Brian Ramsey v. State of Indiana , 122 N.E.3d 1023 ( 2019 )

FILED
Apr 30 2019, 8:53 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Matthew J. McGovern Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Brian Ramsey, April 30, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1276
v. Appeal from the Floyd Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Susan D. Orth,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
22D01-1711-F5-2392
Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Brian Ramsey appeals his convictions for criminal confinement, a Level 5
felony, and intimidation, a Level 6 felony. We affirm.
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Issues
[2] Ramsey raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting
certain evidence.
II. Whether sufficient evidence supports Ramsey’s conviction
for intimidation.
Facts
[3] During the relevant period, Rhonda Crone (“Rhonda”) and her husband, Bruce
Crone 1 (“Bruce”), separated, and Rhonda began dating Ramsey. From
November 4 to November 11, 2017, Ramsey and Rhonda were live-in guests of
Rhonda’s niece, Cassandra Butcher (a.k.a. Cassandra Crone), in Cassandra’s
Floyd County apartment. During the visit, Cassandra accused Rhonda of
having an affair with Cassandra’s husband. Ramsey became angry and beat
Rhonda viciously over the ensuing three or four days.
[4] On November 10, 2017, a neighbor overheard the commotion and called the
police. When responding police officers knocked at the door, Ramsey kept
Rhonda and Cassandra in a bathroom and would not allow them to answer the
door. At one point, Ramsey left the apartment; however, before he left,
1
Bruce Crone is Ramsey’s cousin.
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Ramsey told Rhonda and Cassandra that he would kill their children if they left
the apartment.
[5] On November 11, 2017, Rhonda’s brother, James Clemons, became concerned
because he had not heard from Rhonda, could not reach her on her cell phone,
and had not seen any online activity from her in nearly two weeks. Clemons
looked for Rhonda at her son’s house and then contacted Bruce. Bruce told
Clemons that Rhonda was visiting Cassandra. Clemons and Bruce went to
Cassandra’s apartment together. When they arrived, Ramsey was not there.
Rhonda and Cassandra were “terrified.” Tr. Vol. I p. 118. Rhonda was so
badly battered that Clemons did not recognize her and “thought all of her bones
in her face w[ere] broke[n].” Id. at 114. Rhonda told Clemons that Ramsey
had beaten her. Rhonda was afraid to be there when Ramsey returned.
Clemons called the police.
[6] Officer Tim Wells of the New Albany Police Department was among the
officers who responded to the scene. Rhonda and Cassandra reported that
Ramsey held them against their will for four days and had threatened to harm
their children if Rhonda and Cassandra left the apartment. Officer Wells
observed that Rhonda exhibited “behavior . . . of someone that had, to me, had
been through a traumatic ordeal and she was very upset and almost to the point
of [being] inconsolable”; Rhonda was “visibly shaken [and] nervous” and had
“[e]xtremely severe” injuries, including black eyes, facial bruises and fractures,
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and significant bruising all over her body. 2 Id. at pp. 143, 158. Rhonda was
transported to Floyd Memorial Hospital, where she remained admitted for
three days; she was then transferred to an Indianapolis hospital for an
additional three or four days. Cassandra appeared uninjured.
[7] Officer Wells interviewed Rhonda at the hospital. Rhonda again reported that
Ramsey accused her of infidelity; beat her over a three-day span; destroyed her
phone when she tried to call the police; stopped her from speaking with
responding police on November 10, 2017; prevented both Rhonda and
Cassandra from leaving Cassandra’s apartment; and threatened to harm
Rhonda’s and Cassandra’s children if they left the apartment.
[8] Officer Wells later returned to Cassandra’s apartment and found Ramsey there.
Ramsey maintained that Rhonda was lying; he denied hitting or confining
Rhonda or Cassandra, breaking Rhonda’s phone, and preventing Rhonda and
Cassandra from speaking to the police. He also denied threatening Rhonda’s
and Cassandra’s children and implied that Rhonda’s injuries were self-inflicted.
Ramsey conceded that he might have injured Rhonda in his efforts to protect
her from self-harming and implicated Cassandra as the suspect.
[9] On November 13, 2017, the State charged Ramsey with various offenses
stemming from the attack on Rhonda. The State subsequently amended the
2
In all, Rhonda suffered “multiple facial fracture[s], extensive rib fracture[s] on [her] sides, [a] spine fracture,
. . . extensive resolving ecchymosis around her eyes[,]” and a fractured scapula. Exhibits Vol. I p. 6.
