Lyndale R. Ivy v. Mary Dorsett Kilgore, Anita Williams, and Corizon, Inc. (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                          FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                      Jun 12 2019, 8:17 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                                       CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                                Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                          and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    APPELLANT PRO SE                                         ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES
    Lyndale R. Ivy                                           Jeb A. Crandall
    Pendleton, Indiana                                       Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Lyndale R. Ivy,                                          June 12, 2019
    Appellant-Plaintiff,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-MI-2840
    v.                                               Appeal from the Jennings Superior
    Court
    Mary Dorsett Kilgore, Anita                              The Honorable Gary L. Smith,
    Williams, and Corizon, Inc.                              Judge
    Appellees-Defendants                                     The Honorable Timothy B. Day,
    Special Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    40D01-1807-MI-67
    Altice, Judge.
    Case Summary
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2840 | June 12, 2019                       Page 1 of 6
    [1]   Lyndale R. Ivy filed a civil complaint in Jennings County Superior Court
    against Mary Dorsett Kilgore, Anita Williams, and Williams’s employer,
    Corizon, Inc. The claims raised against Kilgore were entirely unrelated to the
    claims against Williams and Corizon. Williams moved to dismiss the action as
    to her on two separate grounds: 1) the claims were improperly joined with the
    claims against Kilgore and, therefore, the claims against her should be severed
    and transferred to Henry County, a county of preferred venue; and 2) Ivy failed
    to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
    [2]   The trial court entered an order granting Williams’s motion, which the court
    entitled, ORDER TO DISMISS/CORRECT VENUE. In granting the motion,
    the court referred only to the “improper venue” ground but then dismissed
    Williams as a party “effective immediately” without any mention of
    transferring the case. Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 13.
    [3]   On appeal, Ivy makes no argument regarding venue and focuses entirely on
    whether he stated claims against Williams for which relief can be granted. It
    does not appear, however, that the trial court dismissed on this ground. But
    then again, the trial court did not transfer the case as required by Ind. Trial Rule
    75(B). Given the perplexing nature of the appealed order, we find ourselves
    unable to review it. Accordingly, we remand for clarification of the order and
    for transfer of the case to Henry County if indeed venue was improper.
    [4]   We remand with instructions.
    Facts & Procedural History
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2840 | June 12, 2019   Page 2 of 6
    [5]   Ivy is incarcerated in the Indiana Department of Correction (the IDOC),
    serving a 100-year sentence that was imposed in 1978. See Ivy v. State, 
    861 N.E.2d 1242
    , 1244 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. As alleged by Ivy, in
    August 2016, the IDOC transferred him to the New Castle Psychiatric Facility
    (NCP) without providing Ivy written notice of the transfer, without a hearing,
    and without Ivy’s consent. He claims the transfer was not a transfer between
    prisons. According to Ivy, NCP is “the mental hospital of the IDOC that treats
    and provides care for the most severe mentally ill or disturbed inmates confined
    within the IDOC.” Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 17. Corizon is a private
    company under contract with the IDOC to provide medical and clinical care
    and services to inmates. Williams is a Corizon social worker and was involved
    in the transfer of Ivy to NCP under policies established by Corizon. Several
    months after an evaluation and diagnosis, Ivy was transferred out of NCP.
    [6]   On July 27, 2018, Ivy filed the instant complaint in Jennings Superior Court.
    In the complaint, Ivy alleged various claims against Kilgore, who was the
    Jennings County Clerk. Unrelated to these claims, Ivy asserted separate claims
    against Williams and Corizon for their alleged violation of his right to due
    course of law under Article 1, § 12 of the Indiana Constitution and for false
    imprisonment. His claims against Williams and Corizon related to his
    involuntary transfer to NCP.
