Nathaniel W. Dickey v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    FILED
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),                            Sep 15 2016, 8:17 am
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                                  CLERK
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                          Indiana Supreme Court
    Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Donald J. Frew                                           Gregory F. Zoeller
    Fort Wayne, Indiana                                      Attorney General of Indiana
    Larry D. Allen
    Deputy Attorney General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    Nathaniel W. Dickey,                                     September 15, 2016
    Appellant-Defendant,                                     Court of Appeals Cause No.
    02A04-1602-CR-274
    v.                                               Appeal from the Allen Superior
    Court
    State of Indiana,                                        The Honorable Wendy W. Davis,
    Appellee-Plaintiff.                                      Judge
    Trial Court Cause No.
    02D05-1505-F6-440
    Barnes, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1602-CR-274 | September 15, 2016   Page 1 of 8
    Case Summary
    [1]   Nathaniel Dickey appeals his convictions for Level 6 felony battery and Level 5
    felony battery. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
    Issues
    [2]   Dickey raises two issues, which we restate as:
    I.      whether the trial court properly excluded
    evidence of the victim’s health conditions; and
    II.     whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain
    Dickey’s convictions.
    Facts
    [3]   Dickey was in a relationship with Robin Handley. On the evening of April 18,
    2015, Dickey was at Handley’s house, and they were drinking, listening to
    music, and visiting with Handley’s family. After Handley’s brother left,
    Handley told Dickey that he needed to leave because she had to get up early for
    an appointment. Dickey knocked Handley to the floor, and he repeatedly
    punched her face and kicked her. Handley kicked Dickey in the groin to stop
    him from hitting her. Handley’s daughter called 911, and Dickey was arrested.
    Handley required stitches in her mouth. She also sustained severe injuries to
    her eye, and as of the December 2015 trial, her vision was still affected.
    [4]   The State charged Dickey with Level 6 felony battery resulting in moderate
    bodily injury, Level 6 felony strangulation, and later added a charge of Level 5
    felony battery resulting in serious bodily injury. On cross-examination of
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    Handley, Dickey’s counsel questioned her regarding her health history.
    Handley testified that she did not have “any issues” with her liver, that she did
    not have “HIV disease,” but that she had pancreatitis and elevated liver
    enzymes. Tr. p. 176. She also admitted that her alcohol level was almost lethal
    at the time of the battery. On re-cross-examination, Dickey’s counsel asked
    Handley if she had hepatitis C. The State objected on relevancy grounds, and
    Dickey argued that the evidence would show that Handley’s wounds were
    aggravated by a pre-existing condition. The trial court sustained the State’s
    objection.
    [5]   Handley’s ophthalmologist also testified at the trial. He testified that he
    evaluated Handley at the hospital after the incident. Her cornea was inflamed,
    her retina was swollen, there was a hemorrhage in the back part of her eye,
    there were tears in her pupil, and her vision was significantly decreased. At the
    time of trial, Handley still had some vision loss. On cross-examination, Dickey
    asked the ophthalmologist if alcohol or liver disease could be a factor in
    bleeding of the eye. The ophthalmologist testified that liver disease would not
    cause spontaneous bleeding, but severe liver disease could cause “more
    coagulation problems.” Tr. p. 202. The trial court would not allow Dickey to
    question the ophthalmologist regarding whether Handley had a liver condition.
    [6]   The jury found Dickey guilty of Level 6 felony battery and Level 5 felony
    battery but not guilty of strangulation. The trial court sentenced him to five
    years in the Department of Correction for the Level 5 felony conviction and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1602-CR-274 | September 15, 2016   Page 3 of 8
    “merged” the Level 6 felony conviction. Sentencing Tr. p. 13. Dickey now
    appeals.
    Analysis
    I. Exclusion of Evidence
    [7]   Dickey first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding
    evidence of Handley’s health conditions. We afford the trial court wide
    discretion in ruling on the admissibility and relevancy of evidence. Nicholson v.
    State, 
    963 N.E.2d 1096
    , 1099 (Ind. 2012). We review evidentiary decisions for
    an abuse of discretion and reverse only when the decision is clearly against the
    logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. 
    Id. Indiana Evidence
    Rule 402
    requires evidence to be relevant, and Indiana Evidence Rule 403 permits the
    exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed
    by the danger of unfair prejudice or misleading the jury. Smoote v. State, 
    708 N.E.2d 1
    , 3 (Ind. 1999). “A claim of error in the exclusion or admission of
    evidence will not prevail on appeal unless the error affects the substantial rights
    of the moving party.” 
    Nicholson, 963 N.E.2d at 1099
    .
