Ryan Connors v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2019 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 30 2019, 10:56 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Bradley Keffer Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Scott L. Barnhart Attorney General of Indiana
Brooke Smith Samuel J. Dayton
Keffer Barnhart LLP Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Ryan Connors, April 30, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-2458
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert J. Pigman,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
82D03-1701-MR-183
Brown, Judge.
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[1] Ryan Connors appeals his convictions for murder and attempted murder. He
raises two issues which we revise and restate as:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
certain evidence; and
II. Whether the court abused its discretion in not instructing the
jury as to the offenses of voluntary manslaughter and reckless
homicide.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] It is undisputed that Connors had a substance abuse issue. In January 2017, his
grandmother met Avery Shoe at a Walmart in Illinois while Shoe was soliciting
money for his church in North Carolina. Shoe told her about a church program
for those with drug issues and gave her a flier which indicated the program’s
homes were free of charge and funded through donations. Connors’s
grandmother spoke to Connors’s mother about the program, and she in turn
spoke with him. According to Connors’s mother, he initially did not wish to
enter the program and she pressured him to do so. She called and spoke with
Shoe the following day, and then Connors spoke with Shoe. At some point it
was decided that Connors would join Shoe and other men and travel with them
to North Carolina. Connors’s mother drove him to his apartment so that he
could pack and then to meet Shoe and his group, which included Henry Turner,
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a member of the church for fourteen years, Pernell Robinson, 1 and two other
men. Shoe, Turner, and their group traveled as a team to different cities to raise
money, asked for donations and distributed flyers at different locations, and
used the money to support the ministry and recovery homes. The group
typically would not travel for longer than two weeks at a time. Shoe was the
men’s home director and was in charge of the team and the finances during the
trip. According to Turner, the group deposited the donations it received into a
bank account, Shoe usually held the money in a Bank of America bag until it
could be deposited, and on occasion the money would be sent to the church as
a money order.
[3] Turner filled out an intake form for Connors dated January 5, 2017, and
Connors signed the form. 2 The program’s rules provided that smoking and
drugs were prohibited, participants would have no communication with family
for the first thirty days except at church, and there would be an inspection of all
property when entering the home. According to Turner, Connors’s bag was
searched which was standard practice and Shoe would have confiscated any
cell phone or medicine such as hydrocodone. Turner stayed with the group in a
motel room that night.
1
Turner testified that Robinson had a disability, did not understand everything, and needed extra care.
2
The intake form indicated a name of Ryan K. Moore, included a social security number which had one
digit which was different than Connors’s social security number, and indicated that he was not prescribed
any medications by a doctor.
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[4] During the day on January 6, 2017, Shoe, Turner, Robinson, and Connors
raised funds at a Walmart in Evansville, Indiana, and the other men raised
funds at another location. At some point, Connors said that he needed to take
pain pills, and Shoe told him that he could not have them unless he had a
doctor’s order. According to Turner, Connors “probably got a little angry” but
then, when riding in the van to a motel, it “[s]eemed like everything had died
down, the argument that they had, it had died down.” Transcript Volume 2 at
79-80. The group arrived at a Motel 6 in Evansville, and Shoe went inside to
rent a room. He then went into the room, and Turner, Robinson, and Connors
waited in the van for him to call Turner to let them know they could all come
into the room. 3 Connors told Turner that he needed to use the restroom, and
Turner told him that he needed to wait for Shoe’s call. Connors wanted to
urinate outside, and Turner pointed out there were cameras. After several
minutes, 4 Shoe called Turner and said that the men could enter the motel room.
Connors “burst out the van” and went directly and quickly into the room. Id. at
51. Turner got his luggage, helped Robinson with his luggage, and then walked
toward the motel room.
3
When asked “[w]as it [Shoe’s] standard practice to hide the money when he went into the hotel room
alone,” Turner testified “[w]ell he usually just, you know, put it away but sometime we had a safe in the
room, sometime, but I don’t think we had a safe that time so usually he’d just either hide the money I guess,
put it under his mattress or whatever.” Transcript Volume 2 at 90.
4
When asked “[h]ow long was [Shoe] in the hotel room by himself before you let [Connors] go in,” Turner
replied “[c]ould have been five minutes, could have been longer.” Transcript Volume 2 at 90.
