Malcolm Williams v. Marion Thatcher (mem.dec.) ( 2016 )

FILED
MEMORANDUM DECISION Apr 25 2016, 5:54 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Malcolm Williams Gregory F. Zoeller
Michigan City, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Aaron T. Craft
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Malcolm Williams, April 25, 2016
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1507-PL-952
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court.
The Honorable Cynthia J. Ayers,
Marion Thatcher, Judge.
Appellee-Defendant. Cause No. 49D04-1502-PL-5005
Friedlander, Senior Judge
[1] After Malcolm Williams filed a pro se complaint for declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief, and a motion for class certification, against Marion Thatcher,
in his official capacity as the Unit Team Manager of the Honors Unit of the
correctional facility in which Williams was incarcerated, and cross motions for
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summary judgment had been considered, the trial court denied Williams the
relief he requested, which was based upon the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In this appeal, we
are asked to determine whether the trial court erred by denying Williams the
relief he requested. Finding once again that the incentivization programs
instituted by the Department of Correction for the purpose of granting
additional privileges to eligible inmates does not violate the United States
Constitution, we affirm.
[2] In 2011, Williams was sentenced to an aggregate term of seventy-five years
executed in the Department of Correction for his convictions of murder and
Class A felony attempted murder. Williams has been incarcerated at the
Indiana State Prison in Michigan City since June 3, 2011.
[3] The ISP is a Level 4 maximum security facility capable of housing more than
2,200 inmates, in addition to those housed in its minimum security unit. The
maximum security unit, in which Williams was housed, houses offenders “with
very long sentences and/or individuals convicted of violent crimes.” Appellee’s
Br. p. 10. The ISP has established programs to encourage good behavior and to
maintain the safety and security of the correctional facility. One of those
programs is the honors program which is challenged here.
[4] The honors unit is housed in I-Cell House at the ISP. Of the 130 prisoners
alleged to be in the I-Cell House, eighty-eight are members of the honors unit.
Prisoners who are admitted to the honors unit are given additional privileges
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not granted to prisoners who are members of the general population. Examples
of privileges granted to members of the honors unit are the opportunity to
purchase an Xbox 360 and associated video games for personal use in their
cells, and more frequent visitation from guests. Williams alleged that members
of the honors unit have five microwaves available for their use, while members
of other cell houses have two microwaves shared by roughly 300 to 400
prisoners.
[5] Eligibility for the honors unit, effective March 5, 2014, is available to offenders
who: (1) are at least thirty years of age; (2) must have a minimum of two years
at ISP; (3) must be in credit class I at the time of admittance to the program and
maintain that classification; (4) must currently be assigned to a job or program
and maintain an average or better evaluation; (5) must be clear of conduct
involving weapons and/or bodily injury for forty-eight months and be clear of
any conduct reports for twenty four months; (6) must not be an active member
of a security threat group; (7) must have a medical code of “A” or “G”; (8)
must be free of any ongoing investigations; (9) must meet all double-celling
criteria; and (10) must not have a serious escape history. Appellant’s App. pp.
40-41. One of the reasons for the age requirement for eligibility in the honors
unit is that statistics compiled by the DOC show that prisoners younger than
thirty years of age commit violations of prison rules at more than twice the rate
of inmates who are thirty years old or older.
[6] Williams, who was born August 11, 1989, attempted to apply for the honors
unit, but was denied because, at age 23 or 24, he did not meet the minimum age
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requirement. In its denial of his application, the DOC recognized Williams’s
perfect conduct record. Because Williams was denied membership in the
honors unit due to his age, he alleged in his complaint that the ISP violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by engaging in age
discrimination and by treating Williams disparately without relation to penal
interest. Although Williams did not seek damages for the alleged constitutional
violation, he did seek a declaration that the age requirement was
unconstitutional and that his right to equal treatment had been violated.
[7] On June 24, 2015, the trial court entered an order denying Williams’s motion
for summary judgment and request for class certification. The trial court
granted the State’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court’s
judgment reads in pertinent part as follows:
The Court FINDS that the Indiana State Prison is not forbidden
by the federal or state Constitutions from instituting an honors
program that rewards inmates for good behavior. The
Defendants have shown that there is a rational basis for the ISP
to impose an age restriction for admission in its honors unit, in
that the older inmates generally have greater levels of maturity
and are less prone to violence. The existence of the honors unit
serves as an incentive to promote good behavior, particularly
among long-term offenders for whom credit time and other
reward systems might not be as effective. ISP’s experience,
supported by its own records, shows that younger offenders are
far more prone to violence and are less suited to placement in less
restricted environments such as the honors unit. The honors unit
provides inmates with an incentive for good behavior to get into
the program, to not be removed from the program after being
admitted, and serves as an example of model behavior. The age
requirement protects the integrity of the program. The Plaintiff’s
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equal protection claim fails because ISP’s age requirement for the
honors unit is sufficiently related to the ISP’s legitimate objective
in the safety and security of the facility.
Appellant’s App. pp. 7-8. Williams now appeals.