    [8]   Dickey sought to admit evidence of Handley’s alleged pre-existing liver disease
    and alleged hepatitis C infection. There is a “long-standing rule of both
    criminal and tort law that a defendant takes his victim as he finds him.” Bailey
    v. State, 
    979 N.E.2d 133
    , 142 (Ind. 2012). Dickey argued that the evidence was
    relevant to show that the “conditions might have exacerbated the victim’s
    physical appearance.” Appellant’s Br. p. 4. Dickey also argues that the
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1602-CR-274 | September 15, 2016   Page 4 of 8
    evidence was relevant to his self-defense claims because “the reasonableness of
    his self-defense argument would have been more apparent.” 
    Id. at 5.
    [9]    Dickey admitted that “maybe [his] elbow or something had hit her in the face.”
    Tr. p. 279. That Handley’s alleged medical history may have predisposed her
    to bleed more does not make Dickey any less culpable for causing serious
    bodily injury when he hit Handley in the face. It also does not make his self-
    defense argument more credible. The evidence was not relevant, and Dickey’s
    argument to the contrary fails.
    [10]   Even if it was relevant, Handley had already testified that she had pancreatitis,
    elevated liver enzymes, and an almost lethal alcohol level at the time of the
    incident. The ophthalmologist testified that liver disease would not cause
    spontaneous bleeding, but severe liver disease could cause “more coagulation
    problems.” Tr. p. 202. The jury was already aware that Handley had
    significant health concerns, including elevated liver enzymes, and that severe
    liver disease could cause coagulation issues. Any error in the exclusion of
    Handley’s alleged hepatitis C status would not have affected Dickey’s
    substantial rights.
    II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    [11]   Dickey also argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction.
    When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence needed to support a criminal
    conviction, we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. Bailey v.
    State, 
    907 N.E.2d 1003
    , 1005 (Ind. 2009). “We consider only the evidence
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    supporting the judgment and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from
    such evidence.” 
    Id. We will
    affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative
    value such that a reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant
    was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id. [12] Pursuant
    to Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1, a person who knowingly or
    intentionally touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner
    commits battery. The offense is a Level 5 felony if it results in serious bodily
    injury to another person. Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1. “Serious bodily injury” is a
    “bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes: (1) serious
    permanent disfigurement; (2) unconsciousness; (3) extreme pain; (4) permanent
    or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ;
    or (5) loss of a fetus.” I.C. § 35-31.5-2-292. Whether bodily injury is “serious”
    is a question of degree and is reserved for the finder of fact. Sutton v. State, 
    714 N.E.2d 694
    , 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
    [13]   Dickey seems to argue that the jury would not have found a serious bodily
    injury if it had been aware of Handley’s pre-existing medical conditions.
    However, “a defendant takes his victim as he finds him [or her].” 
    Bailey, 979 N.E.2d at 142
    . The issue is not whether Handley’s pre-existing conditions
    made her injury more severe. Rather, the issue is whether Handley suffered a
    serious bodily injury as a result of the battery, regardless of her pre-existing
    conditions.
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    [14]   The State presented evidence that Dickey hit Handley on the face and that her
    eye was swollen shut after the incident. Handley’s ophthalmologist testified
    that Handley’s cornea was inflamed, her retina was swollen, there was a
    hemorrhage in the back part of her eye, there were tears in her pupil, and her
    vision was significantly decreased. At the time of trial, Handley still had some
    vision loss. We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to show
    that Dickey knowingly or intentionally touched Handley in a rude, insolent, or
    angry manner, resulting in permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the
    function of her eye. The evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction for
    Level 5 felony battery. See, e.g., 
    Sutton, 714 N.E.2d at 696-97
    (holding that the
    evidence was sufficient to sustain the defendant’s conviction for battery with
    serious bodily injury where the victim had a protruding knot on the side of her
    head, a black eye, vision problems, and a constant, migraine-like headache for
    one to two weeks after the incident).
    [15]   We note that the trial court “merged” the Level 6 felony battery conviction with
    the Level 5 felony battery conviction. “[I]f the trial court does enter judgment
    of conviction on a jury’s guilty verdict, then simply merging the offenses is
    insufficient and vacation of the offense is required.” Kovats v. State, 
    982 N.E.2d 409
    , 414-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The State concedes that, if we uphold the
    Level 5 felony conviction, we should remand with instructions to vacate the
    Level 6 felony conviction. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with respect to
    the Level 6 felony battery conviction.
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    Conclusion
    [16]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding evidence regarding
    Handley’s alleged health conditions. The evidence is sufficient to sustain
    Dickey’s Level 5 felony battery conviction, but we reverse and remand with
    instructions to vacate the Level 6 felony battery conviction. We affirm in part,
    reverse in part, and remand with instructions.
    [17]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
    Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 02A04-1602-CR-274 | September 15, 2016   Page 8 of 8
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02A04-1602-CR-274

Filed Date: 9/15/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/15/2016