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information to reflect the following charges: Count I, criminal confinement, a
Level 5 felony; Count II, domestic battery, a Level 6 felony; 3 Count III,
intimidation, a Level 6 felony; Count IV, interference with the reporting of a
crime, a Class A misdemeanor; and Count V, a habitual offender
enhancement. 4
[10] At the final pretrial conference in January 2018, the State reported that, in a
departure from her initial cooperative behavior, Cassandra was now “acting
differently, not being responsive to the [State’s] phone calls, changed [her]
number and didn’t, uh, give [ ] an update and ha[d] not been responsive to visits
to her address by [police] investigators.” Id. at 18. Also, the State advised the
trial court that multiple agencies had tried and failed to find Cassandra. Days
before trial, Rhonda recanted her previous statements implicating Ramsey. 5
[11] The trial court conducted Ramsey’s jury trial on February 19 and 20, 2018.
The State’s witnesses testified to the foregoing facts. When the State moved to
admit Rhonda’s medical records, defense counsel objected. 6 The State argued
3
The State charged Ramsey with domestic battery as a Level 6 felony because he had a prior domestic
battery conviction.
4
Ramsey has the following prior convictions: failure to return to lawful detention, a Class D felony (1994);
battery, a Class D felony (2000, 2001); and robbery, a Class C felony (2008).
5
Rhonda appeared for a deposition on February 16, 2018. In her deposition testimony, Rhonda denied that:
(1) Ramsey prevented her from leaving Cassandra’s apartment; (2) Ramsey threatened her; or (3) she or
Cassandra tried to call 911.
6
Although defense counsel did not object as explicitly as we would prefer, we find that he adequately lodged
his objection when he questioned how some of the statements were reasonably pertinent to rendering medical
aid to Rhonda such that the statements could properly be admitted pursuant to hearsay exceptions.
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that Rhonda’s statements that Ramsey had threatened to harm her children
were allowable under the hearsay exception for statements made for medical
diagnosis or treatment. Counsel for the State argued:
It’s very clear in the rule of 803(4), [ ] a statement made by a
person seeking medical diagnosis or treatment, and it is made
reasonably pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment, and
describes the medical history, past or present symp-symptoms.
Right, it is, [ ] they’re attempting to treat her, but that’s the theory
behind it. If you’re asking a patient what happened to you, we’re
trying to treat you.
Id. at 131. Defense counsel objected to narrative aspects of the medical records
on the grounds that the narratives contained irrelevant information; the defense
was “unable to cross examine any person who observed that or put that into the
notes into the record”; and because the narratives “read more like a probable
cause affidavit” than guidance to medical service providers. 7 Id. at 127. In
discussing the admissibility of the narratives, defense counsel and the trial court
engaged in the following exchange:
[Defense counsel]: [ ] I don’t believe she talked about being
separated. I know that Mr. Clemons said, but not Ms. Crone.
[S]he did say that she was staying at her niece[’]s. [ ] I don’t see
her being unemployed and no source of income has any baring
[sic] or relevance on her injuries or how she had been diagnosed
or how that’s helpful. [A]nd again, what-what the medical
7
Defense counsel did not lodge his hearsay objection as explicitly as we would prefer; however, we deem his
remarks to the trial court regarding the medical records to suffice for our purposes here.
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personnel should be concerned with and for that, for evidentiary
purposes of substantiating her injury (about three words
indiscernible)[.]
THE COURT: Well, I-I agree that how an injury occurred, how
old an injury is, how length of time it-it occurred over are all
things that are relevant and I think this all goes--
[Defense counsel]: I mean . . . .
THE COURT: --toward that assessment. . . .[S]o let me, [ ]
overrule your objection to that extent, but what I’m looking at
right now is in narrative number 4. I’m still struggling with that.
[Defense counsel]: Right. I believe that’s not relevant.
[Counsel for the State]: We can redact narrative number 4.[ 8]
Id. at 131-32.
[12] The State then introduced Rhonda’s medical records that described Rhonda’s
“[h]istory of present illness,” as follows:
47 year old female came was hit by her boy friend three days in a
row, tuesday, wednesday and thursday. her brother went on to
check on her and found her bruised up, called 911 and following
this brought into ER and we were asked to admit the patient for
further care. patient underwent extensive radiological workup in
8
The trial court ordered redaction of CM Narrative 4, pertaining to Ramsey’s alleged threats to Cassandra
and Rhonda.
