In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.J. and J.J. (Minor Children), R.J. (Mother) and Jo.J. (Father) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION                                                               FILED
    May 24 2016, 8:37 am
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                            CLERK
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                         Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS                                 ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Bruce N. Elliott                                        Gregory F. Zoeller
    Marion, Indiana                                         Attorney General of Indiana
    Robert J. Henke
    Deputy Attorney General
    James D. Boyer
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Termination of the Parent-                       May 24, 2016
    Child Relationship of K.J. and                          Court of Appeals Case No.
    J.J. (Minor Children),                                  27A02-1510-JT-1811
    Appeal from the Grant Superior
    R.J. (Mother) and Jo.J. (Father),                       Court
    Appellants-Respondents,                                 The Honorable Dana J.
    Kenworthy, Judge
    v.                                              Trial Court Cause Nos.
    27D02-1408-JT-17 and
    Indiana Department of Child                             27D02-1501-JT-2
    Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016             Page 1 of 15
    Najam, Judge.
    Statement of the Case
    [1]   Jo.J. (“Father”) and R.J. (“Mother”) (collectively “Parents”) appeal the trial
    court’s termination of their parental rights over their minor children K.J. and
    J.J. (“Children”). Parents raise a single issue for our review, namely, whether
    the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) presented sufficient
    evidence to support the termination of their parental rights over Children. We
    affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   Father and Mother were married and living together in Marion when Mother
    gave birth to K.J. on May 20, 2013. K.J. was hospitalized for approximately
    two months after her birth due to multiple health issues, including hypoxic
    ischemic encephalopathy. On July 11, DCS filed a petition alleging that K.J.
    was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). And on July 18, Parents admitted
    that the following allegations in the CHINS petition were true:
    a.      That their home was in need of repairs due to a water line
    break, which caused mold in the back bedroom.
    b.      That their home was infested with fleas.
    c.      That their home was not suitable for [K.J.] upon her
    release from the hospital.
    d.      That they were living in temporary housing until their
    home became appropriate.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016   Page 2 of 15
    e.      That [K.J.] had continuing medical needs and they would
    benefit from services to assist them in meeting her needs.
    f.      That Mother had an older child removed from her care
    and not reunified with her.
    Appellants’ App. at 50-51. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that K.J. was a
    CHINS, and the court ordered Parents to comply with a parental participation
    plan. On September 20, “due to further allegations of neglect,” DCS removed
    K.J. from Parents’ care and placed her in foster care. 
    Id. at 51.
    Parents began
    supervised visitation with K.J. at that time.
    [3]   On April 7, 2014, Mother gave birth to J.J. On April 10, DCS filed a petition
    alleging that J.J. was a CHINS, and, with a court order, DCS took J.J. into
    custody. Following an initial hearing, the trial court ordered that J.J. was a
    CHINS, and she was placed into foster care.
    [4]   On August 12, 2014, and January 22, 2015, DCS filed petitions to terminate
    Parents’ parental rights as to K.J. and J.J., respectively. Following a final
    evidentiary hearing on those petitions over the course of four days and
    concluding on June 4, 2015, the trial court issued its order terminating Parents’
    parental rights to Children. In that order, the trial court entered remarkably
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016   Page 3 of 15
    detailed findings and conclusions. DCS has summarized the critical findings
    supporting termination as follows:1
    21. Mother’s Prior CHINS Involvement. Mother had a ten-year[-
    ]old child, H.D., who[m] Montana state authorities removed
    from Mother’s care. The case was open for 18 months and
    Mother was required to participate in services. Child H.D. never
    returned to Mother and Maternal Grandmother, who lives in
    Arizona, adopted child.
    22. The Children’s Special Medical Needs. Children both have
    special medical needs. Child J.J. was born premature and suffers
    from seizures, ischemic encephalopathy, and has one functioning
    kidney. Child K.J. also suffers from seizures. Children both take
    seizure medications. Children are regularly seen by doctors and
    at Riley Children’s Hospital.
    Parents do not understand fully Children’s medical issues nor
    have they been involved fully in their medical care. Despite the
    court ordering Parents to attend Children’s medical
    appointments, they have attended very few of them. They do not
    know the names of Children’s doctors and they do not know the
    medications or dosages given to Children. Because of Parents’
    pattern of passivity and non-involvement, the court finds Parents’
    assertion that they will meet Children’s medical needs when they
    are returned to them to be dubious. There is a reasonable
    probability that Parents would not appropriately attend to
    Children’s medical needs.
