Calvin McGregory v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2017 )

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
FILED
court except for the purpose of establishing Mar 09 2017, 9:20 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbara J. Simmons Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Oldenburg, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Calvin McGregory, March 9, 2017
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1609-CR-2104
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Allan W. Reid,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Commissioner
Trial Court Cause No.
49G16-1604-CM-13705
Brown, Judge.
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[1] Calvin McGregory appeals his conviction for resisting law enforcement as a
class A misdemeanor. McGregory raises one issue which we revise and restate
as whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On April 11, 2016, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer James Perry was
dispatched to investigate a disturbance between a male and a female. He pulled
up to the scene in his marked police car and observed a woman who was
bloody, muddy, visibly upset, shaken, crying, angry, and appeared frightened in
the street walking toward him. She directed him to McGregory in the residence
where Officer Perry observed broken glass all over the front porch. He knocked
on the door of the residence, announced that he was a police officer, told
McGregory that he wanted to speak with him, and asked if McGregory would
step outside to speak with him. McGregory exited the residence and was
agitated, confrontational, “very questioning of what [the police] were doing and
why [the police] were talking to him,” and not responsive initially to any
questions. Transcript at 9. Officer Perry attempted to speak with McGregory,
but did not receive responses and was “met with questions.” Id. at 12. Officer
Perry feared for his safety given McGregory’s increasingly aggravated state and
the information he had been given and decided to handcuff him. 1
1
Officer Perry testified that the information he received was that a male was accused of throwing a female off
a porch. McGregory’s counsel objected on the basis of hearsay, and the prosecutor argued that the evidence
was admissible as course of the investigation evidence. The court clarified with the prosecutor that the
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[3] Officer Perry asked McGregory to turn around, and McGregory did so. When
Officer Perry attempted to handcuff him, McGregory “tensed up,” and “pulled
his hands away” and was “physically pulling them out of” Officer Perry’s hand.
Id. at 10. Officer Perry again attempted to handcuff him, and McGregory did
the same thing and remained “very tense, very tight, balled his fists,” and
“pulled his arms away from” Officer Perry. Id. At that time, Officer Perry
placed his right arm under McGregory’s right arm, his left arm over
McGregory’s left shoulder, and leveraged his weight against McGregory to take
him to the ground.
[4] While on the ground, Officer Shaw came to aid Officer Perry with placing
McGregory in handcuffs. Officer Shaw pulled McGregory’s right arm from
under his body, and Officer Perry was able to pull his left arm out. Officer
Shaw put one handcuff on McGregory’s right arm, and Officer Perry was able
to handcuff his left arm.
[5] On April 12, 2016, the State charged McGregory with resisting law
enforcement as a class A misdemeanor and battery as a class B misdemeanor.
On August 19, 2016, the court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the charge
of battery. That same day, the court held a bench trial. During cross-
examination, when asked whether he explained to McGregory why he was
being detained, Officer Perry stated: “I didn’t have an opportunity to.” Id. at
testimony would not be offered for the truth of the matter asserted, allowed it for course of investigation but
not as substantive evidence, and overruled the objection.
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14. McGregory testified that his girlfriend broke the window with a chair. He
also testified:
As I stepped outside of my door to my porch, the officer, he
asked me to turn around. I turned around, but all the while I’m
asking him to turn around, I’m asking him, okay, I’m still trying
to figure out why he’s here. So as I’m turning around, he
instantly reached for my right hand and right then and there I
simply turned and I asked him. I’m like, hey, am I under arrest
or am I being detained? I’m asking him these questions. I’m not
– I’m not, you know, trying to pull away from him. I’m just
pretty much trying to ask something.
Id. at 26. He testified that Officer Perry did not ask him any questions and did
not explain to him what was happening. He also testified that Officer Perry
told him to stop resisting when he took him down to the ground and that he
was not resisting.
[6] After the presentation of evidence, the court stated: “[I]t basically goes between
what Officer Shaw said --- or Perry and what you said. And the Court tends to
believe that when he asked you to turn around, I mean, you indicated that you
were agitated, that you weren’t complying with what they were saying. And so
the Court does believe that you knowingly, forcibly resist or obstruct or at least
in the very least interfere with what the officer said.” Id. at 38. The court found
McGregory guilty of resisting law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor and
sentenced him to 180 days with 176 days suspended.
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Discussion
[7] The issue is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain McGregory’s
conviction. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, we must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind.
2007). We do not assess witness credibility or reweigh the evidence. Id. We
consider conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court’s ruling. Id. We
affirm the conviction unless “no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements
of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Jenkins v. State,
726 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 2000)). It is not necessary that the evidence
overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Id. at 147. The evidence
is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the
verdict. Id.
[8] The offense of resisting law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor is governed
by Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1, which at the relevant time provided that “[a] person
who knowingly or intentionally . . . forcibly resists, obstructs, or interferes with
a law enforcement officer or a person assisting the officer while the officer is
lawfully engaged in the execution of the officer’s duties . . . commits resisting
law enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor . . . .” 2 The charging information
alleged that McGregory “did knowingly forcibly resist, obstruct or interfere
2
Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 198-2016, § 673 (eff. July 1, 2016).
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with JAMES AARON PERRY, a law enforcement officer with the
Indianapolis Metro Police Dept, while said officer was lawfully engaged in his
duties as a law enforcement officer.” Appellant’s Appendix II at 18.
[9] McGregory argues that the State did not prove forcible resistance. He also
asserts that he did not threaten Officer Perry, his reaction of tensing up and
pulling his hands away was not threatening or violent, and Officer Perry offered
no explanation of what he was trying to do. The State argues that the evidence
is sufficient where he resisted being handcuffed by Officer Perry, physical pulled
his hands away and out of the hands of Officer Perry, tensed up, and balled his
fists.