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[5] Turner walked into the room and observed that “there was blood everywhere,
all on the walls,” saw that “the bed had been moved around like there was a
scuffle,” and saw Shoe standing up. Id. at 51-52. Connors “slammed the door
shut” and struck Turner in the back of the head with a sharp, shiny object
which appeared to Turner to be a piece of metal. Id. at 52. Connors then
stabbed Turner in the chest, Turner fell against the wall, and Connors kicked
Turner in the face. Turner saw Shoe on the floor with his eyes open and
believed he was dead. Turner yelled for Robinson, who was sitting on the bed,
to obtain help, but he remained on the bed. Turner remained on the floor and
pretended to be dead, and Connors grabbed Shoe’s backpack, grabbed
Robinson and told him “come on,” and then ran out of the room. Id. at 53.
Turner called 911 and was hospitalized and left with scars on his head, neck,
and chin. Shoe died as a result of his injuries and sustained five sharp force
trauma wounds, including one involving the deep musculature of the right
shoulder and right upper chest, one in his chest which pierced his pericardium,
and one to his lower abdomen and “his insides were on the ground.” Id. at 95.
[6] Police determined Connors’s location at a Knights Inn in Lexington, Kentucky,
by locating his cell phone. The police found him sitting in a chair in the motel’s
lobby and discovered a black bag beneath his chair. The police took him into
custody and transported him to a hospital due to a laceration on his hand. The
bag found under the chair contained the Bank of America bag of money.
[7] On January 10, 2017, the State charged Connors with Count I, murder; Count
II, attempted murder as a level 1 felony; Count III, kidnapping as a level 2
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felony; Count IV, criminal confinement as a level 2 felony; and Count V,
robbery of Turner resulting in serious bodily injury as a level 2 felony. The
State later amended Count V to allege that Connors took property from Turner
and/or Shoe as a level 2 felony. Connors filed a request for instructions on the
offenses of voluntary manslaughter and reckless homicide. During the jury
trial, over Connors’s objection, the court admitted testimony from Detective
Phillip Luecke that the scene at the Motel 6 “was absolutely the most gruesome
crime scene [he had] ever experienced.” Id. at 142. The court also admitted,
over Connors’s objection, a copy of the charging information under Count V.
The State dismissed Counts III and IV. The court noted that Connors had
tendered instructions for voluntary manslaughter and reckless homicide, found
there was no evidence of sudden heat or evidence of provocation, found no
serious evidentiary dispute as to whether the killing was murder or reckless
homicide, and declined to give the proposed instructions. The jury found
Connor guilty of murder under Count I, attempted murder under Count II, and
robbery resulting in serious bodily injury under Count V. The court vacated
Count V and sentenced him to fifty-five years for murder under Count I and
thirty years for attempted murder under Count II to be served consecutively.
Discussion
I.
[8] The first issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
certain evidence. The admission and exclusion of evidence is a matter within
the sound discretion of the trial court. Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272
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(Ind. 2002). An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court’s ruling is
clearly against the logic, facts, and circumstances presented. Oatts v. State, 899
N.E.2d 714, 719 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Errors in the admission of evidence are
to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of the
party. Lewis v. State, 34 N.E.3d 240, 248 (Ind. 2015). To determine whether an
error in the introduction of evidence affected the party’s substantial rights, we
assess the probable impact of that evidence upon the jury. Id.
[9] Connors claims the court improperly admitted Detective Luecke’s testimony
that the crime scene was the most gruesome he had experienced and the
charging information under Count V. The State called Detective Luecke and
questioned him about his employment and duties as a crime scene detective and
his investigation of the scene at the Motel 6. He testified he had been employed
by the Evansville Police Department for twenty years and had been a crime
scene detective for a little over four years. He testified regarding blood patterns
and the swabs he collected. When asked how many crime scenes he had
processed in his career, Detective Lueke replied: “Hundreds . . . I did eight
[murders] last year I believe. This year I’ve done three murders. I’ve done auto
accidents, fatalities, but I mean we get called out two or three times a night for
maybe something small, maybe something big so . . .” Transcript Volume 2 at
142. When asked “in your experience how does the Motel 6 scene that you
observed on January 6th of 2017 compare to other scenes you’ve seen,”
Connors’s counsel objected based on relevance, the court overruled the
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objection, and Detective Lueke responded: “It was absolutely the most
gruesome crime scene I’ve ever experienced.” Id.
[10] Connors argues on appeal that the challenged testimony was not relevant and
was prejudicial by seeking to inflame the jury. The State responds that the
detective’s statement supports the argument that the wounds caused by
Connors were severe and of the type that reflect an intent to kill or knowledge
that death was highly probable and that the nature of the scene provided a sense
of the magnitude of the victim’s injuries.
[11] The State presented numerous photographs depicting the scene at the Motel 6
and extensive testimony regarding the crime scene and the photographs. The
jury heard testimony from Turner regarding his observations of the blood on the
walls and Connors’s attack on him using a sharp object. The State presented
evidence of the extensive injuries inflicted upon Shoe and Turner and the
appearance of the scene of the attack. Based upon the record and in light of all
of the evidence before the jury, we cannot say the challenged testimony was
likely to have had a significant impact upon the jury or affected Connors’s
substantial rights.
