at a high rate of speed towards his intended victim and strikes him, he has committed
    a voluntary act even though the injury actually occurs because the driver has failed to apply
    his brakes in a timely manner. One could characterize those facts as showing that the injury
    was caused by an act of commission in that the driver accelerated towards the victim or by
    an omission in that he failed to apply his brakes. Driving at a high rate of speed without
    applying brakes or continually feeding a child less food than required to sustain life are each
    circumstances that a rational fact finder could determine are acts of commission as well as
    of omission.      Because life is messy, the law does not require that circumstances
    encompassing multiple legal theories be fit neatly into only one.
    I would hold that the evidence is sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt of the offense
    of felony murder.1 I, therefore, would uphold the decision by the court of appeals in
    affirming the judgment of the trial court.
    Filed: June 18, 2014
    Publish
    1
    The State’s other alternative allegation asserted an omission rather than an act. That
    alternative alleged that appellant withheld sufficient nutrition and fluids from the baby. Withholding
    nutrition and fluids is indicative of an omission rather than an act.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: PD-1189-13

Filed Date: 6/18/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/16/2015