Jason L. McDonough, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Donna L. Allen v. Kentucky Avenue Land Company (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
May 20 2016, 8:58 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
John P. Daly, Jr. Mark D. Gerth
Golitko & Daly, PC Michael Wroblewski
Indianapolis, Indiana Kightlinger & Gray, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Jason L. McDonough, as May 20, 2016
Personal Representative of the Court of Appeals Case No.
Estate of Donna L. Allen, 49A02-1507-CT-824
Deceased, Appeal from the
Appellant-Plaintiff, Marion Superior Court
The Honorable
v. Heather A. Welch, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
Kentucky Avenue Land 49D01-1302-CT-7768
Company,
Appellee-Defendant.
Kirsch, Judge.
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[1] Jason L. McDonough, as personal representative of the Estate of Donna L.
Allen (“the Estate”), appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment
in favor of Kentucky Avenue Land Company (“Kentucky Avenue”) in the
Estate’s claim of wrongful death against Kentucky Avenue. The Estate raises
two issues, of which we find the following dispositive: whether the trial court
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Kentucky Avenue under
Indiana’s summary judgment standard.
[2] We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On October 3, 2011, Donna Allen (“Allen”) was employed by Turner Security
Services Corporation (“Turner”) as a security officer at a premises owned by
Kentucky Avenue. On that evening, Allen fell on the premises of Kentucky
Avenue and suffered injuries. No one witnessed Allen’s fall. Allen died on
May 17, 2012 without giving any sworn testimony as to how the fall occurred
or what caused her fall. In its complaint, the Estate alleged that Allen fell on a
staircase owned and maintained by Kentucky Avenue that was “in a
dilapidated condition, contained no handrails, and was in violation of
Occupational Safety and Health Administration and building code
regulations.” Appellant’s App. at 23.
[4] Bob Beaman (“Beaman”), another Turner employee who was working with
Allen on the evening of October 3, arrived to assist Allen shortly after her fall.
The next day, Beaman spoke with the owner of Turner, Edward A. Turner, Jr.
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(“Edward”), and told him that the steps were in an unsafe condition. Id. at 79.
Beaman was never deposed and never gave a sworn statement. Edward also
spoke to John Russell (“Russell”), Allen’s supervisor, and Russell reported that
the staircase contained some wobbly boards and all the boards were weathered.
Id. at 80. Russell was not deposed and did not give a sworn statement. Edward
also spoke to Allen while she was in the hospital within a couple of days after
her fall. Allen relayed to Edward that she fell down the stairs and that “she
[thought] that she stepped on a wobbly board and fell down.” Id. at 73.
[5] On the day after Allen’s fall, Edward completed the Indiana Worker’s
Compensation First Report of Employee Injury, Illness. The report contained
an inquiry regarding how the injury occurred, to which Edward indicated:
“while walking back from women’s restroom, employee fell from bottom step
of 7-step wooden stair [sic] on the outside of west loading dock . . . . The steps
are wobbly and have no handrail. It was dark outside and the outside dock
lights were NOT on.” Id. at 81. This information was based on what others
reported to him and not from personal knowledge. In the summer of 2013,
Kentucky Avenue replaced the steps where the fall occurred and installed a
handrail.
[6] On February 25, 2013, the Estate filed a complaint against Kentucky Avenue
alleging wrongful death due to injuries Allen sustained falling down on
property owned by Kentucky Avenue. On January 15, 2015, Kentucky Avenue
filed its motion for summary judgment and designated evidence in support of
the motion. The Estate filed a motion for enlargement of time to respond to
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Kentucky Avenue’s summary judgment motion. The motion was granted, and
the Estate was given until April 15, 2015 to file its response. On April 7, the
Estate filed its response in opposition to Kentucky Avenue’s motion for
summary judgment and a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on the
issue of duty, along with its designated evidence. On April 16, Kentucky
Avenue filed its reply brief, a motion to strike, and a response to the Estate’s
cross-motion for summary judgment. On May 5, the Estate filed a response to
the motion to strike, a reply brief in support of its cross-motion for partial
summary judgment motion, and additionally, a supplemental designation of
evidence. Two days later, Kentucky Avenue filed a motion to strike this
supplemental designated evidence. The trial court held a hearing on all of the
pending motions and, on June 12, 2015, issued an order granting Kentucky
Avenue’s motions to strike and motion for summary judgment. The Estate
now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[7] When reviewing the grant of summary judgment, our standard of review is the
same as that of the trial court. FLM, LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 973 N.E.2d
1167, 1173 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Wilcox Mfg. Grp., Inc. v. Mktg. Servs. of
Ind., Inc., 832 N.E.2d 559, 562 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)), trans. denied. We stand in
the shoes of the trial court and apply a de novo standard of review. Id. (citing
Cox v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 848 N.E.2d 690, 695 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). Our
review of a summary judgment motion is limited to those materials designated
to the trial court. Ind. Trial Rule 56(H); Robson v. Tex. E. Corp., 833 N.E.2d
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461, 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Summary judgment is appropriate
only where the designated evidence shows there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
T.R. 56(C). For summary judgment purposes, a fact is “material” if it bears on
the ultimate resolution of relevant issues. FLM, 973 N.E.2d at 1173. We view
the pleadings and designated materials in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Id. Additionally, all facts and reasonable inferences from those
facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party. Id. (citing Troxel Equip.