    [7]   Williams filed a motion to dismiss on August 17, 2018, asserting the following
    alternative grounds:
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2840 | June 12, 2019   Page 3 of 6
    1. Under Indiana Trial Rule 12(b)(3), a defendant may move to
    dismiss an action on the basis of improper venue as set forth
    in Rule 75 or any statutory provision. There is no basis to
    join the claims against co-defendant Mary Kilgore and
    Williams. Thus, the claims against Williams should be
    severed and transferred to Henry County, Indiana, because
    venue is improper in Jennings County. T.R. 75(A)(1)-(10).
    2. Under Indiana Rule 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to
    dismiss an action when the plaintiff fails to state a claim for
    which he can recover. In these circumstances, Plaintiff does
    not state a valid claim under the Indiana State Constitution or
    under Indiana State law; therefore, his claims must be
    dismissed.
    Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 22. Williams filed a memorandum with her
    motion. Related to venue, Williams noted that the only party with any
    connection to Jennings County was Kilgore and that the NCP was not located
    in Jennings County. Because the claims against Williams and Corizon were
    improperly joined with the claims against Kilgore pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule
    20(A), Williams argued that these claims should be severed and venue
    transferred to Henry County, where NCP is located.
    [8]   On September 25, 2018, the trial court issued the following order:
    ORDER TO DISMISS/CORRECT VENUE
    Comes now the Defendant, Anita Williams, by counsel
    and files herein a Motion to Dismiss due to improper venue and
    the Court having read said motion and the Plaintiff’s response
    thereto hereby finds that said motion should be granted.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2840 | June 12, 2019   Page 4 of 6
    IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED by the Court that the
    Defendant, Anita Williams is hereby dismissed as a party to this
    cause of action, effective immediately.
    Appellant’s Appendix Vol. 2 at 13. Thereafter, Ivy filed a motion to correct error,
    arguing in part that “the Court should have severed [Williams] as a party to this
    suit and ordered venue transferred to Henry County instead” of outright
    dismissing the lawsuit against her. The trial court did not rule on the motion to
    correct error, and it was deemed denied on or about November 15, 2018. Ivy
    now appeals.
    Discussion & Decision
    [9]    On appeal, Ivy argues that his claims against Williams should not have been
    dismissed for failure to state a claim, pursuant to T.R. 12(B)(6). Williams
    disagrees and also argues that Ivy’s appeal is premature because the dismissal as
    to only Williams was not a final judgment.
    [10]   Ind. Appellate Rule 14(A)(8) permits interlocutory appeals as a matter of right
    for orders “[t]ransferring or refusing to transfer a case under Trial Rule 75”.
    The first ground asserted in Williams’s motion to dismiss was based on T.R.
    12(B)(3) and T.R. 75, claiming improper venue and seeking transfer to a county
    of preferred venue. As noted above, the trial court’s order is exceedingly vague,
    directly referencing the improper venue ground and saying nothing of the T.R.
    12(B)(6) ground. Despite seemingly dismissing for improper venue, the trial
    court did not order the case transferred to Henry County. See T.R. 75(B)(1)
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2840 | June 12, 2019   Page 5 of 6
    (“Whenever a claim or proceeding is filed which should properly have been
    filed in another court of this state, and proper objection is made, the court in
    which such action is filed shall not then dismiss the action, but shall order the
    action transferred to the court in which it should have been filed.”) (emphasis
    supplied).
    [11]   We conclude that this order is an appealable interlocutory order pursuant to
    App. R. 14(A)(8) that requires clarification and/or correction. On remand, the
    trial court is directed to expressly determine whether preferred venue lies in
    Jennings County. If it does not, then the court shall transfer the matter to
    Henry County, as there appears to be no dispute that Henry County is a county
    of preferred venue. If transfer is not appropriate, the trial court shall consider
    whether Ivy has a claim against Williams for which relief can be granted.
    [12]   Remanded.
    Kirsch, J. and Vaidik, C.J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-MI-2840 | June 12, 2019   Page 6 of 6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18A-MI-2840

Filed Date: 6/12/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/12/2019