[12] As for the charging information under Count V, the prosecutor stated “Your
Honor, at this time the State would move to admit State’s Exhibit 30 into
evidence which is a certified copy of part of the charging Information in this
case, the Amended Count 5, primarily to prove the Defendant’s date of birth
and social security number.” Transcript Volume 3 at 18. The prosecutor later
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argued, “with regard to the Defendant’s date of birth and social security
number on the Defendant’s intake sheet that’s already been admitted into
evidence, he indicated that his name was Ryan Moore instead of Ryan
Connors,” “[h]e gave his correct date of birth and the social security number
that he gave was mostly correct with the exception of one digit which was one
digit off,” “I intend to use that to show intent,” and “[h]is identification card
which has been admitted into evidence has his date of birth and name on it.
However there’s been nothing else to be introduced that would have his social
security number on it.” Id. at 19. Connors’s counsel objected and argued “I
think that a certified piece of, you know, a Court document is certainly going to
be very prejudicial to, to Ryan,” “it paints him as a criminal,” “[y]ou have a
criminal document you’re submitting before a jury and then telling them to go
deliberate on the ultimate issue,” “I would also note that Henry Turner’s
testimony was that Henry Turner is the one that filled that out, not Mr.
Connors so I don’t think it is then fair to insert this and try to suggest that it was
Mr. Connors that filled that out and deliberately put in the wrong information
especially if it was only off by, by one digit.” Id. at 19-20. The court admitted
the information. In closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the
information, noted it contained Connors’s name, birth date, and social security
number, and argued “his social security number you’ll notice ends in 0954 and
what did he put on the intake sheet? 0944.” Id. at 71.
[13] Connors argues on appeal that the admission of the charging information was
highly prejudicial as it asserted in a formal court document that he was a
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criminal. The State responds that the information did not provide any
substantial information which the jury had not already heard, except for
Connors’s correct identifying information, and there is little danger the
information inflamed the passions of the jury.
[14] The record reveals that the challenged exhibit contained the charging
information alleging robbery under Count V and that the trial court did not
enter judgment of conviction on Count V. The trial court read the substance of
the allegations in Count V in its preliminary instructions to the jury, evidence
was presented that Connors took the money in the Bank of America bag, and
the prosecutor in opening and closing argument discussed the allegations of
robbery. We cannot say, in light of the record as a whole, that the admission of
the charging information was likely to have had a significant impact upon the
jury or affected Connors’s substantial rights.
II.
[15] The next issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in not giving
instructions on voluntary manslaughter and reckless homicide. Connors asserts
there was evidence of sudden heat sufficient to allow the jury to find that he
committed voluntary manslaughter. He argues that he was abruptly handed off
to a religious group that he initially did not want to join and was required to
travel with individuals who searched his belongings, to solicit funds, and to
follow certain rules. He argues that a reasonable jury could infer that he was
upset about being given away to Shoe who made him wait to enter the motel
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room and use the bathroom. He also argues that it can be inferred there was a
scuffle and the only organ that was severely impacted was Shoe’s heart and
asserts that, in light of the absence of evidence surrounding his interaction with
Shoe, there is a serious dispute concerning his intent and whether he acted
intentionally or recklessly.
[16] The State maintains, with respect to the proposed voluntary manslaughter
instruction, that while Connors cites to a series of aggravating experiences,
none of them were sudden and all of them were followed by a period of cool
reflection. It argues that he was dropped off and had his cell phone seized and
his bags searched one to one and one-half days before he killed Shoe, and that,
while he was initially angry about being denied hydrocodone, Connors calmed
down after Shoe said that he would only be able to take it with a doctor’s
orders. It contends there is no record of him experiencing the level of anger,
rage, resentment, or terror that would cause an ordinary person to be incapable
of deliberation, premeditation, or cool reflection. As for the proposed reckless
homicide instruction, the State maintains that Connors attacked in such a way
that demonstrated an intent to kill or knowledge that death was highly probable
and that Shoe’s many significant wounds and Connors’s subsequent actions
also show his intent.
[17] We apply a three-step analysis in determining whether a defendant was entitled
to an instruction on a lesser-included offense. See Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d
563, 566-567 (Ind. 1995). We must determine: whether the lesser-included
offense is inherently included in the crime charged; if not, whether the lesser-
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included offense is factually included in the crime charged; and if either,
whether there is a serious evidentiary dispute whereby the jury could conclude
the lesser offense was committed but not the greater offense. Id. If a jury could
conclude that the lesser offense was committed but not the greater, then it is
reversible error for a trial court not to give an instruction, when requested, on
the inherently or factually included lesser offense. Id. at 567. When the trial
court makes a finding that a serious evidentiary dispute does not exist, we will
review that finding for an abuse of discretion. Brown v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1010,
1019 (Ind. 1998).