[8] Williams appeals from the denial of his motion for summary judgment. On
appeal from a grant or denial of summary judgment, our standard of review is
identical to that of the trial court. We must determine whether there exists a
genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Winchell v. Guy, 857 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006); see also Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Appellate review of a summary judgment
motion is limited to those materials specifically designated to the trial court.
Pond v. McNellis, 845 N.E.2d 1043 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. All facts
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are construed in favor of the
nonmovant. Id. The party appealing the judgment carries the burden of
persuading the appellate court that the trial court’s decision was erroneous.
Bradshaw v. Chandler, 916 N.E.2d 163 (Ind. 2009). Although specific findings
may aid our review of a summary judgment ruling, they are not binding on this
Court, Alva Elec., Inc. v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 7 N.E.3d 263 (Ind.
2014), and we may affirm a grant of summary judgment upon any basis
supported by the evidence. Pfenning v. Lineman, 947 N.E.2d 392 (Ind. 2011).
Moreover, “[t]he fact that the parties made cross-motions for summary
judgment does not alter our standard of review. Instead, we must consider each
motion separately to determine whether the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Pond, 845 N.E.2d at 1053.
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[9] We recently considered and affirmed a trial court’s rejection of a nearly
identical claim in Hicks v. Thatcher, 44 N.E.3d 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). In
reaching that conclusion, we stated as follows:
The Appellees have established that the disparate treatment
complained of by Hicks bears a rational relation to a legitimate
penological interest. As a whole, prison security is a primary,
legitimate governmental interest that is influenced by things such
as fostering responsibility and good behavior in inmates and
using inmates as role models for other inmates. Conversely,
Hicks has failed to demonstrate discrimination that was instituted
for the purpose of causing adverse effects on the general
population of inmates at ISP. The opposite is true; the Honor
Unit at ISP, with its attendant privileges, was created to have
positive effects on the behavior of the general population. As a
panel of this Court previously noted, inmates do not forfeit all
constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and
confinement in prison. Faver v. Bayh, 689 N.E.2d 727, 730 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1997). However, incarceration does bring about the
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights,
which is justified by the considerations underlying our penal
system, including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of inmates,
and institutional safety and security. Id.Id. at 1263.
[10] Williams’s argument on appeal actually supports the stated goals of the ISP in
the creation of the Honors Unit and that those goals are having the desired
impact. Prisoners, such as Williams, are conforming their conduct to become
eligible for the program. The ISP acknowledged and we commend Williams
for his lack of conduct issues while incarcerated. Williams can establish a
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history of continued maturity and compliant behavior, while attaining the age
at which his application can be fully considered.
[11] The ISP has established that there is a rational basis for denying membership in
the honors unit based upon age as we have recognized in Hicks. While
Williams has begun to establish a history of good conduct while incarcerated,
he has yet to achieve the age requirement for membership. While relying on
Hicks, we understand that there are factual dissimilarities in Williams’s appeal.
Hicks was between the age of thirty and thirty-five, and was denied membership
because he had not met the minimum age requirement, which at the time was
thirty-five. The age requirement was lowered to thirty during the pendency of
Hicks’s challenge, and the State argued that he therefore lacked standing. We
considered the issues he raised on behalf of others with standing, nonetheless.
Here, Williams has several years before he reaches the minimum age
requirement and there is no evidence that the age requirement for membership
has been or will be lowered. The trial court did not err by granting the State’s
motion for summary judgment and denying Williams’s motion.
[12] Williams also challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for class
certification, but does not offer cogent argument in support of this challenge. A
pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded
no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented. Zavodnik v.
Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259 (Ind. 2014). Although this argument is arguably waived,
however, we prefer to decide a case on the merits whenever possible. Omni Ins.
Group v. Poage, 966 N.E.2d 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
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[13] Whether an action is maintainable as a class action is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Gresh, 888 N.E.2d 779 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2008). On appellate review of a trial court’s order with respect to class
certification, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. Id. The trial court’s
certification order will be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id.Misinterpretation of law will not justify affirmance under the abuse of
discretion standard. Id.[14] Indiana Trial Rule 23 governs class certification. “The class action certification
process promotes the efficiency and economy of litigation.” LHO Indianapolis
One Lessee, LLC v. Bowman, 40 N.E.3d 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting
Gomez v. St. Vincent Health, Inc., 622 F.Supp.2d 710, 717 (S.D. Ind. 2008)). A
plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the class certification requirements
of Trial Rule 23 have been met. Id. Failure to meet any one of the
requirements results in the denial of class status. Id. Whether these
prerequisites have been met is a factual determination to be made by the trial
court. Id.[15] Williams has presented no evidence of a defined class for certification. In fact,
the trial court decided the issue on the merits, prior to the State’s response to
the class certification issue, when ruling on the cross motions for summary
judgment. Ind. Trial Rule 23 does not preclude the trial court from hearing a
party’s motion for summary judgment before addressing the issue of
certification of the class. Reel v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., 855 N.E.2d 343(Ind. Ct. App. 2006). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by addressing
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the issues presented in the cross motions for summary judgment prior to
considering class certification, and ultimately denying it.
[16] In light of the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
[17] Judgment affirmed.
[18] Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.
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