Richard W. Shelton v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2018 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Nov 30 2018, 11:12 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Karen M. Heard Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Vanderburgh County Public Defender’s Attorney General of Indiana
Office
Evansville, Indiana Caroline G. Templeton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Richard W. Shelton, November 30, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1075
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David D. Kiely,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
82C01-1705-F1-2949
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Richard W. Shelton appeals his sentence following his guilty plea to rape, as a
Level 1 felony; attempted aggravated battery, as a Level 3 felony; criminal
confinement, as a Level 3 felony; domestic battery, as a Level 5 felony; and
possession of a narcotic, as a Level 6 felony. He raises two issues for our
review, which we restate as follows:
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
sentenced him.
2. Whether his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature
of the offenses and his character.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On May 14, 2017, Shelton was at home with his wife, L.S., and their four-year-
old daughter. At approximately 2:00 p.m., Shelton’s mother picked up the
child in order to watch her. At that time, Shelton and L.S. began to argue.
Soon after the argument began, Shelton hit L.S. and told her that he was going
to kill her. Shelton threw L.S. into the shower, urinated on her, and cut off
approximately seven inches of her hair with a knife. Shelton then poured
lighter fluid on her and lit his lighter in front of her. He then punched L.S. in
the stomach, ribs, and vagina. Shelton tied L.S. up and inserted an ice cube
into her vagina and her anus. He also inserted a knife blade into her vagina.
Shelton then placed a sock and underwear into L.S.’s mouth, taped her mouth
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shut, and poured water into her nose. He also put a belt around her neck and
penetrated her anus with his penis. Shelton repeatedly hit L.S. with the butt of
his knife, and he cut her legs and buttocks several times. He then used a
Dremel tool to burn her arm, and he shoved her onto the floor where she hit her
head. As a result, L.S. was rendered temporarily unconscious. Shelton
continued to kick, slap, and punch L.S. At around 9:00 p.m., Shelton’s mother
returned with Shelton and L.S.’s daughter, and Shelton “calmed down.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 24.
[4] The next morning, Shelton again “became furious,” and he threatened and
punched L.S. while L.S. was in bed with their daughter. Id. He then pressed
L.S. against a wall, held a knife to her throat, and told her “it was time to die.”
Id. Shelton also told L.S. that the knife would be waiting for her when she
returned from work. Shelton further told L.S. that he would kill L.S. and her
family if she went to the hospital or called the police.
[5] At some point soon thereafter, L.S. went to the hospital and someone notified
the police. After L.S. gave her statement, officers with the Evansville Police
Department arrested Shelton and transported him to a confinement center.
Once there, one of the officers searched Shelton and found a small plastic bag
that contained eleven oxymorphone tablets as well as a folded five-dollar bill in
his wallet that contained methamphetamine.
[6] The State charged Shelton with one count of rape, as a Level 1 felony (“Count
I”); one count of attempted aggravated battery, as a Level 3 felony (“Count
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II”); one count of criminal confinement, as a Level 3 felony (“Count III”); one
count of rape, as a Level 3 felony (“Count IV”); one count of domestic battery,
as a Level 5 felony (“Count V”); one count of possession of methamphetamine,
as a Level 6 felony (“Count VI”); and one count of possession of a narcotic
drug, as a Level 6 felony (“Count VII”).
[7] Prior to the date of the trial, Shelton filed a notice of his intent to raise the
defense of insanity and a request that he be evaluated to determine his
competency. Thereafter, the trial court appointed two psychiatrists to evaluate
Shelton in order to determine whether he was legally insane at the time he
committed the offenses. Shelton reported to one of the psychiatrists that he had
been under the influence of multiple illegal drugs at the time he committed the
offenses against L.S. And he told both psychiatrists that he had used various
illegal drugs, including methamphetamine, heroin, and opiates, as well as
alcohol, on a daily basis since he was approximately thirteen years old. After
both psychiatrists filed their reports,1 the trial court concluded that Shelton was
competent to stand trial. The court then scheduled a jury trial for March 12,
2018.
