Adrian P. Crisostomo v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 30 2016, 8:49 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jay A. Rigdon Gregory F. Zoeller
Rockhill Pinnick LLP Attorney General of Indiana
Warsaw, Indiana
Tyler G. Banks
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Adrian P. Crisostomo, June 30, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
43A03-1512-CR-2377
v. Appeal from the Kosciusko
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David C. Cates,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
43D01-1505-F6-268
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] Adrian P. Crisostomo appeals his conviction for failure to register as a sex or
violent offender, a Level 6 felony, following a bench trial. Crisostomo raises a
single issue for our review, which we restate as whether he was required to
report his change in employment in Elkhart County to Kosciusko County,
which was the county of his principal residence, pursuant to Indiana Code
Sections 11-8-8-7 and 11-8-8-8.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On December, 16, 2014, the court required Crisostomo to register for life as a
sexually violent predator. On December 22, Crisostomo registered with the
Sheriff’s Department in Kosciusko County, which was the county of his
principal residence.1 He listed his employer as AutoZone in Elkhart County.
Crisostomo signed a form acknowledging that he would notify the Kosciusko
County Sheriff’s Department of any change in employment. Crisostomo’s last
day of employment at AutoZone was March 30, 2015. On April 6, Crisostomo
began working for Dexstar Wheel located in Elkhart County. However,
Crisostomo did not report this change to the Kosciusko County Sheriff’s
Department until May 4, more than one month later. As a result, the State
1
The parties agree that Crisostomo was also required to register as a sex offender in Elkhart County, the
county where he was then employed, which Crisostomo did.
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charged Crisostomo with failure to register under the sex offender statute, a
Level 6 felony. After a bench trial, the court found Crisostomo guilty as
charged. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[4] Crisostomo contends that the trial court erred when it found him guilty for
failing to register because the court ignored the plain meaning of Indiana Code
Sections 11-8-8-7 and 11-8-8-8 (2014).2 Statutory interpretation is a question of
law that is to be determined de novo. N.L. v. State, 989 N.E.2d 773, 777 (Ind.
2013). Our goal in statutory interpretation is to give effect to the legislature’s
intent. Id. “‘If a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts do not apply any
rules of construction other than giving effect to the plain and ordinary meaning
of the language.’” Id. (quoting Sloan v. State, 947 N.E.2d 917, 922 (Ind. 2011)).
“However, where the language is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, the statute must be construed to give effect to the legislature’s
intent.” Maynard v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1272, 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans.
denied.
2
The State contends that “[t]he essence of Defendant’s argument is that the ‘facts stated do not constitute an
offense.’” Appellee’s Br. at 6. And the State maintains that Crisostomo has “waived his claim” because,
under Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-4, Crisostomo was required to file a motion to dismiss, which he did not
do. Id. However, in his brief on appeal, Crisostomo is not alleging that the facts in the information do not
constitute an offense; rather, he contends that the facts stated are not true. Therefore, he was not required to
file a motion to dismiss, and the State’s contention of waiver is without merit. State v. Gill, 949 N.E.2d 848,
850 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans denied.
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[5] We reject Crisostomo’s argument and hold that the language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous. Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-7(a) specifies who must
register as a sexually violent predator. Subsection 7(a)(1) requires persons who
reside in Indiana to register; subsection 7(a)(2) requires persons working in
Indiana to register; and subsection 7(a)(3) requires persons attending school in
Indiana to register. And Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-7(b) specifies where a sex
offender must register. Under subsection 7(b), a sex or violent offender who
must register under subsection 7(a)(1) shall register in the county where he
resides. Under subsection 7(c), a sex or violent offender who must register
under subsection 7(a)(2) shall register in the county where he works. And if a
sex offender is required to register under both 7(a)(1) and 7(a)(2), then he shall
register in both the county in which he resides and the county in which he
works. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-7(b) (emphases added) (If offender required to
register under 7(a)(1) “is also required to register under subsection 7(a)(2) or
7(a)(3),” he “shall also register with the local law enforcement agency in the
county” where he works or goes to school.); Ind. Code § 11-8-8-7(c) (emphases
added) (Offender required to register under 7(a)(2) “is also required to register
under subsection 7(a)(1) or 7(a)(3),” and “shall also register with the local law
enforcement agency in the county” where he resides.).
[6] Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-8(a) specifies what information a sex or violent
offender must provide upon registration. Most notably, subsection 8(a)(3)
requires a sex or violent offender to provide “the name and address of each of
[his] employers in Indiana” if he is required to register under subsection 7(a)(2).
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And subsection 8(c) provides that, “[i]f the information described in subsection
(a) changes, the sex or violent offender shall report in person to the local law
enforcement authority having jurisdiction over [his] principal address not later
than seventy-two (72) hours after the change and submit the new information to
the local law enforcement body.”
[7] Crisostomo argues that he was only required to register under subsection
7(a)(1), as a resident of Indiana, and that he was not required to register under
subsection 7(a)(2), as a person working in Indiana. That is, he interprets
Section 11-8-8-7 such that he cannot be required to register under both
subsections 7(a)(1) and 7(a)(2). Thus, he claims he was not required to provide
the Kosciusko County Sheriff’s Department with his updated employment
information pursuant to subsection 8(a)(3) and (c) because he was not required
to register under 7(a)(2).
[8] We cannot agree. First, the statute plainly states that a sex or violent offender
may have to register under more than one subsection. For example, Indiana
Code Section 11-8-8-7(b) states, “[i]f the sex or violent offender is also required
to register under subsection (a) (2) or (a) (3), the sex or violent offender shall
also register with the local law enforcement authority in the county in which the
offender is required to register under subsection (c) or (d).” (Emphases added.)
Second, Indiana Code Section 11-8-8-8(c) states, “[i]f the information described
in subsection (a) changes, the sex or violent offender shall report in person to
the local law enforcement authority having jurisdiction over the sex or violent
offender’s principal address not later than seventy-two (72) hours after the
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change. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, under the plain language of the
statute, Crisostomo was required to submit his change in employment
information to the Kosciusko County Sheriff’s Department within seventy-two
hours of the change having occurred.
[9] Moreover, we agree with the State that Crisostomo’s proffered interpretation of
the statute would lead to an absurd result. “We review the statute as a whole
and presume the legislature intended logical application of the language used in
the statute, so as to avoid unjust or absurd results.” State v. Prater, 922 N.E.2d
746, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. The purpose of the statute is to
notify the community for its safety. N.L., 989 N.E.2d at 778. Yet, under
Crisostomo’s interpretation, the county where he lives would not know where
he works and his community would not have proper notice of his whereabouts.
We do not accept that interpretation. Accordingly, we affirm Crisostomo’s
conviction.
[10] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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