    23. The Children’s Developmental Delays. Children both have
    developmental delays. Child K.J. has delays in her cognitive,
    1
    Parents do not challenge the accuracy of DCS’s summary of the findings, and our close review of the
    summaries of each finding reveals that they are accurate. We adopt DCS’s summary of the findings here for
    the sake of efficiency.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016           Page 4 of 15
    social, expressive, and fine and gross motor skills. Child J.J. has
    delays in her expressive, social-emotional, and fine and gross
    motor skills. Services have been provided to the family three
    times a week since April 2014 to assist Parents in working with
    Children to achieve developmental milestones.
    Although Parents have good attendance and have shown
    improvement, they have not been able to consistently implement
    the skills taught to them without redirection or the provider’s
    continued direct involvement. Parents lack appropriate
    motivation and urgency. Also, they lack understanding of
    Children’s developmental delays and Father outright denies
    Children have such a problem. The provider has concerns about
    Parent’s lack of parenting skills and their inability to remedy the
    poor living conditions. The court finds that there is a reasonable
    probability that Parents would not be able to help Children
    improve their developmental delays.
    24. Unsafe Home Conditions. The court ordered parents to clean
    their home and maintain it in a safe condition. DCS provided
    parents with case management services through several providers
    to help them improve the condition of the home. Despite two
    years with several providers, Parents had not improved the
    condition of the home in that there remained “hazardous clutter
    and dangerous items left within reach of small children, i.e.,
    antifreeze, motor oil, lighters, potting soil, overflowing litter
    boxes full of cat feces, chemicals, and trash.” One service
    provided ended services after Father got into an argument with
    them. Mother acknowledged that progress had been slow.
    Parents were not able to demonstrate skills taught to them. The
    court finds that there is a reasonable probability that Parents will
    not be able to keep their home in a condition that is safe and
    suitable for Children.
    25. Parents’ Contact with DCS. Parents maintained contact with
    DCS and signed all required releases.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016   Page 5 of 15
    26. Inadequate Parenting Skills. Parents regularly attended
    supervised visitation with Children. During the CHINS case,
    visitation never moved past supervised. Although Parents appear
    to love Children and have a bond with them, they have not
    improved in their ability to care appropriately and safely for
    them. Parents do not closely supervise Children. Providers
    supervising visits question whether Parents have benefitted from
    services because they are not able to apply the skills they have
    learned. Parents make excuses, are defensive, and are resistant to
    suggestions. DCS and providers have experienced conflict with
    Parents regarding parenting issues and DCS observed, at a time
    when DCS removed child K.J. from the home, Father “acting
    erratically, cursing, yelling and acting threatening, such that law
    enforcement had to be called.” Mother usually remains in one
    position sitting on the couch during visits and does not interact
    fully with Children. Parents both have fallen asleep on numerous
    occasions during visits.
    27. Common Sense Parenting Program. Parents completed
    parenting classes. Mother admitted that the classes were of little
    benefit and Father fell asleep during some of the class time.
    Despite their completion, concerns remained about their ability
    to appropriately care for Children.
    28. FCM Visits to the Home. Parents denied DCS’ access to the
    home on at least two occasions and denied DCS the ability to
    take pictures of the home.
    29. Parents’ Finances. Father is the beneficiary of a family trust,
    he receives $502 per month in government disability, and earns
    additional income from several part-time jobs. Mother is not
    employed and says she receives $708 per month in Social
    Security. Parents have adequate income to pay their bills but
    make questionable financial decisions that sometimes leave them
    without income to buy such things as gasoline for their vehicle.
    Parents are renting to own a trailer and obtain most of their
    household furnishings from rent-to-own stores. Parents have
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016   Page 6 of 15
    made questionable purchases on such items as a big screen
    television and the latest iPhones. Parents have received help
    with budgeting and have been advised that if they continue their
    current spending habits, the funds in their trust will be depleted
    by 2025. Parents have shown resistance to suggestions regarding
    their finances by becoming angry and defensive.
    30. Parenting/Psychological/IQ Assessments. Parents both
    completed parenting assessments and IQ tests including the Child
    Abuse Potential Inventory (“CAPI”), the Minnesota Multiphasic
    Personality Inventory 2 (“MMPI-2”), and the Wechsler tool to
    measure intellectual functioning.
    Mother’s testing results for CAPI were invalid because she
    presented herself in an overly positive way. The MMPI-2
    showed that she “may tend to deviate from a normal way of
    doing things when she is frustrated, she has a high resistance to
    self-disclosure, has a tendency to minimize problems and not see
    them as significant when they may very well be.” As for
    intelligence, she tested in the “slow normal range” with a full
    scale IQ of 77, which is in the borderline range. She has a severe
    learning disability particularly in verbal learning. The
    psychologist administering the testing has predominant concerns
    about Mother’s ability to parent Children because of her
    tendency to deny and minimize problems.