[8] On the morning of the scheduled trial, the parties filed a plea agreement.
Pursuant to that agreement, the State agreed to dismiss Count VI, and Shelton
1
One of the psychiatrists determined that Shelton was not insane at the time of the offenses. The other was
unable to form a conclusion as to Shelton’s sanity.
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agreed to plead guilty to the remaining counts. That same day, the trial court
accepted the plea agreement and dismissed Count VI.2
[9] On April 5, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. During the hearing,
Shelton presented as evidence letters and testimony from friends and family in
support of his character. And the State presented as evidence photographs of
L.S.’s injuries that officers had taken at the hospital. In addition, the State
presented the testimony of L.S.’s mother, who testified that, since the incident,
L.S. has been “scared, broken, [and] crying.” Tr. Vol. II at 22. L.S.’s mother
further testified that L.S. has been having nightmares.
[10] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered judgment of conviction
for Counts I, II, III, V, and VII.3 At that time, the court found the following
mitigating factors:
The Court notes, as mitigating factors, that the defendant did
plead guilty, again the day of trial, and we did have the jury here
but he plead[ed] guilty before any evidence or any of the Court
proceedings had started, and the Court notes that he did turn
down a twenty[-]year offer the Friday before the trial. The
defendant has no prior felonies, he does have a minor
misdemeanor offense of Reckless Driving and Trespass. Now
there is a prior Domestic Battery that was dismissed because the
defendant completed the Domestic Abuse Intervention Program.
The Court does find that it’s the Court’s belief that it is going to
2
Shelton did not include a copy of the transcript from the March 12 change-of-plea hearing in his appendix.
3
The court did not enter judgment of conviction on Count IV as it found that Count IV merged with Count
I.
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be a hardship on the dependent child of the defendant in this
case, and the other family members that are here in Court today.
The Court finds that . . . I do believe that this incident, part of it
was a result of the defendant’s substance abuse problems. The
Court does feel that the defendant is remorseful.
Id. at 31-32 (omission in original). And the court identified as aggravating
factors the fact that Shelton has a prior incident involving domestic violence
and the nature of the offenses. Specifically, in finding the nature of the offenses
to be an aggravating factor, the trial court found that “[i]t was a brutal incident,
and it was an ongoing incident over numerous hours and, as the State
mentioned, there was a time period when the minor child was present.” Id. at
32.
[11] The trial court sentenced Shelton to thirty-five years for Count I, ten years for
Count II, ten years for Count III, four years for Count V, and one and one-half
years for Count VII. The trial court ordered those sentences to run concurrently
for an aggregate term of thirty-five years in the Department of Correction. This
appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
Issue One: Abuse of Discretion
[12] Shelton first contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced
him. Sentencing decisions lie within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). An abuse of discretion
occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and
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circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual
deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Gross v. State, 22 N.E.3d 863, 869 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied.
[13] A trial court abuses its discretion in sentencing if it does any of the following:
(1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a
sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a
sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating
factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3)
enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly
supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4)
considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.”
Id. (quoting Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind.), clarified on reh’g
other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). However, “the relative weight or
value assignable to reasons properly found, or to those which should have been
found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Sandleben v. State, 22
N.E.3d 782, 796 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Here, Shelton contends that
the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to find certain mitigating
circumstances and when it found certain aggravating factors.
Mitigators
[14] Shelton contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to
identify several mitigating circumstances.
[A] finding of mitigating circumstances also lies within the trial
court’s discretion. The court need not state in the record those
mitigating circumstances that it considers insignificant. And the
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trial court is not obligated to explain why it did not find a factor
to be significantly mitigating. Nor is the sentencing court
required to place the same value on a mitigating circumstance as
does the defendant.
Id. at 796-97. Further, “‘[i]f the trial court does not find the existence of a
mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not
obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist.’”
Anglemeyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493 (quoting Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374
(Ind. 1993)).
[15] Shelton first asserts that the trial court failed to “actually consider Mr. Shelton’s
agreement to plead guilty to the charges against him.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. In
other words, Shelton contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it
omitted a mitigator that was clearly supported by the record. But the record
reflects that the trial court did not fail to consider Shelton’s plea agreement.
Indeed, not only did the trial court consider his guilty plea, the court explicitly
identified Shelton’s guilty plea as a mitigating circumstance.
[16] Shelton next asserts that the trial court failed to “give sufficient consideration”
to his lack of a substantial criminal history or his remorse as mitigating factors.
Id. at 11. In essence, Shelton asserts that, while the trial court identified his lack
of criminal history and his remorse as mitigating factors, the trial court did not
give sufficient weight to those factors. But the court was not required to explain
why it did not find those factors to be significantly mitigating, nor was the trial
court required to place the same weight on the mitigating circumstances that
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Shelton assigns to them. Sandleben, 22 N.E.3d at 796-97. Further, the relative
weight that the trial court assigned to Shelton’s criminal history and remorse is
not subject to review for an abuse of discretion. See id. at 796. Thus, we cannot
say that the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to find Shelton’s
lack of criminal history or remorse to be significant mitigating circumstances.
Aggravators
Rejection of Prior Plea Agreement
Shelton next contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it found as
an aggravating factor the fact that he had rejected a prior plea agreement.
During the sentencing hearing, the trial court twice mentioned that Shelton had
rejected a prior plea agreement the Friday before trial, which started the
following Monday. However, at no point did the trial court identify that as an
aggravating factor, nor is there any evidence that the trial court used the fact
that he had rejected a prior plea agreement to enhance his sentence. Indeed, the
trial court first mentioned the fact that Shelton had rejected the prior plea
agreement before it had entered judgment of conviction. And the court next
mentioned the prior plea agreement at the same time that it identified his guilty
plea as a mitigating factor. The only aggravators that the trial court identified
were his prior offense involving domestic violence and the nature of the
offenses. Because there is no evidence to indicate that the trial court identified
Shelton’s rejection of a prior plea agreement as an aggravating factor, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion.
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Element of the Offense
[17] Shelton also contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it identified
the nature of the offenses as an aggravator because it “used a material element”
of the offenses as an aggravating circumstance. Appellant’s Br at 13. “[A]
material element of a crime may not be used as an aggravating factor to support
an enhanced sentence.” McElroy v. State, 865 N.E.2d 584, 589 (Ind. 2007). But
“when evaluating the nature of the offense, ‘the trial court may properly
consider the particularized circumstances of the factual elements as aggravating
factors.’” Id. (quoting McCarthy v. State, 749 N.E.2d 528, 539 (Ind. 2001)).
[18] Here, while under the influence of illegal drugs, Shelton hit L.S., threatened to
kill her, threw her into the shower, urinated on her, cut her hair, poured lighter
fluid on her and threatened to light her on fire, choked her, repeatedly punched
her, tied her up, put an ice cube in her vagina and anus, put a knife in her
vagina, poured water into her nose while her mouth was taped closed, forced
her to have anal sex with him while he had a belt around her neck, cut her body
multiple times with a knife, hit her several times with the handle of the knife,
burned her with a Dremel tool, shoved her head to the floor, held a knife to her
throat, and threatened to kill her and her family if she went to the police. As a
result of the offenses, L.S. sustained “tremendous bruising,” had several cuts on
her body, and was temporarily unconscious. Tr. Vol. II at 32. Further, the
incident lasted for several hours over the course of two days. And, on the
second day, Shelton and L.S.’s four-year-old child was present.
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[19] Those particular facts clearly go beyond the material elements needed to
establish that Shelton committed rape, attempted aggravated battery, criminal
confinement, domestic battery, and possession of a narcotic. Put another way,
Shelton’s conduct could have satisfied the statutory elements of the crimes
without the offenses having been as brutal as they were. As such, we agree with
the State that the trial court did not rely on the elements of the offenses but,
rather, on the particularized facts of the crimes when it found that the crimes
were “brutal.” Id. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it
identified the nature of the offenses as an aggravating circumstance.