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ER which include ct scan head, spine, chest and x.ray [sic] which
revealed multiple facial fracture, extensive rib fracture on sides,
also spine fracture.
Exhibits Vol. I p. 6 (punctuation and capitalizations in original). Another
medical entry provided:
Patient is a 47[ ]year old white female who was being beaten by
her boyfriend, and she says held captive in his home. Her
brother knew something was wrong because she wasn’t
answering her phone, but he did not know where she was
staying. He [Clemons] tracked her down and called 911 and she
was brought to ER . . . . She was found to have multiple facial
fractures, rib fractures and spine fracture and was admitted for
further care.
Id. p. 13. An additional medical entry describes Rhonda as a “47-year old
female involved in a domestic violence incident coming in through the
emergency department extremely battered.” Id. at 18. The records also state
the “Assessment/Plan” as involving “[d]omestic violence” and warranting
“[s]ocial worker and [c]ase manager for safe discharge planning.” Id. at 65.
The narrative portions of Rhonda’s medical records aimed at “[d]ischarge
[p]lanning” state:
[CM Narrative 1]:
I met with patient at bedside today for interview due to domestic
violence to assess safe DC [discharge] planning. Patient is
married but she and her spouse have been separated for a few
years now. Patient is currently dating her spouse’s cousin, Brian
Ramsey.
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[CM Narratives 2 and 3]:
Patient and Brian have been staying at patient’s spouse’s niece’s
home. Patient is unemployed and has no source of income.
Patient reported a few days ago her niece began telling Brian that
she was having an affair with her spouse. Brian became
extremely angry and began beating patient for 3 days. I asked
patient if her niece was present when he was beating her and she
stated yes, but she has mixed feelings on if she is upset with her
or not for not going to get help or call for help because [redacted].
[CM Narratives 4 and 5]:
[Redacted]. Patient also reported that the niece was coming and
going from the house the 3 days Brian kept her captive. Patient
reported her brother was unable to contact her and became
worried so he went to her spouse’s home, and that is what led to
the discovery of the patient.
[CM Narrative 6]:
[Redacted]. Patient reported she plans to testify against Brian
this time.
Exhibits Vol. I p. 119.
[13] During the State’s case in chief, the State asked Officer Wells what Rhonda
stated had happened to her. Defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds.
The trial court overruled the objection. Officer Wells testified that Rhonda
stated “that she[ ] and [Cassandra] had been held captive in their apartment [ ]
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for the past three (3) to four (4) days and that during that course of time she had
[been] beaten severely by [Ramsey].” Tr. Vol. I p. 146.
[14] Next, Rhonda testified that Ramsey accused her of infidelity and hit her. Id. at
102-03. Rhonda denied ever calling 911 for help; denied that Ramsey
prevented her from leaving the apartment; and denied that Ramsey threatened
or intimidated her to make her stay in the apartment. Rhonda testified that
Cassandra hit her with a fist and struck her in the face, head, and ribs with a
heavy flashlight. Rhonda also testified that she had initially blamed Ramsey,
who was innocent, at Cassandra’s and Clemons’ urging. Rhonda testified
further that Ramsey intervened to help her when Cassandra attacked her, and
that she loves and wants to be in a relationship with Ramsey.
[15] Then, Clemons testified that he “found [Rhonda] battered and she told [him]
that Brian Ramsey had done it and she was so severely beaten [he] naturally
called the police.” Id. at 113, 114, 115. Clemons testified that, at the hospital,
Rhonda expressed fear that Ramsey would “come back and kill [her].” 9 Id. at
119.
[16] The jury found Ramsey guilty of Count I, criminal confinement, a Level 5
felony; Count II, domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor; Count III,
intimidation, a Level 6 felony; and Count IV, interference with the reporting of
9
Defense counsel did not object to Clemons’ testimony as hearsay.
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a crime, a Class A misdemeanor. Ramsey subsequently admitted 10 that he was
a habitual offender. At Ramsey’s sentencing hearing on April 17, 2018, the trial
court sentenced him as follows: Count I, six years; Count II, one year; Count
III, two and one-half years; and Count IV, one year. The trial court ordered the
sentences to be served concurrently, but enhanced the sentences by an
additional six years because Ramsey was a habitual offender. Ramsey, thus,
received an aggregate sentence of twelve years; he now appeals.