Co. v. Limberlost Bancshares, 833 N.E.2d 36, 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans.
denied).
[8] A trial court’s grant of summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of
validity, and the party who lost in the trial court has the burden of
demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous. Id. Where
a trial court enters specific findings and conclusions, they offer insight into the
rationale for the trial court’s judgment and facilitate appellate review, but are
not binding upon this court. Id. We will affirm upon any theory or basis
supported by the designated materials. Id. When a trial court grants summary
judgment, we carefully scrutinize that determination to ensure that a party was
not improperly prevented from having his or her day in court. Id.
[9] Although summary judgment is rarely appropriate in negligence cases because
issues of negligence, contributory negligence, causation, and reasonable care are
more appropriately left for the determination of a trier of fact, questions of law,
like whether a defendant had a duty of care as to a plaintiff or whether certain
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facts constitute proximate cause, may be appropriate for summary judgment.
Kader v. State of Ind., Dep’t of Corr., 1 N.E.3d 717, 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The
tort of negligence has three elements: (1) a duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff resulting from
the defendant’s breach. Christmas v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship, 952 N.E.2d
872, 878 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Summary judgment is appropriate if the
material evidence negates one of these elements. Id.
[10] This case illustrates once again the marked difference in summary judgment
procedure in Indiana as compared to federal practice. Lacy-McKinney v. Taylor
Bean & Whitaker Mortg. Corp., 937 N.E.2d 853, 865 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing
Cole v. Gohmann, 727 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). Federal
summary judgment procedure requires summary judgment to be granted
against a party who fails to come forward with evidence to support an essential
element of that party’s case as to which that party bears the burden of proof at
trial. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). In contrast,
under Indiana’s summary judgment procedure, the party moving for summary
judgment has the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact
exists. Id. at 865-66 (citing Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers, 644 N.E.2d
118, 123 (Ind. 1994)).1 Only after the moving party has met this burden with a
1
We note that our Supreme Court recently handed down Gaff v. Ind.-Purdue Univ. of Fort Wayne, -- N.E.3d –
(Ind. 2016), which again reiterates that Indiana’s summary judgment procedure diverges from federal
summary judgment practice and imposes a “‘more onerous burden’” on the moving party: “‘to affirmatively
negate an opponent’s claim.’” Id. at – (quoting Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000,1003 (Ind. 2014)).
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prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists does the
burden then shift to the non-moving party to establish that a genuine issue of
material fact does in fact exist. Id. at 866.
[11] Here, the dispute between the parties centered on what was the cause of Allen’s
fall. Therefore, to prevail under Indiana procedural law, Kentucky Avenue, as
the moving party, had the burden of affirmatively negating the Estate’s claim
that Kentucky Avenue was negligent in maintaining the stairs and that such
negligence caused Allen’s fall. Kentucky Avenue failed to do so. It did not
designate any evidence to demonstrate that it properly maintained the steps or
that Allen’s fall was not caused by its negligence. Kentucky Avenue only
demonstrated that there were no witness statements relating to the accident and
no statements of Allen related to the matter that could be produced in Kentucky
Avenue’s request for production of documents.
[12] The trial court found, after striking much of the Estate’s designated evidence,
that the Estate’s remaining designated evidence did not support a reasonable
inference that Kentucky Avenue’s negligence caused Allen’s fall and that
summary judgment should be entered in favor of Kentucky Avenue. Appellant’s
App. at 19. However, under Indiana’s summary judgment procedure, unlike the
federal procedure, the burden was on Kentucky Avenue, as the moving party,
to come forth with evidence to negate the Estate’s claim, which Kentucky
Avenue failed to do; the burden was not on the Estate. Therefore, we conclude
that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Kentucky
Avenue because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Allen’s fall
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was caused by Kentucky Avenue’s negligence. We reverse the grant of
summary judgment in favor of Kentucky Avenue and remand for further
proceedings.2
[13] Reversed and remanded.
[14] Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.
2
The Estate also raises contentions that the trial court erred in striking portions of its designated evidence.
We need not reach these issues because even if we were to hold that the trial court should not have stricken
the evidence, we would still reverse the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment in favor of
Kentucky Avenue. Likewise, the Estate also asserts that the trial court erred in denying its cross-motion for
partial summary judgment as to the issue of duty. We note, however, that the trial court did not deny the
Estate’s cross-motion based on the evidence, but instead, found the motion moot due to the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of Kentucky Avenue. As we are reversing that grant of summary judgment,
we remand to the trial court for further proceedings including a determination of this issue.
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