Issue Two: Inappropriateness of Sentence
[20] Shelton next contends that his thirty-five year aggregate sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character. Indiana
Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence
authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the
Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.” This court has recently held that “[t]he
advisory sentence is the starting point the legislature has selected as an
appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Sanders v. State, 71 N.E.3d 839,
844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). And the Indiana Supreme Court has recently
explained that:
The principal role of appellate review should be to attempt to
leaven the outliers . . . but not achieve a perceived “correct”
result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind.
2008). Defendant has the burden to persuade us that the
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sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. [Anglemyer,
868 N.E.2d at 494].
Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635, 642 (Ind. 2017) (omission in original).
[21] Indiana’s flexible sentencing scheme allows trial courts to tailor an appropriate
sentence to the circumstances presented, and the trial court’s judgment “should
receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. Whether we
regard a sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on “our sense of
the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to
others, and myriad other facts that come to light in a given case.” Id. at 1224.
The question is not whether another sentence is more appropriate, but rather
whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265,
268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Deference to the trial court “prevail[s] unless
overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the
offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the
defendant’s character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples
of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[22] Here, for his Level 1 felony conviction, his two Level 3 felony convictions, his
Level 5 felony conviction, and his Level 6 felony conviction, Shelton faced a
maximum possible term of eighty and one-half years. See Ind. Code §§ 35-50-2-
4(b), -5(b), -6(b), -7(b) (2018). In imposing Shelton’s sentence, the trial court
found his guilty plea, his lack of a significant criminal history, the hardship on
his child, his substance-abuse problems, and his remorse as mitigating factors.
And the trial court found his previous incident of domestic violence and the
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nature of the offenses as aggravating circumstances. In light of those findings,
the court ordered Shelton to serve an aggravated sentence for each conviction.
But the court then ordered those sentences to run concurrently, for an aggregate
sentence of thirty-five years.
[23] Shelton concedes that “the nature of the offense[s] is reprehensible.”
Appellant’s Br. at 15. But Shelton contends that his sentence is nonetheless
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses because Shelton “admitted to
heavily using drugs and alcohol at the time of the attack.” Id. He further
contends that his sentence is inappropriate because L.S. “did not write a letter
or attend the sentencing” and because L.S.’s mother “testified that she wasn’t
necessarily asking for a long prison sentence but she wanted him to get help.”
Id. Thus, in essence, Shelton contends that, while the offenses were egregious,
they were not sufficiently egregious to cause L.S. to testify or for L.S.’s mother
to request a lengthy prison sentence.
[24] But L.S.’s decision not to testify and L.S.’s mother’s decision not to ask for a
lengthy sentence are not determinative. And whether the offenses could have
been worse does not detract from the brutality of Shelton’s conduct. Further, as
detailed above, the nature of Shelton’s offenses against L.S. are horrific. We
cannot say that Shelton’s thirty-five year aggregate sentence for his five felony
convictions is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses.
[25] Shelton also asserts that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character
because he has no prior felony convictions and only one prior misdemeanor
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conviction. He further asserts that his sentence is inappropriate because
“[m]ultiple witnesses testified to [his] good character.” Id. Be that as it may,
Shelton has not provided compelling evidence portraying his character in a
positive light. Shelton admitted to a long history of substance abuse for which
he has not received treatment. And Shelton was under the influence of illegal
substances during the instance offenses. Further, the fact that he brutally
attacked his own wife over the course of two days to the point that she suffered
numerous physical injuries and lasting psychological harm reflects poorly on
Shelton’s character. As such, we cannot say that Shelton’s sentence is
inappropriate in light of his character. We affirm Shelton’s thirty-five year
aggregate sentence.
[26] Affirmed.
Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.
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