Analysis
I. Admission of Evidence
[17] A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and
we disturb those rulings only upon an abuse of that discretion. Carr v. State, 106
N.E.3d 546, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. An abuse occurs only
where the trial court’s decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts
and circumstances. Cole v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1143, 1145 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
There is a strong presumption that the trial court properly exercised its
discretion. Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239, 247 (Ind. 2002). We will not
reverse a trial court’s evidentiary ruling if we may sustain it on any ground. See
Crawford v. State, 770 N.E.2d 775, 780 (Ind. 2002).
10
In exchange for Ramsey’s admission that he was a habitual offender, the State agreed to forgo elevating
Count II, the domestic battery conviction, to a Level 6 felony.
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[18] As a panel of this court has previously noted, “[p]olice investigation of
domestic violence involves a unique set of circumstances: ‘In domestic dispute
situations, responses to police officers’ initial inquiries may often be, but are not
always, non-testimonial, because the officers may need to investigate and
identify the persons involved in order to assess the situation, the threat to their
safety, and the potential danger to the victim.’” King v. State, 985 N.E.2d 755,
758 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 11
A. Rhonda’s Statements in Medical Records
[19] Ramsey argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting into
evidence Rhonda’s medical records, in which Rhonda stated that Ramsey
prevented her from leaving Cassandra’s apartment by threatening to harm
Rhonda’s children. Specifically, Ramsey argues that narrative portions of the
medical records admitted into evidence constituted hearsay that did not qualify
under the medical records exception of Indiana Evidence Rule 803(4).
[20] Hearsay is “a statement that: (1) is not made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.” Indiana Evid. R. 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible except as
provided by law or by other court rules. Ind. Evid. R. 802.
11
Here, the Confrontation Clause is not implicated because Rhonda testified at trial, and Ramsey had an
opportunity to cross examine her. See also Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 362 n.9, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157
n.9 (2011) (holding that statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment are the sorts of
non-testimonial statements that do not give rise to Confrontation Clause protection).
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[21] Indiana Evidence Rule 803(4) provides:
The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay,
regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:
...
(4) Statement Made for Medical Diagnosis or Treatment. A
statement that:
(A) is made by a person seeking medical diagnosis or
treatment;
(B) is made for—and is reasonably pertinent to—medical
diagnosis or treatment; and
(C) describes medical history; past or present symptoms,
pain or sensations; their inception; or their general cause.
This exception is “based upon the belief that a declarant’s self-interest in
seeking medical treatment renders it unlikely that the declarant would mislead
the medical personnel person she wants to treat her.” Palilonis v. State, 970
N.E.2d 713, 726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Miles v. State, 777 N.E.2d 767,
771 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)), trans. denied. In order to satisfy the requirement of
the declarant’s motivation, the declarant must subjectively believe that he or she
was making the statement for the purpose of receiving medical diagnosis or
treatment. See 13 Robert Lowell Miller Jr., Indiana Practice: Indiana Evidence §
803.104 at 312 (4th ed. 2018).
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[22] There is a two-step analysis for determining whether a statement is properly
admitted under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(4): “(1) whether the declarant is
motivated to provide truthful information in order to promote diagnosis and
treatment; and (2) whether the content of the statement is such that an expert in
the field would reasonably rely upon it in rendering diagnosis or treatment.”
Palilonis, 970 N.E.2d at 726 (quoting Nash v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1023-1024
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied).
[23] Here, Rhonda presented for medical treatment with “multiple facial fracture[s],
extensive rib fracture[s] on [her] sides, also [a] spine fracture, . . . extensive
resolving ecchymosis around her eyes[,]” and a fractured scapula, after being
beaten savagely over a three-day span. Exhibits Vol. I p. 6. Based on the
severity of Rhonda’s injuries, we find that she was motivated to provide truthful
information to her medical providers in order to promote diagnoses and
treatment.
[24] The record further reveals that, as a result of the multi-day beating and the
delayed medical intervention, Rhonda’s injuries were in different stages of
severity and healing. In order to properly treat Rhonda, to craft an effective
discharge plan and to prescribe an appropriate course of psychological
counseling, Rhonda’s medical providers needed to understand the
circumstances surrounding Rhonda’s injuries, including the likelihood that she
would renew her relationship with her abuser. As the trial court reasoned, and
we agree, “how an injury occurred, how old an injury is, [the] length of time it-
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it occurred over are all things that are relevant and . . . all go[ ] . . . toward that
[medical] assessment.” Tr. Vol. I pp. 131-32.