    Father’s CAPI results indicated an elevated rigidity scale score,
    which shows Father to be inflexible and potentially overly critical
    and demanding. This can contribute to abuse and neglect and
    indicate relationship problems with Children. The overall results
    were concerning.
    Father’s MMPI-2 results indicated that Father has “problems
    with ongoing anxiety, has a negative view of his environment
    and society, has very negative attitudes towards treatment and
    social service organizations, tends to become aggressive when
    frustrated, tends to minimize problems, is socially insecure, has a
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016   Page 7 of 15
    high resistance to self-disclosure, has more stressors related to his
    marital relationship than he admits, has a low motivation to
    change, has a high level of denial of problems, has significant
    problems with social relationships, and has trust issues.” In
    addition, the results indicate Schizoid features such as difficulty
    relating to others and expressing feelings appropriately. Based on
    the MMPI-2 results, the psychologist diagnosed Father with
    Personality Disorder with Schizoid and Paranoid Features.
    Father’s full scale IQ was 60, which placed him in the mildly
    impaired range. The psychologist had concerns about Father’s
    ability to parent Children because of his low motivation, negative
    outlook, and low intellectual functioning.
    31. Family Counseling. Parents have been involved in counseling
    since June 25, 2014. Goals included reunification and Parent’s
    role and responsibility in Children’s removal. Parent’s counselor
    indicated that although Parents made some progress, they did not
    meet the goals. The counselor characterized parents as
    “overwhelmed by the system” and they were limited in their
    ability to understand issues. The counselor also noted that
    Parents frequented a local strip club and sought emotional
    support from the club employees. The counselor expressed
    concerns about Parents ability to provide full-time care for
    Children. Their success would depend on an ability to
    understand Children and Children’s needs, but Parents lack the
    intellectual ability and character to do so. They have been
    unable to apply the skills taught to them.
    32. FCM Hullinger’s Recommendation. The FCM never
    recommended the return of Children to Parents’ care because of
    the condition of the home and Parents’ inability to parent them
    safely. Termination is in Children’s best interests because of
    Parents inability to follow instructions and utilize the thing
    taught to them.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016   Page 8 of 15
    33. CASA’s Recommendations. CASA agreed that Parents have
    not resolved the conditions of Children’s removal and that
    reunification would pose a threat to Children’s wellbeing.
    Children have been in their current foster home for most of their
    lives and are bonded, they feel safe, and are doing well. CASA
    agreed with the DCS’ plan of adoption.
    34. Best Interests. Termination of parental rights is in Children’s
    best interests.
    35. Permanency Plan. Adoption is a satisfactory plan.
    Appellee’s Br. at 21-24 (summarizing findings found at Appellants’ App. at 53-
    71). And the trial court entered the following relevant conclusions:
    2.      There is a reasonable probability that:
    a.     The conditions which resulted in [Children’s]
    removal and continued placement outside the home
    will not be remedied;
    b.    Continuation of the parent-child relationship
    poses a threat to [Children’s] wellbeing.
    3.     Termination of parental rights is in [Children’s] best
    interests.
    4.    There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
    [Children], that being adoption.
    Appellants’ App. at 72. This appeal ensued.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016   Page 9 of 15
    Discussion and Decision
    [5]   We begin our review of this appeal by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional
    right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the
    Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe
    Div. of Family & Children (In re M.B.), 
    666 N.E.2d 73
    , 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996),
    trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the
    parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a
    termination. Schultz v. Porter Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re K.S.), 
    750 N.E.2d 832
    , 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child
    relationship is proper where a child’s emotional and physical development is
    threatened. 
    Id. Although the
    right to raise one’s own child should not be
    terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental
    rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or
    her parental responsibilities. 
    Id. at 836.
    [6]   Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS
    is required to allege and prove, among other things:
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the
    conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
    reasons for placement outside the home of the
    parents will not be remedied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016   Page 10 of 15
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
    continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
    threat to the well-being of the child.
    ***
    (C) [and] that termination is in the best interests of the child . . . .
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). That statute provides that DCS need establish only
    one of the requirements of subsection (b)(2)(B) before the trial court may
    terminate parental rights. DCS’s “burden of proof in termination of parental
    rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” R.Y. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
    Servs. (In re G.Y.), 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting I.C. § 31-37-
    14-2).
    [7]   When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the
    evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cnty. Ofc. of
    Family & Children (In re D.D.), 
    804 N.E.2d 258
    , 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.
    denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that
    are most favorable to the judgment. 
