Troy Phillips v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                                       FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                   Apr 30 2019, 11:02 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any
    CLERK
    court except for the purpose of establishing                             Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    the defense of res judicata, collateral                                       and Tax Court
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    APPELLANT PRO SE                                          ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Troy Phillips                                             Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
    Miami Correctional Facility                               Attorney General
    Bunker Hill, Indiana
    Katherine A. Cornelius
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Troy Phillips,                                            April 30, 2019
    Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    18A-CR-1621
    v.                                                Appeal from the Marion Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Kurt Eisgruber,
    Appellee-Plaintiff                                        Judge
    The Honorable Steven Rubick,
    Magistrate
    Trial Court Cause No.
    49G01-0302-FB-31230
    Crone, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1621 | April 30, 2019                   Page 1 of 3
    [1]   Troy Phillips, pro se, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for jail time
    credit. The sole issue presented for our review is whether the trial court abused
    its discretion in denying his motion. Phillips has submitted an inadequate
    record on appeal and consequently has waived our review of his claim.
    Therefore, we affirm.
    [2]   Here, other than his mere allegations, Phillips has presented us with no
    information to support his motion. The limited record before us indicates that
    Phillips pled guilty to class B felony robbery and the trial court entered
    judgment of conviction in January 2004. The record contains no copy of the
    judgment or the trial court’s sentencing order. Consequently, we cannot
    discern what credit time Phillips was actually awarded by the trial court, much
    less whether he was entitled to more.
    [3]   Although Phillips claims that he served 325 days of presentence jail time and is
    therefore entitled to 325 days of good time credit toward his sentence, we are
    unable to consider his claim due to his failure to provide us with an adequate
    record on appeal. We emphasize that pro se litigants are held to the same
    standard as trained legal counsel and are required to follow procedural rules.
    Evans v. State, 
    809 N.E.2d 338
    , 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. It is the
    appellant’s duty to provide a record that reflects the error alleged. Williams v.
    State, 
    690 N.E.2d 162
    , 176 (Ind. 1997). To the extent the record is inadequate,
    it results in waiver of the issue. Id.; see Thompson v. State, 
    761 N.E.2d 467
    , 471
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (failure to present adequate record regarding credit for
    time served resulted in waiver of the issue on appeal). Based upon the limited
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1621 | April 30, 2019   Page 2 of 3
    and inadequate record before us, there is no way for this Court to determine
    whether Phillips is entitled to any additional credit time. The issue is waived,
    and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 1
    [4]   Affirmed.
    Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.
    1
    Waiver notwithstanding, Phillips admits that the trial court properly stated in its sentencing order that he
    had spent 325 days in presentence confinement. We have no idea whether the trial court’s sentencing order
    also expressly accounted for good time credit. Even assuming that the sentencing order reported only actual
    days served, our supreme court has held:
    Sentencing judgments that report only days spent in pre-sentence confinement and fail to
    expressly designate credit time earned shall be understood by courts and by the Department of
    Correction automatically to award the number of credit time days equal to the number of pre-
    sentence confinement days.
    Robinson v. State, 
    805 N.E.2d 783
    , 792 (Ind. 2004). Thus, the sentencing order would have been corrected by
    presumption, and therefore the trial court properly denied Phillips’s motion for jail time credit, which was
    essentially a motion to correct erroneous sentence. See Brattain v. State, 
    777 N.E.2d 774
    , 776 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2002) (holding that request for jail time credit was tantamount to motion to correct erroneous sentence).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1621 | April 30, 2019                      Page 3 of 3