[25] We, therefore, find that the circumstances surrounding Ramsey’s attack on
Rhonda, the protracted three-day beating, the delay in medical treatment, and
the fact that Rhonda was, at times, unguarded and free to leave the apartment
but would not for fear of Ramsey, are circumstances that medical providers
would reasonably rely upon in rendering diagnosis or treatment to a domestic
violence victim.
[26] For these reasons, we conclude that Rhonda’s statements, as contained within
her medical records, and in which she describes Ramsey’s protracted attack and
her delay in receiving vital medical attention, were made in the course of
medical treatment and fall under the hearsay exception of Rule 803(4).
Rhonda’s statements describe her “pain or sensations; their inception; [and]
their general cause”; were made to medical personnel while Rhonda sought
medical treatment; and were made for, and were reasonably pertinent to,
medical diagnosis or treatment. See Ind. Evidence Rule 803(4). Accordingly,
we find that the trial court’s decision to admit Rhonda’s medical records was
not clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the
court. See Perry v. State, 956 N.E.2d 41, 50 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (upholding
admission of medical records under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(4) where
records included statements that the victim was grabbed around her neck and
strangled, because those statements were pertinent to diagnosis and treatment
of the victim’s injuries).
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B. Rhonda’s Statements to Officer Wells
[27] Next, Ramsey argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing
Officer Wells to testify regarding Rhonda’s statements that Ramsey confined
her. A trial court may admit hearsay that qualifies under the excited utterance
exception. See Ind. Evidence Rule 803(2). An excited utterance is “[a]
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant
was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition” and is not
excluded by the hearsay rule. Id.
[28] To meet the excited utterance exception, three elements must be present: (1) a
“startling event or condition” has occurred; (2) the declarant made a statement
while “under the stress or excitement caused by the event or condition;” and (3)
the statement was “related to the event or condition.” Lawrence v. State, 959
N.E.2d 385, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.
[29] This test is not “mechanical” and admissibility turns “on whether the statement
was inherently reliable because the witness was under the stress of the event and
unlikely to make deliberate falsifications.” Sandefur v. State, 945 N.E.2d 785,
788 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The lapse of time is not dispositive, but if a statement
is made long after a startling event, it is usually “less likely to be an excited
utterance.” Teague v. State, 978 N.E.2d 1183, 1187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). See
Chambless v. State, 119 N.E.3d 182, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“The longer the
time between an event and an utterance, the greater the likelihood that the
statement is a narrative of past events instead of an excited utterance.”).
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[30] “The heart of the [excited utterance] inquiry is whether the declarant was
incapable of thoughtful reflection.” Teague, 978 N.E.2d at 1187 (quoting Jones
v. State, 800 N.E.2d 624, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). The rationale behind
admitting excited utterances is that startling events and absence of opportunity
for reflection vest the statements with reliability and reduce the likelihood of
falsification. See 13 Robert Lowell Miller Jr., Indiana Practice: Indiana Evidence §
803.102 at 307-09 (4th ed. 2018).
[31] The record here reveals that Officer Wells interviewed Rhonda shortly after she
was “rescued” from Cassandra’s apartment. Officer Wells later testified that
Rhonda exhibited “behavior . . . of someone that . . . had been through a
traumatic ordeal and she was very upset and almost to be point of [being]
inconsolable”; was “visibly shaken,” “nervous,” and had “[e]xtremely severe”
injuries all over her body. Tr. Vol. I p. 143, 158. Rhonda’s contemporaneous
medical records on November 11, 2017, describe her as “very tearful,
“anxious,” “frightened,” requiring “emotional support,” “tense,” “restless.”
Exhibits Vol. I pp. 92, 94, 95, 97, 112.
[32] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Rhonda made the statements
implicating Ramsey while she was under the stress of excitement from the
attack; and the trial court’s decision, pursuant to Rule 803(2), to admit
Rhonda’s statements that Ramsey confined her was not an abuse of discretion.
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements under the
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 12
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[33] Lastly, Ramsey argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction
for intimidation, a Level 6 felony. When there is a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence, “[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.”
Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016) (citing Bieghler v. State, 481
N.E.2d 78, 84 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied). Instead, “we ‘consider only that
evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at 84). “We will affirm
the judgment if it is supported by ‘substantial evidence of probative value even
if there is some conflict in that evidence.’” Id.; see also McCallister v. State, 91
N.E.3d 554, 558 (Ind. 2018) (holding that, even though there was conflicting
evidence, it was “beside the point” because that argument “misapprehend[s]
our limited role as a reviewing court”). Further, “[w]e will affirm the
conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime
12
Even if we had found error here, we have already found that Rhonda made similar statements—properly
admitted pursuant to Evidence Rule 803(4)—to her medical care providers. See Bowman v. State, 73 N.E.3d
731, 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the conviction is
supported by such substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no
substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the conviction.”).
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proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind.
2017) (citing Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)).
[34] The intimidation statute provides that a person who “communicates a threat to
another person, with the intent . . . that the other person engage in conduct
against the other person’s will” commits intimidation as a Class A
misdemeanor. Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(1). The offense is a Level 6 felony
when the threat is to commit a forcible felony. I.C. § 35-45-2-1(b)(1). To
convict Ramsey, the State was required to prove that Ramsey communicated a
threat to commit a forcible felony—his threat on Rhonda’s life—with the intent
that Rhonda engage in conduct against her will—staying in Cassandra’s
apartment. See App. Vol. II p. 16.
[35] Ramsey argues that “there was no evidence that Ramsey threatened Rhonda
with the intent that she engage in conduct against her will.” Appellant’s Br. p.
28. We cannot agree. The evidence most favorable to the verdict is that, after
accusing Rhonda of infidelity, Ramsey beat Rhonda over a three-day period of
time. Rhonda identified Ramsey as her attacker and reported that Ramsey
threatened to harm Rhonda’s children if she left the apartment. Clemons
testified that Rhonda and Cassandra seemed terrified when he arrived at the
apartment, and that, upon rescue, the women were both afraid to leave the
apartment and afraid to be in the apartment when Ramsey returned.
[36] A reasonable inference may be drawn, from the severity of Rhonda’s injuries
and her three-day delay in seeking medical treatment, that Ramsey confined
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Rhonda. Specifically, one can reasonably infer that, in Rhonda’s condition, she
did not willingly forgo medical assistance for her fractured face, ribs, scapula,
and spine—injuries that required a full week of hospitalization to treat.
[37] Further, although Ramsey attempted to implicate Cassandra in the brutal attack
on Rhonda, the admitted medical records reveal that Rhonda permitted
Cassandra to stay with Rhonda in her hospital room on the first night of her
hospitalization, and that Rhonda “was ok[ay] with [Cassandra staying].” 13
Exhibits Vol. I p. 92. Cassandra’s presence in Rhonda’s hospital room
overnight, on Rhonda’s first night free from confinement, invites the inference
that another person – and not Cassandra – caused Rhonda’s injuries.
[38] Further still, the jury heard Rhonda’s testimony that: (1) Ramsey accused her of
infidelity; (2) Ramsey battered her; (3) Ramsey did not threaten or intimidate
her against calling 911 or calling for help; (4) Ramsey tried to protect Rhonda
from Cassandra; (5) Rhonda did not know why she did not call the police; and
(6) Rhonda still loved Ramsey and still wanted to be in a relationship with
Ramsey at the time of the trial. The jury made a credibility assessment
regarding the reliability and veracity of Rhonda’s trial testimony, especially in
light of Rhonda’s stated desire to remain Ramsey’s girlfriend. We are not
permitted to second-guess the jurors’ apparent determination that Rhonda was
13
Cassandra stayed in Rhonda’s room while the hospital had in effect a safety plan requiring “[Rhonda] to
have a sitter in her room at all time and visitors to be monitored.” Exhibits Vol. I p. 92.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1276 | April 30, 2019 Page 20 of 21
less than truthful in her testimony. See Gibson, 51 N.E.3d at 210. Sufficient
evidence supports Ramsey’s conviction for intimidation.
Conclusion
[39] The trial court properly admitted Rhonda’s statements pursuant to the medical
records and excited utterance exceptions to the rule against hearsay. The
evidence is sufficient to support Ramsey’s conviction for intimidation as a Level
6 felony. We affirm.
[40] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and May, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-CR-1276 | April 30, 2019 Page 21 of 21