[18] A person commits murder when the person knowingly or intentionally kills
another human being. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. A person commits voluntary
manslaughter when he knowingly or intentionally kills another human being
“while acting under sudden heat.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a). The existence of
sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be murder
to voluntary manslaughter. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(b). “Sudden heat occurs
when a defendant is provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree
sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and
premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection.” Conner v.
State, 829 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ind. 2005). “[N]either mere words nor anger, without
more, provide sufficient provocation.” Id. Also, sudden heat can be negated by
a showing that a sufficient “cooling off period” elapsed between the
provocation and the homicide. Morrison v. State, 588 N.E.2d 527, 531-532 (Ind.
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Ct. App. 1992). Voluntary manslaughter is inherently included in murder.
Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 507 (Ind. 1997), reh’g denied.
[19] The evidence reveals that Connors joined Shoe, Turner, and the other men on
January 5, 2017, at which time he signed an intake form, his bags were
searched, and any cell phone or drug such as hydrocodone would have been
confiscated. He spent the night with the group and was with them all day as
they raised money on January 6, 2017. Shoe told him at one point that
ordinarily he could not have pain pills unless he had a doctor’s order, and
Connors “probably got a little angry,” but it “[s]eemed like everything had died
down, the argument that they had, it had died down.” Transcript Volume 2 at
79-80. Connors said that he needed to use the restroom, Turner told Connors
that he needed to wait for Shoe’s call, and Turner testified that five or more
minutes could have passed before he received Shoe’s call. To the extent the
evidence shows that Connors was angry with Shoe or Turner, we note that
anger without more does not provide sufficient provocation. See Conner, 829
N.E.2d at 24. Moreover, Connors does not point to any actions of Shoe or
Turner which could constitute provocation to a degree sufficient to render him
incapable of reflection. Based upon the record, we conclude that there was no
serious evidentiary dispute regarding whether Connors committed the offense
causing the death of Shoe or committed the attempted offense against Turner
while acting in sudden heat. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to give Connors’s proposed instruction on voluntary manslaughter.
See Collins v. State, 873 N.E.2d 149, 159-160 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that
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anger alone is not sufficient to support an instruction on sudden heat), trans.
denied.
[20] Reckless homicide is an inherently included lesser offense of murder, as the
only element distinguishing the two is the requisite culpability. See Fisher v.
State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004); Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 702 (Ind.
1999). A person engages in conduct “‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the
conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so,” whereas a person
engages in conduct “‘recklessly’ if he engages in the conduct in plain,
conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the
disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of
conduct.” See Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2.
[21] The evidence establishes that Connors engaged in a vicious and prolonged
attack upon Shoe and then upon Turner. Connors caused five sharp force
trauma injuries to Shoe which included significant stab and incisional wounds.
When Turner entered the room, Connors slammed the door shut and attacked,
stabbed, and kicked him, ending the attack after Turner pretended to be dead.
There is no evidence that Connors swung the sharp object at random. The
court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give the proposed instruction
on reckless homicide. See Dearman v. State, 743 N.E.2d 757, 760 (Ind. 2001)
(holding there was no serious evidentiary dispute to support giving an
instruction for reckless homicide where the defendant struck the victim in the
head twice with a concrete block); Lyttle v. State, 709 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ind. 1999)
(holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a requested
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reckless homicide instruction where the defendant struck the victim in the head
several times with a baseball bat); Sanders v. State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 122 (Ind.
1999) (holding “[t]here is no evidence that [the defendant] was shooting at the
crowd on the stairs at random; rather, he shot only at” the victim and the
defendant was not entitled to an instruction on reckless homicide); McDowell v.
State, 102 N.E.3d 924, 933 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (noting that, in certain cases,
“there was a relatively brief act that resulted in the victim’s death (shooting a
gun that might have been loaded, playing around with a handgun, striking a
small child with a paddle, squeezing a small child’s neck during play)” and that
these actions could have been performed recklessly, but that “[i]n contrast, the
evidence here shows that [the victim] was subject to an extensive beating, not a
momentary action, such that there is no way that [the defendant] could have
acted merely recklessly without also acting knowingly”), trans. denied. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Connors’s proposed instructions.
[22] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Connors’s convictions for murder and
attempted murder.
[23] Affirmed.
May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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