    Id. Moreover, in
    deference to the trial
    court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s
    judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.
    Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children (In re L.S.), 
    717 N.E.2d 204
    , 208
    (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). trans. denied.
    [8]   Here, in terminating Parents’ parental rights, the trial court entered specific
    findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court’s judgment
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016   Page 11 of 15
    contains special findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of
    review. Bester v. Lake Cnty. Ofc. of Family & Children, 
    839 N.E.2d 143
    , 147 (Ind.
    2005). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and,
    second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. 
    Id. “Findings are
    clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to
    support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 
    671 N.E.2d 98
    ,
    102 (Ind. 1996). If the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s
    decision, we must affirm. In re 
    L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208
    .
    [9]    Parents contend that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s
    findings underlying its conclusions that they will not remedy the conditions that
    resulted in Children’s removal or that the continuation of the parent-child
    relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Children. Because Indiana Code
    Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, we only address the
    sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that
    continuation of the parent-child relationships poses a threat to Children’s well-
    being.2
    [10]   Parents devote much of the Argument section of their brief on appeal to the trial
    court’s conclusion that the reasons for Children’s removal will not be remedied.
    2
    Parents do not challenge the trial court’s conclusions that termination is in the Children’s best interests or
    that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children, namely, adoption.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016                 Page 12 of 15
    With respect to the trial court’s conclusion that continuation of the parent-child
    relationships poses a threat to Children’s well-being, Parents state as follows:
    Without actual evidence that the parents are unwilling or unable
    to care for the girls’ medical issues, the court improperly
    concluded that the girls’ well-being was somehow threatened by
    living with their parents in the home that the parents had
    improved to make it safe.
    It is noteworthy that mother told the court that the girls were
    place[d] in Early Head Start as infants. . . .
    With the continued help of such programs, there is nothing in the
    record to substantiate the contention that these parents are a
    danger to the well[-]being of these children.
    There was insufficient evidence presented as to what the girls’
    specific medical needs are that these parents are either unwilling
    or unable to meet, or couldn’t meet satisfactorily with help from
    family service programs. . . .
    Appellants’ Br. at 25-26.
    [11]   Parents’ contentions on appeal amount to a request that we reweigh the
    evidence, which we will not do. A trial court need not wait until a child is
    irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that his physical, mental, and
    social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child
    relationship. Shupperd v. Miami Cnty. Div. of Family & Children (In re E.S.), 
    762 N.E.2d 1287
    , 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). When the evidence shows that the
    emotional and physical development of a child in need of services is threatened,
    termination of the parent-child relationship is appropriate. 
    Id. Court of
    Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016   Page 13 of 15
    [12]   DCS presented evidence that K.J. was removed from Parents’ care only a few
    months after her birth, and J.J. was removed from their care only a few days
    after her birth. Throughout the CHINS proceedings, Parents struggled to
    comply with the parental participation plans. The evidence shows that Parents
    struggled to maintain a clean and safe home environment for Children, and
    they did not engage in Children’s extensive medical care. Parents’ supervised
    visits with Children were marred by Mother’s lack of interaction with Children,
    both parents’ failure to practice good parenting skills, and both parents sleeping
    during visits. As Ed Pereira, Parents’ family counselor, testified, Parents have
    poor judgment and would be unable to care for Children, who are both special
    needs. Pereira testified that the thought of Parents attempting to care for
    Children on their own “scare[d]” him. Tr. at 105.
    [13]   Still, Parents assert that “[m]ental disability, standing alone, is not a proper
    ground for terminating parental rights.” Appellants’ Br. at 24 (citing R.G. v.
    Marion Cnty. Ofc., Dep’t of Family & Children, 
    647 N.E.2d 326
    , 330 (Ind. Ct. App.
    1995), trans. denied). But Parents acknowledge that “their mental disabilities
    were [not] the sole issue cited by the trial court” in support of termination of
    their parental rights. 
    Id. at 24-25.
    Indeed, while the trial court acknowledges
    Parents’ IQs in its findings, the court’s many other findings more than support
    termination of Parents’ parental rights.
    [14]   The trial court’s findings support the trial court’s conclusion that there is a
    reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationships
    pose a threat to Children’s well-being. Again, Parents do not challenge the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016   Page 14 of 15
    remainder of the trial court’s conclusions. We hold that the trial court did not
    err when it terminated Parents’ parental rights to Children.
    [15]   Affirmed.
    Robb, J., and Crone, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 27A02-1510-JT-1811 | May 24, 2016   Page 15 of 15