[10] The Indiana Supreme Court has observed that “[s]uch a seemingly simple
statute . . . has proven to be complex and nuanced in its application.” Walker v.
State, 998 N.E.2d 724, 726 (Ind. 2013). In Spangler v. State, 607 N.E.2d 720,
722-723 (Ind. 1993), the Indiana Supreme Court held that the word “forcibly” is
an essential element of the crime and modifies the entire string of verbs—resists,
obstructs, or interferes—such that the State must show forcible resistance,
forcible obstruction, or forcible interference. The Court also held that the word
meant “something more than mere action.” Spangler, 607 N.E.2d at 724.
“[O]ne ‘forcibly resists’ law enforcement when strong, powerful, violent means
are used to evade a law enforcement official’s rightful exercise of his or her
duties.” Id. at 723. “[A]ny action to resist must be done with force in order to
violate this statute. It is error as a matter of law to conclude that ‘forcibly
resists’ includes all actions that are not passive.” Id. at 724.
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[11] “But even so, ‘the statute does not demand complete passivity.’” Walker, 998
N.E.2d at 727 (quoting K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ind. 2013)). In
Graham v. State, 903 N.E.2d 963, 965 (Ind. 2009), the Court clarified that “[t]he
force involved need not rise to the level of mayhem.” “In fact, even a very
‘modest level of resistance’ might support the offense.” Walker, 998 N.E.2d at
727 (quoting Graham, 903 N.E.2d at 966) (“even ‘stiffening’ of one’s arms when
an officer grabs hold to position them for cuffing would suffice”)). The Indiana
Supreme Court held:
So in summary, not every passive—or even active—response to a
police officer constitutes the offense of resisting law enforcement,
even when that response compels the officer to use force.
Instead, a person “forcibly” resists, obstructs, or interferes with a
police officer when he or she uses strong, powerful, violent
means to impede an officer in the lawful execution of his or her
duties. But this should not be understood as requiring an
overwhelming or extreme level of force. The element may be
satisfied with even a modest exertion of strength, power, or
violence. Moreover, the statute does not require commission of a
battery on the officer or actual physical contact—whether
initiated by the officer or the defendant. It also contemplates
punishment for the active threat of such strength, power, or
violence when that threat impedes the officer’s ability to lawfully
execute his or her duties.
Id.
[12] In Berberena v. State, which is cited by McGregory, a police officer “gave several
loud verbal commands” for Edwin Berberena to stop. 914 N.E.2d 780, 780-781
(Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. The police officer ordered Berberena to
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place his hands behind his back, but Berberena did not comply. Id. at 781. The
officer then “had to forcefully place [Berberena] against the wall of the building.
[Berberena’s] chest was facing the building, and [the officer] had to struggle
with him to grab his hands and place them in handcuffs.” Id. The trial court
found Berberena guilty of resisting law enforcement. Id. On appeal, the court
held that the officer’s testimony “that he struggled to place the handcuffs on
Berberena’s wrists [was] ambiguous.” Id. at 782. The court also observed that
the officer “did not testify, and there [was] no evidence, that Berberena stiffened
his arms or otherwise ‘made threatening or violent actions’ to contribute to the
struggle.” Id. (quoting Ajabu v. State, 704 N.E.2d 494, 496 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998)). Lastly, the court observed that the officer “could not remember what
Berberena was doing with his hands, and the struggle did not last very long.”
Id. The court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support
Berberena’s conviction. Id. at 783.
[13] McGregory also cites Colvin v. State, 916 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans.
denied. In that case, Curtis Colvin kept his hands in his pockets during a
struggle with officers and did not comply with officers’ commands, and the
officers had to use force to execute the arrest. 916 N.E.2d at 309. The State did
not present any evidence that Colvin used force or made threatening or violent
actions to contribute to the struggle with the officers. Id. The court held that
the evidence did not support a reasonable inference that Colvin did more than
passively resist the officers. Id.
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[14] Here, unlike the defendants’ actions in Berberena and Colvin, we cannot say that
the State did not present any evidence that McGregory used force. The record
reveals that McGregory was agitated, confrontational, very questioning of
Officer Perry, and not responsive to his questions. When Officer Perry
attempted to handcuff him, McGregory “tensed up,” and “pulled his hands
away” from Officer Perry “physically pulling them out of” Officer Perry’s hand.
Transcript at 10. Officer Perry again attempted to handcuff him, and
McGregory did the same thing and remained “very tense, very tight, balled his
fists,” and “pulled his arms away from” Officer Perry. Id. While on the
ground, Officer Shaw came to aid Officer Perry. Officer Shaw pulled
McGregory’s right arm from under his body, Officer Perry was able to pull his
left arm out, and they were then able to handcuff McGregory.
[15] Based upon the record, we conclude that there exists evidence of probative
value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find that McGregory exercised
at least a modest exertion of strength, power, or violence that impeded Officer
Perry in the lawful execution of his duties and that he was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of resisting law enforcement as a class A misdemeanor. See
Lopez v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1090, 1093-1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant acted with the requisite
force in resisting the officers in the execution of their duties where the defendant
refused to stand and “started to pull away” when the officers tried to physically
pull him up from the couch and where the officers were unable to pull his arms
out from under the defendant), trans. denied; Johnson v. State, 833 N.E.2d 516,
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518-519 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that the defendant forcibly resisted police
officers by turning away and pushing away with his shoulders as they attempted
to search him, refusing to enter the transport vehicle, and stiffening up, thus
requiring the officers to exert force to place him inside the transport vehicle).
Conclusion
[16] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm McGregory’s conviction.
[17] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.
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